Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police discovered the bodies of two men, both shot in the head, in a burning car in Jackson County, Michigan. Barbara Mercer lived with her boyfriend, Richard Janish, and her friend, Jessica Campbell. Mercer had recently tricked one of the victims, Thomas, into giving her crack cocaine without payment, resulting in threatening messages from Thomas. The night of the killing, Mercer and Janish discussed the threats, and Janish ultimately shot and killed both victims. Mercer and Janish then attempted to destroy evidence by burning the bodies in the victims’ car. Both were arrested, and their statements to police, as well as Campbell’s testimony, formed the basis of the prosecution’s case. Mercer was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and arson.The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Mercer’s convictions, rejecting her claims that the trial court erred by denying a defense-of-others jury instruction, that her counsel was ineffective, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review. Mercer then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court granted habeas relief on the ground that Mercer’s due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to give a defense-of-others instruction, but denied relief on her other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the jury-instruction claim, holding that Mercer’s claim did not satisfy the requirements for relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on Mercer’s remaining claims regarding ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct, finding that the state court’s decisions were not contrary to or unreasonable applications of clearly established federal law. View "Mercer v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted under a federal statute that prohibits individuals convicted of crimes punishable by more than one year of imprisonment from possessing firearms. The defendant’s criminal history included prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated battery, and the conduct leading to the present prosecution involved using a firearm to threaten passengers on public transportation and possessing a loaded semi-automatic weapon in a location where firearms were explicitly prohibited.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, dismissed the indictment. The district court concluded that the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), was invalid on its face under the Second Amendment, meaning that it was unconstitutional in every possible application. The government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court considered Supreme Court precedents regarding the Second Amendment, including District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald v. Chicago, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi. The appellate court noted that, while there is disagreement among courts about the statute’s application in some circumstances, all courts of appeals have agreed that §922(g)(1) is valid in many applications and cannot be declared unconstitutional in all cases. The Seventh Circuit held that the statute cannot be found facially invalid and reserved judgment on whether it might be unconstitutional as applied to individuals whose prior convictions do not suggest they are dangerous. In this case, because the defendant’s convictions and conduct indicated a risk of dangerousness, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v Prince" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was indicted under federal law for possessing firearms after having been previously convicted of felony offenses, including possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and being a firearm user while using controlled substances. The case arose when police, investigating a shooting, traced evidence to the defendant through witness statements, storage unit searches, and DNA samples. The defendant challenged both the admissibility of DNA evidence and the constitutionality of the federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress the DNA evidence. The court found that the DNA collected by federal authorities was obtained independently of any potentially unlawful prior collection by state authorities, and that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the federal warrant. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty but preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the DNA evidence was admissible under the independent-source doctrine, as the federal warrant was based on evidence untainted by any prior illegality. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as applied to the defendant’s conviction for a dangerous felony (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute), did not violate the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that disarmament of individuals convicted of dangerous felonies is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition and supported by both categorical disarmament of dangerous groups and the historical imposition of severe penalties for such offenses. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA v Watson" on Justia Law

Kenneth Karwacki was convicted by a special court martial of delivering peyote to fellow soldiers and received a bad-conduct discharge from military service. Later, he applied for a permit to carry a concealed firearm in Wisconsin. The state denied his application under Wis. Stat. §941.29(1m)(b), which bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in Wisconsin. Although the military court labeled his offense a misdemeanor, Wisconsin classified his conduct as a felony under its own laws.Karwacki brought a federal lawsuit, arguing that Wisconsin’s decision to treat his military misdemeanor conviction as a state-law felony violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and his Second Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin entered judgment in favor of the state, rejecting Karwacki’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to federal court martial convictions because such proceedings are not “judicial Proceedings of any other State,” nor has Congress prescribed any effect for court martial judgments in the states. The court also concluded that Wisconsin did not fail to give effect to the court martial’s judgment, as it imposed only collateral consequences under state law. Addressing the Second Amendment, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that neither the federal nor Wisconsin’s statutory scheme is facially invalid, and that individuals convicted of distributing illegal drugs are not entitled to as-applied relief from firearms disabilities. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "Karwacki v Kaul" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at a residence in Starkville, Mississippi, after an officer obtained the warrant through an affidavit detailing three controlled drug purchases involving a confidential informant. The affidavit described the procedures followed during the buys, including continuous surveillance of the informant and searches for contraband before and after each transaction. The search resulted in the seizure of drugs, firearms, money, and cellphones, and the resident was arrested. During a subsequent police interview, the resident was read his Miranda rights and signed a form acknowledging this, but the waiver portion of the form was not read aloud or explained.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted the defendant’s motion to suppress both the physical evidence from the search and the statements made during the interview. The district court found the supporting affidavit for the search warrant to be “bare bones,” lacking sufficient detail or corroboration, and concluded that the officer’s reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable. The court further found that the defendant’s signature on the Miranda form did not amount to a voluntary waiver of his rights, as the waiver section was not explained and the officer’s conduct was considered deceptive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the affidavit was not “wholly conclusory” and contained sufficient factual detail to justify an officer’s reasonable reliance on the warrant. Thus, the suppression of the physical evidence was reversed. Regarding the statements, the appellate court agreed that the express waiver was involuntary but remanded for the district court to determine whether an implied waiver occurred under the totality of the circumstances. The panel retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s further findings. View "USA v. Weaver" on Justia Law

