Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Eric Skeens was convicted in Indiana of five counts of child molesting, based almost entirely on the detailed testimony of the child victim, K.W. There was no physical evidence presented at trial, but the prosecution relied on K.W.’s account, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, a school counselor, a therapist, and a sexual assault nurse who explained the absence of physical evidence. During closing arguments, Skeens’s attorney made a statement to the jury, “I believe her,” referring to K.W., which Skeens later argued constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.After his conviction, Skeens appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and found that the attorney’s statement did not prejudice the outcome, given the strength and detail of K.W.’s testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to review the case, and Skeens’s subsequent state post-conviction and federal habeas petitions were also denied. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied relief, concluding that Skeens had not shown the state court’s decision was unreasonable under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, applying the deferential standards required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and Strickland v. Washington. The court held that the Indiana Court of Appeals did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply the Strickland standard when it concluded that there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different absent the attorney’s statement. The Seventh Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of Skeens’s habeas petition. View "Skeens v Neal" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed after being convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York Penal Law (NYPL) § 130.60(2). This conviction was deemed an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Approximately a year later, the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the motion as untimely and concluded that he did not warrant equitable tolling.An Immigration Judge (IJ) initially determined that the petitioner’s conviction was an aggravated felony, rendering him removable and ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. The IJ also found the conviction to be a "particularly serious crime," barring withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied the petitioner’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence regarding his mental health and diabetes diagnosis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed the petition challenging the removal order, citing its recent decision in Debique v. Garland, which held that a conviction under NYPL § 130.60(2) is categorically an aggravated felony. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments that Debique was not binding and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined its precedential force. The court also denied the petition challenging the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to show due diligence for the entire period between the expiration of the 90-day deadline and the filing of the motion. View "Garcia Pinach v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Raymundo Guevara-Lopez was stopped by a New Mexico State Police officer for a minor traffic violation in September 2021. During the stop, inconsistencies in the travel plans provided by Guevara-Lopez and his passenger raised the officer's suspicions. A search of the vehicle revealed $60,980 in cash hidden behind screwed-in panels. Guevara-Lopez admitted to transporting the money to Mexico for drug cartels and estimated he had made 25 to 30 trips, typically transporting between $110,000 to $118,000 each trip.A federal grand jury indicted Guevara-Lopez in June 2023 for attempted bulk-cash smuggling and aiding and abetting. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The Presentence Report (PSR) calculated a guidelines range of 24 to 30 months based on a total offense level of 17 and a criminal-history category of I. The district court, however, varied upward and sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 60 months, citing the large amount of money smuggled and his pending state charges in Texas.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the district court's sentence substantively unreasonable, noting that the district court failed to adequately address the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities and relied on incorrect information about Guevara-Lopez's Texas charges. The Tenth Circuit vacated the 60-month sentence and remanded for resentencing, emphasizing the need for a more detailed explanation to justify the significant upward variance. View "United States v. Guevara-Lopez" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2019 of home invasion robbery, burglary, assault with a firearm, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. The jury also found that a principal in the offense was armed with a firearm. The trial court found that the defendant had two prior strikes based on 2006 and 2007 convictions for felony active participation in a criminal street gang. The defendant filed a Romero motion to dismiss the prior strikes, which the trial court initially denied, citing his criminal history and the nature of his current offenses. The defendant was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 30 years and a consecutive indeterminate term of 27 years to life.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s findings regarding the prior strikes, noting that recent judicial authority had narrowed the scope of the offense. At the 2023 resentencing, the District Attorney conceded that the 2007 conviction did not qualify as a strike, and the trial court found the 2006 conviction did qualify. The defendant filed a new Romero motion, which the trial court granted, citing recent legislative changes and the remoteness of the 2006 strike. The trial court dismissed the strike and imposed a reduced sentence.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeal erred in directing the trial court to reinstate the strike and resentence the defendant under the Three Strikes law. The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy was to remand the case to the trial court to allow it to exercise its discretion based on a correct understanding of the law. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "P. v. Dain" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple offenses related to sex trafficking, including trafficking minors who were often recruited from foster care or group homes. He exerted control over these victims through violence and threats, collected all proceeds from their prostitution, and provided them with basic necessities in return. The defendant also filmed sexual acts with minor victims and arranged for some to be tattooed with his aliases. A grand jury indicted him on several counts, including conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sex trafficking of minors, sex trafficking by force, sexual exploitation of a child, and possession of child pornography. He was found guilty on all counts, but his appeal focused on two counts related to sex trafficking and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss two counts of the indictment as duplicitous, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 creates two separate crimes—one for sex trafficking by advertising and another for other forms of trafficking—based on different mens rea requirements. The court found that the statute defines a single offense with multiple means of commission. After a jury conviction, the district court sentenced the defendant to life in prison, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, and adequately addressed his mitigation arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sex trafficking a minor by advertising is not a separate crime under § 1591, but rather an alternative means of violating the statute, so the indictment was not duplicitous. The court also found no procedural or substantive error in the life sentence imposed. View "USA V. BRADFORD" on Justia Law

