Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Federal agents learned that a previously convicted felon arranged the sale of a World War II-era Russian machinegun, which he acknowledged could not be lawfully transferred. The defendant, though not in physical possession of the weapon, set up the transaction between an undercover federal agent—posing as a firearms and drug trafficker—and a third party who actually had the gun. The agent and the defendant traveled together to complete the purchase, and the defendant was later arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the prosecution. A grand jury indicted the defendant for both possessing or transferring a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the machinegun charge, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen required invalidation of the statute, and also that the statutory exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) applied since the transfer was to a federal agent. The district court denied the motion, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in United States v. Henry, which held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment, and on earlier cases interpreting the statutory exemption narrowly. At trial, the jury acquitted on the felon-in-possession count but convicted on the possession or transfer count, and the district court sentenced the defendant to twenty-seven months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the exemption in § 922(o)(2)(A) for transfers to the United States does not apply to transfers to undercover agents unless the transfer is authorized by the government for its benefit. The court also held that its prior decision in Henry remains binding, and that § 922(o) does not violate the Second Amendment. View "USA V. KITTSON" on Justia Law

A police officer in Des Moines, Iowa attempted to stop a vehicle driven by Dylan Pettyjohn for lacking license plates or a temporary registration. Pettyjohn fled, leading the officer on a high-speed chase through a residential area before crashing. He then ran from the vehicle, discarding a loaded revolver and a fanny pack containing 54 fentanyl pills, $389 in small bills, marijuana, and about 85 grams of methamphetamine. A search of his vehicle yielded a digital scale with white residue, more marijuana, and shell casings. Pettyjohn was arrested, and a federal grand jury indicted him on multiple counts related to drug possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Pettyjohn’s motion to dismiss the felon in possession charge, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. The court also allowed limited admission of his prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, after an agreement between Pettyjohn and the government. At trial, Pettyjohn moved for acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the district court found the evidence sufficient and denied the motions. The jury found Pettyjohn guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings under Rules 404(b) and 609, and upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) based on circuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior conviction evidence, and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pettyjohn" on Justia Law

A special agent with Homeland Security Investigations was discovered to have stolen money from criminal targets, embezzled agency funds, and entered into a cash-for-protection arrangement with a confidential source. The agent’s conduct came to light after the confidential source was arrested by the DEA, and text messages between the two were uncovered. Investigators found that the agent deleted incriminating messages, misappropriated cash from drug dealers and agency sources, manipulated controlled buys for personal gain, and protected his source from law enforcement scrutiny. The agent was also shown to have structured cash deposits to evade bank reporting requirements and failed to report significant taxable income.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, conducted a thirteen-day jury trial in 2023. The jury found the agent guilty on all counts, including filing false tax returns, structuring cash transactions, and concealing material facts from the government. The district court denied the agent’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, then imposed sentence. The agent appealed, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict on all counts. The evidence included direct and indirect proof of unreported income, clear indications of structuring to evade reporting requirements, and material omissions on government forms. The court found no grounds to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations or the district court’s denial of post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Sabaini" on Justia Law

