Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Sweeney was involved in a late-night argument with neighbors over stolen marijuana, during which he fired a gun, missing his intended targets but fatally striking a bystander some distance away. At trial, a key issue was whether Sweeney could have been the shooter given his location and the trajectory of the bullet. After the prosecution rested, a juror independently visited the crime scene and reported his findings to the rest of the jury, leading to his dismissal and the continuation of deliberations with the remaining eleven jurors. Sweeney was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges.His convictions were upheld by a Maryland appellate court on direct appeal. Sweeney then pursued postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking to question the rest of the jury about possible prejudice following the dismissed juror’s unauthorized crime-scene visit. The state court denied relief. Sweeney repeated this claim in a federal habeas petition before the United States District Court, which also denied relief, finding that the state court's application of Strickland v. Washington was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, not on the ineffective assistance claim Sweeney asserted, but on the grounds that a series of failures deprived him of his constitutional rights, and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourth Circuit erred by granting relief on a claim that Sweeney had never raised, thus violating the principle of party presentation. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to address only the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually raised. View "Clark v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

A child reported sexual abuse by her father following a weekend visit, which led to criminal charges against him. At trial, the prosecution requested that a screen be placed between the child witness and the defendant during her testimony, citing a Mississippi statute that mandated such a screen in child-abuse cases. The defendant objected, contending that the statute’s mandatory requirement could not override his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser face to face unless the court made a case-specific finding that such a procedure was necessary to protect the witness.The trial court granted the State’s motion, reasoning that the statutory mandate left no discretion, and the defendant was subsequently convicted by a jury. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court did not make a case-specific finding of necessity but upheld the procedure, distinguishing Supreme Court precedents and holding that the statutory requirement was sufficient authority for the use of the screen.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant’s right to confront witnesses may not be denied based solely on a statute or generalized findings of necessity. Instead, a trial court must hear evidence and make a case-specific finding of necessity before permitting screening of a child witness. The Court remanded the case, allowing the Mississippi Supreme Court to consider whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with the harmless-error standard. View "Pitts v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A 20-year-old man with autism developed a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl he met online. Although the girl claimed to be thirteen, she was in fact younger. Their conversations became sexual, and at the man’s request, the girl sent him nude and sexually explicit photos and videos. In one video, she, who was pubescent, is depicted inserting a marker into her vagina at his suggestion. Law enforcement intervened after the girl reported him, leading to his arrest when he arrived at a hotel believing he would meet her for sex.A grand jury indicted the defendant on several sex-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, enticing a minor, and attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, in calculating the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, applied a four-level enhancement for material depicting “sadistic or masochistic conduct,” based on the video of the girl’s self-penetration. The court relied on prior Sixth Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Preston, to apply this enhancement, treating penetration with a foreign object as per se sadistic. The court sentenced the defendant to 226 months’ imprisonment after some downward variance for his immaturity and autism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sentence. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying a categorical rule that all foreign-object penetration by a pubescent minor is per se sadistic. The appellate court clarified that for pubescent minors, the sadism enhancement requires an objective finding, based on the content of the material, of visible physical pain, emotional suffering, or humiliation—not simply penetration. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct legal standard. View "United States v. Vowels-Harper" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated a drug trafficking organization operating in eastern Texas and identified Rodney Ignacio Castro as the cocaine supplier. Castro was linked to an apartment in downtown Houston. When law enforcement executed a search warrant at this apartment, they discovered $1,050,860 in cash, jewelry worth roughly $250,000, and an unloaded gold-plated handgun stored in a closet. Castro admitted these valuables were proceeds from his drug trafficking, that he possessed the handgun, and that he used the apartment in furtherance of drug trafficking activities.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas received a presentence report finding Castro responsible for 39.05 kilograms of cocaine and recommended two sentencing enhancements: one for possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and another for maintaining a premises for drug distribution under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Castro objected, arguing there was no evidence of drugs or drug paraphernalia in the apartment and the firearm was not stored with such items. The district court overruled both objections, reasoning the proximity of the handgun to drug proceeds and Castro’s own admissions supported the enhancements. The court sentenced Castro to 210 months in prison and noted it would have imposed the same sentence even if the guideline range was calculated differently.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error. The Fifth Circuit held that the firearm enhancement was justified by the temporal and spatial relation between the weapon, proceeds, and defendant, and that storing drug proceeds in the apartment constituted a principal use for drug distribution purposes. The appellate court found no clear error and affirmed Castro’s sentence. View "USA v. Castro" on Justia Law

Ahmadou entered the United States from Niger in 2016 under an F1 student visa. In 2021, he visited a Texas gun range, rented and fired guns, and completed a waiver form that did not list his visa status as a prohibited category for firearm possession under federal law. Investigators connected Ahmadou to an Islamic extremist involved in a 2020 attack, and a search of Ahmadou’s devices revealed extensive ISIS propaganda. Undercover agents were present during his visits, but did not instruct the gun range staff to act differently. Ahmadou was later arrested and admitted his gun range visits were in preparation for potential jihad overseas.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ahmadou moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing he was entitled to the defense of entrapment by estoppel based on alleged misrepresentation by the gun range’s waiver form. The district judge denied his motion, excluded evidence of the defense, and refused his proposed jury instruction. After trial, a jury found Ahmadou guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the court denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and declined to apply the terrorism enhancement, but imposed an above-guidelines sentence, citing Ahmadou’s conduct and associations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held that entrapment by estoppel did not apply because the gun range’s waiver form was not an affirmative misrepresentation, and the firearms dealer was not a federal official or agent for purposes of the defense. The Fifth Circuit also found that denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was not clearly erroneous, and the above-guidelines sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable, as it was based on permissible considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). View "USA v. Ahmadou" on Justia Law

A jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge initially announced a sentence of one year, suspending all but nine months to be served on home detention, followed by three years of supervised probation. While the judge was advising the defendant of his post-trial rights, the prosecutor questioned whether the sentence properly reflected the intended punishment and raised concerns about the remaining active time if probation was violated. After a brief colloquy and clarification, the judge revised the sentence, increasing it to five years, suspending all but nine months on home detention, and three years of supervised probation.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, arguing that the trial judge had illegally increased the sentence after it had been imposed, in violation of Maryland Rule 4-345, which restricts modifications to sentences once they are imposed. The Appellate Court rejected this argument, holding that the sentence was not illegally increased because the revision occurred before the sentencing proceeding concluded, and Rule 4-345 was therefore not triggered.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court held that under Maryland law, a sentence is not considered “imposed” under Rule 4-345 until the sentencing proceeding ends. Thus, a trial court retains authority to modify or increase a sentence during an ongoing sentencing hearing. Since the revision to the defendant’s sentence occurred before the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding—while the defendant was still present and the case was not over—Rule 4-345 did not apply, and the increase did not violate double jeopardy protections. The judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County was affirmed. View "Reyes v. State" on Justia Law

Donald Felton was investigated after a confidential source informed law enforcement that Felton made trips from Taylorville, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine for resale. The source described Felton’s routine, including his use of a white Mazda SUV registered to his girlfriend and referenced a prior traffic stop involving Felton. Inspector Brown corroborated some details by reviewing police records and speaking with another officer about the earlier stop, but found no drugs during that encounter. Relying on this information and Felton’s criminal history, Inspector Brown prepared an affidavit seeking a warrant to install a tracking device on the SUV.The affidavit, submitted to the Circuit Court of Christian County, supported the issuance of the warrant. However, it omitted substantial information about the confidential source’s credibility, such as payments to the source, the source’s cooperation in exchange for consideration in legal matters, and the source’s own criminal history and pending charges. Based on the warrant, the tracking device was installed, and later, Felton was stopped and methamphetamine was found in the vehicle. Felton was indicted in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant was not supported by probable cause and requesting a Franks hearing regarding omissions in the affidavit. The district court denied both requests, concluding the affidavit was sufficiently corroborated and that Felton failed to show material omissions affecting probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause because it relied almost exclusively on the confidential source and omitted material information regarding the source’s credibility. The court further concluded that Felton made a substantial preliminary showing warranting a Franks hearing. The appellate court reversed the denial of Felton’s suppression motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "USA v Felton" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged following two shootings in Buffalo, New York, that occurred about an hour apart on August 4, 2016, resulting in one death and three injuries. Key evidence included witness accounts and surveillance footage showing a shooter in distinctive clothing matching what the defendant wore earlier that day. Forensic testimony linked the fatal weapon to an individual depicted in the videos. After trial, the jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, while acquitting him of two counts of attempted murder.During jury deliberations, a juror raised concerns that another juror had made a racially biased remark. The trial judge questioned both the reporting juror and the accused juror individually, with input from counsel, but did not question other jurors. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on alleged racial bias affecting up to six jurors but declined to request further inquiry or substitution of jurors, relying solely on the mistrial request. The trial judge denied the motion, finding no convincing evidence of grossly unqualified jurors or racial animus affecting deliberations, and subsequently denied a post-verdict motion to set aside the verdict.The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reviewed the trial court’s response and concluded that the judge had conducted an appropriate inquiry into the allegations and did not abuse discretion by denying the mistrial request. Upon further appeal, the New York State Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient, that the record did not convincingly demonstrate a lack of impartiality among the jurors, and that the denial of the motion for a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "People v Wiggins" on Justia Law

After an incident in Brooklyn where the defendant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle, he was charged by misdemeanor complaint with several offenses, including aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degrees, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and failure to obey a traffic control signal. The supporting documents contained allegations for the unlicensed operation charges but lacked factual allegations for the failure to obey a traffic signal charge. Later, the prosecution filed an information and a statement of readiness, certifying compliance with statutory requirements for facial sufficiency for all counts, even though the failure to obey a traffic signal charge was facially insufficient.The defendant moved to dismiss the information on grounds of facial insufficiency and statutory speedy trial violations, arguing that the prosecution’s certification under CPL 30.30 (5-a) was inaccurate, thereby invalidating their statement of readiness. The prosecution conceded the insufficiency of the traffic signal count, which was dismissed by the Criminal Court. The court otherwise denied the motion, finding that the statute only required a certification for readiness and did not mandate dismissal of the entire instrument due to inaccuracies in the certification. The Appellate Term affirmed, holding that the statute did not require further remedy beyond dismissal of the insufficient count.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court held that CPL 30.30 (5-a) requires only that the prosecution file a certification of facial sufficiency for all counts in a local criminal court accusatory instrument as a condition of readiness. The statute does not provide for invalidation of the statement of readiness or dismissal of the entire instrument when that certification is inaccurate as to a particular count; the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the defective count alone. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law