Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An 18-year-old defendant assisted his employer, a drug dealer, in abducting a drug addict at gunpoint. The victim, who had previously sold drugs for the dealer under threat, was lured to a parking lot, forcibly taken to the dealer’s home, and subjected to prolonged violence and threats in an attempt to extort $100,000. The victim was beaten, tied up, threatened with death, forced to ingest or absorb drugs, and ultimately locked in a closet with the door screwed shut. After approximately 28 hours, a SWAT team rescued the victim. The defendant was present throughout the ordeal, actively participated in the violence, and threatened the victim and his family.A jury in the Superior Court of Orange County convicted the defendant of aggravated kidnapping with bodily harm and a firearm enhancement. The court imposed a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus a 10-year firearm enhancement, and also imposed a $300 parole revocation fine. The defendant appealed, arguing that the LWOP sentence was unconstitutional as applied to 18-year-olds under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, and that the parole revocation fine was improper because he was ineligible for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court does not extend the constitutional protections against LWOP sentences for juveniles to offenders who were 18 at the time of the crime. The court also found that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate under the California Constitution, given the defendant’s conduct and criminal history. However, the court agreed that the parole revocation fine was improper and ordered it stricken. The judgment was affirmed as modified. View "P. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

Juan Montas, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States as a toddler in 1996. In 2017, he was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey for conspiracy to distribute heroin and was subsequently deported in 2020. Montas reentered the U.S. illegally before April 2023 and was arrested by New Jersey State Police for possession of a false driver’s license, drug offenses, and money laundering. He pled guilty in 2023 to illegally reentering the United States.The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Montas in 2024. During the sentencing, the court relied on the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and the hearing transcript from Montas’s 2017 sentencing without prior notice to Montas or his counsel. Montas’s counsel did not object to this reliance during the sentencing. The court imposed a 34-month imprisonment sentence, noting Montas’s previous statements and actions from the 2017 sentencing.Montas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by relying on information from the 2017 sentencing without prior notice. The Third Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error since Montas did not raise the objection in the lower court. The Third Circuit found that the District Court erred and that the error was clear. However, Montas failed to demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, as he could not show that the sentence would have been different with proper notice. Consequently, the Third Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "USA v. Montas" on Justia Law

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, resulting in Class C misdemeanor convictions in municipal court. They appealed for a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5, posting appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72. They also filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, but acknowledged that the appellants were restrained by the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law’s denial of habeas relief, but did not address the merits of the appellants' arguments. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with fine-only offenses who were not in custody or released on bond. The court of appeals reasoned that the potential for re-arrest due to non-payment of fines was too speculative to constitute sufficient restraint.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The higher court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints, preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds requiring their appearance in court. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of "restraint" is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "EX PARTEAUSPRO ENTERPRISES, L.P." on Justia Law

Michael Kleinman and his business, Auspro Enterprises, L.P., were charged with multiple violations of Cedar Park Code of Ordinances, operating a "head shop," which are Class C misdemeanors. Both were convicted in municipal court and sought a trial de novo in the Williamson County Court at Law No. 5. They posted appellate bonds totaling $64,881.72 and filed pretrial applications for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances on vagueness grounds. The county court at law denied relief on the merits, finding that the appellants were restrained in their liberty due to the cash appeal bonds.The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the county court at law's denial of relief but did not address the merits. Instead, it concluded that pretrial habeas relief was not available to applicants charged with a fine-only offense who were not in custody or released from custody on bond. The court of appeals found that the potential for re-arrest was too speculative to constitute a sufficient restraint to justify habeas relief.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that the appellants were indeed restrained within the meaning of the habeas corpus statutes due to the combination of the complaints filed against them, their preliminary convictions, and the appellate bonds they posted. The court emphasized that the definition of "restraint" under Texas law is broad and includes any control that subjects a person to the general authority and power of the state. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "EX PARTE KLEINMAN" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, drive-by shooting, and conspiracy to commit a drive-by shooting. The incident occurred on September 12, 2020, when the defendant and a group of friends encountered another group, leading to a shooting that injured three individuals. The defendant was identified as the driver of the vehicle from which the shots were fired. The police investigation led to the arrest of the defendant and the recovery of the firearm used in the shooting.In the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms for the assault and conspiracy charges, with additional sentences for the drive-by shooting and conspiracy to commit a drive-by shooting. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in several ways, including not admitting a witness's juvenile record, improperly admitting hearsay evidence, denying his motion for a new trial, and denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decisions. The court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding the juvenile record, as the defendant did not sufficiently alert the trial justice to the specific rule of evidence he was relying on. The court also determined that the hearsay statement about a "blinky" was properly admitted to show its effect on the listener, not for the truth of the matter asserted.The court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial, concluding that the trial justice had thoroughly reviewed the evidence, made credibility determinations, and found the testimonies of key witnesses credible. The court also upheld the denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "State v. Peckham" on Justia Law

