Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Keith Moore was stopped by Richmond, Virginia police officers after they observed his vehicle displaying a temporary license tag number that matched two other vehicles they had stopped earlier that day. Moore fled from the police, leading to a chase that ended with him crashing his car. Upon his arrest, officers found a gun in his vehicle and discovered that Moore had a prior felony conviction. He was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Moore’s indictment, finding that the traffic stop was racially motivated and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court based its decision on statistical evidence showing that Black drivers were disproportionately stopped by Richmond police and historical evidence of racial discrimination in Richmond. The court concluded that Moore’s stop was part of a pattern of selective enforcement against Black drivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Moore’s stop and arrest were motivated by racial discrimination. The court noted that the officers had probable cause to stop Moore due to the fake license tag and his subsequent flight. The statistical evidence presented did not adequately demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, and the historical evidence was not contemporaneous with the events in question. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the indictment against Moore. View "US v. Moore" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on charges of possession of child pornography and sexual abuse of a minor. Before the trial, the government filed a notice to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior similar conduct under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court allowed this evidence, and after a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of several counts related to coercion and enticement and child sex offenses. He was sentenced to 340 months in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the prior conduct evidence, claiming it was not for a proper purpose and was unfairly prejudicial.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to show the defendant's identity, intent, motive, and plan. The court also provided a limiting instruction to the jury to mitigate any potential prejudice. The jury found the defendant guilty of the charges involving one minor but acquitted him of charges involving another.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the evidence of the defendant's prior conduct was admissible under Rule 404(b) for proper purposes, including showing identity, intent, plan, and motive. The court found that the evidence was relevant and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The limiting instruction given to the jury was deemed sufficient to address any potential prejudice. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Summers" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old boy lifted his grandmother, causing her to fall and suffer pain. The boy’s father, in response, pushed the boy to the ground to show him "how it felt to be Grandma." The boy’s mother sought a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against the father on the boy’s behalf. The superior court granted the order, finding that the father had assaulted the boy and rejected the father's argument that the push was reasonable parental discipline.The superior court found that the father's actions amounted to an assault and were not reasonable corporal discipline. The court noted that the father should have calmed down and had a mature conversation with his son instead of pushing him to the ground. The court granted a long-term DVPO against the father. The father moved for reconsideration, arguing insufficient evidence of assault and permissible corporal discipline. The court denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s finding of assault, as the father’s actions caused the boy physical pain and were reckless. The court also affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the reasonable corporal discipline defense, finding that the father’s actions were not reasonable or appropriate and were motivated by retribution rather than a desire to promote the child’s welfare. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Peter R. v. B.M.R." on Justia Law

Sheldon Morales and Eduardo Santana were surveilled by the DEA after Morales, recently released from prison for drug trafficking, resumed similar activities. Morales coordinated with two incarcerated brokers to arrange drug shipments, which were intercepted by law enforcement. Santana acted as a translator and partner in the operation, discussing plans to expand their drug distribution and defraud suppliers. Morales and Santana were indicted for conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. Morales faced additional charges for attempting to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl.In the Northern District of Illinois, Morales requested new counsel multiple times, causing trial delays. His final request for new counsel was partially granted, but the court denied a subsequent motion to replace Joseph Lopez, citing potential further delays. Morales and Santana were convicted by a jury, with Morales found guilty of all charges and Santana convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Post-trial motions for a new trial and acquittal were denied. Santana's request for a minor role reduction at sentencing was also denied, and he was sentenced to 200 months, while Morales received 235 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Santana's appeal argued insufficient evidence for his conspiracy conviction and error in denying a minor role reduction. The court found ample evidence of Santana's active role in the conspiracy and upheld the district court's sentencing decision. Morales contended the district court erred by not giving a buyer-seller jury instruction and violated his right to counsel of choice. The court found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy with Santana, making the buyer-seller instruction irrelevant, and determined Morales had not properly requested new counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Santana" on Justia Law

In 2014, Diamond Lee Jamal Griffin was convicted in Hennepin County District Court of first-degree intentional felony murder while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, stemming from the fatal shooting of Francisco Benitez-Hernandez in Minneapolis in July 2013. Griffin appealed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, concluding that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Griffin shot Benitez-Hernandez with intent to kill. Griffin's subsequent petitions for postconviction relief were also denied.Griffin filed a preliminary application for relief under a 2023 Minnesota law that allows individuals convicted of certain felony murder offenses under an aiding-and-abetting theory to have their sentences vacated if they can show they neither caused the death nor intentionally aided in causing the death. The Hennepin County District Court denied Griffin's application, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that Griffin was entitled to relief under the new law, based on the application, supporting materials, and previous court decisions.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed two primary issues: the appropriate standard of review for appeals under the new law and whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Griffin's application. The court concluded that the standard of review is abuse of discretion, given the text of the law and its treatment of the application as a postconviction proceeding. The court then determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffin's application, as the established facts and prior court decisions supported the conclusion that Griffin caused the death of Benitez-Hernandez. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "State of Minnesota vs. Griffin" on Justia Law

