Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Antonio Ingram pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including armed robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery, on September 30, 2016. The court found his plea was freely and voluntarily entered and entered a judgment of conviction on March 3, 2017, nunc pro tunc to September 30, 2016. Ingram was sentenced to concurrent 20-year prison terms, with 15 years to serve for each conviction. Ingram retained attorney David Jones to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was timely filed on October 27, 2016. However, there is no evidence that the trial court ruled on the motion, and Jones testified that the motion was dismissed without a hearing on March 3, 2017.The Superior Court of Richmond County granted in part Ingram’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, allowing him to pursue an out-of-time direct appeal. The court found that Jones rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform Ingram of his right to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Ingram cross-appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in denying him the remedy of setting aside his guilty plea and judgment of conviction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the habeas court erred in treating the March 3 "Order to Enter Sentence" as an order denying Ingram’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record did not demonstrate that Ingram’s judgment of conviction was final for purposes of habeas review. The court vacated the habeas court’s order and remanded the case with directions to allow the parties to supplement the record and demonstrate whether Ingram’s judgment of conviction is final. If the motion to withdraw the guilty plea remains pending, the habeas petition should be dismissed as premature. If the judgment is final, the habeas court may reenter its previous order with that determination. The cross-appeal claims were deemed moot. View "JOSEPH v. INGRAM" on Justia Law

Jaquan Dontae Weston was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of his father, Leroy Weston. The crimes occurred between March 5-6, 2018. A Terrell County grand jury indicted Weston in June 2018, and he was found guilty on all counts in an October 2019 jury trial. Weston was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and twelve months concurrent for cruelty to children in the third degree. Weston filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. His appeal was initially stricken due to his appellate counsel's failure to file a brief, but it was later re-docketed after new counsel was appointed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Weston argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court found that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Weston formed the intent and malice necessary for a malice murder conviction. The jury was entitled to find Weston guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on his actions and statements following his daughter's outcry about her grandfather.Weston also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his competency to stand trial, request a competency hearing, and object to certain evidence. However, these claims were not preserved for appellate review as they were not raised in his motion for a new trial. The court also found that Weston failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining an expert evaluation of his sanity at the time of the crimes, as there was no evidence presented to support this claim.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no merit in Weston's arguments. View "WESTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Carlos Cruz-Rivera filed a motion in 2020 to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act. Cruz was originally charged with multiple counts, including carjacking and weapons-related offenses, and received a nearly 73-year sentence, largely due to mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The First Step Act amended § 924(c) to prevent "stacking" of sentences for first-time offenders, but this change was not retroactive. Cruz argued that the disparity between his original sentence and what it would be under the amended law constituted "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially denied Cruz's motion, adopting the government's reasoning. Cruz appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in United States v. Ruvalcaba, which clarified that district courts could consider nonretroactive sentencing amendments as part of the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" analysis. On remand, the District Court again denied the motion without specifying the grounds for its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court's brief text order did not clarify whether it had properly considered the factors outlined in Ruvalcaba. The appellate court noted that the government's arguments might have led the District Court to apply an unduly narrow interpretation of what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration, ensuring that the correct legal standards are applied. The appellate court also denied Cruz's request to assign the case to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Cruz-Rivera" on Justia Law

In 2008, Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera began working with co-conspirators in Latin America to obtain and transport cocaine for importation into the United States. Rafael Segundo Castro Diaz joined the conspiracy later, helping transport 1,200 kilos of cocaine in April 2013. The United States Coast Guard intercepted the boat carrying the cocaine, and the men aboard were arrested. Years later, a federal grand jury returned three indictments against Gomez Rivera and Castro Diaz, with the second superseding indictment expanding the conspiracy period from January 2008 to September 2013.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the second superseding indictment, which they argued was untimely and broadened the original charges. The defendants then negotiated a stipulated bench trial, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their motions to dismiss. The district court adjudicated them guilty, but there were clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment documentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a superseding indictment can satisfy the statute of limitations if it is independently timely or relates back to a timely prior indictment. The second superseding indictment was independently timely, as it was returned within five years of the alleged conspiracy period. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as both defendants stipulated to facts indicating their involvement in the conspiracy until September 2013. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences but remanded for the correction of clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment. View "USA v. Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Hinojos, who was convicted of three counts under the gang conspiracy statute, Penal Code section 182.5, related to an attack on a prison inmate by individuals associated with the Mexican Mafia. The underlying offenses were assault by a life prisoner, conspiracy to commit murder, and attempted murder. Hinojos appealed, raising several issues, including the application of section 654 to stay two of his convictions, the gang enhancement, the application of the Three Strikes law, the sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Hinojos and sentenced him to 50 years to life plus additional terms for the gang enhancement. The court imposed sentences on all three counts, which Hinojos argued should be stayed under section 654. He also contended that the gang enhancement should not apply, the Three Strikes law was improperly applied to one count, and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Additionally, he challenged the jury instructions on the pattern of criminal gang activity and the natural and probable consequences doctrine.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court agreed that two of Hinojos's three convictions must be stayed under section 654 but rejected the rest of his challenges. The court held that the gang enhancement punishes aspects of criminal conduct beyond those in the gang conspiracy statute, and therefore section 654 does not bar its imposition. The court also found that allegations of Three Strikes sentencing as to some counts are sufficient to allege sentencing as to all eligible counts. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the convictions, and any error in not setting aside the indictment was harmless. The court concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the pattern of criminal gang activity and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury did not convict Hinojos of multiple conspiracies but rather a single conspiracy charged in three ways. The convictions were affirmed, and the case was remanded for the trial court to stay execution of the sentence on two of the three counts. View "P. v. Hinojos" on Justia Law

