Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Seamus Coyle was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Due to a conflict of interest, the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) assigned a panel attorney to represent Coyle in his direct appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, which affirmed his convictions. The panel attorney discussed filing a petition for a writ of certiorari with Coyle and the OPD and was authorized to file the petition but failed to do so. Coyle then petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied Coyle’s petition for postconviction relief, finding that the issues raised on appeal were neither novel nor important from a public policy standpoint and that there was no possibility that the Supreme Court of Maryland would have granted certiorari. Coyle’s application for leave to appeal was granted, but the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, concluding that Coyle did not have a right to counsel for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari and thus was not deprived of due process.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that, based on the plain language of the Maryland Public Defender Act, where an attorney is authorized by the OPD to represent an indigent defendant in filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, the attorney must provide effective assistance of counsel. The Court concluded that the panel attorney’s conduct in failing to file the petition fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The Court held that prejudice is established because the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to have the petition considered. The judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and Coyle was permitted to file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari. View "Coyle v. State" on Justia Law

Harry Davis, Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, and one count of openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to 72 years in prison. After sentencing, the judge informed Davis of his right to appeal and to file a motion for modification of sentence within 90 days but did not advise him of his right to counsel for filing such a motion. Davis filed an appeal, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court of Maryland. No motion for modification of sentence was filed on his behalf.Davis later filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence. The Circuit Court denied the petition, stating that there was no evidence Davis had asked his counsel to file the motion. Davis appealed, and the Appellate Court granted his application for leave to appeal and certified questions to the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a defendant can establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification of sentence by demonstrating that counsel failed to consult with the defendant about filing the motion and that this failure was unreasonable. The Court overruled previous decisions that suggested a per se rule either requiring or not requiring a request from the defendant. The Court concluded that Davis’s trial counsel’s failure to consult with him about filing a motion for modification of sentence constituted deficient performance and that Davis was prejudiced by losing the opportunity to have the motion considered. The Court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment and remanded the case, allowing Davis to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Jermaine Kimbrough pleaded guilty in 2022 to four criminal offenses related to carjacking and firearms. At sentencing, the district court determined that Kimbrough had three prior violent felonies committed on different occasions, making him subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This enhancement increased his statutory penalty range for being a felon in possession of a firearm from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years.The district court, following then-controlling Sixth Circuit precedent, decided that Kimbrough's two 2016 aggravated burglary offenses occurred on different occasions, thus applying the ACCA enhancement. Kimbrough objected, arguing that a jury should make this determination. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 148 months for Counts One, Two, and Four, to be served concurrently, and 84 months for Count Three, to be served consecutively.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States established that it is an error for a judge, rather than a jury, to determine whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions for ACCA purposes. The Sixth Circuit found that this error was not harmless in Kimbrough's case. The court noted that a reasonable jury could find that Kimbrough's two 2016 burglaries were part of a single criminal event, given their close proximity and similar nature.The Sixth Circuit vacated Kimbrough's sentence on Counts One, Two, and Four and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also noted that the sentence for Count One exceeded the statutory maximum and must be corrected on remand. Additionally, the court left Kimbrough's Double Jeopardy argument for the district court to address if the government seeks an ACCA-enhanced sentence on remand. View "United States v. Kimbrough" on Justia Law

Federal and local law enforcement officers in Toledo, Ohio, uncovered a large-scale drug distribution scheme involving cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl. Christopher Simpson, Marquise Figures, and Antuan Wynn were charged with various federal crimes related to this scheme. They were tried together, and the jury found them guilty on all charges except one against Wynn.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio sentenced Simpson to 300 months, Wynn to 224 months, and Figures to 70 months. All three defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Simpson challenged the seizure and search of a vehicle, arguing Fourth Amendment violations, but the court found the actions lawful. Simpson also contested his sentence, particularly the drug quantity calculation and an obstruction of justice enhancement, but the court upheld the district court's findings.Figures argued that evidence from a traffic stop was improperly admitted and that there was insufficient evidence for his conspiracy conviction. The court found the evidence intrinsic to the charged conspiracy and sufficient to support the conviction. Figures also challenged his sentence, but the court found no error in the drug quantity calculation or the denial of a minor participant reduction.Wynn contended there was a variance between the indictment and the trial evidence, but the court found no prejudicial variance. He also challenged a jury instruction and the admission of pre-conspiracy evidence, but the court found no error. Wynn's sentence challenges, including the drug quantity calculation and enhancements for firearm possession and maintaining a drug premises, were also rejected.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court for all three defendants. View "United States v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Omari Davis was convicted in 2019 under Colorado law for possession with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance, which turned out to be baking soda. This offense is classified as a level-4 drug felony, the lowest level in Colorado, with a presumptive sentencing range of six months to one year. However, under certain aggravating circumstances, the sentence could be extended to a maximum of two years. Davis was sentenced to two years of probation, with no aggravating circumstances identified or admitted.In the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Davis was indicted in 2022 on two counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Davis moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that his 2019 conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under § 922(g)(1) because it carried a presumptive maximum sentence of one year. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Colorado courts always have the discretion to impose a sentence greater than the presumptive range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Davis's 2019 conviction did not meet the prior-conviction requirement of § 922(g)(1) because there were no aggravating circumstances in the record that could have permitted a sentence exceeding one year. The court emphasized that under Colorado law, a sentence in the aggravated range requires specific findings of aggravating circumstances, which were absent in Davis's case. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit vacated Davis's conviction under § 922(g)(1). View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

