Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

George Guldi, a former Suffolk County legislator and disbarred real estate attorney, conspired with his former girlfriend, Victoria Davidson, to deceive a mortgage servicer, Ditech Financial LLC, into wiring them $253,236. The funds did not belong to either of them. A jury convicted Guldi of wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York oversaw the trial. The jury found sufficient evidence to support the existence of a conspiracy, fraudulent intent, and aiding and abetting. The district court also found no reversible error in its jury instructions on conspiracy, wire fraud, and fraudulent intent. Additionally, the court properly considered Guldi’s medical needs during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Guldi’s convictions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings and that the district court did not err in its jury instructions. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court erred in applying a two-offense-level enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for using “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the offense. The appellate court determined that this procedural error rendered Guldi’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.As a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated and remanded Guldi’s sentence for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Guldi" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of capital murder for the deaths of his girlfriend and her unborn child. The case against him was largely circumstantial. He reported finding the victim shot in her home, cooperated with police, and provided an account of his whereabouts, supported by his grandmother. The investigation included analysis of surveillance footage, U-Haul rental records, cell phone data, and forensic evidence, but no direct evidence placed him at the scene. The prosecution’s theory relied on the timing and mileage of a rented U-Haul, similarities between shell casings found at the crime scene and at a friend’s house, and the defendant’s purchase of a firearm and ammunition. The defense pointed to gaps in the evidence, alternative suspects, and the lack of direct forensic links.The Johnson District Court admitted some of the defendant’s statements to police, excluded certain ballistics testimony, and barred evidence of the victim’s past fears of an ex-boyfriend. After a three-week trial, a jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor repeatedly violated the court’s order in limine by discussing excluded ballistics evidence and improperly asserted as fact that disputed evidence was undisputed, among other claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas found multiple instances of prosecutorial error, including repeated violations of the order in limine and improper statements during closing argument that conveyed the prosecutor’s opinion on disputed facts. The court held that these errors were not harmless, given the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the meaningful gaps in the State’s case. Applying the constitutional harmlessness standard, the court concluded there was a reasonable possibility the errors contributed to the verdict. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Wash " on Justia Law

Jason W. Phipps pled no contest to two felonies and two misdemeanors in 2022. His presentence investigation report calculated a criminal history score of B, which he contested, arguing that his 2010 conviction for criminal threat should not be counted due to a ruling in State v. Boettger that struck down reckless criminal threat as unconstitutional. The district court used the modified categorical approach and concluded that Phipps' conviction was for the intentional version of criminal threat, thus maintaining the B score for sentencing.The Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed the case while the United States Supreme Court issued Counterman v. Colorado, which held that a reckless mens rea is sufficient for a criminal threat conviction. The Court of Appeals determined that Counterman overruled Boettger, making it irrelevant whether Phipps' conviction was for reckless or intentional criminal threat, and affirmed his sentence.The Kansas Supreme Court granted Phipps' petition for review. During the review, Phipps completed his sentence, leading the court to question whether the case was moot. After further briefing, the court concluded that Phipps' release rendered the issues moot and overruled the precedent set in State v. Roat, which allowed for review of moot issues under certain exceptions. The court held that once an issue is determined to be moot, jurisdiction is extinguished, and no prudential exceptions apply. Consequently, Phipps' appeal was dismissed as moot, and the court did not address the merits of the Counterman decision. View "State v. Phipps " on Justia Law

Brian Stubbs was convicted of criminal use of a weapon and interference with law enforcement after an incident where he stabbed Edward McCutcheon with a large kitchen knife. Stubbs arrived uninvited at McCutcheon's apartment, leading to a fight. McCutcheon was seriously injured, and Stubbs fled the scene. Police pursued Stubbs, who ignored commands to stop, leading to his arrest.The Douglas District Court convicted Stubbs of criminal use of a weapon and interference with law enforcement. Stubbs appealed, arguing that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for interference with law enforcement. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Stubbs lacked standing to challenge the statute's vagueness because he did not show it was vague as applied to his conduct.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Stubbs had standing to bring an arbitrary-enforcement challenge to the statute. The court explained that such challenges are inherently facial because they dispute the legislature's authority to enact the statute at all. The court found that Stubbs' conviction under the allegedly void statute presented a concrete injury, satisfying the standing requirements.On the merits, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute's prohibition on possessing a "dangerous knife" with intent to use it "unlawfully against another" provided adequate enforcement guidelines. The court concluded that the statute did not invite arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Additionally, the court found sufficient evidence to support Stubbs' conviction for interference with law enforcement, as the jury could reasonably conclude that Stubbs knowingly obstructed the officer's duties. The court affirmed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. Stubbs " on Justia Law

Dary Jene Green shot and killed Angela Gatlin as she was getting out of his car in Kansas City, Kansas. Green waived his right to counsel before the preliminary hearing and represented himself through pretrial proceedings and trial. After a jury convicted him of premeditated first-degree murder, the district court briefly appointed counsel, but Green opted to resume self-representation before sentencing. The district court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.The Wyandotte District Court found Green guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. Green appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of premeditation, the statute's vagueness, the district court's error in requiring evidence of a witness's unavailability, and the lack of a second waiver colloquy for self-representation at sentencing. The district court had denied Green's motions to dismiss charges due to an allegedly illegal arrest and ruled that his arrest was lawful. The court also addressed Green's Fifth Amendment claim, finding no interrogation occurred at the time of his arrest.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support Green's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder, noting the use of a deadly weapon, lack of provocation, and Green's conduct before and after the killing. The court also found that the premeditated first-degree murder statute was not unconstitutionally vague, as the components of premeditation (time and consideration) provided explicit standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court did not err in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony of an allegedly unavailable witness, as Green failed to present evidence of the witness's unavailability. Finally, the court held that Green knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel at sentencing, as the brief appointment of counsel did not substantially change the circumstances requiring a new waiver. View "State v. Green " on Justia Law

