Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Verlynin Buckley pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that he was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Buckley appealed, arguing that the court erred in deeming him an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years in prison for defendants with three or more prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that Buckley’s prior Arkansas convictions for possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver and for delivering cocaine were serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Buckley conceded that his prior convictions involved prohibited activity subjecting him to ten or more years in prison but contended that his prior convictions did not involve a controlled substance as defined by federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Buckley’s argument. The court held that the Arkansas statutes under which Buckley was convicted did not incorporate the state’s drug schedules but instead referred to cocaine in its ordinary sense. The court found no reason to believe that Arkansas intended to define cocaine more broadly than federal law. Consequently, Buckley’s prior cocaine convictions were deemed serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Buckley’s sentence as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Buckley" on Justia Law

Justin Johnson, a pretrial detainee at Jefferson County Jail, was attacked by two other inmates while in protective custody. Johnson sued correctional officers Jacob Schurman and Christopher Taylor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect him and for negligence under Missouri law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that official immunity and the public duty doctrine barred the negligence claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri determined that Johnson could not show a constitutional violation necessary to overcome qualified immunity. The court found no evidence that the officers were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, as the attackers were not known to be violent, and Johnson had no prior relationship with them. The court also dismissed the negligence claims, ruling that the officers were protected by official immunity because their actions were discretionary, not ministerial. Additionally, the court found that the public duty doctrine applied, as the officers owed no particular duty to Johnson beyond that owed to the general prison population.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as Johnson failed to show that they were deliberately indifferent to a known risk. The court also upheld the dismissal of the negligence claims, concluding that the officers' actions involved discretionary decisions protected by official immunity. The court did not address the public duty doctrine, as the official immunity finding was sufficient to resolve the negligence claims. View "Johnson v. Schurman" on Justia Law

On May 6, 2022, Royce Gresham drove his car into the bedroom wall of his neighbors, Alix and Jose S. After the crash, Gresham got into a fight with their son, Anthony, who accused him of endangering his parents. When sheriff's deputies arrived, Gresham resisted arrest, leading to a struggle during which he appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol. Gresham claimed he did not know the deputies were police officers due to his confusion from a head injury and his schizoaffective disorder.The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Gresham with assault with a deadly weapon, misdemeanor vandalism, misdemeanor resisting arrest, and hit and run. The jury convicted him of resisting arrest but acquitted him of the other charges. Gresham filed a Pitchess motion for information on complaints against the deputies, which the court denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Gresham argued that his conviction for resisting arrest required proof that he actually knew he was resisting a peace officer. The court disagreed, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant "knew or reasonably should have known" the person was a peace officer. The court found substantial evidence supporting the conviction, noting the deputies' marked car, uniforms, and body camera footage. The court also upheld the denial of the Pitchess motion, citing the video evidence that captured the incident and showed no excessive force or false reporting by the deputies. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Gresham" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to allow the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) to award credits for good behavior and rehabilitative or educational achievements. The department adopted regulations to award credits beyond statutory limits and to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims challenged these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allowed the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and the petitioners appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes. However, the court also held that the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law, as Proposition 57 is silent on this issue. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment. View "Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Devante Glenn was accused of selling drugs that led to the overdose death of Renee Ducatman. He was convicted on two counts of distributing carfentanil and one count of using a telecommunications device to facilitate the transaction. Ducatman had multiple interactions with Glenn and others through text messages and phone calls, seeking drugs. On the night of her death, she and Glenn exchanged messages and met, after which she overdosed on carfentanil.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio conducted the trial. The jury convicted Glenn on all charges, and the court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment on one count and 48 months on the other counts, to be served concurrently. Glenn appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and improper expert testimony by Agent Orlando Almonte, who interpreted text messages between Glenn and Ducatman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in allowing Agent Almonte to testify as an expert on the meaning of common words and phrases in the text messages, as the jury was capable of interpreting them without expert assistance. The court determined that this error was not harmless, as the text messages were a significant part of the evidence against Glenn. Consequently, the court vacated Glenn’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing for a retrial without the improper expert testimony. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