John Doe, using multiple aliases, had a long history with U.S. immigration authorities dating back to 1985. He was twice caught trying to enter the U.S. with fraudulent documents and was deported. In 1988, he was found in Texas and deported again. In 2018, he was detained in Florida, and despite a final deportation order, he refused to cooperate with immigration officials, leading to his indictment on three counts of willfully failing to leave the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Doe's request for a jury instruction that would require the government to prove he had been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to convict him under § 1253(a)(1). The court also denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the same grounds. Doe was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 51 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 1253(a)(1) does not require a noncitizen to have been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to be subject to its penalties. The court found that the statutory text and context did not support Doe's interpretation that only admitted noncitizens could be penalized under § 1253(a)(1). The court affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Doe's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Doe" on Justia Law

Jadyn Logan was convicted of aggravated robbery in January 2018, a first-degree felony that prohibited her from possessing a firearm under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Later, a Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted her for having weapons while under a disability, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, and carrying a concealed weapon. Logan pleaded guilty to attempting to have weapons while under a disability with a one-year firearm specification, and the other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced her to one year for the firearm specification and two years of community control for the attempt offense.The State appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required a prison term for the attempt offense. The Eighth District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the statute required a prison sentence only for the firearm specification, not the underlying felony offense. The State sought en banc consideration, which was denied, and the Eighth District maintained its position.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) mandates a prison sentence for any felony offense with a corresponding firearm specification. The court clarified that a firearm specification is a sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense, and that the statute's language requires a prison term for the underlying felony offense when a firearm specification is attached. The court reversed the Eighth District's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Logan" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Markeese Mitchell, Pedro Ortiz, and Terrance Pabon were convicted of second-degree murder. Years later, they moved to interview a juror, alleging bias and concealment of material information during jury selection. The motion was denied, and the convictions were affirmed on appeal. Subsequently, the defendants filed motions for a new trial, citing additional evidence of the same juror's alleged bias. The motion judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, where the juror testified, and then denied the new trial motions. The defendants also moved to disqualify the trial judge, arguing a conflict of interest due to the judge's professional relationship with the prosecutor from their original trial, who had since become a Superior Court judge. This motion was also denied.The Appeals Court affirmed the orders denying the motions for a new trial and for disqualification. The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review. The defendants argued that they were entitled to a new trial because the juror failed to provide an honest response to a material question during empanelment, and an honest response would have provided valid grounds for a challenge for cause. They also argued that the trial judge should have been disqualified due to a conflict of interest.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motions for a new trial or the motion for disqualification. The Court found that the juror's inaccurate answer was not dishonest and did not demonstrate bias. The Court also found that the trial judge's professional relationship with the former prosecutor did not create an appearance of partiality. Therefore, the orders denying the motions for a new trial and for disqualification were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of unlawful restraint in the second degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, attempt to commit sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual assault in the third degree. The charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim, C, in his home. C testified that the defendant made unwanted advances, restrained her, and sexually assaulted her. The defendant argued that C fabricated the story due to a rent dispute between the defendant and C's mother, K.The trial court found the defendant guilty on all charges, and the Appellate Court affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed, claiming that the prosecutor's remarks during rebuttal closing argument were improper and deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, the prosecutor listed common defenses in criminal cases and referred to the "nuts and sluts" defenses in sexual assault cases, suggesting that C would have to be "nuts" to fabricate her story.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and determined that the prosecutor's use of the phrase "nuts and sluts" was improper as it appealed to the jurors' emotions and diverted their attention from the evidence. The court also found that the prosecutor's listing of defenses was improper because it was unrelated to the evidence presented at trial. However, the court concluded that these improprieties did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.The court applied the factors from State v. Williams to assess the impact of the improprieties. It found that the prosecutor's statements were not severe, were infrequent, and the state's case was relatively strong. The court also noted that defense counsel did not object to the statements or request curative instructions. As a result, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. View "State v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

On July 17, 2021, Whitefish Police Officer Chase Garner confronted Paul Kermit Gysler for urinating in public. The encounter escalated, resulting in Gysler assaulting Officer Garner. Gysler claimed self-defense, asserting that Officer Garner approached him aggressively. The State charged Gysler with felony assault on a peace officer. Gysler was arrested and released on bond but was later re-arrested for unrelated charges, leading to multiple delays in his trial.The Eleventh Judicial District Court issued an arrest warrant for Gysler for violating his release conditions. The court ordered a competency evaluation due to concerns about Gysler's mental fitness, which delayed the trial further. Gysler's trial was eventually set for December 12, 2022. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the court denied. The jury found Gysler guilty of assaulting a peace officer.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court analyzed the four factors of a speedy trial claim: length of delay, reasons for delay, the accused’s response to the delay, and prejudice to the accused. The court found that most of the delay was institutional and not due to the State's negligence. The court concluded that Gysler did not suffer oppressive pretrial incarceration, undue anxiety, or impairment of his defense.The court also reviewed the jury instructions. It held that the District Court did not err in instructing the jury on resisting arrest and justified use of force, as the instructions were supported by the evidence and did not nullify Gysler's self-defense claim. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding no violation of Gysler's right to a speedy trial and no error in the jury instructions. View "State v. Gysler" on Justia Law