Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Victor Yoel Perez Cremades was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package containing nearly four pounds of methamphetamine and over 1,200 fentanyl-laced pills, addressed to a Tampa residence linked to Cremades. Upon searching the home, agents found additional drugs, cash, receipts for wire transfers to Nogales, Arizona (the package's origin), and a handwritten note referencing the transfer. Most identifying documents and mail within the house belonged to Cremades, and only he and his daughter were known to reside there.Following trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the jury found Cremades guilty on both counts. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Cremades appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a “drug ledger” into evidence without proper foundation or relevance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the de novo standard for sufficiency of evidence and abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings, the court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Cremades on both possession and conspiracy counts. The court further determined that, even if admitting the drug ledger was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both convictions and the district court’s rulings. View "USA v. Cremades" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a series of crimes that began when he picked up an acquaintance from a motel and, instead of taking her home, brought her to his house where he and his girlfriend assaulted her. During the assault, the defendant’s girlfriend held the victim at gunpoint with the defendant’s shotgun. The defendant subsequently forced the victim into the trunk of his car, drove her to the motel, and confronted another individual in a motel room, threatening him and stealing his possessions as well as his car keys. The defendant and his girlfriend then left the scene, with the stolen items and the shotgun in the original car, and the defendant driving the stolen car. During their flight, the victim managed to escape, and law enforcement later apprehended the defendant and recovered both the shotgun and the stolen property.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of several offenses, including carjacking, robbery in Indian Country, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The defendant moved for acquittal on the § 924(c)(1)(A) count, arguing insufficient evidence that he carried a firearm during the robberies because he did not have the shotgun on his person during the “taking” phase of the offenses. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found the defendant guilty, specifying that he carried (but did not use) the firearm during the robberies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court held that “carrying” under § 924(c)(1)(A) includes constructive possession and transportation of a firearm during the commission or flight from a continuing offense such as robbery. The court concluded that evidence supported the jury’s verdict, as the defendant constructively carried the firearm during his escape from the robberies. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. McHenry" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was observed by law enforcement in the parking lot of a hotel known for illegal activity. The officer identified the defendant as the owner of a station wagon and a convicted felon with outstanding arrest warrants. Upon seeing the officers, the defendant refused to exit his vehicle and attempted to hide items, then fled at high speed, leading police on a dangerous chase before crashing and fleeing on foot. After his arrest, officers found a holster in the car and, following a search, discovered a loaded .38 Special revolver hidden behind a loose dashboard panel. The gun was determined to be stolen. The defendant was charged with fleeing to elude arrest, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a stolen firearm.At trial in the Superior Court of Brunswick County, the defendant moved to dismiss the firearm charges for insufficient evidence, arguing that the State had not shown he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant on all charges. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence—specifically the defendant’s flight, the gun’s concealment, and his misrepresentations about the firearm—was sufficient for a rational juror to infer knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the gun was stolen. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the evidence as insufficient on the knowledge element.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the issue of whether substantial evidence supported the defendant’s knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe the firearm was stolen. The Supreme Court held that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented met the substantial evidence standard, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss. View "State v. Bracey" on Justia Law

The case involves a fatal shooting that occurred outside the defendant’s residence, where the defendant admitted to shooting and killing Brandon Adams. The incident unfolded after Adams, following a dispute with his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers, went to the defendant’s home. Tensions escalated between Adams and Rodgers, leading the defendant to ask Adams to leave. Later, after a series of confrontational encounters and threatening messages from Adams, Adams attempted to force his way into the defendant’s home. The defendant, after a physical struggle at the doorway and observing Adams make a sudden movement, fatally shot Adams. The defendant was subsequently charged and went to trial, asserting a defense under North Carolina’s castle doctrine.A jury in the Superior Court of Burke County convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 144 to 185 months in prison. At trial, the defendant requested an instruction on the castle doctrine. The trial court gave a pattern instruction on defense of habitation but did not instruct the jury that the curtilage of the home is protected under the statute. The jury also received instructions that allowed it to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in imminent harm and the necessity of the force used.On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error, holding that the State presented substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of reasonable fear and that the jury instruction was proper.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the correct application of the castle doctrine statute, specifically whether the statutory presumption of reasonable fear could be rebutted by circumstances not listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). The Supreme Court held that the statutory presumption may only be rebutted by the five circumstances enumerated in the statute. Because the jury instructions failed to reflect this, and likely affected the trial’s outcome, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Allison" on Justia Law

The case involved a business owner who operated an event rental company in Asheville, North Carolina. On May 17, 2021, while driving a company vehicle with an employee as a passenger, the owner encountered a man who was locally known for panhandling with his cat, Thomas, usually in a stroller. After a brief interaction in which the driver harassed the man by flicking a golf ball at him, the driver drove onto a grassy area and struck the stroller with the cat inside. Witnesses saw the incident, and the cat was shaken but not physically harmed. Police investigation soon focused on the event rental company’s trucks and driver records. When asked by police about driver documentation, the owner first denied having records, then claimed ignorance about who drove the truck, and eventually law enforcement discovered that the physical copy of the key scheduling document for May 17 was missing, though a digital copy was later found on the owner’s phone.The Superior Court in Buncombe County denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss charges of felony obstruction of justice and felony cruelty to animals. The jury found him guilty on both counts. On appeal, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding there was sufficient evidence to submit both charges to the jury. The majority used a “knew or should have known” standard for the cruelty to animals charge, while the dissent argued the obstruction charge should have been dismissed due to lack of legal obligation to retain documents and absence of effective obstruction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the motions to dismiss, holding that substantial evidence supported both charges. Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified that the felony cruelty to animals statute requires proof of actual knowledge—not just what the defendant should have known—regarding the presence of an animal. The Court modified the Court of Appeals’ analysis accordingly but affirmed the result. View "State v. Ford" on Justia Law