In 2023, Tovis Ation Richardson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, under a written plea agreement. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Richardson appealed, raising two issues: whether the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for firearm possession, and whether his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this enhancement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina adopted the presentence report (PSR) which included a base offense level of 36, with two enhancements: one for firearm possession and another for maintaining a premises for drug distribution. The PSR also included reductions for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 37 and a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months. Both parties recommended a 240-month sentence, which the district court imposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Richardson had waived his right to appeal the firearm enhancement in his plea agreement, which was valid and enforceable. The court also determined that Richardson’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not conclusively appear in the record, as required for direct appeal. The court noted that the firearm enhancement was properly applied based on the discovery of a shotgun in Richardson’s car, which was used in the drug conspiracy. The court concluded that counsel’s failure to object to the enhancement did not constitute deficient performance under the Strickland standard.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Richardson’s 240-month sentence. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Eric Walton, whose life sentence was commuted by the President, was found in possession of drugs and drug proceeds within a year of his release, violating the terms of his supervised release. Walton represented himself in the revocation proceedings, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months' imprisonment. Walton appealed, arguing that the court erred in allowing him to represent himself, lacked jurisdiction over his commuted sentence, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia revoked Walton's supervised release based on multiple violations, including committing new offenses and possessing controlled substances. Walton admitted to these violations during the revocation hearing. The court appointed counsel for Walton, but he chose to proceed pro se, with stand-by counsel available.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court retained jurisdiction over Walton's supervised release, as the commutation order explicitly left the supervised release term intact. The court also found that Walton knowingly and voluntarily chose to represent himself, given his extensive experience with the legal system and his clear and repeated requests to proceed pro se.Regarding the sentence, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court did not err in its calculation of the Guidelines range or in its explanation of the sentence. The court noted that Walton's violations included a Grade A violation, justifying the 60-month sentence. The court also found that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence imposed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Walton's 60-month imprisonment sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law

David Swartz was charged with wire fraud and aiding and assisting the filing of a false tax return. He pleaded guilty to both counts. The probation department prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) that incorrectly calculated Swartz's net worth. Despite Swartz's correction of his assets, the PSR did not update his net worth. At sentencing, the district court imposed a $10,000 fine, relying on the PSR's recommendations.Swartz objected to the PSR's net worth calculation and filed a memorandum noting the correct figure. The district court adopted the PSR's recommendations, including the fine, and ordered restitution and a special assessment. Swartz argued that the district court violated his due process rights by relying on inaccurate financial information and failed to comply with statutory requirements in imposing the fine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not rely on the incorrect net worth figure when imposing the fine. The district court considered Swartz's significant assets, limited liabilities, and positive monthly cash flow, which were accurately stated in the PSR. The court also found that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) and did not err in determining Swartz's ability to pay the fine.The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not commit procedural error or violate Swartz's due process rights. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, including the imposition of the $10,000 fine. View "United States v. Swartz" on Justia Law

Todd Joseph Harbuck was charged with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and possessing a stolen firearm. The indictment alleged that Harbuck qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to his prior convictions, including a South Carolina conviction for assault with intent to kill. Harbuck pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon but contested the ACCA enhancement, arguing that his South Carolina conviction should not qualify as a "violent felony" and that the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia reviewed Harbuck's objections. The court examined the South Carolina conviction and determined that it qualified as a felony under the ACCA. The court also concluded that the crime was a violent felony under the ACCA, leading to a sentence of fifteen years and eight months in prison. Harbuck appealed the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the categorical approach to determine whether the South Carolina conviction for assault with intent to kill qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. The court concluded that the crime's elements, which include an unlawful attempt to commit a violent injury with malicious intent, met the ACCA's definition of a violent felony. The court also rejected Harbuck's argument that the ACCA's elements clause is unconstitutionally vague, citing Supreme Court precedent that upheld the clarity of the elements clause.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence and judgment, holding that Harbuck's South Carolina conviction for assault with intent to kill qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA and that the ACCA's elements clause is not unconstitutionally vague. View "USA v. Harbuck" on Justia Law

The case concerns Erik J. Vivier, who was accused of engaging in sexual acts with J.M., a 15-year-old girl, while she was allegedly incapacitated due to alcohol consumption. J.M. testified that she felt dizzy, nauseous, and not in control of her body after drinking, and described being invited into Vivier’s home, given more alcohol, and then sexually assaulted while in a spare bedroom. Vivier initially denied knowing J.M., then changed his account multiple times, eventually admitting to a sexual act but claiming he was not in the right state of mind. Other witnesses present at the home offered limited observations, and the government’s case relied heavily on J.M.’s testimony and Vivier’s inconsistent statements.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota presided over the trial, where a jury convicted Vivier of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim and sexual abuse of a minor. Vivier moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim, arguing insufficient evidence of J.M.’s incapacity and his knowledge thereof. The district court denied this motion. During trial, Vivier also objected to the testimony of an FBI agent who opined on Vivier’s truthfulness, arguing it was undisclosed expert testimony. The district court denied the motion to strike but issued a curative instruction, partially adopting Vivier’s proposed language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that J.M. was incapacitated and that Vivier knew of her incapacity. The court also found that, although the district court erred in its curative instruction regarding the agent’s opinion testimony, this did not affect Vivier’s substantial rights. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Vivier" on Justia Law