Tyler James Hill pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter after an incident where he shot Ashley Bartel during an argument involving his mother, Rhonda Bryan. The shooting occurred when Hill produced a small pistol during the altercation, and the gun discharged after Bryan pushed Hill's arm, resulting in Bartel's death. Hill was charged with second-degree murder but later agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter. The district court sentenced him to 15 to 20 years imprisonment.The district court of Laramie County denied Hill's motion to continue his sentencing hearing, despite his attorney filing a sentencing memorandum on the day of the hearing. Hill's attorney argued that the delay was due to the short notice and the July 4 holiday. The district court proceeded with the hearing, allowing Hill's attorney to present the contents of the memorandum orally. The court ultimately sentenced Hill to 15 to 20 years imprisonment, finding him not suitable for probation.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hill's motion to continue the sentencing hearing, as the defense counsel was able to present the mitigating evidence orally during the hearing. Additionally, the court found that Hill did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, as he could not demonstrate that the outcome of his sentencing would have been different if the memorandum had been filed earlier. The court concluded that Hill was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Hild, the Defendant-Appellant, was convicted by a jury in 2021 of securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. Hild, as the CEO of Live Well Financial, Inc., engaged in a scheme to inflate the value of a bond portfolio used as collateral for loans. This scheme allowed Live Well to grow its bond portfolio significantly from 2014 to 2016. Hild appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that a new trial was warranted due to a Supreme Court decision invalidating one of the fraud theories used in his jury instructions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Hild's post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. Hild then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.The Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that sufficient evidence supported Hild's conviction. The court noted that Hild misrepresented the value of the bonds to secure loans and acted with fraudulent intent. The court also addressed Hild's argument regarding the jury instructions, acknowledging that the instructions included an invalid right-to-control theory of fraud as per the Supreme Court's decision in Ciminelli v. United States. However, the court concluded that this error did not affect Hild's substantial rights because the jury would have convicted him based on a valid theory of fraud.Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Hild's conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Hild" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn M. Fenimore arrived at the Woodstown State Police barracks on June 2, 2021, in response to a request for a statement regarding a harassment claim. New Jersey State Police Trooper Daniel Radetich interviewed Fenimore, observed signs of intoxication, and administered three sobriety tests, two of which Fenimore failed. Radetich arrested Fenimore for driving while intoxicated (DWI) and secured him to a holding cell bench. Radetich and other troopers then conducted a warrantless search of Fenimore's car, parked in the barracks parking lot, and found drugs, a loaded gun, and other evidence. Fenimore was charged with possession offenses and moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search.The trial court denied Fenimore's motion to suppress, reasoning that police had the right to search the vehicle without a warrant based on probable cause. Fenimore pled guilty and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, even though the car was in a police station parking lot and subject to mandatory impoundment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply under the circumstances. The Court emphasized that the car was parked in a State Police barracks parking lot, police had arrested the driver, removed the passenger, and obtained the keys, and the car was subject to imminent, mandatory impoundment. The Court concluded that there was no inherent exigency justifying a warrantless search and that the police were required to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Fenimore" on Justia Law

In this case, the applicant was convicted of capital murder for the 2004 killing of an elderly man, James Tomlin, during a robbery. The applicant and his girlfriend, Leketha Allen, were implicated in the crime, with the applicant providing statements to the police detailing their involvement. The medical examiner, Dr. Nizam Peerwani, testified that Tomlin's death was caused by smothering with positional asphyxia, which was critical in proving the applicant's intent to kill.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals previously affirmed the applicant's conviction and death sentence. The applicant's first post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. In his subsequent application, the applicant raised claims that his due process rights were violated by the presentation of false or misleading testimony by Dr. Peerwani and that new scientific evidence contradicted the evidence presented at trial.The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the lower court to review the merits of these claims. The habeas court held evidentiary hearings and considered testimony from various experts, including Dr. Peerwani, who reaffirmed his trial testimony. The habeas court recommended granting relief based on the new evidence and alleged false testimony.Upon review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the habeas court considered evidence beyond the scope of the claims raised in the application. The court determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate that Dr. Peerwani's testimony was false or misleading and that the new scientific evidence did not meet the requirements for relief under Article 11.073. Consequently, the court denied the applicant post-conviction habeas relief. View "EX PARTE CARTER" on Justia Law

The defendant, a visiting nurse, was charged with two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and four counts of misdemeanor sexual assault (MSA) based on events that allegedly occurred while he was providing care to the victim. The charges included allegations under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) (sexual assault by medical provider) and I(i) (sexual assault by surprise). The victim was over the age of 13 at the time of the alleged assaults.The defendant notified the court of his intention to assert a consent defense under RSA 626:6, I. The State moved to preclude this defense, leading to substantial pre-trial litigation. The trial court directed the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement, which was approved and transferred to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed three questions: whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1); whether RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and whether consent is a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The court held that consent is not a defense under RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) because the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) prohibits sexual conduct between nurses and patients, making such conduct professionally unethical or unacceptable. The court also found that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.Regarding RSA 632-A:2, I(i), the court concluded that consent cannot be a legal defense because if the defendant admitted to causing sexual contact through concealment or surprise, it would inherently mean the victim did not consent. However, the defendant may present evidence of the victim's consent to support his theory of the case, allowing the factfinder to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.The court answered all three questions in the negative and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Allore" on Justia Law