Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was originally convicted in the Middle District of Florida for receiving child pornography and sentenced to eighty-four months in prison followed by fifteen years of supervised release. After completing his custodial sentence, his supervision was transferred to the Northern District of Ohio. While on supervised release, he committed several violations, including a misdemeanor disorderly conduct offense, unauthorized travel outside his district, and possessing an unapproved internet-connected device used to view adult pornography and interact with others online. He admitted to these violations.Upon review of his violations, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio conducted a revocation hearing. The court presented the defendant with an ultimatum: serve six months in prison immediately or continue on supervision with the warning that any future violation, no matter how minor, would result in the statutory-maximum two-year prison term. The defendant chose to remain on supervision. Shortly thereafter, he committed additional violations similar to the previous ones, again admitting to them. At a second violation hearing, the district court imposed the full two-year statutory maximum, explicitly referencing the ultimatum given at the prior hearing as the basis for its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when a district court predetermines a supervisee’s revocation prison term in advance—by promising a particular sentence for any future violation and then imposing that sentence without individualized consideration of the circumstances—the sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that revocation terms must be determined after individualized assessment and consideration of the relevant statutory factors, not based solely on prior warnings or promises. View "United States v. Barton" on Justia Law

A motorist was stopped by law enforcement after driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The officer who made the stop observed signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol. The driver admitted to consuming alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. Preliminary breath tests conducted at the scene showed blood-alcohol concentrations (BAC) of 0.160 and 0.162 percent. The driver was arrested, and later, two chemical breath tests at the police station indicated BAC levels of 0.15 and 0.16 percent. The officer certified compliance with the requirement to observe the motorist continuously for 15 minutes before the chemical breath test, as mandated by California regulations.The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended the driver’s license, and after an administrative per se (APS) hearing, the administrative hearing officer upheld the suspension. The driver challenged this decision by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Kern County. The trial court reviewed body-worn camera footage and determined that the arresting officer had not continuously observed the driver for the required 15-minute period prior to the breath test. The trial court found that this regulatory violation called the reliability of the test results into question. The court excluded the chemical breath test results and granted the writ of mandate, setting aside the DMV’s order of suspension.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the officer had not complied with the observation requirement. The appellate court held that the presumption of reliability for the chemical breath test results was rebutted by the video evidence and that the DMV failed to establish the reliability of the tests despite the regulatory violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order setting aside the suspension of the driver’s license. View "Myers v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was discovered inside a stranger’s apartment in Oklahoma City. After being confronted by the resident, a physical altercation ensued and the defendant fled. The resident claimed that the defendant pulled a gun and fired at him as he was chased outside. Although no firearm was recovered, police found a recently fired shell casing at the scene. Video evidence and witness testimony corroborated the sequence of events. The defendant was subsequently arrested after a foot chase, and a grand jury indicted him for possessing ammunition as a felon.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma presided over the trial. The government sought to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under Rule 404(b), which the defendant opposed. The district court admitted the evidence over objection, provided a limiting instruction, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The presentence report calculated a guideline range of 63 to 78 months; however, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 120 months, citing the seriousness and repetitive nature of the defendant’s conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the admission of the prior conviction was an abuse of discretion because knowledge was not at issue under the circumstances, but found the error harmless due to the strength of the evidence. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the sentence was substantively reasonable, and the argument that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment was foreclosed by binding precedent. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Dias" on Justia Law