Aaron Cardinale was stopped by Omaha police officers after they observed him allegedly failing to signal a left turn at least 100 feet in advance, as required by Nebraska law. During the stop, a K-9 unit detected drugs in his vehicle, leading to his arrest and subsequent indictment for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Cardinale moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska denied Cardinale's motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had a reasonable belief that Cardinale violated the traffic signal law based on Officer Cleveland's testimony. The court reviewed video evidence and other exhibits but concluded that the evidence did not clearly show the officer's belief was unreasonable. Cardinale's motion to reconsider was also denied, with the court reiterating that the entire record supported the officer's reasonable suspicion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Cardinale argued that the government did not present sufficient historical facts to justify the stop and that Officer Cleveland's testimony was too conclusory. The appellate court upheld the district court's decision, noting that the officer's testimony was credible and supported by the record. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion does not require precise measurements or perfect knowledge, only that the officer's belief was reasonable under the circumstances. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Cardinale's motion to suppress evidence. View "United States v. Cardinale" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement in Little Rock, Arkansas, conducted a sting operation targeting illegal prostitution, which led to the arrest of A.B., a woman working for Deonte Womack. Initially, A.B. did not identify Womack, but after suffering physical abuse from him, she later cooperated with authorities. The FBI’s investigation revealed that Womack managed a prostitution ring involving at least twelve women, exerting control through violence, threats, and financial manipulation. Womack was arrested and charged with three counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, and one count of witness intimidation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas presided over Womack’s trial. The court allowed testimony from a woman, C.C., about uncharged conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), with a limiting instruction to the jury. At the close of the government’s case, the district court granted Womack’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one sex trafficking count and the witness intimidation count, but denied it as to the remaining two sex trafficking counts. The court also denied Womack’s request for a lesser included offense jury instruction and sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment, applying a base offense level of 34 under the sentencing guidelines.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed four issues. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting C.C.’s testimony under Rule 404(b), nor in denying the lesser included offense instruction, and found sufficient evidence supported the convictions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in calculating the base offense level at sentencing, as Womack was not convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing with the correct base offense level. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law

On February 4, 2022, the Tulsa Police Department responded to calls about a violent domestic dispute involving Dakota Wayne Campus and his pregnant fiancée, M.D. Campus chased M.D. with a firearm, dragged her back to her apartment, and strangled her. He fled the scene but was apprehended seven days later. Campus was charged with multiple crimes, including assault and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma found Campus guilty on all counts. The jury's verdict included charges of assault by strangulation, assault with a dangerous weapon, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced Campus to 240 months in prison, including a two-level adjustment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for physically restraining the victim.Campus appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court improperly applied the two-level adjustment for physical restraint under § 3A1.3 of the Guidelines. He contended that this adjustment constituted impermissible double counting because his offense already involved a degree of restraint.The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error. The court held that the two-level adjustment for physical restraint was appropriate because Campus's actions of holding M.D. at gunpoint and dragging her back into the apartment were separate from the strangulation offense. The court concluded that the adjustment did not constitute double counting and affirmed the district court's sentence. View "United States v. Campus" on Justia Law

In August 2019, a Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) lieutenant fired a shotgun during an argument with his girlfriend, leading to his arrest and charges of terroristic threats and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He pled guilty to a lesser charge and completed a pre-trial intervention program. The JCPD conducted an internal affairs (IA) investigation, resulting in a ninety-day suspension for the lieutenant. Plaintiff States Newsroom Inc. sought access to the IA report under the common law.The trial court denied the plaintiff's request, citing the expungement statute and an expungement order that barred the release of information related to the lieutenant’s arrest and criminal case. The court also ordered the entire docket to remain sealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to apply the common law balancing test from Rivera v. Union County Prosecutors’ Office and to analyze the sealing of court documents individually.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the expungement statute does not categorically bar the release of IA reports but does prohibit the release of any information related to the lieutenant’s arrest, conviction, or criminal case disposition. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment with modifications, remanding the case to the trial court to redact such information from the IA report and then conduct the common law balancing test on the remainder. If the court finds that the interests favoring disclosure outweigh confidentiality concerns, it must further redact information as specified in Rivera before releasing the report. The Court also upheld the Appellate Division’s direction regarding the sealing of court documents. View "States Newsroom Inc. v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Mitchell Green was charged with trafficking a child and related offenses in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During his trial, Green called his cousin, Jonathan Cousin, as a witness, who testified that he, not Green, had driven the minor to a hotel. The state did not initially object to Cousin's testimony but later argued that Green failed to provide pretrial notice as required for a "Denny witness," leading the judge to declare a mistrial. Green, out on bond, argued that a retrial would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.The trial court denied Green's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the mistrial was erroneous. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sided with the trial judge, finding that he exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial. Green then filed a collateral attack, and the district court denied relief, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial was based on a mistaken belief that pretrial notice for Denny evidence was required. The court noted that no such requirement existed in Wisconsin law. The trial judge failed to exercise sound discretion by not considering alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no manifest necessity for the mistrial, and thus, a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue an unconditional writ. View "Green v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court" on Justia Law