Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man who was born in India entered the United States illegally and sought asylum, which was denied. He then submitted a second asylum application under a false identity and later married a U.S. citizen, using the same false information to obtain permanent residency and, eventually, naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After obtaining a U.S. passport and reentering the country, he was questioned by border agents and gave false answers regarding his identity. As a result, he was charged with using a fraudulently obtained passport and making false statements to federal agents. He pleaded guilty to the passport charge, with the other charge dismissed, and was sentenced to probation. Both his plea agreement and the district court informed him of potential immigration consequences, including possible loss of citizenship.Later, the government initiated denaturalization proceedings, alleging that he had illegally procured citizenship through fraud and misrepresentation. The man petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not advise him that his guilty plea could lead to denaturalization. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding he had not shown a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have chosen a different course. After a Second Circuit decision in Farhane v. United States adopted a broader view of counsel’s obligations, he sought reconsideration, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense attorneys to advise naturalized citizens that a guilty plea may carry the risk of denaturalization and eventual deportation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

During a December 2023 election recount at the Oakland County Courthouse in Michigan, Andrew Hess, serving as an observer, raised concerns about ballot-box tampering with the county’s director of elections, Joseph Rozell. Following a tense exchange, Hess left the recount room and, in the courthouse lobby, remarked to another member of the public, “hang Joe for treason.” The comment was overheard by a county receptionist, who later reported it to law enforcement. Although Hess was not removed from the event, months later Oakland County prosecutors charged him with a felony under Michigan’s terrorist-threat statute for this statement. The charge was initially dismissed after the Michigan Court of Appeals found the statute facially unconstitutional, but the Michigan Supreme Court later vacated that decision, and the potential for prosecution was revived.In response, Hess filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, primarily arguing that the prosecution violated his First Amendment rights. He also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent any renewed prosecution under the statute. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, finding Hess unlikely to succeed on his constitutional claims and failing to demonstrate irreparable harm.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that while Hess was likely to succeed on the merits of his as-applied First Amendment claim—concluding his statement did not constitute a true threat—he had not shown irreparable harm because any threatened prosecution targeted only his past speech, not future speech. Furthermore, Michigan’s state-court procedures offered him a fair and prompt opportunity to litigate his First Amendment defense. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "Hess v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant whose longstanding methamphetamine addiction led to psychosis. During a delusional episode, he brutally attacked an elderly, physically infirm stranger in a clinic parking lot by striking him with a brick, punching and kicking him, covering his head with a plastic bag, and stabbing him in the neck. The victim, who was homeless and suffering from grave heart and liver disease, was hospitalized and remained unconscious until his death about a month later. The coroner testified that although the victim’s preexisting conditions were severe and could have caused his death within a few years, the immediate cause of death was the cumulative effect of the traumatic injuries inflicted during the attack.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. The defendant appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on attempted murder as a lesser included offense. He contended that there was substantial evidence suggesting his actions were not the proximate cause of death, given the victim’s poor health, and therefore the jury could have found him guilty of attempted, but not completed, murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence did not support giving a lesser included offense instruction for attempted murder because the defendant’s attack was both a substantial factor and the proximate cause of the victim’s death, despite the victim’s frailty. The court also rejected the defendant’s other claims, finding no prosecutorial error and no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s Pitchess review. The court affirmed the conviction but remanded solely to correct the calculation of pretrial custody credits. View "People v. Mijares" on Justia Law

