Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Roger Snake, an elder member of the Ho-Chunk tribe, pleaded guilty in 2011 to two counts of abusive sexual contact with minors. After completing his prison sentence in 2020, he began a lifetime term of supervised release. Snake violated several conditions of his release, including having unapproved and unsupervised contact with minors and traveling outside the judicial district without permission. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison, which was above the recommended range in the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin initially addressed Snake's violations informally, reminding him of the conditions of his supervised release. However, after further violations, including being found alone with minors in his home, the court issued a summons. Snake admitted to the violations, and his lawyer requested home detention instead of prison, citing his role as a tribal elder. The district court rejected this argument, emphasizing the severity of his violations and the risk he posed to minors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Snake argued that the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for imposing a sentence above the guideline range. The appellate court, applying a highly deferential standard of review, found that the district court had sufficiently explained its decision. The court noted that the district judge had considered the relevant statutory factors and the egregiousness of Snake's violations. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, emphasizing the need for clear explanations in sentencing and the importance of addressing potential procedural errors promptly. View "United States v. Snake" on Justia Law

Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

Jacob McWaters was stopped by law enforcement in January 2023, and they found 19,910 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle. During a post-Miranda interview, McWaters admitted to transporting methamphetamine from Texas to Minnesota and had done so on two prior occasions. He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa sentenced McWaters to 240 months in custody, followed by five years of supervised release. McWaters objected to the Presentence Report’s (PSR) calculation of his Guidelines range, arguing for a reduction in his offense level due to his mitigating role. The district court overruled his objection and calculated his Guidelines range at 292 to 365 months. However, the court granted a partial downward variance, resulting in a 240-month sentence.McWaters appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in not applying a role reduction under USSG § 3B1.2. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual finding for clear error. The court noted that McWaters needed to prove his conduct involved more than one participant and that his culpability was minor compared to others. McWaters emphasized his role as a low-level courier with minimal knowledge of the drug operation but failed to provide evidence comparing his conduct to other participants. The court found no clear error in the district court’s decision and upheld the denial of the role reduction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, maintaining McWaters’s 240-month sentence. View "United States v. McWaters" on Justia Law

A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

DeShawn Gervin was on probation in Georgia with the sole condition that he not return to the South Georgia Judicial Circuit. He moved to North Carolina but was later imprisoned there for various crimes. A Georgia probation officer, Pamela Florence, learned of his North Carolina offenses and sought a warrant for his arrest in Georgia, falsely claiming he had violated probation by failing to report. Gervin was arrested in North Carolina and extradited to Georgia, where he spent 104 days in jail before a court found he had not violated his probation and ordered his release.Gervin sued Florence and another probation officer, Tandria Milton, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment claim, characterizing it as a malicious-prosecution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that Gervin presented enough evidence to support his Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. The court found that Florence and Milton recklessly made false statements and omissions that led to Gervin's arrest and prolonged detention, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the probation officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional violations were clearly established at the time of their actions. View "Gervin v. Florence" on Justia Law