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which the defendant was charged with violating an abuse prevention order issued under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209A. The order directed the defendant to "stay away" from the victim's residence, which was a multi-unit building, but did not set a specific distance for compliance. On the day in question, the defendant was observed by police walking on a street parallel and behind the victim’s residence, eventually reaching a point approximately 200 feet away from the victim’s home but on the opposite side of the block. He was arrested at that location. There was no evidence the defendant entered the victim’s property or that the victim was at home at the time.The Cambridge Division of the District Court Department conducted a jury trial, at which the defendant was convicted of violating the abuse prevention order. The defendant’s motions for a required finding of not guilty were denied at multiple stages. On appeal, the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find a violation. The defendant sought, and was granted, further appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the evidence under the standard of whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had positioned himself so proximate to the victim’s property that he would have been able to abuse or contact the victim if she were present. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction, set aside the verdict, and ordered that judgment enter for the defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Carino" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses arising from the abuse of a minor, J, who lived with him and her mother over several years. The victim alleged that the defendant, who acted as a father figure, committed various acts of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse while the mother was at work. After the defendant was incarcerated for a separate domestic dispute, J disclosed the abuse to her mother, which eventually led to a police report and a forensic interview at a child advocacy center. Subsequently, a pediatrician conducted a medical examination and relied on the forensic interview report to obtain a history of the alleged abuse. The physical exam results were normal and did not confirm or refute the allegations.The case was tried in the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain. During trial, the state sought to admit statements J made during her forensic interview through the testimony of the interviewer, arguing these were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule. The defense objected, contending the interview lacked a medical purpose. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the statements. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the court imposed a substantial prison sentence. The defendant appealed, raising two main issues: the admission of the forensic interview statements as hearsay, and the denial of a special jury instruction on child witness credibility.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It clarified that, for statements to be admissible under the medical treatment exception, the declarant must be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain medical diagnosis or treatment, and the statements must be reasonably pertinent to that end. The Court found the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the forensic interview statements because there was insufficient evidence that J understood the interview had a medical purpose. However, the Court concluded this error was harmless since the evidence was cumulative of J’s testimony and not emphasized by the prosecution. The Court further held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a special child credibility instruction, and it declined to modify its approach to such instructions. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Connecticut v. Giovanni D." on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal shooting that followed a car accident in Hartford, Connecticut. The defendant, after colliding with the victim’s vehicle, agreed to pay for the damages and arranged to meet the victim later that day. Surveillance footage and eyewitness accounts linked the defendant to the scene, describing his distinctive clothing and actions. Evidence showed the defendant met with the victim, shot him multiple times, and fled the scene. Forensic analysis detected gunshot residue on the defendant’s clothing, and cellphone data further corroborated his involvement. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with murder and criminal possession of a firearm.At trial in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and the court found him guilty of criminal possession of a firearm. The defendant appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, raising several unpreserved constitutional claims. He argued that his right to confrontation was violated when the State’s gunshot residue expert testified based on data and notes from a nontestifying analyst, and when the prosecutor elicited testimonial hearsay on cross-examination. He also alleged prosecutorial impropriety for introducing facts not in evidence during cross-examination.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the claim regarding the expert’s reliance on the nontestifying analyst’s materials failed because the record was inadequate to determine whether those materials were testimonial. The court declined to adopt the State’s proposed rule barring all unpreserved confrontation claims and reaffirmed that such claims may still be reviewed if the record is sufficient. The court further held there was no confrontation clause violation or prosecutorial impropriety regarding the cross-examination, as the questions did not introduce hearsay or inadmissible evidence. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State of Connecticut v. Bester" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child and her mother, recently arrived from the Dominican Republic, were staying with family in New Britain, Connecticut. The defendant, who was married to the mother's niece, lived in the same apartment. On New Year's Eve, the defendant sexually assaulted the child. Later that evening at a family party, the child told her mother that the defendant had kissed her, and after further questioning, disclosed more details of the assault. The next day, the mother confronted the defendant, who made incriminating admissions both in person and via text. Police interviewed the defendant at the station after he voluntarily agreed to meet and requested a Spanish-speaking detective. During the interview, which was conversational and not confrontational, the defendant confessed to inappropriate sexual conduct.The Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress his statements to police, finding he was not in custody for Miranda purposes. At trial, the court admitted the child’s statements to her mother under the spontaneous utterance exception to hearsay, and limited the testimony of the defense expert regarding the U visa program, which provides immigration benefits to victims of certain crimes who cooperate with law enforcement. The jury convicted the defendant of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion, admitting the victim’s hearsay statements, and restricting expert testimony, and further sought review of confidential personnel records of one detective. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court properly denied the suppression motion, as the defendant was not in custody. The admission of the child’s statements was error but harmless, given other strong evidence. The limitations on the expert’s testimony did not deny due process or affect the verdict. Review of the confidential records revealed no material requiring disclosure. The conviction was affirmed. View "State of Connecticut v. Lazaro D." on Justia Law