Andrew Christian Temple was found not guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of second-degree murder. The jury determined that Temple used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on considering his mental disorders in determining imperfect self-defense, erred in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and wrongly denied his motion for a trial continuance to locate a witness.The Superior Court of Riverside initially handled the case, where Temple was convicted. Temple's defense requested jury instructions on imperfect self-defense and consideration of mental disorders, which the court provided. However, Temple contended these instructions were insufficient as they did not explicitly allow the jury to consider his mental disorders in assessing imperfect self-defense. Additionally, Temple's request for a trial continuance to locate a witness was denied by the trial court, which found no good cause for the delay.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple's mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no guarantee the witness could be located within a reasonable time. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Temple" on Justia Law

Brandon Richardson was sentenced to 182 months in prison in Missouri for federal firearm and drug convictions. Subsequently, he was transported to Oklahoma to face a federal charge of illegal possession of a firearm. Richardson pleaded guilty to the Oklahoma offense, and the district court sentenced him to 27 months, with 10 months to be served consecutively to the Missouri sentence. Richardson appealed, arguing that the Oklahoma court abused its discretion by imposing the consecutive sentence, claiming that the Missouri court had already punished him for the Oklahoma conduct.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sentenced Richardson to 27 months for the Oklahoma firearm possession charge, with 10 months to be served consecutively to his Missouri sentence. Richardson contended that the Missouri court had already accounted for his Oklahoma conduct in its sentencing, although he did not specify any time attributed to the Oklahoma conduct by the Missouri court. He also argued that the consecutive sentence created an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to defendants sentenced under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with Richardson's arguments. The court found that the Oklahoma district court did not abuse its discretion under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) by treating the Oklahoma offense as independent of the Missouri offenses and imposing the 10-month consecutive sentence. The appellate court held that Richardson failed to show that the Missouri court had attributed any part of its sentence to his Oklahoma conduct. Additionally, the court found no unwarranted sentencing disparity, as Richardson did not request a transfer under Rule 20, and his comparators should be defendants sentenced outside of Rule 20. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Oklahoma court's sentence. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 2016, an anonymous user uploaded child pornography images to Chatstep, an internet chatroom service. Chatstep identified and reported the uploads to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) using Microsoft’s PhotoDNA. The Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) in New Mexico traced the IP address to Guy Rosenschein and obtained a warrant to search his home, uncovering approximately 21,000 images and videos of child pornography. Rosenschein was indicted on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Rosenschein’s pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, dismiss the case, or compel discovery of the computer programs used by Microsoft and NCMEC. Rosenschein pleaded guilty to one count of possession and seven counts of distribution of child pornography, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of all three motions. The court held that Chatstep and Microsoft were not acting as governmental agents, so the Fourth Amendment did not apply to their conduct. Even if they were considered governmental agents, Rosenschein had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the images he uploaded to a public chatroom. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Rosenschein’s motion to compel discovery of NCMEC’s reporting system, since he had the opportunity to access the information through witness examination. Lastly, the court upheld the district court’s refusal to require expert reports for the government’s witnesses before the suppression hearing, since Rule 16(a)(1)(G) does not apply to suppression hearings. View "U.S. v. Rosenschein" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Erick Jose Sandoval Argueta, a Salvadoran national, was lawfully present in the United States when he solicited sex over the internet from someone he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover police officer. He was convicted in Texas of online solicitation of a minor. Based on this conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered him removed for committing a "crime of child abuse." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision.Sandoval Argueta filed two petitions for review. In the first, he challenged the BIA's determination of his removability and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Sandoval Argueta had been convicted of multiple crimes, including property theft, drug trafficking, and online solicitation of a minor. The government initially charged him with removability based on the solicitation conviction but later added charges related to his drug trafficking conviction. After the drug trafficking conviction was vacated, the government reasserted the "crime of child abuse" charge.The Fifth Circuit held that the best reading of "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) includes convictions for online solicitation of a minor, even if no actual child was involved. The court reasoned that the statute's broad language encompasses offenses that create a high risk of harm to a child, including attempt offenses. Therefore, Sandoval Argueta's conviction under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c) categorically met the definition of a "crime of child abuse."In his second petition, Sandoval Argueta argued that the BIA erred by not considering his equitable tolling argument when denying his motion to reconsider. The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as it was procedurally barred by statutory limits on the number of motions to reconsider and the prohibition on reconsidering a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.The Fifth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Argueta v. Bondi" on Justia Law