Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After an incident in Brooklyn where the defendant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle, he was charged by misdemeanor complaint with several offenses, including aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second and third degrees, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and failure to obey a traffic control signal. The supporting documents contained allegations for the unlicensed operation charges but lacked factual allegations for the failure to obey a traffic signal charge. Later, the prosecution filed an information and a statement of readiness, certifying compliance with statutory requirements for facial sufficiency for all counts, even though the failure to obey a traffic signal charge was facially insufficient.The defendant moved to dismiss the information on grounds of facial insufficiency and statutory speedy trial violations, arguing that the prosecution’s certification under CPL 30.30 (5-a) was inaccurate, thereby invalidating their statement of readiness. The prosecution conceded the insufficiency of the traffic signal count, which was dismissed by the Criminal Court. The court otherwise denied the motion, finding that the statute only required a certification for readiness and did not mandate dismissal of the entire instrument due to inaccuracies in the certification. The Appellate Term affirmed, holding that the statute did not require further remedy beyond dismissal of the insufficient count.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court held that CPL 30.30 (5-a) requires only that the prosecution file a certification of facial sufficiency for all counts in a local criminal court accusatory instrument as a condition of readiness. The statute does not provide for invalidation of the statement of readiness or dismissal of the entire instrument when that certification is inaccurate as to a particular count; the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the defective count alone. View "People v Williams" on Justia Law

An individual went to a police station to report being assaulted, and officers responded to take his statement. While at the hospital, where the individual had been transported, officers observed that he was intoxicated and later placed him in custody for transport to a detoxification facility under Oregon’s civil detox statutes. The individual had a backpack with him. During an inventory of his property, an officer opened the closed, opaque backpack and discovered a butterfly knife, which led to a criminal history check and a subsequent arrest for possession of a restricted weapon.Initially, the Washington County Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress evidence from the backpack. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld both the seizure and the inventory search of the backpack, reasoning that, under established case law, police could open closed, opaque containers likely to contain valuables if done pursuant to a lawful inventory policy. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decisions, concluding the inventory search was permissible under the relevant county ordinance and inventory policy.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that, under Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, inventory searches of closed, opaque containers that do not announce their contents are not permitted when a person is taken into custody on a civil detox hold, even if executed under a valid, non-discretionary inventory policy. The court emphasized that in the civil detox context, compliance with an inventory policy does not alone render such a search reasonable; privacy interests and the non-criminal nature of the detention require a higher level of protection. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Wilcox" on Justia Law

The petitioner was serving two probation terms following no contest pleas to computer crime, burglary, and criminal mischief. As a condition of probation, he was prohibited from possessing “weapons, firearms or dangerous animals.” During a scheduled probation meeting, his officer noticed a knife handle protruding from his backpack. The knife was described as a nine-inch steak knife with a rounded tip. The officer arrested the petitioner and reported a probation violation, alleging that possession of the knife breached the weapons condition. The petitioner argued that the knife was an essential eating tool, not a weapon, given his unhoused status.At the Washington County Circuit Court probation violation hearing, the probation officer testified that “anything that can cause harm” was considered a weapon and that the office’s notice defined “all knives” as weapons. The petitioner argued that the statutory condition did not cover utility knives like steak knives. The trial court found a violation, concluding that the knife was clearly a weapon under the probation provision, and imposed a 30-day jail sentence without revoking probation. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed whether possession of a steak knife constituted a violation of the probation weapons condition under ORS 137.540(1)(j). The court held that “weapons,” as used in the statute, refers only to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or those reasonably recognized as having substantially the same character—not to tools designed primarily for utility, even if such tools could be used as weapons. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, remanding the case for further factual inquiry consistent with this interpretation. View "State v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of unauthorized use of a U-Haul truck. She had rented the truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and drove it to Oregon, where she lived in it for several weeks. The truck was later reported stolen and found with the defendant inside. The prosecution's case relied on a photograph of a rental agreement that purportedly bore the defendant’s signature, indicating a one-day rental. The defendant, however, denied signing the contract, claimed she was not shown the contract, and asserted that the signature was not hers. She also testified that she had rented the truck for 30 days and provided evidence that the U-Haul database only contained an unsigned version of the contract.After a first trial ended in a hung jury, the case was retried in Curry County Circuit Court. Before the retrial, the state sought to admit the photograph of the signed agreement, rather than the original document. The defendant objected, citing the best evidence rule under OEC 1002 and arguing that, under OEC 1003(1), a duplicate is inadmissible when a genuine question is raised about the authenticity of the original. The trial court ruled that the duplicate was admissible and allowed the photograph. The jury convicted the defendant. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s denial of signing was insufficient to raise a “genuine question” as to authenticity.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon held that a genuine question under OEC 1003(1) is raised when there is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the original is not authentic. The court found the defendant’s testimony and supporting evidence sufficient to raise such a question, making the admission of the photograph in error. The court further held the error was not harmless, as the photograph was central to the state’s case. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Blue" on Justia Law