Brandon and Rachel McCarthy operated an online business, Lone Goose Bakery, selling unprocessed poppy seeds coated in opium latex. These seeds, not processed to food-grade standards, retained opium alkaloids, including morphine, codeine, and thebaine. The McCarthys primarily sold to individual consumers and provided publications with guidance and recipes for brewing poppy-seed tea, which can contain significant amounts of these controlled substances and poses substantial health risks. At least one customer died from an overdose after consuming tea made from their seeds.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma returned a superseding indictment against the McCarthys, charging them with multiple counts, some for distributing or possessing controlled substances and others for distributing or possessing “precursors” for controlled substances. The defendants moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) excludes poppy seeds, that any ambiguity should be resolved in their favor, and that the law was unconstitutionally vague if read to prohibit their conduct. The district court granted the motion, including as to counts based on the theory that the unprocessed seeds were precursors for manufacturing controlled substances.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that, while poppy seeds are excluded from the controlled substances schedule, the CSA prohibits the knowing distribution or possession of materials intended to be used to manufacture controlled substances. The court held that unprocessed poppy seeds coated with opium latex constitute a “material” that may be used to manufacture a controlled substance when intended for extraction of opiates. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the related charges and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a violent incident with his girlfriend and their young daughter, during which he physically assaulted the girlfriend multiple times, including striking her with his fists and a handgun, strangling her to unconsciousness, and kicking her to the extent of causing severe injuries. Their daughter also sustained injuries. The defendant was charged with several felonies, including aggravated assault, battery, strangulation of a household member, and child abuse. He was also facing charges in other unrelated cases. The parties reached a global plea agreement covering all the charges, under which the defendant pled guilty to certain offenses, and the State agreed to dismiss others in exchange for restitution and the right for both sides to argue sentence.In the District Court of Goshen County, the defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms for the charges to which he pled guilty. At sentencing, the victim presented both oral and written impact statements, some of which referred to uncharged conduct by the defendant, including additional incidents of abuse and property theft or destruction. The defendant did not object to the use of these statements at sentencing.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, the defendant argued that the district court erred by considering the victim impact statements referencing uncharged crimes. The Wyoming Supreme Court applied the plain error standard, since no objection was raised below. The court held the defendant failed to show that the district court relied on inaccurate or unreliable information in imposing sentence; the record reflected the court’s decision relied on the violent nature of the charged offenses and the defendant’s criminal history, not on the contested statements. The court found no plain error or violation of due process, and affirmed the district court’s sentencing decision. View "Atkinson v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Samir Kevin Shank was charged after an incident in which, while trying to evade police in a stolen vehicle, he reversed the car down a narrow street. During the attempt to escape, the car’s open passenger-side door collided with an officer’s open driver-side door, knocking the officer to the ground. The officer suffered a scraped knee, but no serious injuries. Shank was arrested after a further pursuit and indicted for, among other charges, Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN).During his trial in the Greenville County Circuit Court, Shank requested a jury instruction on Third-Degree Assault and Battery, arguing that the evidence—particularly the minor injury and lack of intent to harm—supported conviction for the lesser offense rather than ABHAN. The trial court denied this request, agreeing with the State that the manner in which the vehicle was used was likely to produce death or great bodily injury, as required for ABHAN. Shank was convicted as charged. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense and that this error was not harmless.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence did not support a rational inference that Shank was guilty only of Third-Degree Assault and Battery. The Court found that Shank’s use of the vehicle constituted a means likely to produce death or great bodily injury, thus satisfying all elements of ABHAN and making an instruction on the lesser offense inapplicable. View "The State v. Shank" on Justia Law

The case arose from a fatal stabbing at a bakery in Ludlow, Massachusetts. The defendant, a long-term employee of the bakery, stabbed the victim, who co-owned the bakery, after a series of workplace arguments. On the night of the incident, witnesses observed the defendant behaving normally before the attack. Surveillance footage captured the defendant deliberately retrieving a knife and repeatedly stabbing the victim. After the attack, the defendant resisted arrest but subsequently became calm and cooperative, providing coherent responses to police, and later to medical staff. The defendant had a documented history of psychiatric hospitalizations and had previously been diagnosed with major depression with psychotic features, but it was unclear whether he was taking medication at the time of the stabbing.The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Superior Court indicted the defendant for murder in the first degree and assault on a person over sixty with a dangerous weapon. At trial, the primary defense was lack of criminal responsibility due to mental illness. Competing expert testimony was presented on this issue. The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation but acquitted him of the assault charge. The defendant appealed, raising claims of judicial error regarding juror selection, the prosecution’s closing arguments, the admission of autopsy photographs, and the denial of his motion to suppress statements made post-arrest.