Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A man was indicted on six counts of wanton endangerment involving a firearm after allegedly firing an AR-type rifle at his wife’s vehicle while she was leaving their shared home with their children. Following the incident, law enforcement obtained and executed a search warrant for the man’s property, seizing a rifle, ammunition, and casings, and arrested him. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was based on double hearsay and lacked a good faith effort to verify his wife’s statement. The State opposed the motion, and the Circuit Court of Pendleton County denied the suppression request.Subsequently, the parties entered into a conditional plea agreement. The defendant pled no contest to one count of wanton endangerment, with the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and agreed to pay restitution. The circuit court accepted the plea, dismissed the remaining charges, and continued the matter for sentencing, pending the outcome of the appeal. The circuit court’s order specified that the case would proceed to further hearings after the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia resolved the appeal on the suppression issue. At the time of appeal, the defendant had not been sentenced.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction at this stage because a sentence had not been imposed. The court clarified that, under West Virginia Code § 58-5-1(c), only a final judgment—which in a criminal case requires both conviction and sentencing—is appealable. Since the defendant had not yet been sentenced, there was no final order from which to appeal. The appeal was therefore dismissed without prejudice. View "State v. Hensley" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers pursued the defendant, Austin Lodge, after a traffic stop in Clarksburg, West Virginia. During the pursuit, Lodge attempted to place a camouflage backpack inside a residence where his children’s grandmother lived, but was turned away by the occupant. He then fled to the backyard and discarded the backpack next to a shed. Lodge was apprehended without the backpack. Later, officers searched the area, found the bag, and searched it without a warrant, uncovering controlled substances. Lodge admitted ownership of the backpack but argued that his actions were meant to conceal, not abandon, the bag because it was left on familiar, semi-private property.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia first reviewed Lodge’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Lodge had abandoned the bag, thus forfeiting any reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. The district court adopted these findings and denied the suppression motion, concluding that Lodge’s conduct amounted to abandonment, relying on the Fourth Circuit’s precedent in United States v. Small.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court emphasized that abandonment is a factual finding based on the objective circumstances known to officers at the time. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s finding—that Lodge abandoned the backpack when he discarded it after being denied entry at the residence—was not clearly erroneous. Because Lodge abandoned the backpack, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and the denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. The court declined to resolve whether a different result would obtain if the property had not been abandoned but was merely concealed on private property. View "US v. Lodge" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with distributing fentanyl and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. During jury selection, one of the prospective jurors, a retired police chief with decades of law enforcement experience, disclosed his background in policing and drug task force work, but did not reveal that he had previously been the target of a federal investigation into corruption involving local officials. When asked if he or his family had been involved in any controversy or litigation with a federal agency, the juror answered “no.” The defendant was convicted on all counts.After trial, defense counsel discovered the juror’s undisclosed involvement as a target in a prior federal investigation. The defendant moved for a new trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that the juror’s dishonesty during voir dire deprived him of an impartial jury. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found that the juror had given dishonest answers to material questions, but concluded that there was no evidence of actual bias or that the juror should have been struck for cause if he had answered truthfully. The court denied the motion for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not commit manifest error in finding no actual bias and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the juror’s prior experience did not require exclusion under any per se rule of implied or inferred bias. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that under the standard of review, the defendant was not deprived of a trial by an impartial jury. View "US v. Williamson" on Justia Law

A young woman, who had been in the custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families, stayed at the defendant’s apartment after leaving various homes to avoid group placement. She testified that while staying with the defendant, a family friend, he sexually assaulted her at gunpoint in his car after they left the apartment together at night. Following the assault, the complainant did not immediately leave the apartment due to fear for her safety. The next morning, she confided in the defendant’s roommate, who became emotional and told her she needed to leave. She subsequently contacted her mother and was picked up by her mother, cousin, and boyfriend. She did not initially report the assault to authorities, fearing placement in a group home, but disclosed the incident to police nearly two years later.The case proceeded in the Providence County Superior Court, where a grand jury indicted the defendant for first-degree sexual assault. At trial, the complainant’s account was central to the prosecution. The defendant objected to the admission of the roommate’s statements to the complainant, arguing that they constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial justice overruled these objections, and the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant was sentenced to fifty years, with twenty-five to serve and twenty-five suspended with probation.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the defendant argued that the admission of the roommate’s statements was reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the statements were not hearsay because they were not offered for their truth, but rather to explain the complainant’s subsequent actions in leaving the apartment. The Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial justice and affirmed the conviction. The case was remanded to the Superior Court. View "State v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

