Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who, as a member of the Osage Nation, was previously convicted in Oklahoma state courts of several offenses, all committed in areas recognized as Indian country. In 2013, she was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington County. She was subsequently convicted in Mayes County in 2016 for possessing methamphetamine and a firearm, and again in Tulsa County in 2016 for possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as impersonation. In each proceeding, she was represented by counsel. Later, she was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances after a DEA investigation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma calculated her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by including her three prior state convictions in her Criminal History Category. The defendant objected, arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her because she is Native American and the offenses occurred in Indian country. The district court overruled her objection, noting the convictions had not been vacated or reversed by any Oklahoma court and were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel. The district court ultimately sentenced her after applying a downward variance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in including the prior state convictions in the Criminal History calculation. The Tenth Circuit held that, under federal law and United States Sentencing Guidelines, prior state convictions must be counted unless they have been vacated, reversed, or were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. The court found no exception for convictions alleged to be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent their invalidation by the convicting court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud. From inside a Georgia prison, he and others targeted women in the medical profession, convincing them by phone that they had failed to appear in court and faced arrest unless they paid a bond. The scheme involved spoofing local police department phone numbers, impersonating police officers, meticulous research of victims, and coordinating with coconspirators outside the prison to collect money at bail bond companies. Over two years, two dozen victims across the country were defrauded, including some in the Southern District of Iowa.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa calculated a sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 130–162 months, applying enhancements for “sophisticated means,” impersonating police officers, and for the defendant’s leadership role in a conspiracy involving at least five participants. The court denied a motion for a downward departure, finding that the defendant’s criminal history category was not substantially over-represented. The defendant challenged the application of the enhancements and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, arguing that the scheme was not sufficiently sophisticated, that applying both enhancements for impersonation and sophistication was double counting, and that he was not an organizer or leader.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the scheme was sufficiently sophisticated to warrant the enhancement, that applying both enhancements did not constitute double counting, and that the defendant’s role justified the leadership enhancement. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s assessment of criminal history and concluded the sentence was reasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

Adam Blocker used Dropbox, a cloud storage service, to share files, some of which contained child pornography. Dropbox detected these illegal files through its own monitoring, as permitted by its terms of service, and reported them to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Following this report, NCMEC notified federal authorities, which led the FBI to obtain a search warrant for Blocker’s digital storage. The subsequent search uncovered additional illegal images. Blocker pleaded guilty to two counts related to possession and distribution of child pornography, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Dropbox and his devices.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Judge Lee denied Blocker’s suppression motion. The court concluded that Blocker had consented to Dropbox’s search and disclosure of his files by agreeing to its terms of service. Blocker argued that the terms were not specific or clear enough to constitute voluntary consent, especially because NCMEC is a government-affiliated entity. After Judge Lee’s elevation to the appellate court, the case was transferred to Chief Judge Kendall, who oversaw Blocker’s sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Blocker’s acceptance of Dropbox’s terms of service constituted effective consent for Dropbox to scan his files and disclose them for certain purposes, including reporting to authorities. The court rejected Blocker’s argument that the consent was invalid because the terms did not obligate Dropbox to search every file or regularly disclose information. The Seventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding of consent, and thus upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Blocker" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and other offenses, and was sentenced to life without parole. After his conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals, he sought postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel due to a conflict with the Public Defender’s Office. Postconviction counsel discovered that large portions of the pretrial discovery materials were missing from prior counsel’s file. When attempts to obtain the missing materials from the prosecution were met with instructions to request them through the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (CCJRA) and pay associated fees, counsel instead moved the district court to compel disclosure of the discovery.The