Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Milton Porter pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 200 months in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on three prior violent felony convictions: a 2008 domestic assault in the second degree, a 2018 domestic assault in the second degree, and a 2018 domestic assault in the third degree, all under Missouri law. Porter appealed, arguing he did not have the requisite three prior violent felony convictions to qualify as an armed career criminal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri determined that each of Porter's domestic assault convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The court did not address whether Porter’s 2018 Missouri conviction for burglary in the second degree qualified as a violent felony, as the domestic assault convictions were sufficient for the ACCA enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court applied the modified categorical approach to determine that Porter's 2008 and 2018 second-degree domestic assault convictions were violent felonies under the ACCA, as they involved knowingly causing physical injury. The court also determined that Porter's 2018 third-degree domestic assault conviction was a violent felony, as it involved attempting to cause physical injury. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Porter’s three domestic assault convictions were violent felonies under the ACCA, justifying the sentence enhancement. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Abraham Torres-Lopez, sought to compel the Oregon Department of Corrections (DOC) to grant him credit towards his Marion County prison sentence for the 125 days he spent in Clackamas and Marion County jails before being sent to prison. The circuit court granted the relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court had misinterpreted ORS 137.370(4).The circuit court had granted Torres-Lopez credit for the time served in jail before his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison. The Court of Appeals, however, found that the circuit court had erred in its interpretation of the statute, leading to the current appeal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve two statutory interpretation questions regarding ORS 137.370(4). The first question was whether a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit for time served for unrelated conduct, even when the person has not yet been convicted or sentenced for that conduct. The second question was whether a person held in custody in a local jail awaiting resolution of a pending probation violation matter while serving an unrelated prison sentence is in "jail" presentencing for purposes of ORS 137.370(4).The Oregon Supreme Court held that a trial court may grant presentence incarceration credit in both circumstances. The court concluded that confinement for certain conduct, even in the absence of a sentence, is covered by ORS 137.370(4). Additionally, the legislature expressly authorized trial courts to order presentence credit for time spent in jail awaiting resolution of a probation violation matter, even if the person was also serving a prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

Townsend Thorndike was convicted of unlawful sexual contact and visual sexual aggression against a child. The charges stemmed from alleged sexual abuse that occurred in the summer of 2021 when the victim was six years old. The State sought to admit a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview under a statutory hearsay exception. Thorndike argued that the statute allowing the video’s admission was unconstitutionally enacted as emergency legislation and violated the separation of powers clause in the Maine Constitution.The trial court initially granted the State’s motion to admit the video but later vacated its order, concluding the statute did not apply retroactively to pending cases. The State then sought and obtained an emergency legislative amendment clarifying the statute’s retroactive applicability. The trial court reinstated its original order, allowing the video’s admission. Thorndike was subsequently convicted on all counts, and the court sentenced him to fourteen years of imprisonment with all but eight years suspended, plus six years of probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the emergency enactment of the statutory amendment was constitutionally valid, as the preamble expressed sufficient facts to constitute an emergency. The Court also determined that the legislative action did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, as it did not mandate the admission of evidence but clarified the statute’s applicability to pending cases. The Court affirmed Thorndike’s conviction and the trial court’s admission of the forensic interview video. View "State of Maine v. Thorndike" on Justia Law

A woman’s nude body was discovered near the Vaca Cut Bridge in Marathon, Florida, with evidence of ligature strangulation and severe sexual injuries. Car parts found near the body matched damage to a conversion van driven by Steven Wolf, who was detained nearby. Wolf gave inconsistent statements to law enforcement, initially denying involvement but later admitting to being present when the victim died in his van and to disposing of evidence. Forensic evidence, including DNA, linked Wolf to the victim and the crime scene. The medical examiner determined the victim was alive during the infliction of fatal injuries, which could not have been caused by male genitalia, and that she suffered extreme pain before death.Wolf was charged in the Circuit Court with first-degree murder, two counts of sexual battery with force likely to cause injury, and tampering with physical evidence. He was found guilty on all counts by a jury. During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Wolf’s prior violent felony conviction. The jury unanimously found all aggravating factors proven and recommended a death sentence. The trial court agreed, finding the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Wolf to death.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Wolf’s claims, including challenges to venue, jury selection, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial misconduct, jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that venue was properly established in Monroe County, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in jury selection or evidentiary rulings, and the improper prosecutorial comments did not rise to fundamental error. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Wolf’s convictions and sentence of death. View "Wolf v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The appellant was married to the victim, with whom he shared two daughters, and was also living with her two sons from a previous marriage. In July 2019, following an argument, he killed his wife by beating her with a baseball bat and concealed her body in their home. Over the following weeks, he lied to family and friends about her whereabouts, impersonating her in communications. As the children returned home before the start of school, he became concerned that the boys might reveal their mother’s absence. He then killed the two boys, one by strangulation and the other by drowning, and later killed his two daughters in a similar manner. He concealed all five bodies in storage boxes, eventually transporting them in a minivan. After a wellness check was requested by the victim’s family, law enforcement began investigating. The appellant fled the state, ultimately confessing to the murders after a car accident in Georgia, and led police to the children’s remains.A grand jury in Marion County, Florida, indicted the appellant on four counts of first-degree murder (for the children) and one count of second-degree murder (for his wife). He pleaded guilty to all charges. At the penalty phase, the State sought six aggravating factors for each first-degree murder count. The defense presented expert testimony regarding the appellant’s mental health, arguing for mitigation. The trial court denied a defense request for a special jury instruction on the “avoid arrest” aggravator, gave the standard instruction, and the jury recommended death sentences. The court imposed four death sentences, finding all aggravators proven and that they outweighed mitigation.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case, affirming the convictions and sentences. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the special jury instruction, found Florida’s capital sentencing scheme constitutional, and determined the appellant’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The convictions and death sentences were affirmed. View "Jones v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Jamees Cooke was employed at a restaurant when a team from the United States Marshals Service Regional Fugitive Task Force arrived to execute three outstanding warrants for his arrest. Cooke attempted to escape but was confronted by officers. He became disorderly, assaulted a Task Force Officer (TFO) by punching him in the eye, and bit another officer. The assaulted TFO suffered a serious eye injury requiring surgery and resulting in permanent vision impairment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted Cooke after he pleaded guilty to one count of assaulting, resisting, and interfering with federal officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). The district court sentenced him to eighty-four months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The court applied a six-level official-victim enhancement under section 3A1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.Cooke appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in applying the six-level enhancement. He contended that section 3A1.2(b) should not apply when the offense guideline already includes an enhancement for the victim's status as a government officer. The Second Circuit agreed that section 3A1.2(b) does not apply if the offense guideline already incorporates such an enhancement but clarified that the only offense guideline incorporating this factor is section 2A2.4, which was not relevant in this case. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the application of the six-level enhancement under section 3A1.2(b). View "United States v. Cooke" on Justia Law

