Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dary Jene Green shot and killed Angela Gatlin as she was getting out of his car in Kansas City, Kansas. Green waived his right to counsel before the preliminary hearing and represented himself through pretrial proceedings and trial. After a jury convicted him of premeditated first-degree murder, the district court briefly appointed counsel, but Green opted to resume self-representation before sentencing. The district court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.The Wyandotte District Court found Green guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. Green appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of premeditation, the statute's vagueness, the district court's error in requiring evidence of a witness's unavailability, and the lack of a second waiver colloquy for self-representation at sentencing. The district court had denied Green's motions to dismiss charges due to an allegedly illegal arrest and ruled that his arrest was lawful. The court also addressed Green's Fifth Amendment claim, finding no interrogation occurred at the time of his arrest.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support Green's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder, noting the use of a deadly weapon, lack of provocation, and Green's conduct before and after the killing. The court also found that the premeditated first-degree murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague, as the components of premeditation (time and consideration) provided explicit standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not err in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony of an allegedly unavailable witness, as Green failed to present evidence of the witness's unavailability. Finally, the court held that Green knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel at sentencing, as the brief appointment of counsel did not substantially change the circumstances requiring a new waiver. View "State v. Green " on Justia Law

Amanda Fletcher was arrested after a police officer, Officer Biagi, noticed her vehicle parked outside a convenience store and discovered she had a warrant for her arrest. Upon arresting her, Biagi requested a drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of her vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, leading officers to search the vehicle and find methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Fletcher, who was on probation and had waived her Fourth Amendment rights, moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection against dog sniffs and searches than the Fourth Amendment.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Fletcher's motion to suppress, citing her probation agreement, which included a waiver of her rights concerning searches. Fletcher entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion. She was sentenced to seven years with two years fixed, but her sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for seven years. Fletcher then appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that exterior sniffs of a vehicle by a drug dog are not considered searches under Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Additionally, the court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not impose a heightened standard under the Idaho Constitution. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to search Fletcher's vehicle based on the drug dog's alert, which was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search. Thus, the district court's order denying Fletcher's motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

On January 22, 2021, officers from the Coeur d’Alene Police Department were patrolling the downtown bar district when they observed James Mark Popp sitting in a parked car and flicking cigarette ash out the window. The officers approached Popp, requested his identification, and subsequently conducted a search after a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances. The search revealed cocaine, leading to Popp’s arrest and charges for possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and littering.The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho denied Popp’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, ruling that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Popp for littering under local and state laws. Popp entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the officers had reasonable suspicion under Idaho Code section 18-7031.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Popp under Idaho Code section 18-7031. The court found that the officers’ observation of Popp flicking cigarette ash in a private parking lot did not constitute reasonable suspicion of littering, as there was no evidence that the property owner prohibited such conduct. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, vacated Popp’s judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Popp" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Kevin Woods was found in possession of drugs, a scale, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and additional high-capacity firearm magazines. He was charged with possession of a controlled substance and carrying a dangerous weapon while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. Woods pleaded guilty to both charges but challenged the latter conviction, arguing it violated his Second Amendment rights and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Woods's motion to dismiss the dangerous weapon charge, reasoning that the legislature could impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms. The court concluded that the prohibition on carrying firearms while illegally possessing a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense was a reasonable regulation supported by historical analogues. Woods entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of his conviction.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Second Amendment does not cover the right to carry a firearm while illegally possessing a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense. The court reasoned that the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms is limited to responsible, law-abiding citizens engaged in lawful conduct. Additionally, the court found that even if the conduct were covered by the Second Amendment, the regulation was consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also concluded that Woods's conviction did not violate article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution, as the state has a compelling interest in public safety, and the statute was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. View "State of Iowa v. Woods" on Justia Law

Jordan Cole consented to a one-year protective order in a domestic abuse case, which prohibited him from possessing firearms under Iowa Code section 724.26(2)(a). Despite this, Cole pawned stolen firearms while the order was in effect. He was charged with theft and violations of section 724.26(2)(a). The theft charge was dropped, and Cole was convicted of two violations of section 724.26(2)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences, which were suspended with probation.Cole appealed his convictions, arguing that section 724.26(2)(a) violated the Second Amendment and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. He also claimed an error in his sentencing order. The Iowa District Court for Story County had denied his motion to dismiss the charges based on these constitutional claims. Cole and the State agreed to dismiss two charges, and Cole waived his jury rights, leading to a trial on the minutes of testimony. The district court found Cole guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms, suspended with probation, but stated that if probation was revoked, the sentences could be served consecutively.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Cole waived his Second Amendment and article I, section 1A rights by consenting to the protective order, which explicitly prohibited firearm possession. The court affirmed his convictions but agreed with Cole that the sentencing order's provision for consecutive sentences upon probation revocation was unlawful. The court remanded the case for entry of a corrected sentencing order, ensuring that any revocation of probation would not result in consecutive sentences. View "State of Iowa v. Cole" on Justia Law