A forty-year-old man was convicted by a jury of three counts of taking indecent liberties with a thirteen-year-old girl. The charges stemmed from separate instances on a single morning: kissing the girl on the neck outside his van, kissing her on the mouth inside the van, and kissing her on the mouth a second time inside the van—these last two kisses were separated by a six-to-seven-minute interval during which the defendant and the girl engaged in conversation and joking. The defendant denied any sexual acts beyond kissing, while the girl and two neighbors who witnessed parts of the encounter provided differing accounts. The jury acquitted the defendant of additional charges, including statutory sex offenses and kidnapping.Following conviction in Wake County Superior Court, the defendant appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, concluded that the three kisses did not constitute three sufficiently distinct acts to support three separate convictions for indecent liberties with a child. The appellate court reasoned that only two acts were distinct enough—those occurring outside the van and the first inside the van—so it reversed one conviction, remanded for judgment to be arrested on that count, and ordered resentencing. The dissent argued that all three acts were sufficiently separate for conviction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the lower appellate court erred in drawing a threshold distinction between “touching” and “sexual acts” and by applying the wrong legal test for multiplicity. Instead, the Supreme Court clarified that the correct standard is whether a “distinct interruption” occurred between acts. Applying this test, it held that the six-to-seven-minute interval between the two kisses inside the van was sufficient to constitute separate acts. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating all three convictions. View "State v. Calderon" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, arising from the killings of two victims in August 2001. After pleading guilty to all charges in 2004, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without parole for the murders, as well as concurrent sentences for the robbery and conspiracy convictions. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, the defendant sought resentencing, and his case eventually returned to the trial court for resentencing under North Carolina’s Miller-fix statute.After multiple appeals, including a key decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina (Kelliher I) holding that consecutive life with parole sentences for juvenile offenders violating North Carolina’s constitution, the trial court was instructed to enter two concurrent sentences of life with parole for the murder charges. On remand, the trial court imposed two concurrent life with parole sentences for murder, but also ordered the sentences for the robbery convictions to run consecutively to the murder sentences. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded the scope of the Supreme Court’s mandate. The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed and remanded with instructions for the resentencing court to only change the murder sentences from consecutive to concurrent.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that its prior mandate in Kelliher I required only that the murder sentences be made concurrent, leaving the resentencing court with de novo authority over the remaining convictions. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in running the robbery sentences consecutively, so long as the total sentence complied with the forty-year limitation established in Kelliher I. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the 31 March 2023 judgments were reinstated. View "State v. Kelliher" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

In the early morning of May 27, 2021, Aaron Shepherd and his wife, Megan, were collecting scrap metal in Topeka when they encountered a Chevy Trailblazer driven by Brandon Croskey, with Jeremy Volle as a passenger. After a confrontation at a car wash, Croskey called Volle for backup. The SUV chased Shepherd’s car, and during the pursuit, Shepherd exited his vehicle. A single gunshot fired from the Trailblazer struck Shepherd, who later died. Investigation and witness statements led police to Croskey and Volle. Croskey identified Volle as the shooter, while Volle claimed Croskey fired the shot. The State charged Volle with criminal possession of a weapon, first-degree felony murder, and premeditated murder, with the felony-murder count predicated on criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.The case was tried in the Shawnee District Court, where both Croskey and Volle testified, each implicating the other. Croskey had previously pleaded guilty to related charges and testified for the State. Volle was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, reckless second-degree murder (as a lesser included offense), and criminal possession of a firearm. Before sentencing, Volle moved to be sentenced for reckless second-degree murder, arguing it was more specific than felony murder. The district court denied the motion, merged the murder convictions, and sentenced Volle to life without parole for felony murder.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, Volle raised multiple trial and sentencing errors, including claims of improper evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, sufficiency of evidence, and cumulative error. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the search warrants and evidence suppression rulings were proper, the aiding and abetting instruction was factually appropriate, and there were no cumulative errors. The court affirmed that sufficient evidence supported Volle’s felony-murder conviction and ruled that sentencing for felony murder, not reckless second-degree murder, was correct. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Volle " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant committed crimes in Kansas in February 2016 and later pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, the presentence investigation report counted a prior Illinois conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm as a person felony, which affected the defendant’s criminal history score and sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that the Illinois law on third-party liability was broader than Kansas law and that this should preclude the Illinois conviction from being counted as a person felony under Kansas law.The Saline District Court rejected the defendant’s argument and classified the Illinois conviction as a person felony, holding that the proper inquiry was whether the elements of the Illinois offense were comparable to a Kansas person felony, not whether the theory of liability in Illinois was broader. The defendant was sentenced accordingly and appealed. The Kansas Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court, reasoning that neither state treats third-party liability as a separate crime and that the conviction itself, not the underlying theory of liability, should be compared. The panel found the Illinois aggravated discharge statute was at least as narrow as, if not narrower than, the comparable Kansas statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals and the district court. The court held that, for crimes committed before May 23, 2019, the proper method is to compare the elements of the out-of-state offense with the Kansas offense. The court concluded that the Illinois crime of aggravated discharge of a firearm is comparable to Kansas’ criminal discharge of a firearm and should be classified as a person offense. The court further held that sentencing courts are not required to consider theories of liability, such as aiding and abetting, when conducting this comparability analysis. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law