On November 23, 2019, the appellant was driving an Acura with three children, including her own, when her vehicle was rear-ended by another driver. Witnesses testified that after this collision, the Acura accelerated rapidly, left the road, then reentered it and collided head-on with a Yukon. The crash resulted in the death of one child and serious injury to another. At the time, the appellant’s driver’s license was suspended, and she was not permitted unsupervised contact with her children due to prior involvement with Child Protective Services.The State of Montana charged the appellant with multiple offenses, including negligent homicide, criminal endangerment, and driving with a suspended license. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over a six-day jury trial. The jury found the appellant guilty on all counts. The appellant’s defense argued that the initial rear-end collision was the cause of the subsequent crash, while the prosecution maintained that the appellant’s actions, including improperly restraining the children and fleeing the scene, were negligent and directly led to the fatal incident.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the negligent homicide conviction, asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, objected to the admission of certain expert testimony, sought a mistrial based on inadmissible testimony, and disputed the order of restitution for lost wages. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that there was sufficient evidence for the negligent homicide conviction, found no ineffective assistance of counsel, ruled that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony or denying a mistrial, and upheld the restitution award, finding it legally appropriate under Montana law. View "State v. Mullendore" on Justia Law

The case concerns a confrontation between the defendant, a 29-year-old man, and his 79-year-old neighbor in Winnett, Montana. After an altercation outside their apartments, the neighbor was found fatally stabbed, while the defendant had a gunshot wound. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense after the neighbor allegedly shot him first. Physical evidence, however, contradicted the defendant’s account, indicating the victim was not standing when stabbed and that the sequence of events differed from the defendant’s narrative. The defendant was charged with deliberate homicide, with a sentencing enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.In the Tenth Judicial District Court, the defendant initially indicated he might raise a mental disease or disorder defense but failed to meet several disclosure deadlines and ultimately abandoned that defense. The District Court, upon a motion in limine by the State, precluded the defendant from introducing evidence to support a lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide while pursuing a justifiable use of force (self-defense) claim. The court also addressed juror evidentiary questions during trial without consulting the parties, to which the defendant did not object. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 110 years in prison.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court erred in categorically precluding the defendant from seeking a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction while pursuing a justifiable use of force defense. The Supreme Court clarified that a defendant may present alternative theories if supported by the evidence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced, as he did not present admissible evidence supporting mitigation at trial. The court also declined to exercise plain error review regarding the handling of juror questions, finding no manifest miscarriage of justice. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged in October 2022 with possession of child pornography, including an enhancement for possessing a large number of images involving very young minors. In February 2023, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation, jail time under work release, and required to register as a sex offender. The defendant is a registered nurse, and after his conviction, the state Board of Registered Nursing began disciplinary proceedings to remove his license. He lost his job but later received support from his former employer and sought therapy and treatment.In September 2023, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County under Penal Code section 236.15 to vacate his conviction. He argued that his offense was a direct result of sexual violence he suffered as both a child and an adult, including repeated abuse and rapes. The petition was supported by a clinical director who opined that the defendant’s behavior was a “direct result” of trauma repetition linked to his history of sexual violence. After an evidentiary hearing in January 2024, the Superior Court granted the petition and vacated the conviction, leading to the dismissal of disciplinary proceedings against him.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court clarified the requirements for relief under section 236.15 and held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to appellate review. It found that, although the defendant suffered significant sexual violence, his later possession of child pornography was not a “direct result” of that victimization as required by the statute. The court emphasized that multiple contributing factors and the passage of time attenuated the causal connection. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting the petition and directed the lower court to deny the petition. View "P. v. S.H." on Justia Law