Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of Criminal Endangerment in 2015 and later Issuing a Bad Check in 2017, receiving concurrent five-year suspended sentences. In 2019, after a consolidated revocation proceeding, both sentences were revoked and reimposed as concurrent five-year suspended commitments, with credit awarded for time served and street time as agreed by the parties. In 2022, a second consolidated revocation resulted in the reimposition of concurrent five-year suspended sentences, again with credits for incarceration and street time based on a joint recommendation. In 2024, a third revocation was sought against only one of the cases, resulting in revocation and imposition of an unsuspended five-year sentence, with credits for incarceration and street time awarded as determined at the hearing.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, handled each revocation proceeding. During the relevant proceedings, credits for time served and street time were awarded based on the parties’ stipulations or the court’s findings. At the January 2025 hearing, both prior and current credits were discussed and agreed upon.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred by failing to award the defendant twelve additional days of jail credit and three months of street time credit. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to credit in the later case for incarceration served before the sentences merged because credit for time served applies only from the date concurrent sentences merge. The Court further held that, because the defendant stipulated to the amount of street time credited and did not object at the 2019 revocation, any claim to additional credit was waived. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. View "State v. Schmiedeke" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a physical altercation with a police officer at a homeless shelter after refusing to leave and lighting papers on fire. The officer used force to prevent the defendant from re-entering the building, leading to the defendant headbutting and punching the officer. The State charged the defendant with assault on a peace officer resulting in bodily injury. During the pretrial and trial stages, defense counsel initially did not raise any mental disease or defect defense but reserved the right to do so pending further evaluation. The defendant was disruptive in court, displaying unusual behavior during the trial.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, presided over the case. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of assault on a peace officer resulting in bodily injury. Before sentencing, the defendant underwent an independent psychological evaluation diagnosing him with schizophrenia and autism-spectrum disorder. The defense requested alternative sentencing under Montana’s mental disease sentencing statutes or a continuance for further evaluation, but the court proceeded to sentence the defendant to ten years in prison without conducting the statutory analysis for mental disease or defect or considering placement with the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by failing to evaluate the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense as required under Montana law. The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred by imposing sentence without first determining whether the defendant satisfied the statutory criteria for alternative sentencing based on mental disease or defect. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded for further proceedings, directing the District Court to perform the required analysis and, if appropriate, consider alternative sentencing. View "State v. Myers-Starks" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for possessing a firearm while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, as applied to him, the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The District Court denied his motion, finding that, even assuming the Second Amendment protected him, the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The appellant then pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and timely appealed his conviction, preserving his constitutional challenge.The appeal was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government argued that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, both because the appellant was not among “the people” whom the Amendment protects, and because, even if he was, the statute was consistent with historical tradition. The First Circuit, like the District Court, did not resolve whether the Second Amendment’s text covered the appellant, relying instead on the second step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.Applying the Bruen framework, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi, the First Circuit held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, including laws disarming those without allegiance to the sovereign, supported the regulation. The court concluded that the government met its burden to show that the statute is relevantly similar to such historical regulations. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and rejected the appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. View "US v. Vizcaino-Peguero" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with multiple crimes, including murder, related to a 2016 incident. Before his first trial, the parties agreed to exclude evidence of firearms, ammunition, or marijuana found at the defendant’s residence, as these items were not relevant to the charges. In the first trial, the jury convicted the defendant on some counts and was hung on others, resulting in a mistrial on the unresolved charges. At retrial on the remaining counts, a prosecution witness unexpectedly mentioned the excluded evidence despite the prior agreement. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing this reference was improper. The trial court granted the mistrial, and the State did not oppose it.After the second mistrial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that Maryland’s common law double jeopardy protections should bar a third prosecution if the State’s reckless conduct caused the mistrial. The defendant argued that the State was reckless in failing to adequately instruct the witness not to mention the excluded evidence and in its questioning. The Circuit Court for Charles County denied the motion, finding the State’s conduct was neither intentional nor reckless. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that Maryland common law did not attach double jeopardy protections in these circumstances and, even if it did, the State’s conduct was not reckless.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. Without deciding whether Maryland law bars retrial after a mistrial caused by reckless State conduct, the Court assumed for argument’s sake that such a standard might apply. The Court held that the circuit court’s factual finding—the State did not act recklessly—was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, allowing the retrial to proceed. View "Santana v. State" on Justia Law

A man who was born in India entered the United States illegally and sought asylum, which was denied. He then submitted a second asylum application under a false identity and later married a U.S. citizen, using the same false information to obtain permanent residency and, eventually, naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After obtaining a U.S. passport and reentering the country, he was questioned by border agents and gave false answers regarding his identity. As a result, he was charged with using a fraudulently obtained passport and making false statements to federal agents. He pleaded guilty to the passport charge, with the other charge dismissed, and was sentenced to probation. Both his plea agreement and the district court informed him of potential immigration consequences, including possible loss of citizenship.Later, the government initiated denaturalization proceedings, alleging that he had illegally procured citizenship through fraud and misrepresentation. The man petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not advise him that his guilty plea could lead to denaturalization. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding he had not shown a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have chosen a different course. After a Second Circuit decision in Farhane v. United States adopted a broader view of counsel’s obligations, he sought reconsideration, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense attorneys to advise naturalized citizens that a guilty plea may carry the risk of denaturalization and eventual deportation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