Amanda Fletcher was arrested after a police officer, Officer Biagi, noticed her vehicle parked outside a convenience store and discovered she had a warrant for her arrest. Upon arresting her, Biagi requested a drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of her vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, leading officers to search the vehicle and find methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Fletcher, who was on probation and had waived her Fourth Amendment rights, moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection against dog sniffs and searches than the Fourth Amendment.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho denied Fletcher's motion to suppress, citing her probation agreement, which included a waiver of her rights concerning searches. Fletcher entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion. She was sentenced to seven years with two years fixed, but her sentence was suspended, and she was placed on probation for seven years. Fletcher then appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that exterior sniffs of a vehicle by a drug dog are not considered searches under Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Additionally, the court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not impose a heightened standard under the Idaho Constitution. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to search Fletcher's vehicle based on the drug dog's alert, which was sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search. Thus, the district court's order denying Fletcher's motion to suppress was affirmed. View "State v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

On January 22, 2021, officers from the Coeur d’Alene Police Department were patrolling the downtown bar district when they observed James Mark Popp sitting in a parked car and flicking cigarette ash out the window. The officers approached Popp, requested his identification, and subsequently conducted a search after a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances. The search revealed cocaine, leading to Popp’s arrest and charges for possession of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and littering.The District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho denied Popp’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, ruling that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Popp for littering under local and state laws. Popp entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the officers had reasonable suspicion under Idaho Code section 18-7031.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Popp under Idaho Code section 18-7031. The court found that the officers’ observation of Popp flicking cigarette ash in a private parking lot did not constitute reasonable suspicion of littering, as there was no evidence that the property owner prohibited such conduct. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, vacated Popp’s judgment of conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Popp" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Kevin Woods was found in possession of drugs, a scale, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and additional high-capacity firearm magazines. He was charged with possession of a controlled substance and carrying a dangerous weapon while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. Woods pleaded guilty to both charges but challenged the latter conviction, arguing it violated his Second Amendment rights and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied Woods's motion to dismiss the dangerous weapon charge, reasoning that the legislature could impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms. The court concluded that the prohibition on carrying firearms while illegally possessing a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense was a reasonable regulation supported by historical analogues. Woods entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of his conviction.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Second Amendment does not cover the right to carry a firearm while illegally possessing a controlled substance or committing an indictable offense. The court reasoned that the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms is limited to responsible, law-abiding citizens engaged in lawful conduct. Additionally, the court found that even if the conduct were covered by the Second Amendment, the regulation was consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court also concluded that Woods's conviction did not violate article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution, as the state has a compelling interest in public safety, and the statute was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. View "State of Iowa v. Woods" on Justia Law

Jordan Cole consented to a one-year protective order in a domestic abuse case, which prohibited him from possessing firearms under Iowa Code section 724.26(2)(a). Despite this, Cole pawned stolen firearms while the order was in effect. He was charged with theft and violations of section 724.26(2)(a). The theft charge was dropped, and Cole was convicted of two violations of section 724.26(2)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences, which were suspended with probation.Cole appealed his convictions, arguing that section 724.26(2)(a) violated the Second Amendment and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. He also claimed an error in his sentencing order. The Iowa District Court for Story County had denied his motion to dismiss the charges based on these constitutional claims. Cole and the State agreed to dismiss two charges, and Cole waived his jury rights, leading to a trial on the minutes of testimony. The district court found Cole guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms, suspended with probation, but stated that if probation was revoked, the sentences could be served consecutively.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Cole waived his Second Amendment and article I, section 1A rights by consenting to the protective order, which explicitly prohibited firearm possession. The court affirmed his convictions but agreed with Cole that the sentencing order's provision for consecutive sentences upon probation revocation was unlawful. The court remanded the case for entry of a corrected sentencing order, ensuring that any revocation of probation would not result in consecutive sentences. View "State of Iowa v. Cole" on Justia Law

Rodney Higgins pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. He appealed, challenging the search that led to his arrest, arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause. From June to August 2021, Higgins was involved in a drug distribution ring. Officers used a confidential source to conduct two controlled buys from Higgins. A Drug Enforcement Administration task force officer prepared an affidavit for a search warrant for Higgins’s apartment, detailing the officer’s training, the confidential source’s knowledge of Higgins’s drug activities, Higgins’s criminal history, and the controlled buys. The affidavit also included a text exchange where Higgins used coded language to indicate he had more drugs.The magistrate judge found probable cause and issued a search warrant. The search of Higgins’s apartment yielded 370 grams of methamphetamine and over 200 grams of fentanyl. Higgins was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. He moved to suppress the evidence, but the district court denied the motion. Higgins pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, raising three issues: the nexus between his drug trafficking and residence, entitlement to a hearing based on alleged misrepresentations or omissions in the affidavit, and the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause, establishing a fair probability that contraband would be found in Higgins’s apartment. The court also found that Higgins was not entitled to a Franks hearing, as he failed to make a substantial preliminary showing of a knowing, intentional, or reckless falsehood in the affidavit. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Higgins’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Higgins" on Justia Law