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant, a military veteran, who was charged with felony corporal injury to his spouse after a violent altercation in which he assaulted the mother of his newborn child while intoxicated. The defendant had a documented history of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance abuse, both stemming from his military service. He sought pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, presenting evidence of his diagnoses and the availability of a comprehensive treatment program through the Department of Veterans Affairs. The victim supported his request for treatment rather than incarceration.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the defendant both eligible and suitable for mental health diversion, specifically determining that his mental disorders were significant factors in the offense and that he did not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined by statute (i.e., likelihood of committing a “super strike”). Nonetheless, the court denied diversion, expressing concerns that a two-year diversion period would not be sufficient for rehabilitation or to protect the victim and public, and instead offered the defendant probation with the same treatment conditions if he pleaded no contest. The defendant accepted this offer, pleaded no contest, and was placed on probation with conditions mirroring the proposed diversion program.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying mental health diversion after finding the statutory criteria were met. The appellate court clarified that residual discretion to deny diversion cannot be based on public safety considerations broader than the statutory definition, and requiring a plea as a condition for treatment was inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. The judgment was reversed and the trial court was directed to grant diversion unless changed circumstances warranted otherwise. View "People v. Tourville" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with producing child pornography and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. The charges centered on three videos found in her husband’s online storage account, showing him interacting with a six-year-old girl in a pool at a family gathering. The defendant was not visible in the videos, but a woman’s voice—alleged to be hers—was present. She denied it was her voice, but several witnesses identified it as hers. The government also introduced evidence that, years after the pool incident, the defendant and her husband had made videos in public places surreptitiously filming up women’s skirts. In these later videos, the defendant was visually and audibly identifiable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma admitted three of these “Peeping Tom” videos as evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), finding them relevant and admissible to prove the defendant’s identity as the camera operator in the pool videos and to show the absence of mistake or accident. The court limited the number of such videos introduced and declined to further edit them, as the defendant did not request specific excision and the entire videos were relevant for the stated purposes. After trial, the defendant was convicted.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the “other acts” evidence. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion. The court found the later videos relevant, sufficiently similar, and admissible for the proper purposes of proving identity and absence of mistake or accident, thus affirming the conviction. The appellate court did not address other proposed grounds for admission, as it found the purposes relied upon by the district court adequate. View "United States v. Bycroft" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, as a member of the Osage Nation, was previously convicted in Oklahoma state courts of several offenses, all committed in areas recognized as Indian country. In 2013, she was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington County. She was subsequently convicted in Mayes County in 2016 for possessing methamphetamine and a firearm, and again in Tulsa County in 2016 for possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as impersonation. In each proceeding, she was represented by counsel. Later, she was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances after a DEA investigation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma calculated her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by including her three prior state convictions in her Criminal History Category. The defendant objected, arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her because she is Native American and the offenses occurred in Indian country. The district court overruled her objection, noting the convictions had not been vacated or reversed by any Oklahoma court and were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel. The district court ultimately sentenced her after applying a downward variance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in including the prior state convictions in the Criminal History calculation. The Tenth Circuit held that, under federal law and United States Sentencing Guidelines, prior state convictions must be counted unless they have been vacated, reversed, or were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. The court found no exception for convictions alleged to be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent their invalidation by the convicting court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud. From inside a Georgia prison, he and others targeted women in the medical profession, convincing them by phone that they had failed to appear in court and faced arrest unless they paid a bond. The scheme involved spoofing local police department phone numbers, impersonating police officers, meticulous research of victims, and coordinating with coconspirators outside the prison to collect money at bail bond companies. Over two years, two dozen victims across the country were defrauded, including some in the Southern District of Iowa.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa calculated a sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 130–162 months, applying enhancements for “sophisticated means,” impersonating police officers, and for the defendant’s leadership role in a conspiracy involving at least five participants. The court denied a motion for a downward departure, finding that the defendant’s criminal history category was not substantially over-represented. The defendant challenged the application of the enhancements and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, arguing that the scheme was not sufficiently sophisticated, that applying both enhancements for impersonation and sophistication was double counting, and that he was not an organizer or leader.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the scheme was sufficiently sophisticated to warrant the enhancement, that applying both enhancements did not constitute double counting, and that the defendant’s role justified the leadership enhancement. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s assessment of criminal history and concluded the sentence was reasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

Adam Blocker used Dropbox, a cloud storage service, to share files, some of which contained child pornography. Dropbox detected these illegal files through its own monitoring, as permitted by its terms of service, and reported them to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Following this report, NCMEC notified federal authorities, which led the FBI to obtain a search warrant for Blocker’s digital storage. The subsequent search uncovered additional illegal images. Blocker pleaded guilty to two counts related to possession and distribution of child pornography, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Dropbox and his devices.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Judge Lee denied Blocker’s suppression motion. The court concluded that Blocker had consented to Dropbox’s search and disclosure of his files by agreeing to its terms of service. Blocker argued that the terms were not specific or clear enough to constitute voluntary consent, especially because NCMEC is a government-affiliated entity. After Judge Lee’s elevation to the appellate court, the case was transferred to Chief Judge Kendall, who oversaw Blocker’s sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Blocker’s acceptance of Dropbox’s terms of service constituted effective consent for Dropbox to scan his files and disclose them for certain purposes, including reporting to authorities. The court rejected Blocker’s argument that the consent was invalid because the terms did not obligate Dropbox to search every file or regularly disclose information. The Seventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding of consent, and thus upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Blocker" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and other offenses, and was sentenced to life without parole. After his conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals, he sought postconviction relief and was appointed new counsel due to a conflict with the Public Defender’s Office. Postconviction counsel discovered that large portions of the pretrial discovery materials were missing from prior counsel’s file. When attempts to obtain the missing materials from the prosecution were met with instructions to request them through the Colorado Criminal Justice Records Act (CCJRA) and pay associated fees, counsel instead moved the district court to compel disclosure of the discovery.The Jefferson County District Court denied the motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to order discovery in postconviction proceedings except in death penalty cases, and relying on prior Colorado Supreme Court cases such as People v. Silva-Jaquez and People v. Owens. The district court concluded that neither the rules, statutes, nor the Constitution provided a basis to compel postconviction discovery outside of those limited situations.The Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc, reviewed the case as an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21. The court held that if an indigent defendant seeking postconviction relief shows that specific facts likely contained in pretrial discovery—which is unavailable to current counsel—would help substantiate claims for relief, the postconviction court should order the prosecution to provide a free copy of the requested duplicate discovery. The court further held that postconviction counsel is not required to rely on the CCJRA process, as it does not guarantee access to complete, unredacted discovery and may impose unjustified financial burdens. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute, reversed the district court’s denial, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "People v. Bell" on Justia Law