Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) loans. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay $3.85 million in restitution. Additionally, a forfeiture judgment of $673,210 was entered against him. On appeal, Philossaint contested the forfeiture amount, arguing it was miscalculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially handled the case. Philossaint pled guilty to the wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, and the court accepted a factual proffer detailing his role in the fraudulent loan scheme. The presentence investigation report (PSI) provided additional details, including the specific companies involved and the amounts of the fraudulent loans. The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, but miscalculated the amount by assuming Philossaint received a 10% kickback on every loan funded, which was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed a clear error in determining the forfeiture amount due to the government's miscalculation. The correct amount of forfeiture should have been $549,226.30, based on the accurate figures of the loan proceeds and kickbacks Philossaint received. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court did not make any factual findings about whether Philossaint was a leader or mastermind of the scheme, which could affect the forfeiture amount under the Honeycutt v. United States hypothetical. View "USA v. Philossaint" on Justia Law

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right to abortion, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 940.04(1), which criminalizes the intentional destruction of an unborn child, does not ban abortion. The plaintiffs included the Attorney General, the Department of Safety and Professional Services, the Medical Examining Board, and three physicians. They argued that the statute either does not apply to abortion or has been impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation.The Dane County Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because § 940.04 does not prohibit consensual medical abortions. The court later issued a declaratory judgment that the statute does not prohibit abortions.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The central question was whether § 940.04(1) bans abortion. The court concluded that comprehensive legislation enacted over the last 50 years, which regulates various aspects of abortion, impliedly repealed the 19th-century near-total ban on abortion. The court held that the legislature's detailed regulation of abortion was meant as a substitute for the earlier statute, and therefore, § 940.04(1) does not ban abortion in Wisconsin.The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order, holding that the comprehensive legislative framework governing abortion impliedly repealed the near-total ban on abortion in § 940.04(1). View "Kaul v. Urmanski" on Justia Law

The State of Montana charged John Raymond Welzel with Assault with a Weapon, a felony, on November 14, 2022. On April 4, 2023, Welzel pled no contest during a change of plea hearing. The District Court released him on his own recognizance, with the condition that he reside either at the Recovery Centers of Montana (RCM) or with his father before sentencing. Welzel attended treatment at RCM from April 5, 2023, to May 6, 2023. On June 15, 2023, the District Court sentenced Welzel and credited him with 142 days of time served, excluding the 30 days spent at RCM.The Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County reviewed the case and determined that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM. The court's order did not mandate Welzel to attend or complete treatment at RCM, only to reside there or with his father. The court concluded that Welzel's stay at RCM was not "under the order of the court" as required by the relevant statute for credit for time served.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Welzel was not entitled to credit for the time spent at RCM because the District Court's order did not require him to attend treatment or impose consequences for not doing so. The court emphasized that the statute requires the time spent in a residential treatment facility to be "under the order of the court" to qualify for credit. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment and sentence. View "State v. Welzel" on Justia Law

Jonah Micah Warr called 911 on July 29, 2020, expressing suicidal intent. Ravalli County Deputy Gregoire responded, and Warr, armed with a knife and experiencing a severe mental health crisis, advanced toward the deputy. Warr was subdued with tasers. On August 10, 2020, the State charged Warr with Assault on a Peace Officer, a felony, alleging he caused reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury in Gregoire by use of a weapon. Warr faced a mandatory minimum of two years in prison.Warr initially entered a no contest plea on September 1, 2021, under a plea agreement that included a five-year suspended sentence and an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence due to mental impairment. The District Court rejected this plea agreement on December 1, 2021, doubting the applicability of the mental impairment exception due to evidence of voluntary intoxication. Warr withdrew his plea, and the case was reset for trial. On May 10, 2022, Warr re-entered a no contest plea under the same agreement, providing additional evidence of his mental impairment. On July 28, 2022, the District Court definitively rejected the plea agreement again, ruling that Warr's impairment resulted primarily from voluntary intoxication. Warr's request to withdraw his plea was denied by the court, which required a written motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the mental impairment exception under § 46-18-222(2), MCA, did not apply, as Warr's impairment was influenced by voluntary intoxication. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision regarding Warr's right to withdraw his plea. The court held that the District Court violated § 46-12-211(4), MCA, by not allowing Warr to withdraw his plea immediately after rejecting the plea agreement. The case was remanded to the District Court to afford Warr the opportunity to withdraw his plea. View "State v. Warr" on Justia Law

Richard Evans, a former Captain in the Boston Police Department (BPD), was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, federal programs theft, and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft. These charges stemmed from his submission of false claims for overtime pay and his involvement in a scheme to submit such claims. Evans and his subordinates falsely reported working four-hour overtime shifts, even when they worked fewer hours or when the Evidence Control Unit (ECU) was closed.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found Evans guilty on all counts after a five-day jury trial. He was sentenced to one year and one day of incarceration for each count, to be served concurrently, fined $15,000, and ordered to pay $17,390.99 in restitution. Evans appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the willful blindness instruction, and other aspects of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Evans' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, finding that the willful blindness instruction was appropriate given the numerous "flags of suspicion" that Evans ignored. However, the court vacated Evans' convictions for federal programs theft and conspiracy to commit federal programs theft, concluding that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the BPD received more than $10,000 in federal benefits during the relevant period, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Brian Fenner and Dennis Birkley were convicted of seventeen counts related to a fraud scheme involving the manipulation of Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute. Fenner, who ran a towing company, and Birkley, who financed the operation, conspired to inflate the value of mechanic’s liens on vehicles and conducted sham auctions to obtain clean titles, which they then sold for profit. The scheme involved towing vehicles from across the country to Indiana, inflating lien values, and holding fake auctions at unreasonable hours to ensure no legitimate buyers attended. Birkley would then falsely claim to have purchased the vehicles at these auctions and apply for clean titles, which extinguished the creditors' interests.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana convicted both defendants on all counts. Fenner and Birkley were sentenced to 70 and 60 months in prison, respectively, and ordered to pay $49,045.84 in restitution. Fenner and Birkley appealed, arguing that the district court made several errors, including allowing improper testimony and violating Fenner’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting Birkley’s unredacted statement to law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. The court held that the testimony of the government witnesses was proper and that any potential errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also found no plain error in the admission of Birkley’s statement, as it was consistent with Fenner’s defense and did not significantly impact the jury’s verdict. Additionally, the court rejected Birkley’s ex post facto argument and upheld the restitution calculation, finding it supported by the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of Fenner and Birkley. View "United States v. Birkley" on Justia Law

