Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Marilyn Mosby, the former Baltimore City State’s Attorney, was convicted of mortgage fraud and perjury in separate jury trials. She appealed her perjury convictions, arguing that the question on the form she completed to withdraw funds from her retirement account was fundamentally ambiguous. She also contended that the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding her use of the withdrawn funds. For her mortgage fraud conviction, she argued that the district court gave an erroneous venue instruction, the evidence did not support the jury’s finding on venue, and the court improperly allowed cross-examination about her perjury convictions. Additionally, she challenged the district court’s forfeiture order as unauthorized and excessive.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Mosby’s motion to dismiss the perjury counts, finding the term “adverse financial consequences” on the form was not fundamentally ambiguous. The court also allowed evidence of how Mosby used the withdrawn funds, deeming it relevant to whether she experienced adverse financial consequences due to COVID-19. Mosby was convicted on both perjury counts. In her mortgage fraud trial, the court permitted cross-examination about her perjury convictions and gave a jury instruction on venue that Mosby argued was improper. She was convicted of mortgage fraud based on a false gift letter used to purchase a property in Florida.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mosby’s perjury convictions, finding no error in the district court’s rulings. However, the appellate court vacated her mortgage fraud conviction, agreeing that the district court’s jury instruction on venue was erroneous and could have led the jury to base its decision on preparatory acts rather than essential conduct elements. Consequently, the court also vacated the related forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Mosby" on Justia Law

Clifford Robert Letourneau, III, was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), which criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force, defined as the infliction of bodily harm. The complaint alleged that Letourneau arrived at K.L.'s home, and without consent, inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to cry and bleed due to vaginal tearing.The district court dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause, concluding that the complaint did not allege facts showing that Letourneau used force to accomplish the act of sexual penetration. The court interpreted the statute to require the use of force to accomplish the act of penetration, not merely in conjunction with it.The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, interpreting the statute to require the use of force either before or during the act of sexual penetration, not necessarily to accomplish it. The court of appeals determined that the plain language of the statute criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force either before or during the act.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that the plain language of section 609.342, subdivision 1(d) criminalizes nonconsensual sexual penetration when the actor uses force either before or during the act. The court held that the statute does not require the force to be used to accomplish the act of penetration. The court found that the facts alleged in the complaint, including K.L.'s statements about the bleeding and vaginal tearing caused by Letourneau's actions, established probable cause that Letourneau used force before or during the act of sexual penetration. View "State of Minnesota vs. Letourneau" on Justia Law

Mark Schena operated Arrayit, a medical testing laboratory in Northern California, which focused on blood tests for allergies. Schena marketed these tests as superior to skin tests, despite their limitations, and billed insurance providers up to $10,000 per test. To maintain a steady flow of patient samples, Schena paid marketers a percentage of the revenue they generated by pitching Arrayit’s services to medical professionals, often misleading them about the tests' efficacy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Schena transitioned to COVID testing, using similar deceptive marketing practices to bundle allergy tests with COVID tests.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Schena’s motion to dismiss the EKRA counts, arguing that his conduct did not violate the statute as a matter of law. The jury convicted Schena on all counts, including conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, healthcare fraud, conspiracy to violate EKRA, EKRA violations, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced Schena to 96 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $24 million in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Schena’s convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 220(a)(2)(A) of EKRA covers payments to marketing intermediaries who interface with those who do the referrals, and there is no requirement that the payments be made to a person who interfaces directly with patients. The court also concluded that a percentage-based compensation structure for marketing agents does not violate EKRA per se, but the evidence showed wrongful inducement when Schena paid marketers to unduly influence doctors’ referrals through false or fraudulent representations. The court affirmed Schena’s EKRA and other convictions, vacated in part the restitution order, and remanded in part. View "United States v. Schena" on Justia Law

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child, including eight counts of third-degree sexual offense, one count of sexual solicitation of a minor, and one count of indecent exposure. He was sentenced to ten years for one of the third-degree sexual offenses (Count 1) and another ten years for a different third-degree sexual offense (Count 8), to be served consecutively.The Division of Correction (DOC) informed Fenton that he would not receive diminution of confinement credits for the sentence on Count 8 because he had been previously convicted of a similar offense (Count 1). Fenton's grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (IGO) was dismissed, and the Circuit Court for Washington County partially granted and partially denied his petition for judicial review, ruling that he was entitled to good conduct credits but not other types of diminution credits for Count 8.The Appellate Court of Maryland held that Fenton was not prohibited from accruing diminution credits for Count 8, as the statute only applied if the previous conviction occurred before the commission of the offense for which the sentence was being served. The court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for recalculation of Fenton's credits.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that under Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), diminution credits are precluded only if the offense was committed after a previous conviction for the same offense. The court concluded that Fenton was entitled to diminution credits for Count 8, as he had not been "previously convicted" at the time of the offense. View "Dept. of Pub. Saf. & Corr. Serv. v. Fenton" on Justia Law

