Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Olayinka Alege, was charged with one count of simple assault and/or battery following an incident at the Edge Fitness club in Warwick, Rhode Island, where he allegedly removed a complaining witness's sock and shoe and massaged his foot without consent. The Warwick Police Department filed a criminal complaint on May 10, 2021, and the defendant was found guilty in the Third Division District Court on April 8, 2022. The case was then transferred to the Superior Court, where a mistrial was declared due to a hung jury. A new trial was scheduled, and the defendant's counsel withdrew, leading to the defendant representing himself.In the Superior Court, the defendant's motion for a Franks hearing was denied. The trial justice found that the statement in the affidavit, which indicated that surveillance video supported the complaining witness's version of events, was not materially false and that the complaining witness's statement alone supported probable cause. The trial justice also granted the state's motion in limine to admit testimony from Alexander Harrington under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, finding it relevant to show intent or plan.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the Franks hearing, as the affidavit contained sufficient content to support probable cause. The Court also upheld the admission of Harrington's testimony, agreeing that it was relevant to show intent or plan and that the trial justice provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury. The Court found no error in the trial justice's denial of the defendant's motion to recuse, noting that the trial justice's actions demonstrated no personal bias or prejudice. Finally, the Court declined to consider the defendant's argument regarding sentencing, as he had not filed a Rule 35 motion and presented no extraordinary circumstances. View "State v. Alege" on Justia Law

Capice Johnson was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, reckless endangering in the first degree, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The incident involved a drive-by shooting in Middletown, Delaware, where a masked man on an orange dirt bike fired at least 17 shots at Siyona Jones and Thomas Haye, critically injuring Jones. Surveillance footage and other evidence, including images from Johnson’s cell phones, linked him to the crime. Johnson was sentenced to 75 years of incarceration, suspended after 30 years for probation.In the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, Johnson was found guilty on all counts except for carrying a concealed deadly weapon without a license. His defense strategy was to create reasonable doubt about the identity of the shooter. The State’s key witness, Detective Joshua Stafford, provided testimony while surveillance videos were played to the jury. Johnson did not request a limiting instruction regarding Stafford’s narration of the videos, and the jury was instructed that they were the sole judges of the facts and witness credibility.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The court held that the trial judge did not err in failing to provide a limiting instruction sua sponte regarding Stafford’s testimony. The court found that Stafford’s testimony was a neutral explanation of the surveillance footage and did not constitute lay-opinion identification testimony. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on their role as fact-finders. Even if the failure to give a limiting instruction was considered an error, it did not rise to the level of plain error that would have affected the outcome of the trial. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Vincent Petrushkin pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The case arose from a sting operation where Petrushkin, along with Randy Holmes and William Burns, went to a Motel 6 in Spokane. Holmes intended to rob someone and obtained a gun from Burns. Petrushkin briefly held the gun before handing it back to Holmes, who then used it in an attempted robbery, shooting an undercover agent. Petrushkin was charged and pled guilty, with a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver for sentences under 12 months and one day, reserving the right to appeal the reasonableness of a longer sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington applied a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1), which allows for a higher base offense level if a firearm is used or possessed in connection with another offense. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 110 to 120 months using this enhancement. Alternatively, it applied a four-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), resulting in a 77 to 96-month range. The court sentenced Petrushkin to 48 months in prison and three years of supervised release. Petrushkin appealed, arguing the enhancement was improperly applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appeal waiver did not preclude Petrushkin from challenging the application of the (c)(1) enhancement. The court determined that both clauses of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) require the government to show that the defendant possessed the firearm in a manner that potentially emboldened or facilitated another offense. The district court did not make such a finding, and the record did not support it. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Petrushkin’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Petrushkin" on Justia Law