Dana Curtin was convicted by a jury of attempted sex trafficking of a minor after engaging in a series of text communications with an undercover federal agent posing as the father of a 12-year-old girl. Over ten weeks, Curtin discussed paying for sex with the purported minor, repeatedly acknowledged her age, and arranged to meet at a public location. When Curtin arrived at the meeting spot with cash and items consistent with the planned encounter, law enforcement arrested him. A search of his vehicle and phone revealed evidence of adult pornography and solicitation of prostitutes, but no child sexual abuse material.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois presided over Curtin’s trial. Before trial, Curtin sought to introduce expert testimony from a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Fabien Saleh, to show that Curtin did not have pedophilic disorder and that an interest in adult sex or pornography does not imply an interest in minors. The district court excluded Dr. Saleh’s testimony, finding it would not be helpful to the jury, and allowed Curtin to make related arguments without expert support. The jury found Curtin guilty, and the court sentenced him to 180 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Curtin’s challenges to the exclusion of Dr. Saleh’s testimony. The court held that Curtin had waived his challenge regarding testimony about his lack of pedophilic tendencies by expressly agreeing with the district court’s ruling. As to the remaining expert testimony, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in its exclusion, concluding that the proposed testimony was within the common understanding of jurors and that any error was harmless given the strength of the government’s evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Curtin’s conviction. View "United States v. Curtin" on Justia Law

Damon Victor Crist was convicted of first-degree kidnapping in Utah in 2006 and was required to register as a sex offender in Utah. In 2022, Crist began working in Idaho but did not register as a sex offender there. An informant tipped off the Idaho State Police (ISP), leading to Crist's arrest for failing to register. Crist argued that Idaho law did not permit the magistrate court to determine that his Utah conviction was substantially equivalent to Idaho’s second-degree kidnapping law, which would require him to register. He also claimed that the statutory scheme was void for vagueness.The magistrate court found probable cause to bind Crist over for trial, determining that his Utah conviction was substantially equivalent to an Idaho registrable offense. Crist filed a motion to dismiss in the district court, arguing that only the ISP’s Bureau of Criminal Identification could make the substantial equivalency determination and that he lacked proper notice of his duty to register. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the magistrate court had the authority to make the determination and that Crist had sufficient notice of his registration requirements.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that a nonresident’s duty to register as a sex offender in Idaho is triggered by the fact of an out-of-state conviction that is substantially equivalent to an Idaho registrable offense and entry into Idaho for employment purposes. The court also concluded that the statutory and regulatory scheme provided fair notice to Crist and did not grant law enforcement unbridled discretion. Therefore, Crist's arguments were rejected, and the decision of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Crist" on Justia Law

Robert Lanoue, a Canadian citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to submitting false claims to the government under 18 U.S.C. § 287. He operated a scuba school that was part of a government program funded by the post-9/11 GI Bill, which reimbursed him for teaching veterans. Lanoue admitted to submitting false and fraudulent claims, resulting in a loss of over $3 million to the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit with losses exceeding $10,000.The Immigration Judge found that Lanoue's crime met the criteria for an aggravated felony and denied his request for a waiver of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld this decision, leading Lanoue to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Lanoue's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 287 categorically involved deceit, as the statute requires knowingly submitting false claims to the government. The court also found that the government had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the loss exceeded $10,000, based on Lanoue's stipulation and plea agreement indicating losses between $1.5 and $3.5 million.Lanoue's argument for a retroactive waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) was rejected. The court noted that to qualify for such a waiver, a lawful permanent resident must have been convicted or admitted to the crime at the time of reentry, which was not the case for Lanoue.The Third Circuit held that filing false claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287 is an aggravated felony involving deceit, and the government sufficiently proved the loss amount. Consequently, Lanoue is removable and ineligible for a waiver. The court denied his petition for review. View "Lanoue v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

During a covert surveillance operation in Denver, undercover police officers observed Arthur S. Mills engaging in behavior consistent with a drug transaction. Mills was stopped for a traffic violation, during which he failed to produce a valid driver's license or proof of insurance. Mills became uncooperative, and the officers, believing they had probable cause, decided to impound his vehicle and obtain a search warrant rather than conducting an on-scene search.The Denver County District Court granted Mills's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in his vehicle, ruling that although the police had probable cause to seize the vehicle, the delay in obtaining a search warrant was longer than necessary. The court cited Chambers v. Maroney, reasoning that the vehicle should only be held for the period necessary to obtain the warrant. The People filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and established a four-factor balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a delay in seeking a search warrant: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the nature and strength of the individual's possessory interest, (3) the strength of the government's justification for the delay, and (4) the government's diligence in applying for the warrant. Applying this test, the court concluded that the three-day delay, which included a weekend, was reasonable. The court noted that the police acted diligently and cautiously, considering officer safety and the thoroughness of the investigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the delay in obtaining the search warrant did not render the seizure unconstitutional. View "People v. Mills" on Justia Law