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the appeal. It held that there was no reversible error: the allegedly biased juror did not participate in deliberations; the prosecutor’s challenged statements were supported by the evidence and did not amount to improper argument; the autopsy photographs were properly admitted with limiting instructions; and the defendant’s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. The Court affirmed the conviction and declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Conza" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with murder, one count of criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order, and three counts of criminal violation of a protective order—all arising from events on December 13, 2020, involving the same victim. The defendant admitted to killing the victim, his long-term partner, but claimed he lacked the intent for murder due to intoxication and anger. He did not move to sever the murder charge from the protective order violation charges. After being found guilty by a jury on all counts, he was sentenced to seventy years in prison.Following his conviction in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain, the defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. While the appeal was pending, he requested an articulation from the trial court regarding its reasons for not severing the charges under Practice Book § 41-18. The trial court explained that all charges stemmed from the same incident and that evidence would have been cross-admissible at separate trials. The court also noted the defendant had not moved for severance or shown substantial prejudice.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and held that the defendant’s claim regarding the court’s failure to sever the charges sua sponte was unpreserved and therefore not reviewable, as the defendant had not raised the issue before the trial court. The court further determined that even if the claim had been preserved, the trial court had not misunderstood its authority to sever the charges on its own motion. Instead, it had properly exercised its discretion, finding no substantial prejudice in trying the counts together. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "State v. Bard" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal shooting that occurred after the victim arranged to meet the defendant at a public park. The victim, accompanied by four others, approached the defendant and his companion. According to eyewitness accounts, the victim was unarmed, exchanged brief words with the defendant, and then the defendant drew a gun and pointed it at the victim. The victim told his group to run and attempted to flee himself, at which point the defendant fired multiple shots, striking and killing the victim as he ran away.Following the incident, the defendant was charged with murder in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. At trial, he did not testify but sought to assert self-defense through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, the duty to retreat, and several lesser included offenses. The jury rejected the self-defense claim and convicted the defendant of murder. The defendant was sentenced to forty-eight years in prison and appealed his conviction directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.On review, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found that eyewitness testimony and physical evidence supported the conclusion that the victim was not armed, did not attack, and was attempting to escape when shot. The Court also determined that the state had proven the defendant could have safely retreated. Furthermore, the Court found no plain error in the trial court’s jury instructions on intent, proximate cause, or general intent, concluding that the instructions, when read as a whole, did not mislead the jury or dilute the state’s burden of proof. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Baez" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, stemming from two separate incidents. The first incident involved his biological daughter between October 2020 and June 2021 when she was approximately eight to nine years old. The second involved his former girlfriend’s daughter in 2011 or 2012, when that child was about eight years old. In both instances, the allegations centered on inappropriate sexual conduct by the defendant, with both victims eventually disclosing the abuse years after the events occurred.Prior to trial in the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, the State moved to join the two cases for a single trial, arguing the evidence was cross-admissible and that joinder was supported by established factors. The trial court granted the motion for joinder. At trial, an expert witness testified about the behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims and the concept of “grooming” through responses to hypothetical questions based on the facts of the case. Defense counsel objected, claiming this testimony improperly bolstered the victims’ credibility, but the court overruled the objection. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts and he was sentenced accordingly.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard in granting joinder, and had abused its discretion by allowing the expert’s testimony in response to the hypotheticals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had applied the correct legal standard and properly placed the burden on the state to justify joinder. The court also concluded that the expert’s testimony, given in general or hypothetical terms without direct reference to the complainants, was permissible and did not amount to improper vouching. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Lawrence M." on Justia Law