Erick Dewaun Haynes pleaded guilty to first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. He admitted to planning a confrontation with his ex-girlfriend's new partner, R.C., involving two juveniles armed with handguns. The plan resulted in the juveniles shooting and killing his ex-girlfriend, Zaria McKeever, instead. Haynes received a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole. The plea agreement did not specifically address restitution.The district court ordered Haynes to pay $7,500 in restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims Reimbursement Board (CVRB) and reserved the determination of additional restitution for 90 days. Haynes did not challenge this order. The State later sought additional restitution for McKeever’s family members, totaling $17,026.06. Haynes did not object to this request either, and the district court granted it.Haynes appealed the restitution award, arguing that the district court failed to make necessary factual findings and that some restitution recipients were not "victims" under the statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that Haynes forfeited his challenges by not raising them in the district court. The court emphasized that challenges to restitution must be made within 30 days of the order, as outlined in Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, subdivision 3. Since Haynes did not follow this procedure, his challenges were not properly before the court.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s restitution award, holding that Haynes forfeited his right to challenge the restitution by failing to object in the district court. View "State of Minnesota vs. Haynes" on Justia Law

James Nyonteh was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree domestic abuse murder, second-degree intentional murder for killing his wife, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing his minor stepdaughter. The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of release and a consecutive prison term of 144 months. Nyonteh appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court erred by dismissing a juror for sleeping during the trial, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his stepdaughter feared imminent great bodily harm during the sexual assaults, and that the district court erred by entering multiple convictions for the same conduct against the same victim.The district court had excused a juror who repeatedly fell asleep during the trial, despite efforts to keep him awake and engaged. The court determined that the juror's inability to stay awake compromised the fairness of the trial. The jury found Nyonteh guilty on all charges, and the district court entered convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but the warrant of commitment also included convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the sleeping juror, as the juror's conduct raised concerns about the fairness of the trial. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support Nyonteh's conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, as the circumstances proved that his stepdaughter reasonably feared imminent great bodily harm.However, the court agreed with Nyonteh that the district court erred by entering multiple convictions for the same conduct against the same victim. The court reversed the additional convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder and remanded the case to the district court to vacate those convictions. The court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. View "State of Minnesota vs. Nyonteh" on Justia Law

Ricky Darnell Waiters was convicted of first-degree felony murder and attempted first-degree felony murder following a shooting incident in Winona County. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Waiters subsequently filed multiple petitions for postconviction relief, all of which were denied by the district court. In his latest petition, Waiters sought reversal of his convictions or a new trial, citing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and insufficient evidence.The district court summarily denied Waiters's latest petition without a response from the State. Waiters appealed, and the Supreme Court of Minnesota remanded the case for further proceedings, as the basis for the district court's decision was unclear. On remand, the State argued that Waiters's claims were both procedurally and time-barred. The district court agreed and again summarily denied the petition, providing a written order with its reasoning. Waiters appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary denial of Waiters's petition for postconviction relief. The court held that Waiters's petition was time-barred under Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4, as it was filed more than two years after the appellate court's disposition of his direct appeal. The court also found that the exceptions to the time bar, including newly discovered evidence and new interpretations of law, did not apply to Waiters's claims. Consequently, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing. View "Waiters vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

David Paitsel, a former FBI Special Agent, was given at least $6,500 by his friend, Brian Bailey, after providing Bailey with information about certain residential tenants. Paitsel obtained this information from the FBI’s access to the non-public Thomson Reuters information system known as CLEAR, by representing that his searches were for FBI law enforcement investigative purposes. The primary issue in this appeal is whether Paitsel’s conduct constituted bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C), which prohibits public officials from agreeing to accept valuable compensation in exchange for performing an “official duty.”The United States District Court for the District of Columbia indicted Paitsel for various bribery offenses, including conspiracy to commit bribery and bribery in violation of his “official duty.” The evidence presented at trial established that Bailey sought to identify tenants whose property was for sale and had begun to proceed through the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) process. Bailey paid Paitsel for tenants’ information, which Paitsel obtained by searching the CLEAR database. The jury found Paitsel guilty of both conspiracy to commit bribery and bribery. The District Court denied Paitsel’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to two years’ incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Paitsel’s conduct fell within his official duties because he performed an act made possible by his official position in the FBI and his affirmative representation that his conduct was part of official FBI law enforcement investigative duties. The court also rejected Paitsel’s other challenges, including a purported instructional error and the sufficiency of the Government’s quid pro quo evidence. The court affirmed Paitsel’s convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Paitsel" on Justia Law

Lonnie Parker, a licensed medical practitioner, was found guilty by a jury of distributing oxycodone and promethazine HCl with codeine solution in a manner unauthorized by the Controlled Substances Act. The case began when an individual named N.C. was pulled over for reckless driving, found impaired, and later died in custody. The DEA suspected Parker of operating a "pill mill" and seized patient records from his clinic. An expert reviewed these records and found that Parker had prescribed controlled substances inappropriately.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas sentenced Parker to 87 months’ imprisonment. Parker appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury instructions were improper, and the district court committed procedural error in sentencing. The district court had calculated Parker’s base offense level by including uncharged prescriptions as relevant conduct, resulting in a total offense level of 30 and an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 108 to 135 months. The court varied downwards to 87 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Parker’s convictions, as the expert testimony provided enough basis for the jury to conclude that Parker prescribed controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose. The court also found no plain error in the jury instructions, noting that the instructions as a whole clarified the requirements for criminal conduct. Finally, the court determined that any potential error in calculating the quantity of controlled substances for sentencing was harmless, as the district court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Parker" on Justia Law