Jefferson County District Court denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to order discovery in postconviction proceedings except in death penalty cases, and relying on prior Colorado Supreme Court cases such as People v. Silva-Jaquez and People v. Owens. The district court concluded that neither the rules, statutes, nor the Constitution provided a basis to compel postconviction discovery outside of those limited situations.The Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, reviewed the case as an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21. The court held that if an indigent defendant seeking postconviction relief shows that specific facts likely contained in pretrial discovery—which is unavailable to current counsel—would help substantiate claims for relief, the postconviction court should order the prosecution to provide a free copy of the requested duplicate discovery. The court further held that postconviction counsel is not required to rely on the CCJRA process, as it does not guarantee access to complete, unredacted discovery and may impose unjustified financial burdens. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute, reversed the district court’s denial, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Bell" on Justia Law

Eric Bernard Hills was convicted of malice murder and other crimes connected to the shooting death of Branden Lewis in Lewis’s former residence. At the time, Lewis was separated from his wife, Destiney Lewis, who was involved in a romantic relationship with Hills. On the morning of the incident, Destiney instructed Hills to avoid Lewis, but after Lewis left, she signaled Hills to return. Lewis unexpectedly returned to retrieve his firearm, entered the house, and confronted Destiney and Hills in the bedroom. Hills shot Lewis six times and was subsequently arrested at the scene. Hills admitted to the shooting during a police interview, stating he acted after Lewis “raised his hand” at him.A Chatham County grand jury indicted Hills on multiple counts, and following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Hills was found guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus five consecutive years for possession of a firearm during a felony. Hills filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Hills’s claim that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Applying plain error review, the Court held that the trial court did not err because there was no evidence that Hills acted solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion from serious provocation. The evidence only indicated Hills acted out of fear or in self-defense, not anger or passion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment and convictions against Hills. View "HILLS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Anthony Faison was indicted for several offenses, including three counts of felony murder related to the shooting death of Curtis Johnson during an attempt to recover a fugitive, Edward Atkins, in Henry County, Georgia. Faison, a licensed bail recovery agent, had his authorization to operate in Henry County revoked by the county sheriff prior to the incident due to unrelated pending charges. Despite the revocation, Faison participated in an effort, commissioned by a Florida bail bond agency, to locate and apprehend Atkins, who was believed to be staying at an apartment complex in Henry County. Faison was accompanied by another bail recovery agent, Johnson, and his son Romello. During their attempt to enter the apartment, a confrontation occurred, and Johnson was shot and killed by Atkins, who then took his own life.The Superior Court of Henry County held an evidentiary hearing on Faison’s motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which allows immunity for justified use of force. The court granted Faison immunity, finding that the sheriff lacked authority to revoke his bail recovery agent status, and therefore Faison was acting lawfully in his capacity at the time of the incident.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had applied the wrong legal analysis. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not specify which statutory basis under OCGA § 16-3-20 supported its grant of immunity, nor did it analyze whether Faison’s conduct met the requirements of any of the statute’s provisions. As a result, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the proper statutory analysis. View "THE STATE v. FAISON" on Justia Law

The case concerns a workplace shooting in Forsyth County, Georgia, where Peavy confronted his coworker Darwin regarding alleged disparaging remarks. After a physical altercation in which Darwin punched Peavy, Peavy walked to his car, pursued by Darwin. Upon reaching his car, Peavy retrieved a gun and fired at Darwin multiple times, while Darwin, also armed, returned fire, striking Peavy. Peavy admitted to shooting Darwin, who later died of his wounds. At trial, testimony included statements from a fellow inmate about Peavy’s motive and actions, and Peavy argued justification, alternatively seeking a voluntary manslaughter conviction.A Forsyth County grand jury indicted Peavy on several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After a jury trial, Peavy was acquitted of malice murder and one count of firearm possession but convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and another firearm possession count. The trial court sentenced Peavy to life imprisonment plus five years. Peavy filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the Superior Court of Forsyth County, and then appealed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Peavy’s claims and rejected each. The Court held that the verdict form and jury instructions did not violate Edge v. State or constitute an improper sequential instruction, as they allowed consideration of voluntary manslaughter in any order. The exclusion of Peavy’s expert witness testimony was upheld, as the trial court acted within its discretion under Georgia’s Rule 702, finding the testimony irrelevant and not helpful to the jury. The Court also found no plain error or constitutional violation in this exclusion. Lastly, Peavy’s argument that the guilty verdicts were repugnant was dismissed, as there were no affirmative findings by the jury rendering the verdicts logically incompatible. The judgment was affirmed. View "PEAVY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