Robert L. Fooks was convicted by the Circuit Court for Wicomico County for violating Section 5-133(b)(2) of the Public Safety Article, which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of a common law crime and sentenced to more than two years in prison. Fooks, who had a prior conviction for constructive criminal contempt and a sentence exceeding four years, argued that this statute violated his Second Amendment rights.The Circuit Court denied Fooks's motion to dismiss the firearms-related counts, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. The Appellate Court of Maryland upheld the statute's constitutionality, affirming Fooks's convictions. Fooks then sought review from the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Section 5-133(b)(2) is consistent with the Second Amendment. The court noted that the statute is effectively a prohibition on firearm possession by felons, which the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly identified as presumptively lawful. The court also found that such prohibitions are consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, which has long included disarming individuals deemed to present a special danger, including those who have committed serious crimes. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Fooks. View "Fooks v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, filed a lawsuit against General Motors (GM) and Robert Bosch LLC, alleging that the companies misled consumers about the emissions produced by certain Chevrolet Cruze vehicles. They claimed that the vehicles emitted higher levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) than advertised and that the emissions control systems were manipulated to pass regulatory tests. The plaintiffs sought damages under various state fraud laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims, ruling that those based on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards were preempted by the Clean Air Act. The court allowed other claims to proceed, particularly those alleging that GM's advertising misled consumers about the vehicles' emissions. However, after the Sixth Circuit's decision in a similar case (In re Ford Motor Company F-150 and Ranger Truck Fuel Economy Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation), the district court revisited its decision and dismissed the remaining fraud claims, concluding they were preempted by federal law. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the RICO claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court should determine whether the plaintiffs' remaining claims could proceed without relying on a disagreement with the EPA's determinations. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide if the claims were preempted under the analysis described. The court affirmed the dismissal of the RICO claims and the denial of the plaintiffs' post-judgment motion to vacate the judgment in part and approve a preliminary settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Counts v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Detectives from the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department observed Edwin Santiago arriving at a car dealership in a vehicle emitting a strong odor of marijuana. Santiago exited the car, and the detectives noticed a pistol on his waistband. Suspecting Santiago of possessing a firearm while under the influence of marijuana, the detectives detained him. During the detention, they discovered Santiago was a felon, leading to his arrest and subsequent indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held a suppression hearing where the detectives and a witness testified about the marijuana odor. The court found the detectives' testimony credible and ruled that the odor provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the arrest. Consequently, the court denied Santiago's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the arrest. Santiago, representing himself at trial, was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 56 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Santiago's appeal, which challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the arrest. The court also found Santiago's within-Guidelines sentence to be substantively reasonable, considering his criminal history and the circumstances of the offense. Santiago's additional pro se claims were not considered, as he was represented by counsel on appeal. View "United States v. Santiago" on Justia Law

The case involves Deliezha Davonte Gravely, who was pulled over by a police officer for speeding. During the stop, the officer discovered that Gravely was driving with a revoked license due to a DUI and found a loaded firearm in his pocket. Gravely was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, based on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery.The Circuit Court of Mercer County ruled that Gravely's prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery qualified as a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" under West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Gravely was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in classifying his conspiracy conviction as a crime of violence.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the elements of conspiracy under West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 include a violent act against a person. The court applied the elements test from State v. Mills, which requires examining the statutory elements of the predicate offense rather than the specific conduct of the defendant. The court found that the elements of conspiracy—an agreement to commit an offense and an overt act to effect the conspiracy—do not require a violent act against a person.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery is not a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" for the purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Consequently, the court reversed Gravely's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, and remanded the case for resentencing on his remaining convictions. View "State v. Gravely" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 28, 2014, Ms. Taylor Hawkridge was shot and killed in the parking lot of her apartment complex. Eyewitnesses reported seeing a man in a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene and entering a dark Dodge Charger. Ms. Hawkridge had a verbal altercation with Nasstashia Van Camp Powell at Vixens Gentlemen’s Club, where she worked. Ms. Powell, after being convicted of second-degree murder, implicated Richard Small and Joseph Mason in the murder, stating they were paid to kill Ms. Hawkridge because she was a police informant. Mr. Small was interviewed by law enforcement multiple times, including a June 2018 interview where he ambiguously mentioned needing a lawyer.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County held a joint trial for Mr. Small and Mr. Mason. Mr. Small filed motions to exclude evidence of Mr. Mason’s gang affiliation and to suppress his June 2018 statement, arguing he had invoked his right to counsel. The court denied these motions, finding the gang affiliation evidence intrinsic to the crimes and Mr. Small’s statement ambiguous. The jury convicted Mr. Small of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Mr. Small argued his constitutional rights were violated by his and his counsel’s absence from critical-stage hearings, the admission of prejudicial evidence, the failure to sever his trial from Mr. Mason’s, the denial of his motion to suppress, and improper comments by the State during the mercy phase. The court found no error, holding that the hearings were not critical stages for Mr. Small, the evidence was intrinsic and relevant, Mr. Small did not properly move to sever, his statement was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and the State’s comments did not constitute plain error. The court affirmed Mr. Small’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Small" on Justia Law