Robert Cottier was driving with a suspended license and a high blood alcohol concentration when he collided head-on with Cheryl Cross' vehicle, causing serious injuries to Cross and her passengers. Cottier's passenger, Harold Long Soldier, died from the crash. Cottier was charged with involuntary manslaughter and four counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. He pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge and one count of assault.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota accepted Cottier's guilty plea. The plea agreement included a government recommendation for sentences within the applicable Guideline range to run consecutively. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a total offense level of 21, resulting in a guideline range of 37-46 months. The government’s Sentencing Memorandum recommended a 73-month sentence, which Cottier argued breached the plea agreement. The district court varied upwards and sentenced Cottier to 96 months, explaining the decision was based on the severity of the injuries and Cottier's history of DUI offenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Cottier argued that the government breached the plea agreement by recommending a 73-month sentence. The court found no breach, noting that the government’s final position at the sentencing hearing aligned with the plea agreement. The court also determined that any potential breach in the Sentencing Memorandum did not affect the district court’s decision to impose a 96-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the government honored its plea agreement obligations and that the district court’s sentence was justified. View "United States v. Cottier" on Justia Law

Kevin Keith Bell was convicted of rape, witness intimidation, and felony domestic battery. He filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell later filed an amended petition through counsel, focusing on three specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State moved for summary dismissal of the amended petition, which the district court granted. Bell then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the district court erred in dismissing his amended petition on grounds not raised by the State. The district court denied the motion.The district court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho initially handled Bell's case. After the State moved for summary dismissal, the district court granted the motion, finding Bell had not provided sufficient legal argument to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell's motion for reconsideration was also denied, as the district court concluded that the State had indeed argued the grounds for dismissal and that Bell had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. The court held that Bell failed to preserve his argument regarding the lack of notice for the dismissal of his original claims because he did not raise this issue in his motion for reconsideration. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bell's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into an allegedly biased juror, as Bell did not provide sufficient evidence of actual bias or resulting prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Bell's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Bell v. State" on Justia Law

Trevor Leon Moore pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery, and the magistrate court entered an order withholding judgment, which included a requirement for Moore to complete a domestic violence evaluation. Moore objected to this requirement, arguing it was improper since he pleaded guilty to simple battery, not domestic battery. The magistrate court's order was file stamped on December 14, 2023, and Moore filed a notice of appeal to the district court on January 26, 2024, challenging only the evaluation requirement.The district court addressed the intermediate appeal and affirmed the magistrate court's order, including the disputed requirement. Moore then filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The State filed a motion to dismiss Moore's appeal, arguing that his notice of appeal from the magistrate court to the district court was untimely, rendering the district court's decision void. The Supreme Court of Idaho agreed that the district court's decision was void due to the untimely appeal but clarified that it still had jurisdiction to review the district court's decision. The court held that it could not grant Moore the relief he sought because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant any relief on intermediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the district court's decision, dismissed the appeal to the Supreme Court, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Moore's intermediate appeal as untimely. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card following a traffic stop where police found a loaded firearm in his pocket. At trial, the Commonwealth sought to prove the defendant lacked a license to carry a firearm through the testimony of a Department of Criminal Justice Information Services (DCJIS) employee. The employee testified that a search of the DCJIS-maintained Statewide database using the defendant's name and a birth date provided by the district attorney's office returned no results. However, the judge did not admit the testimony regarding the birth date as evidence of the defendant's actual birth date due to the witness's lack of personal knowledge, and the Commonwealth did not introduce other evidence establishing the defendant's birth date.The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty and convicted him of possessing a firearm without a license and possessing ammunition without a firearm identification card. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's proof of nonlicensure and arguing that the testimony violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that a witness testifying about a search of a public records database must be familiar with the process of searching the database and the government record-keeping practices. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the DCJIS employee's testimony. However, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's proof of lack of licensure was insufficient because it did not introduce evidence that the birth date used to search the database was the defendant's actual birth date. Consequently, the court reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded for entry of judgments in favor of the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Nicholas Karagianis was indicted on federal drug and firearm charges and later entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to all counts. The plea agreement stipulated a final offense level of 31 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. However, the presentence report (PSR) recommended a final offense level of 33 due to an additional two-level firearm enhancement. The district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation and imposed a below-guideline sentence. Karagianis subsequently sent a letter to the court, claiming he was misled by his counsel about how his sentence would be calculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana conducted a combined change-of-plea and sentencing hearing. During the hearing, the court confirmed that Karagianis understood the plea agreement and its terms, including that the court was not bound by the stipulations in the agreement. The court adopted the PSR’s recommendation of a final offense level of 33 and imposed a sentence of 168 months for Counts 1 and 2, and 120 months for Count 3, to be served concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Karagianis raised three arguments on appeal: that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly due to the district court’s failure to inform him about the waiver of his right to appeal an adverse ruling on a § 3582(c)(2) motion, that the court did not explain the impact of the PSR on sentencing, and that the government breached the plea agreement by not objecting to the PSR’s recommended offense level. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding no plain error in the district court’s actions and concluding that any potential breach by the government did not affect Karagianis’s substantial rights or the fairness of the judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Karagianis" on Justia Law