A man and his wife were involved in a longstanding property dispute with a neighbor, which escalated after the neighbor began harvesting wood from land adjacent to the couple’s home. On the day of the incident, law enforcement was called by the wife to address what she believed was trespassing. Officers determined that the property in question did not belong to the couple, and advised them the matter was civil, not criminal. The husband became increasingly frustrated and angry during the officers’ visit, expressing that the dispute would end that day and referencing a possible shoot-out. Shortly after leaving the sheriff’s office, he encountered the neighbor and two others on the disputed property and fired multiple gunshots, fatally wounding the neighbor and shooting at the other two men. The deceased was unarmed according to multiple witnesses. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense, believing the neighbor was reaching for a weapon.The Superior Court of Harris County tried the case before a jury, which found the defendant guilty on all counts, including malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court sentenced him to life without parole plus additional years for the other offenses. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict beyond a reasonable doubt and that the State had adequately disproved the defendant’s justification defense. The court rejected claims of evidentiary and procedural errors, including the admission of autopsy photographs and the prosecutor’s conduct. The court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel. However, it vacated the aggravated assault conviction against the deceased victim, as it merged with the malice murder conviction, and clarified that the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. The convictions and sentences were otherwise affirmed. View "BRYANT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in events that led to the fatal shooting of Wayne Cunningham at the Scottish Inn in DeKalb County, Georgia. On the afternoon of the incident, the defendant, Quindarious Gray, and two unidentified men arrived at the motel in a stolen vehicle. The group, along with Cunningham, entered a motel room, where Cunningham was later shot. After Cunningham fled and collapsed outside, the defendant and the others left the room, attempted to conceal their identities, and departed together in the same stolen car. Physical evidence, including DNA and a firearm, linked the defendant to the scene and the crime. Additional items belonging to Cunningham and the murder weapon were found in a motel room rented by the defendant under an assumed name. Cell phone records demonstrated frequent contact between the defendant and Gray before, during, and after the crime, as well as their close physical proximity.Following an indictment for multiple offenses, the theft and drug counts were severed and later dismissed. After a trial in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, the jury found the defendant guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant was acquitted of other charges. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm offense. The conviction for felony murder was vacated by law, and the aggravated assault conviction merged into the malice murder conviction. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on conspiracy. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that sufficient evidence existed to warrant the conspiracy charge, even though conspiracy was not explicitly charged, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "MERRITT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting that occurred in May 2014 in DeKalb County, Georgia, resulting in the death of a nine-month-old child and non-fatal injuries to three others. The violence was linked to internal retaliation within a gang called Sex Money Murder (“SMM”), a subset of the United Blood Nation. The evidence showed that Kenneth Jackson, also known as “KG,” “Big Homie,” and “Notorious,” was a high-ranking SMM member who, while incarcerated, communicated with other gang members using contraband cell phones. When another gang member, Oslushla Smith, murdered a fellow member without proper authorization, Jackson gave the order (“green light”) to retaliate, resulting in the shooting at Oslushla’s family’s home.Jackson, along with co-defendants, was indicted on charges including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and violations of Georgia’s Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. At the DeKalb County Superior Court, Jackson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life without parole plus 90 consecutive years. His subsequent motion for a new trial was denied, and he timely appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed several claims: the sufficiency of the evidence and corroboration of accomplice testimony, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, and evidentiary rulings regarding gang-related evidence. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient under both Georgia law and constitutional due process, that there was adequate independent corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony, and that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Court further found no plain error in the admission of gang-related evidence and ruled that Jackson’s claim regarding an improper judicial comment was not preserved for appellate review. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "JACKSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law