Rodney Higgins pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. He appealed, challenging the search that led to his arrest, arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause. From June to August 2021, Higgins was involved in a drug distribution ring. Officers used a confidential source to conduct two controlled buys from Higgins. A Drug Enforcement Administration task force officer prepared an affidavit for a search warrant for Higgins’s apartment, detailing the officer’s training, the confidential source’s knowledge of Higgins’s drug activities, Higgins’s criminal history, and the controlled buys. The affidavit also included a text exchange where Higgins used coded language to indicate he had more drugs.The magistrate judge found probable cause and issued a search warrant. The search of Higgins’s apartment yielded 370 grams of methamphetamine and over 200 grams of fentanyl. Higgins was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence, but the district court denied the motion. Higgins pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, raising three issues: the nexus between his drug trafficking and residence, entitlement to a hearing based on alleged misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit, and the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause, establishing a fair probability that contraband would be found in Higgins’s apartment. The court also found that Higgins was not entitled to a Franks hearing, as he failed to make a substantial preliminary showing of a knowing, intentional, or reckless falsehood in the affidavit. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Higgins’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Higgins" on Justia Law

Luis A. Ramirez, an inmate serving a lengthy sentence for felony convictions, attacked a corrections officer with a sharpened pencil. He was charged with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Due to multiple continuances and rescheduled trial dates, Ramirez was tried and convicted by a jury 46 months after the charges were filed.Ramirez moved for postconviction relief, claiming the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The postconviction court denied his motion, and Ramirez appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the decision, concluding that Ramirez's right to a speedy trial was violated and ordered the charges dismissed. The State sought review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The court found that while the 46-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, it was not long enough to declare prejudice as a matter of law. The reasons for the delay were attributed to neutral factors, such as the orderly administration of justice and the State's negligence, but not deliberate or bad-faith conduct. Ramirez's significant delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial and his failure to demonstrate particularized prejudice weighed against him.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

William C. Dugan sought a harassment protection order against Steve Sorensen, alleging that Sorensen attacked him in the driveway of Sorensen's home while Dugan was picking up his children. Dugan claimed Sorensen knocked him down, banged his head into the pavement, and later threatened him while he was in his car waiting for the police. Sorensen argued that he intervened to protect his wife, Natalie Sorensen, who he believed was being assaulted by Dugan. The incident was partially captured on a neighbor's security camera.The district court for Douglas County issued an ex parte harassment protection order in favor of Dugan. At a subsequent show cause hearing, the court reviewed the evidence, including the security footage and testimonies from Dugan, Sorensen, Natalie, and the older child of Dugan and Natalie. The court found Dugan's testimony more credible and determined that Sorensen's actions constituted harassment. The court affirmed the protection order, finding that Sorensen's conduct involved multiple acts of harassment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a course of conduct for harassment protection orders requires at least two separate acts of harassment. The court found that Sorensen's physical assault on Dugan in the driveway and the subsequent verbal threats while Dugan was in his car constituted two separate acts of harassment. The court also addressed Sorensen's justification defense, noting that justification is an affirmative defense in criminal prosecutions and certain civil actions but not explicitly in civil protection order proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's decision to issue the harassment protection order, concluding that Sorensen's actions met the statutory definition of harassment and that his justification defense was not applicable. View "Dugan v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

A man was accused of attempting to commit statutory rape against his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. The incident occurred in the early morning hours when the child’s mother discovered the man in bed with her daughter, who was nude except for a bra. The mother called 911, and the child was taken to the hospital and later interviewed at a Children’s Advocacy Center. The man was initially indicted on seven counts related to various alleged acts against the child, but all but one count—attempted statutory rape—were dropped or not presented to the jury at trial.The case was tried in the Warren County Circuit Court. Before trial, the court held a hearing to determine whether the child’s recorded interview at the advocacy center could be admitted under the tender years hearsay exception. The court allowed the recording, finding the exception satisfied. During trial, the court also admitted a 911 dispatch report over defense objections regarding hearsay and reliability. The jury heard testimony from the child, her mother, law enforcement, a forensic interviewer, and a nurse examiner. The defense challenged the credibility of the evidence and witnesses, but the jury found the defendant guilty of attempted statutory rape. The trial court sentenced him to fifty years in prison, with thirty years to serve.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed claims that the admission of the child’s interview and the 911 report were erroneous, that expert and prosecutorial comments improperly vouched for the child’s credibility, and that cumulative error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The court held that no reversible error occurred, finding that the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated, the evidentiary rulings were not plain error, and there was no improper vouching or cumulative error. The conviction was affirmed. View "Cole v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The People initiated a criminal prosecution against Diana Maria Teran, alleging she misused information obtained during her employment with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) while working for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. Teran was charged with violations of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(2), which criminalizes unauthorized access and use of data from a computer system. The charges were based on Teran’s alleged use of data related to disciplinary proceedings of sheriff’s deputies, which she accessed during her tenure at LASD and later shared with a colleague at the District Attorney’s Office.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held Teran to answer on six counts after a preliminary hearing, finding sufficient evidence that she accessed the deputies' personnel records through LASD’s Performance Recording and Monitoring System (PRMS) and used this data without permission. The court rejected Teran’s argument that she was exempt from prosecution under the statute for acting within the scope of lawful employment and denied her motion to dismiss the charges under section 995. Teran then filed a petition for writ of prohibition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted Teran’s petition. The court held that section 502(c)(2) does not apply to the use of purely public court records, even if those records were accessed from a computer system without permission. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the statute was to prevent hacking and tampering with computer systems, not to criminalize the sharing of public information. Consequently, the court ordered the dismissal of the charges against Teran and unsealed certain exhibits related to the case. View "Teran v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law