A man was charged with murder and related offenses after a gang-related shooting in Los Angeles. The prosecution’s case at his second trial relied heavily on the testimony of two eyewitnesses who identified him as the shooter. Both witnesses gave new statements on the stand that they had not made at the first trial: one claimed to have told police soon after the shooting that the shooter had a tattoo, and the other claimed to have told police she saw the accused fleeing the scene. In fact, both statements were contradicted by the witnesses’ initial police interviews; no such statements were made to police at that time. These contradictions were not introduced into evidence at trial.Following a first trial that resulted in a hung jury, the second trial concluded with the defendant’s conviction. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed one count but otherwise affirmed. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing, among other things, that the prosecution failed to correct false testimony by its witnesses in violation of due process (under Napue v. Illinois), and that his own counsel was ineffective for not impeaching these witnesses with their prior inconsistent statements. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, after an evidentiary hearing, denied the habeas petition, finding the challenged statements were merely prior inconsistencies and not falsehoods.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that both eyewitnesses’ statements about their prior police interviews were actually false, that the prosecution knew or should have known of their falsity, and that the prosecution did not adequately correct the record. Applying the Napue materiality standard, the court found the false testimony could have contributed to the conviction, and the People had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not. The court granted the writ of habeas corpus and vacated the conviction, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Melson" on Justia Law

A woman born in Soviet Armenia immigrated to the United States as a child and was later convicted of grand theft in California. In 2011, she was ordered removed based on this conviction. However, because Armenia did not accept individuals born during the Soviet era, she was considered “stateless” and not deported. She lived in the United States under supervision, checking in annually with immigration authorities. In 2018, she was informed that Armenia had begun accepting such individuals, which placed her at immediate risk of removal. She promptly retained counsel, who identified grounds to vacate her conviction due to a procedural defect, and the conviction was vacated in May 2019.Following the vacatur, she filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, but the Immigration Judge denied it, finding she had not explained why she waited over two years after the relevant California statute became effective to seek vacatur. She then filed a second motion to reopen, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel in the first motion failed to present facts or arguments about her diligence. The Immigration Judge denied the second motion as number-barred, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal, finding she had not demonstrated due diligence and thus was not entitled to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA applied the wrong standard in assessing diligence for stateless individuals. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it is reasonable for someone in her position to begin challenging removability only upon learning they are at risk of removal. The court found she acted with due diligence after learning of her removability and that the BIA abused its discretion in finding otherwise. The court granted her petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ESKILIAN V. BONDI" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was involved in a fatal shooting that occurred during a planned marijuana sale in a public parking lot. The appellant and a companion arrived on motorcycles to meet the buyer, Ose, for the drug transaction. According to the appellant’s testimony, the buyer pulled a gun, robbed him, and threatened his life. The appellant asserted that he fired his own weapon in self-defense as Ose drove away. Eyewitnesses and security footage documented the aftermath, and evidence was presented regarding both the appellant’s and Ose’s actions before and after the shooting.The trial was held in the 240th District Court of Fort Bend County. The State argued throughout that the appellant could not claim self-defense because he was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the shooting. Over defense objections, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to present this interpretation during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. The jury was charged on murder, self-defense, and the law of parties, with an instruction that the presumption of reasonableness in self-defense did not apply if the defendant was committing a crime. The jury found the appellant guilty of murder but found sudden passion at punishment, sentencing him to 18 years in prison.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District found that it was error to include the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction but deemed the error harmless. On review, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the appellant suffered “some harm” from the erroneous inclusion of the presumption instruction, as the State and trial judge repeatedly misstated the law, which undermined the appellant’s self-defense claim. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. View "HUGO v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions. View "United States v. Otuonye" on Justia Law

Susan and Richard Spry managed their uncle Richard Hermanek’s finances under a power of attorney after he suffered from significant cognitive decline. Acting in this capacity, the Sprys opened a joint bank account with Mutual of Omaha in Nebraska, titling it in the names of Hermanek, Susan, and Richard, and transferred large sums from Hermanek’s South Dakota accounts, proceeds from his home, and other funds. After Hermanek’s death, Susan transferred the remaining balance to the Sprys’ personal account in Texas. Concerned relatives who would have inherited from Hermanek initiated a civil suit and notified authorities, leading to a criminal investigation.A Bon Homme County grand jury indicted the Sprys on multiple counts, including grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft related to the handling of Hermanek’s property. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, both were convicted on these charges, among others. At trial, the court instructed the jury on contractual rather than testamentary capacity regarding the joint account and limited testimony about Hermanek’s statements during the account’s creation. The court also instructed the jury that the presumption of survivorship rights in a joint account could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of contrary intent, rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that the circuit court did not err in choosing the contractual capacity instruction but erred by excluding testimony about Hermanek’s contemporaneous statements and by using the clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for rebutting the presumption of survivorship rights. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions for grand theft and conspiracy to commit grand theft and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Spry" on Justia Law