Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Britt Lander was stopped by police in June 2022, and drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine were found in his vehicle. After being read his Miranda rights, Lander requested the presence of his partner, whom he jokingly referred to as his attorney. The officer denied this request and continued the interrogation, during which Lander made incriminating statements about his involvement in methamphetamine trafficking. Lander was subsequently indicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine after a prior felony drug conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Lander's motion to suppress his statements, concluding that his waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary and that his request for his partner was not a clear invocation of his right to counsel. The court also denied his motion for a new trial, finding the evidence against him, including testimony from co-conspirators and video evidence, sufficient to support the conviction. Lander was sentenced to 360 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court held that Lander's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, as he appeared to understand the situation despite his claims of intoxication and sleep deprivation. The court also found that Lander's request for his partner was not a clear and unequivocal request for an attorney. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of Lander's motion for a new trial, noting that the testimony of cooperating witnesses was consistent and corroborated by other evidence. Finally, the court found no error in the district court's sentencing calculation and determined that the 360-month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Lander" on Justia Law

Wilbur Morrison, Jr. was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in Indian territory and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment for the sexual abuse counts and 120 months for the assault count, to run concurrently. The court also imposed concurrent supervised release terms of five years for the sexual abuse counts and three years for the assault count, but the written judgment incorrectly stated five years for all counts.Morrison appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a forensic interview and accompanying testimony, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the sexual abuse counts, that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, and that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the forensic interview under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, as it had sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Morrison’s convictions for both counts of aggravated sexual abuse, based on the testimonies of the children and the medical evidence presented. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Morrison to 480 months’ imprisonment, as it properly considered the relevant factors.However, the court agreed with Morrison that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding the terms of supervised release. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions on the admission of evidence, the convictions, and the sentence of imprisonment, but vacated the terms of supervised release and remanded the case for the district court to amend its written judgment to conform to its oral pronouncement. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2022, law enforcement in Illinois and Iowa investigated Kpangbala Benyan Blamah after two shooting incidents involving vehicles linked to him. On June 27, a black Toyota Camry was involved in a shooting in Rock Island, Illinois. On August 4, a shooting occurred in Davenport, Iowa, involving a vehicle registered to Blamah’s ex-girlfriend. On August 7, officers observed the Camry at Blamah’s ex-girlfriend’s residence, leading to a chase where Blamah fled, leaving behind a loaded Glock 9mm handgun and several iPhones. A search of the Camry revealed marijuana, a digital scale, and packaging material. Further investigation linked Blamah to drug trafficking activities, including shipping packages containing cocaine from California to Iowa.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa convicted Blamah of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. The jury found the conspiracy involved five or more kilograms of cocaine. Blamah was sentenced to 360 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of evidence from the two shootings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the conspiracy involved more than five kilograms of cocaine, based on intercepted packages, testimony, and text messages. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the firearm possession conviction, noting the proximity of firearms to drugs and expert testimony on the use of firearms in drug trafficking. The court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence from the shootings, as it was intrinsic to the charged offenses. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Blamah" on Justia Law

In late October 2021, Shamsa Issack was sitting in her car in Fargo, North Dakota, when a man, later identified as Sharmake Mohamed Abdullahi, approached her with a gun and forced her to drive to Moorhead, Minnesota. After attempting to withdraw money from an ATM unsuccessfully, Abdullahi took Issack's cell phone and fled. Issack sought help from bank employees, who called the police. Abdullahi was later arrested and charged with state robbery and kidnapping.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota admitted Issack's statements to bank employees as excited utterances and allowed the jury to hear part of a recording of Issack's conversation with police before striking it from the record. Abdullahi's motion for a mistrial was denied, and he was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and attempted witness tampering. The district court sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the kidnapping conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Abdullahi's actions constituted kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). However, the court vacated the attempted witness tampering conviction, concluding that the government failed to prove that Abdullahi contemplated a particular, foreseeable federal proceeding when he made phone calls from state custody. The court held that Abdullahi's actions did not meet the statutory definition of attempted witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) and 2. View "United States v. Abdullahi" on Justia Law

