Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of health care fraud after participating in a scheme involving fraudulent prescriptions and false Medicaid/Medi-Cal billing. The conviction, which involved a loss exceeding $10,000, rendered him removable from the United States. He claimed that his attorneys gave him incorrect or incomplete advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Despite being informed by both the sentencing judge in 2003 and a U.S. immigration official in 2007 that his conviction could lead to removal, he did not seek to vacate his conviction until many years later.After removal proceedings began in 2008, the defendant waited until 2016 to file his first petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition due to unreasonable delay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial in 2020, finding the delay between 2014 and 2016 unjustified. The first petition focused on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at sentencing.In 2021, the defendant filed a second coram nobis petition in the same district court, this time alleging ineffective assistance by three different attorneys, including the one who handled his first petition. The district court denied the second petition, finding it barred by laches due to prejudicial delay, as key witnesses had died and evidence had been lost. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was prejudiced by the delay and that the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in seeking relief, given that he was on notice of the immigration consequences years earlier. View "USA V. KROYTOR" on Justia Law

A defendant was arrested in 2017 on charges related to promoting and possessing a sexual performance by a child. Bail was initially set, but the defendant was unable to post it and remained in custody. He was convicted at trial and sentenced to prison. On direct appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding ineffective assistance of counsel, though the conviction was otherwise supported by sufficient evidence. The People’s appeal of that reversal is still pending. After the conviction was reversed, the defendant applied for a new securing order under the amended bail law, which now requires courts to make an individualized determination of flight risk and to explain the basis for their decision and choice of securing order.At the new bail hearing, the defendant argued he was not a flight risk, citing his lack of prior convictions, his desire to clear his name, and his intent to return to work. The prosecution argued for continued remand, referencing the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood of prevailing on appeal. The Supreme Court ordered continued remand but did not explicitly find the defendant to be a flight risk or explain its reasoning, merely stating it had considered statutory factors and that remand was the least restrictive means to assure the defendant’s return.The defendant’s counsel filed a habeas petition in the Appellate Division, arguing that the remand order violated statutory requirements. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ, finding no violation of constitutional or statutory standards. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by failing to make the required individualized flight risk determination and to explain its reasoning as mandated by CPL 510.10. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded for issuance of a new securing order in compliance with the statute. View "People ex rel. Kon v. Maginley-Liddie" on Justia Law

A nineteen-year-old man was convicted for his involvement in two murders in Wyoming. He was sentenced in 2006 to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, following a jury trial in which he was acquitted of one count of first-degree murder but convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder for the other offenses. The crimes involved the killing of a roommate and a sixteen-year-old, with the defendant playing a significant role in both. At sentencing, the jury declined to impose the death penalty and instead issued mandatory life without parole sentences, as required by Wyoming law at the time.After his direct appeal was denied by the Wyoming Supreme Court, the defendant filed a motion in 2024 to correct his sentences, arguing that mandatory life without parole for “emerging adults” (those aged eighteen to twenty-one) is unconstitutional under both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions. He claimed that new scientific evidence and evolving legal standards, particularly those established in Miller v. Alabama and related U.S. Supreme Court cases, should extend protections against mandatory life without parole to offenders in his age group. The District Court of Campbell County denied his motion, finding that the relevant constitutional protections and precedents did not apply to adults over eighteen.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Wyoming Constitution does not provide broader categorical protections for “emerging adults” than the Eighth Amendment. It concluded that the state’s constitutional provisions on cruel or unusual punishment and on the penal code’s humane principles do not prohibit mandatory life without parole sentences for offenders over eighteen. The court also found no violation of equal protection or entitlement to a new sentencing hearing. The holding clarified that, while Wyoming’s constitution is distinct from the federal constitution, it does not require categorical relief for emerging adults sentenced to life without parole. View "Hicks v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Victor Allen Smith was involved in a fatal collision on March 6, 2022, in Gwinnett County, Georgia, after attempting to evade a Georgia State Patrol trooper during a high-speed pursuit. Smith, driving a silver sports car, made improper lane changes and exceeded the speed limit, reaching speeds estimated at over 120 miles per hour. While fleeing, Smith’s vehicle veered onto the interstate shoulder where Hugo Nathaniel Martinez was waiting for his truck to be towed. Smith’s car struck and killed Martinez, who died from severe blunt-force injuries. Smith exhibited signs of intoxication at the scene, and subsequent toxicology tests revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.188. Evidence also showed that Smith’s driver’s license had been suspended since 2004.Smith was indicted by a Gwinnett County grand jury on multiple charges, including felony murder, homicide by vehicle, aggravated assault, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, driving under the influence, and other traffic offenses. Prior to trial, certain counts were dismissed, including driving while license suspended. At trial in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, the jury found Smith guilty on all remaining counts. Smith was sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder, with additional concurrent sentences for other offenses. After the trial court denied his motion for a new trial, Smith appealed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Smith’s sole claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his suspended driver’s license. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the evidence may have been erroneous but found any error harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of Smith’s guilt and the minimal role the license suspension played at trial. The Court affirmed Smith’s convictions. View "SMITH v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a shooting that occurred on March 15, 2022, in Griffin, Georgia, resulting in the death of Wildarius Draggs and the assault of Rayshon Goodrum. Surveillance footage showed that Draggs and Goodrum were sitting on a porch when a car containing Isaac Reid, Kinesa Harvey, DeQuivon McMullin, and Cameron Barkley drove by. Later, Reid, McMullin, and Barkley exited the car, walked behind a nearby house, and shortly thereafter, shots were fired at Draggs and Goodrum. Barkley, a co-defendant, testified that Reid fired the shots, motivated by the belief that a rival gang member was present. Physical evidence included shell casings at the scene and a photograph of a gold gun allegedly used in the shooting. Draggs died from his injuries, and Goodrum survived.The Superior Court of Spalding County conducted a joint trial for Reid, Harvey, and McMullin. The jury acquitted Harvey of all charges, found Reid guilty of malice murder and other offenses (but not guilty on one gang-related count), and found McMullin guilty of aggravated battery and felony murder predicated on that battery. Reid was sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive sentences for aggravated assault and a gang violation. Reid filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. He then appealed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after it was transferred from the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient under federal due process standards to support Reid’s convictions, finding that the jury could reasonably conclude Reid was the shooter based on the surveillance footage, testimony, and corroborating evidence. The Court also found that the statutory requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony was met. The denial of Reid’s motion for new trial was affirmed, and his convictions were upheld. View "REID v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