Steven Morgan was convicted by a jury of three drug-trafficking crimes for smuggling cocaine from the Caribbean into South Florida. The scheme involved shipping jars of shaving gel with false bottoms containing cocaine. The operation was discovered when law enforcement dogs in Puerto Rico alerted on packages containing cocaine. A controlled delivery led to Morgan's arrest, during which two cellphones were found near him. Morgan initially claimed ownership of both phones but later stated only the iPhone was his.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida suppressed Morgan's statement in the patrol car and his statements made 18 months later but admitted the LG phone's contents, finding Morgan had abandoned it. The court also allowed the government to introduce Morgan's initial statement claiming ownership of both phones but later reversed this decision during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in finding Morgan had abandoned the LG phone, thus allowing its contents to be admitted. The court also found that the Fifth Amendment did not require suppression of the phone's contents, as Morgan's statement was voluntary despite being obtained in violation of Miranda. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a mistrial after an agent referred to Morgan's suppressed statement, finding no substantial prejudice. The court also upheld the admission of testimony from Agent Gaviria and expert testimony from Agent Suarez, finding no plain error in the government's expert disclosures. Finally, the court found no cumulative error warranting reversal and affirmed Morgan's conviction. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Amondre Clark filed a successful petition for writ of habeas corpus after several of his convictions were vacated on October 20, 2023. The Division of Correction did not execute the next valid sentences and apply credit for time served under the vacated convictions. Instead, the Division tolled his next valid consecutive sentences, waiting to see if the State’s reprosecution would result in a new conviction. On April 17, 2024, Clark pled guilty to one charge and was sentenced to a new "time served" sentence. However, the Division did not release him, treating the new sentence as a "replacement sentence" for one of the vacated sentences and tacking on the consecutive sentences it had tolled.Clark filed a petition for habeas relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, arguing that the Division incorrectly interpreted CP § 6-218(c) and (d). The habeas court agreed, ordering his immediate release. The Division appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, but the Supreme Court of Maryland granted Clark’s petition for a writ of certiorari.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that under CP § 6-218(d), when a criminal defendant’s term of confinement consists of multiple sentences and one or more convictions underlying those sentences is vacated, the defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served when the conviction is vacated, commencing on the date of the first invalidated sentence. The court also held that if a defendant is reprosecuted or retried and a new conviction results, CP § 6-218(c) applies to any leftover credit after credit has been given under CP § 6-218(d). The new sentence should be in last place in a chain of consecutive sentences, and the sentencing judge may make the new sentence consecutive or concurrent to any then-existing sentences.The court vacated the judgment of the habeas court and remanded the case to the habeas court with instructions to vacate the sentence entered on April 17, 2024, and remand the matter to the sentencing court to exercise its discretion with a full understanding of the status of the valid sentences. View "Bivens v. Clark" on Justia Law