Michael Kay was convicted after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Kay had hidden the firearm in the trunk of his vehicle before his arrest and imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, despite the defense's objection. Kay was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Kay challenged the imposition of the § 3C1.1 enhancement, arguing that his pre-investigative conduct was not "likely to thwart" the investigation of the offense, as required by application note 1 in the commentary to § 3C1.1.The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially reviewed the case. The court found that Kay's act of hiding the firearm in the trunk was sufficient to warrant the obstruction of justice enhancement. The court noted that Kay's conduct was purposefully calculated to obstruct justice and that the firearm was hidden in a manner that was likely to thwart the investigation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Kay's conduct was likely to thwart the investigation. The Tenth Circuit noted that the firearm was hidden behind multiple barriers in the trunk, and the officers only discovered it after Kay's son directed them to the trunk. The court concluded that the district court's finding was plausible and permissible in light of the entire record, and thus, the obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1 was appropriately applied. View "United States v. Kay" on Justia Law

Defendants Jibril Adamu and Jean-Claude Okongo Landji were involved in an international narcotics trafficking conspiracy, using a private aircraft to transport cocaine from South America to Africa and Europe. Landji owned an aviation charter business and Adamu was his co-pilot. They were arrested in Croatia in 2018 after flying a test shipment of cocaine. Their cell phones, containing incriminating evidence, were seized. Both defendants were extradited to the United States and charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted both defendants following a jury trial. They were sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The defendants appealed, arguing that the government lacked jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 959, violated their Sixth Amendment rights by using privileged information, and erred in admitting data extracted from their cell phones.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 21 U.S.C. § 959 applies extraterritorially, affirming the government’s jurisdiction. It also found no Sixth Amendment violation, as the district court correctly determined that the government did not use privileged information in its prosecution. The court concluded that the cell phone data was properly authenticated and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court noted that any potential error in admitting the cell phone data was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the convictions and sentences of both defendants. View "United States v. Adamu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, American service members and civilians injured or killed in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, along with their family members, sued Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), and Danske Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). They alleged that the banks aided and abetted terrorist organizations by providing banking services to customers involved in tax fraud and money laundering schemes, with proceeds allegedly funding terrorist activities. Plaintiffs also claimed SCB aided the attacks by providing banking services to fertilizer companies whose products were used to make bombs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient nexus between the banks' actions and the terrorist acts that caused their injuries. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that further amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, which clarified the pleading standard for aiding-and-abetting claims under JASTA. The court held that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the banks were generally aware of their role in the terrorist activities or that they provided knowing and substantial assistance to the terrorist organizations. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' allegations were too attenuated and speculative to support a claim of aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. View "Wildman v. Deutsche Bank" on Justia Law

Pedro Hernandez, a New York State prisoner, was convicted of the 1979 kidnapping and murder of six-year-old Etan Patz. The case hinged on Hernandez's confessions, as there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime. Hernandez, who has a history of mental illness and low IQ, initially confessed to the crime after seven hours of unwarned questioning by police. After this confession, he was given Miranda warnings and repeated his confession on video. He later confessed again to an Assistant District Attorney.Hernandez's first trial ended in a hung jury. In his second trial, the jury convicted him of felony murder and kidnapping but acquitted him of intentional murder. During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court if they must disregard Hernandez's post-Miranda confessions if they found his initial unwarned confession involuntary. The trial court answered "no," without further explanation. Hernandez appealed, arguing that this instruction violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, which addresses the admissibility of confessions obtained through a two-step interrogation process.The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court's instruction was correct and that any error was harmless. Hernandez's petition for habeas relief was denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which found the trial court's instruction erroneous but concluded that the error was harmless under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's instruction was contrary to clearly established federal law under Seibert and that the error was not harmless. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for the conditional granting of the writ, ordering Hernandez's release unless the state affords him a new trial within a reasonable period. View "Hernandez v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Sergey Danshin was charged with the murder of Javier Gonzalez-Mena, which occurred outside a hotel room in Montgomery County, Maryland. Danshin claimed he acted in defense of Christina Jones, who he believed was in imminent danger from Gonzalez-Mena. Danshin's recorded statement to the police, introduced by the State at trial, indicated that he shot Gonzalez-Mena because he believed Jones was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that his actions were necessary to protect her.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied Danshin's request to instruct the jury on the defense of others, concluding there was no evidence of an imminent threat to Jones. The jury convicted Danshin of first-degree premeditated murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and illegal possession of a firearm. Danshin's motion for a new trial was denied.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the conviction, holding that there was not "some evidence" to support the defense of others instruction because Danshin denied shooting Gonzalez-Mena. The court relied on the precedent that inconsistent defenses, such as denying the act while claiming justification, do not warrant such an instruction.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that there was some evidence to support the defense of others instruction. The court noted that Danshin's statements to the police provided sufficient evidence that he believed Jones was in imminent danger and that his actions were necessary to protect her. The court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a new trial, instructing the lower court to provide the jury with the defense of others instruction. View "Danshin v. State" on Justia Law