On the night of January 3, 2016, the defendant, along with two accomplices, planned and executed a burglary at the home of a family friend. The group traveled together to the residence, where they confronted the victim, Caleb Short, outside the house. The defendant and another accomplice forcibly subdued and bound Caleb with tape, then moved him to the backyard. Subsequently, the group entered the house, stole various items including vehicles, and left the scene. The next morning, law enforcement discovered the bodies of Caleb, his mother, and his niece, all of whom had suffered fatal injuries. Evidence linked the defendant to the stolen property and to actions taken before, during, and after the crimes.A Muscogee County grand jury indicted the defendant and his accomplices on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, kidnapping, burglary, and theft by taking. At trial in the Superior Court of Muscogee County, the defendant’s co-defendants pleaded guilty, and the jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder (as to Caleb), kidnapping, burglary, and theft by taking, but could not reach a verdict on other counts, leading to a mistrial on those. The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole and additional concurrent and consecutive terms. The defendant’s motion for new trial was denied, and after procedural delays, he filed a timely appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, including as a party to the crimes. It found no abuse of discretion in admitting post-incision autopsy photographs, giving an Allen charge to the jury, denying a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, or refusing to impanel a new jury after the co-defendants pleaded guilty. The Court concluded that none of the alleged errors warranted reversal. View "BURKS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Michael Riley in his home on June 30, 2013. Police investigation revealed that Riley’s wife, Antoinette Riley, and her daughter, Katrina Ledford, were involved in a plot to kill Riley, with Tarell Momon, who was incarcerated and romantically involved with Ledford, allegedly orchestrating the murder. Cell phone records showed extensive communication between Momon, Ledford, and Antoinette, as well as with two other individuals, Terrance Griswould and Travis Berrian, who were implicated as co-conspirators. The evidence included text messages indicating planning and coordination of the murder, and testimony about Momon’s gang affiliation and prison conduct.A Bulloch County grand jury indicted Momon, Griswould, Ledford, and Antoinette Riley for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Ledford and Antoinette pleaded guilty, while Momon and Griswould were tried together. The jury found Momon guilty of murder but acquitted him of the firearm charge; Griswould was acquitted on all counts. Momon was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court after several amendments and delays.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Momon’s appeal, in which he argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to make certain evidentiary objections and that the cumulative effect of these alleged errors denied him a fair trial. The court held that Momon failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by his counsel or resulting prejudice under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the challenged evidence was either admissible, cumulative, or not prejudicial, and that counsel’s decisions were within the bounds of reasonable trial strategy. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "MOMON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was charged with malice murder and related offenses after fatally stabbing a man with whom he had no prior relationship. On the day of the incident, the accused exhibited unusual behavior at work, left the premises, and later entered a bank where he appeared confused and reported hearing voices. After a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation, the accused was taken to a hospital and subsequently to a behavioral health facility. There, detectives interviewed him, and he admitted to the killing, describing delusional beliefs and auditory hallucinations. Forensic evidence linked him to the crime, and expert testimony at trial addressed his mental state, with differing opinions on whether his psychosis was drug-induced and whether he could distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense.A Catoosa County grand jury indicted the accused on multiple counts, including malice murder. After a jury trial, he was found guilty but mentally ill of malice murder and other charges. The trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole for malice murder and additional consecutive time for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The court vacated the felony murder count by operation of law and merged the aggravated assault count. The accused filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellant argued that his statements to law enforcement at the behavioral health facility should have been suppressed because he was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings, and that the trial court erred in refusing certain jury instructions related to his insanity defense and voluntary intoxication. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the appellant was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the interview, and that the trial court’s jury instructions adequately covered the applicable law. The court affirmed the convictions. View "GRAVITT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two brothers, Matthew and Shane, involving a $445,000 debt that Matthew owed to Shane. After learning that the government intended to recover over $1 million from him due to unrelated criminal charges, Matthew convinced Shane to allow him to create a company in Shane’s name to shield assets. Later, Matthew orchestrated a real estate transaction through this company, Cap Fund 783, LLC, resulting in a $767,000 assignment fee. Matthew attempted to divert these proceeds to himself by lying to the escrow agent and falsifying business records online to make it appear he controlled Cap Fund, thereby concealing the asset from Shane.The United States District Court for the District of Utah presided over Matthew’s trial. A jury convicted him on two counts of wire fraud, based on his phone call to the escrow agent and his online alteration of Cap Fund’s records. The district court also found him guilty, after a bench trial, of criminal contempt and possession of ammunition by a felon. Matthew was sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. He appealed, arguing that his actions did not deprive Shane or the escrow agent of property, that the district court erred by not admitting a state-court judgment, and that the government failed to prove the interstate element for one wire fraud count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction for wire fraud related to the phone call, holding that a creditor’s right to collect a debt is a property interest under the wire fraud statute, and that the escrow agent also had a property interest in the funds. The court reversed the conviction on the count involving the online alteration, finding insufficient evidence that the communication crossed state lines. The court affirmed the convictions for criminal contempt and felon-in-possession, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law