James Sawyer was involved in two drive-by shootings in Omaha, Nebraska, in February 2019. On February 5, Sawyer, as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Adonus Moses, fired multiple shots from a Draco pistol, injuring Erica Robinson and killing Elijah Foster. Sawyer was charged with seven counts, including first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. On February 8, Sawyer again fired the Draco at Aldron Thompson and his brother, missing both. He was charged with five counts, including attempted assault and use of a deadly weapon.The State moved to consolidate the two cases for trial, which the district court granted. A jury trial ensued, and Sawyer was found guilty on all charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and additional consecutive sentences for the other convictions. Sawyer appealed, arguing improper joinder and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the two cases were sufficiently related to be joined for trial, as both involved Sawyer using a Draco in drive-by shootings within a short time frame and geographical proximity. The court found no prejudice to Sawyer from the joinder, as the evidence against him was overwhelming in both cases.Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that Sawyer's claims failed. The court determined that counsel's performance was not deficient in failing to move to suppress cell phone and Facebook evidence, as Sawyer had abandoned the phone and the Facebook warrant was supported by probable cause. Additionally, the court found no prejudice from counsel's failure to object to certain evidence, as it was cumulative or not hearsay. Finally, the court found no basis for a competency evaluation before sentencing, as there was no indication of incompetence post-trial. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Shaquille Browder was shot and killed in a parking lot in Boston. Ralph Brown was indicted and convicted of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation. Brown appealed, claiming errors by judges and the prosecutor, and insufficient evidence of his guilt.The Superior Court denied Brown's pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from search warrants for a vehicle's infotainment system and his cell phone's location data. The court found no material misstatements or intent to deceive in the affidavits supporting the warrants. Brown's motion to dismiss the indictments, alleging grand jury impairment due to improper statements by a detective, was also denied. The court ruled that the statements did not influence the grand jury's decision to indict.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld Brown's conviction. The court found that the evidence, including surveillance footage, cell phone records, and vehicle rental information, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also addressed Brown's claims of improper jury empanelment and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. It concluded that any errors in voir dire questions about motive did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The court determined that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were permissible and did not shift the burden of proof or misstate facts.The court affirmed Brown's conviction of first-degree murder but vacated his convictions for carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a loaded firearm, remanding for further proceedings consistent with recent case law. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Missoula Police Department received information from a reliable source that Shayden Bradley Westfall had recently received a distributable quantity of drugs at a Missoula hotel room. After corroborating the information, officers obtained a search warrant for the room, where they found methamphetamine, fentanyl, and a firearm. Based on this seizure and Westfall’s statements, officers obtained another warrant for Westfall’s Facebook records stored in California. Westfall was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied Westfall’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the searches of his hotel room, vehicles, and phones. The court found that each search warrant was valid based on ample probable cause and that the issuing state court was authorized to issue a warrant for subscriber information outside Montana. Westfall entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 88 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Westfall’s motion to suppress. The court held that law enforcement’s independent corroboration of information from a reliable source provided a substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude there was sufficient probable cause for the hotel room search warrant. Additionally, the court held that a Montana district court judge has jurisdiction under the federal Stored Communications Act and Montana law to issue a search warrant for retrieving electronic records stored out-of-state. View "USA V. WESTFALL" on Justia Law

Abdul Malik Muhammad was convicted of first-degree murder in 2001 for the 1999 shooting death of Damone Mims. Muhammad was interrogated by Chicago police detectives and allegedly made incriminating statements, which he later denied. He was sentenced to 50 years in prison. Muhammad's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his subsequent postconviction petition and habeas corpus petition were denied.Muhammad later filed a claim with the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC), alleging he was tortured by police during his interrogation. The TIRC found sufficient evidence of torture to merit judicial review and referred the case to the Cook County Circuit Court. The court appointed the Office of the Special State’s Attorney, including Robert Milan, as special prosecutor. After two years of discovery, Milan moved to terminate the judicial review proceedings, arguing the TIRC acted outside its authority. The circuit court granted the motion to terminate and denied Muhammad's motions to rescind Milan's appointment as special prosecutor.Muhammad appealed, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court's orders, finding the TIRC's definition of "tortured confession" was reasonable and that Muhammad's statements qualified as such. The appellate court also found an actual conflict of interest with Milan's appointment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse the termination of the proceedings under the TIRC Act, agreeing that the TIRC's definition of "tortured confession" was appropriate. However, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision regarding Milan's appointment, finding no actual conflict of interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "People v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Melissa Wanna discovered her profile on MyLife, an information broker, which contained a poor reputation score and references to court records. MyLife offered to provide details or remove the profile for a fee. Believing she lost employment opportunities due to this profile, Wanna filed a class action lawsuit against several Lexis entities, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), along with several Minnesota state law claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Wanna’s claims, concluding that MyLife was not Lexis’s agent. The court found that the data-licensing agreement between Lexis and MyLife explicitly stated that their relationship was that of independent contractors, not principal and agent. As a result, Wanna’s federal claims, which depended on an agency relationship, failed. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wanna’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The appellate court agreed that Wanna’s federal claims required an agency relationship between Lexis and MyLife, which was not established. The court found that MyLife did not have actual or apparent authority to act on Lexis’s behalf, nor did Lexis ratify MyLife’s actions. Additionally, the appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Wanna v. RELX Group, PLC" on Justia Law