During a December 2023 election recount at the Oakland County Courthouse in Michigan, Andrew Hess, serving as an observer, raised concerns about ballot-box tampering with the county’s director of elections, Joseph Rozell. Following a tense exchange, Hess left the recount room and, in the courthouse lobby, remarked to another member of the public, “hang Joe for treason.” The comment was overheard by a county receptionist, who later reported it to law enforcement. Although Hess was not removed from the event, months later Oakland County prosecutors charged him with a felony under Michigan’s terrorist-threat statute for this statement. The charge was initially dismissed after the Michigan Court of Appeals found the statute facially unconstitutional, but the Michigan Supreme Court later vacated that decision, and the potential for prosecution was revived.In response, Hess filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, primarily arguing that the prosecution violated his First Amendment rights. He also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent any renewed prosecution under the statute. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding Hess unlikely to succeed on his constitutional claims and failing to demonstrate irreparable harm.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that while Hess was likely to succeed on the merits of his as-applied First Amendment claim—concluding his statement did not constitute a true threat—he had not shown irreparable harm because any threatened prosecution targeted only his past speech, not future speech. Furthermore, Michigan’s state-court procedures offered him a fair and prompt opportunity to litigate his First Amendment defense. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Hess v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant whose longstanding methamphetamine addiction led to psychosis. During a delusional episode, he brutally attacked an elderly, physically infirm stranger in a clinic parking lot by striking him with a brick, punching and kicking him, covering his head with a plastic bag, and stabbing him in the neck. The victim, who was homeless and suffering from grave heart and liver disease, was hospitalized and remained unconscious until his death about a month later. The coroner testified that although the victim’s preexisting conditions were severe and could have caused his death within a few years, the immediate cause of death was the cumulative effect of the traumatic injuries inflicted during the attack.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. The defendant appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on attempted murder as a lesser included offense. He contended that there was substantial evidence suggesting his actions were not the proximate cause of death, given the victim’s poor health, and therefore the jury could have found him guilty of attempted, but not completed, murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence did not support giving a lesser included offense instruction for attempted murder because the defendant’s attack was both a substantial factor and the proximate cause of the victim’s death, despite the victim’s frailty. The court also rejected the defendant’s other claims, finding no prosecutorial error and no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s Pitchess review. The court affirmed the conviction but remanded solely to correct the calculation of pretrial custody credits. View "People v. Mijares" on Justia Law

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant, a military veteran, who was charged with felony corporal injury to his spouse after a violent altercation in which he assaulted the mother of his newborn child while intoxicated. The defendant had a documented history of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse, both stemming from his military service. He sought pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, presenting evidence of his diagnoses and the availability of a comprehensive treatment program through the Department of Veterans Affairs. The victim supported his request for treatment rather than incarceration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the defendant both eligible and suitable for mental health diversion, specifically determining that his mental disorders were significant factors in the offense and that he did not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined by statute (i.e., likelihood of committing a “super strike”). Nonetheless, the court denied diversion, expressing concerns that a two-year diversion period would not be sufficient for rehabilitation or to protect the victim and public, and instead offered the defendant probation with the same treatment conditions if he pleaded no contest. The defendant accepted this offer, pleaded no contest, and was placed on probation with conditions mirroring the proposed diversion program.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying mental health diversion after finding the statutory criteria were met. The appellate court clarified that residual discretion to deny diversion cannot be based on public safety considerations broader than the statutory definition, and requiring a plea as a condition for treatment was inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. The judgment was reversed and the trial court was directed to grant diversion unless changed circumstances warranted otherwise. View "People v. Tourville" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with producing child pornography and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges centered on three videos found in her husband’s online storage account, showing him interacting with a six-year-old girl in a pool at a family gathering. The defendant was not visible in the videos, but a woman’s voice—alleged to be hers—was present. She denied it was her voice, but several witnesses identified it as hers. The government also introduced evidence that, years after the pool incident, the defendant and her husband had made videos in public places surreptitiously filming up women’s skirts. In these later videos, the defendant was visually and audibly identifiable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma admitted three of these “Peeping Tom” videos as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding them relevant and admissible to prove the defendant’s identity as the camera operator in the pool videos and to show the absence of mistake or accident. The court limited the number of such videos introduced and declined to further edit them, as the defendant did not request specific excision and the entire videos were relevant for the stated purposes. After trial, the defendant was convicted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the “other acts” evidence. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion. The court found the later videos relevant, sufficiently similar, and admissible for the proper purposes of proving identity and absence of mistake or accident, thus affirming the conviction. The appellate court did not address other proposed grounds for admission, as it found the purposes relied upon by the district court adequate. View "United States v. Bycroft" on Justia Law