The defendant used a false pretense to enter the motel room of Carole Sund, her daughter Juli Sund, and family friend Silvina Pelosso. Once inside, he brandished a gun, used duct tape to bind the three, and murdered Carole and Silvina by strangulation and suffocation. Over several hours, he sexually assaulted Juli, then kidnapped her, assaulted her again, and ultimately killed her by slitting her throat. Months later, he also kidnapped, murdered, and decapitated Joie Armstrong. The defendant confessed to these crimes in detail. Physical evidence and testimony corroborated his confession. Evidence related to the Armstrong murder, prosecuted federally, was introduced during the penalty phase.A jury in the Santa Clara County Superior Court convicted the defendant of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of kidnapping. The jury found true multiple enhancement allegations, including use of a deadly weapon and firearm, and five special circumstances: multiple murders, kidnapping murder, attempted rape murder, forcible oral copulation murder, and burglary murder. The jury found not true the alleged robbery-murder special circumstance. In a separate sanity phase, the jury found the defendant sane at the time of the offenses, and in the penalty phase, recommended the death penalty. The trial court denied motions for a new trial and sentence modification, imposing death plus a consecutive prison term.On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reviewed numerous claims, including challenges to the admission of the defendant’s confession, claims of evidentiary and procedural error, allegations of juror misconduct, and arguments regarding the constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme. The Court held that the confession was properly admitted, the evidentiary and procedural rulings were within the trial court’s discretion, and that there was no prejudicial juror misconduct or judicial bias. The Court also rejected constitutional challenges to the death penalty statute. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "People v. Stayner" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after attempting to purchase food at a restaurant using several credit cards, three of which were lost cards belonging to other individuals. When the first five cards were declined, he discarded them; the sixth card worked, but after a dispute with the manager over a refund, he left without the food and was later taken into custody. He was charged with multiple counts, including felony vandalism, identity theft, and petty theft. At arraignment, the trial court denied his motion for release on his own recognizance and set bail at $75,000, citing his extensive criminal history and past failures to appear. After further hearings, the trial court ultimately denied bail altogether.The defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, challenging the denial of bail. While the petition was pending, he entered a plea agreement, resulting in his release. The appellate court dismissed the petition as moot, but the Supreme Court of California directed the Court of Appeal to address unresolved constitutional questions regarding bail. The Court of Appeal issued a published opinion addressing the relationship between two California constitutional provisions on bail and whether a trial court may set bail above a defendant’s ability to pay. The appellate court's reasoning conflicted with another appellate decision, In re Brown.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve these issues. It held that Article I, section 12, subdivisions (b) and (c), defines the exclusive circumstances under which bail may be denied in noncapital cases, and Article I, section 28(f)(3), can be harmonized with, but does not expand, these exceptions. The court further held that, except where pretrial detention is authorized, bail must be set in an amount reasonably attainable given the defendant’s circumstances; courts may not set bail at an amount that is objectively unattainable based solely on indigency. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. View "In re Kowalczyk" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old defendant and several adult associates, all affiliated with a street gang, confronted perceived rivals outside a taco truck in Modesto. During the confrontation, one of the group’s members fatally shot a rival gang member. The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and participation in a criminal street gang. Jury enhancements were applied for crimes committed for the benefit of a gang and for personal firearm use causing death. The prosecution’s theory at trial shifted, with arguments that either the defendant was the shooter or he aided and abetted the shooting. The jury was instructed on both perpetrator and accomplice liability, using standard instructions that later case law found potentially ambiguous as to whether malice could be imputed to an accomplice.Following the passage of Senate Bill 1437 and related legislation, which restricted murder liability and created a resentencing process for those convicted under prior, broader legal theories, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Stanislaus County Superior Court acknowledged a prima facie case for relief, but, after an evidentiary hearing, denied the petition, finding the defendant could be convicted as either the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor. The defendant appealed, arguing the instructions allowed conviction on an impermissible imputed malice theory. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, holding the defendant’s claim was not cognizable in a section 1172.6 petition because he could have raised it on direct appeal and had therefore forfeited it.The Supreme Court of California reversed. It held that Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), does not categorically bar resentencing relief for petitioners who could have raised instructional challenges to imputed malice on direct appeal but did not. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for consideration of the merits of the defendant’s claims. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The case involved the shooting death of Jessica Griffin by Jesce Richt, who was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Richt and Griffin had a turbulent relationship, which included a history of domestic violence, protective orders, and threats exchanged via text and calls. In the days leading up to Griffin’s death, Richt repeatedly contacted Griffin, followed her movements, and was recorded on surveillance video entering the garage of Griffin’s mother’s house immediately before Griffin was shot multiple times. No firearm was found with Griffin. Richt fled and was later apprehended and charged.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County presided over the trial. Richt did not dispute shooting Griffin but claimed he acted in self-defense, arguing that Griffin had threatened him and was armed. However, Richt did not testify, and no independent evidence was introduced to support the self-defense claim. The court excluded evidence of Griffin’s threats, gun ownership, and communications, ruling that Richt failed to lay a proper foundation for a self-defense theory. The jury found Richt guilty of murder, and he pleaded guilty to the firearm charge.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed Richt’s appeal. The court held that a defendant cannot present a self-defense theory based solely on evidence of a victim’s character; foundational evidence of self-defense must first be introduced by other means. The court found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the proffered evidence, the admission of lay testimony regarding GPS tracking, or the omission of a jury instruction about reconvening for sentencing. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Richt’s conviction. View "RICHT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree online sexual corruption of a child, a felony governed by the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines. At sentencing, the trial court calculated his sentence using the guidelines’ grid, resulting in a presumptive incarceration range of 19-20 months based on a crime seriousness score of 8 and the defendant’s criminal history. The defendant accepted the guideline’s classification but argued that using a seriousness score of 8 for his offense resulted in a sentence that was disproportionately severe compared to other, more serious or functionally equivalent sex offenses, allegedly violating Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.The Lane County Circuit Court disagreed and imposed a sentence within the guidelines’ prescribed range. The defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, assigning error to the use of the crime seriousness category 8. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address the merits of his proportionality argument. Instead, it concluded that ORS 138.105 barred appellate review of the defendant’s constitutional challenge because his sentence was within the presumptive range set by the guidelines.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the scope of appellate authority under ORS 138.105. The court held that the statute does not preclude appellate review of a constitutional challenge to a sentence on the grounds that the guidelines’ crime seriousness ranking disproportionately penalizes the offense. The court found that ORS 138.105(8)(c)(A) specifically allows appellate review of errors in “ranking the crime seriousness classification of the current crime,” which includes claims of unconstitutional disproportionality under Article I, section 16. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of the defendant’s proportionality challenge. View "State v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

A prisoner on death row sought access to DNA testing data generated by a private laboratory from evidence collected in 1987, specifically a swab from the victim’s underwear containing sperm cells. This sample had previously been considered unsuitable for conclusive DNA testing due to deterioration and limited material, but the prisoner argued that new technology—Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) testing—could yield more reliable results. Because the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) lacked the capacity for SNP testing, the sample was tested by a private lab, DNA Labs International, Inc. The resulting report concluded the DNA was not suitable for genealogical or phenotypic analysis, and was labeled “inconclusive.” However, underlying data from the SNP testing existed, and FDLE suggested that a qualified expert might be able to conduct further statistical analysis using this data.The Circuit Court for Lake County granted the prisoner’s motion for DNA testing, but allowed the State to control the process. After the private lab’s inconclusive report, the prisoner requested the underlying data and information about the lab’s protocols, arguing that further analysis could exonerate him. The circuit court denied these requests, finding that the prisoner had not shown how the data would be exonerating and that information about the lab’s protocols was not relevant to any postconviction claim.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the circuit court’s denial of the request for the underlying DNA testing data, holding that the prisoner was entitled to the complete testing results, including the data necessary for statistical analysis by an expert. The court reasoned that such data is part of the “results” required by statute and rule to be disclosed. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the request for information about the lab’s testing process and protocols, as the prisoner had not shown its relevance to a postconviction claim. The case was remanded to provide the data and for further proceedings if necessary. View "Duckett v. State of Florida" on Justia Law