Kenneth Thompson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, following a guilty plea. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to thirty-seven months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, including submitting to searches, complying with sex offender registration requirements, and undergoing a mental health evaluation and treatment if necessary.Thompson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in imposing the special conditions without an individualized assessment and explanation. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Additionally, he challenged the district court's Sentencing Guidelines calculation and argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Thompson waived any challenge to the mental health treatment condition by consenting to it. The court held that the district court made an individualized assessment and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the special conditions, which were supported by the record. The court declined to consider Thompson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting that it was not raised in the district court and lacked sufficient factual development. The court also held that Thompson's remaining challenges to his conviction and sentence were barred by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2004, Gregory Terrell was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA), aggravated assault while armed (AAWA), and related offenses for the shooting of Darren Marshall. Terrell was sentenced to 27 years in prison. During sentencing, Marshall provided a victim impact statement claiming severe injuries, including impotence. Terrell later discovered that Marshall had fathered another child and was convicted of rape, suggesting that Marshall's statement was false.Terrell filed multiple post-conviction motions over nine years. His first Rule 35(b) motion to reduce his sentence, based on the alleged falsity of Marshall's statement, was denied. The trial court found that the new information did not warrant a sentence reduction. Terrell's first Section 23-110 motion, which included claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the false victim impact statement, was also denied. The trial court did not address the victim impact statement claim in its denial. Terrell's second Rule 35(b) motion, citing his rehabilitation and difficult childhood, was denied as procedurally barred and lacking substantive merit.In 2022, Terrell filed a second Section 23-110 motion, arguing that the trial court's reliance on Marshall's false statement violated his due process rights. The trial court denied the motion, ruling it was procedurally barred and successive, as it raised the same claim as his first Rule 35(b) motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Terrell's second Section 23-110 motion was successive. The court adopted the rule from Sanders v. United States, which allows a motion to be deemed successive if it asserts an identical ground for relief as a previous motion, even if supported by different legal or factual arguments. The court found that Terrell's second motion raised the same ground for relief as his first Rule 35(b) motion, which had been denied on the merits. View "Terrell v. United States" on Justia Law

In the early morning of August 10, 2014, the defendant entered an apartment in Lowell and fatally shot two occupants. He was convicted of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and possession of a firearm without a license. The defendant appealed, raising several arguments.The Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth needed to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances for felony-murder, that the prosecutor improperly appealed to emotion, that the judge prejudged the sentences, and that defense counsel was ineffective for not presenting mitigating information at sentencing. The defendant also contended that his convictions for armed home invasion and firearm possession should be vacated.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court vacated the armed home invasion conviction as duplicative of the felony-murder conviction and vacated the firearm possession conviction due to improper jury instructions regarding the burden of proof for licensure. The court remanded the firearm charge for further proceedings. The court affirmed the felony-murder convictions, finding no error in the jury instructions regarding mitigating circumstances, no improper appeals to emotion by the prosecutor, and no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice due to the judge's sentencing comments or defense counsel's performance. The court also declined to exercise its authority to reduce the verdicts under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Poum" on Justia Law

Pierre Robinson and Derrick Swanson, members of the Evans Mob gang in Chicago, were charged with murdering rival gang members to enhance their status within the gang. Swanson entered a cooperation agreement and pleaded guilty, while Robinson went to trial. At Robinson's trial, his cousin Anise, who had previously identified him as the shooter in a recorded statement and grand jury testimony, claimed memory loss and could not identify him in court. The district court admitted her prior statements as evidence. Robinson was convicted by a jury after a four-day trial.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Robinson was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering and sentenced to life in prison. Swanson, who cooperated with the government, received a 30-year sentence and five years of supervised release. Swanson's sentence included a condition allowing probation officers to search his workplace, which he contested as inconsistent with the oral pronouncement of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Robinson argued that the admission of Anise's statements violated his Confrontation Clause rights and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that Robinson had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Anise, thus satisfying the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Robinson's counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Swanson's challenge to his supervised release condition was rejected, as the written judgment did not contradict the oral pronouncement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments. View "United States v. Swanson" on Justia Law