A nurse practitioner working in Georgia became involved in a nationwide Medicare fraud scheme between 2018 and 2019. She took part-time telemedicine jobs and reviewed patient charts for durable medical equipment (DME) prescriptions, such as neck and knee braces. The scheme involved submitting thousands of DME orders to Medicare for patients who had not actually been examined or treated as required by law. Federal investigators discovered she was signing orders, attesting to patient assessments and medical necessity, despite never contacting or examining the patients. Several orders were found to be fraudulent, such as prescribing braces to deceased or bedridden patients, or to patients with amputated limbs. She received compensation per chart reviewed, and her records indicated knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the activity.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia presided over her trial, where she was charged with conspiracy, health care fraud, making false statements, aggravated identity theft, and related offenses. The jury found her guilty on sixteen counts but acquitted her of conspiracy to commit health care fraud. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on perjury, citing her false testimony and inconsistencies. Her motion for a new trial was denied as untimely; the court rejected her claim of excusable neglect due to her attorney’s actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed four main issues: sufficiency of evidence, the lack of a deliberate ignorance jury instruction, the sentencing enhancement for perjury, and the denial of her new trial motion. The appellate court found sufficient evidence for all convictions, held that the absence of the deliberate ignorance instruction did not prejudice her substantial rights, affirmed the obstruction of justice enhancement, and found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the new trial motion. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed her convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Beaufils" on Justia Law

Police responded to a report of a disturbance at a man’s home, where they learned from his girlfriend that he was a convicted felon in possession of firearms. The man admitted that he knew about the firearms and had purchased two for his children. He led officers through his home, where they recovered three firearms and ammunition. The State charged him with three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The case progressed through the Idaho courts, beginning with the magistrate court, where the man repeatedly stated he could not afford an attorney and wanted “effective assistance of counsel,” rather than representation. The magistrate court suggested he did not qualify for a public defender due to his employment, and the preliminary hearing proceeded with the defendant unrepresented, after which he was bound over to the district court. Throughout proceedings before the district court, the man continued to appear without counsel, filing many pro se motions. Eventually, after much confusion about his wishes, the district court appointed “shadow counsel” to assist him at trial, but continued to treat him as self-represented. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the district court denied his post-trial motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case after the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of “shadow counsel” did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the defendant, not an attorney, controlled and managed his defense. The Court further held that the record did not show the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by law. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement agents, posing as a 14-year-old girl named "Rolianas," engaged in online communications with the defendant, who responded to an ad the agents posted on a casual encounters section of Craigslist. Over a series of emails, texts, and phone calls spanning several days, the defendant initiated and sustained contact, despite being told early in the exchange that "Rolianas" was 14. He sent sexually suggestive messages and photos and made plans to meet, including discussions of sexual activity and bringing condoms.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico conducted a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of attempted transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) but acquitted of attempted sexual enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, arguing that the government induced him to commit the offense. The district judge denied that request, concluding that the defendant had not met the threshold of producing evidence of both government inducement and lack of predisposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the district court erred in refusing the entrapment instruction. The court found that the government’s conduct did not rise to the level of inducement, as the agents merely provided an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, and the defendant pursued the illegal activity after being informed of the purported minor’s age. The court held that the evidence did not support the defense of entrapment and affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district judge properly denied the entrapment instruction. View "United States v. Medina-Ortiz" on Justia Law

James Cohen accepted monthly payments from an individual who was required to register as a sex offender, in exchange for falsely representing to authorities that this individual lived at his address. Cohen knew that the person had been convicted of a sex offense and was required by law to register his place of residence. When United States marshals investigated the individual's compliance with registration requirements, Cohen knowingly lied to a marshal, claiming the individual resided with him, despite knowing this was untrue.Cohen was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, with making a materially false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He entered a plea agreement, admitting to an offense with a maximum sentence of eight years, and agreed to a sentencing guidelines calculation that included a four-level enhancement for matters relating to a sex offense under chapter 109B. At sentencing, Cohen objected to the application of this guideline, arguing that his offense did not constitute a sex offense under federal law, but withdrew his other objections. The district court overruled his remaining objection, applied the guideline, and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cohen’s arguments that the sentencing guideline was improperly applied. The court held that guideline § 2J1.2 properly applied because Cohen’s false statement related to failure to register under chapter 109B, which falls within the guideline’s scope. The court found no merit in Cohen’s remaining arguments, determined that certain claims had been waived or forfeited, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Cohen" on Justia Law

A defendant was found guilty by a jury of second-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge initially announced a sentence of one year, suspending all but nine months to be served on home detention, followed by three years of supervised probation. While the judge was advising the defendant of his post-trial rights, the prosecutor sought clarification about the sentence, noting that the initial announcement did not leave sufficient “backup” time for a probation violation. After a brief colloquy, the judge, realizing a misunderstanding regarding the sentencing guidelines, revised the sentence to five years, suspending all but nine months on home detention, and three years of supervised probation. The defendant remained in the courtroom, and the sentencing proceeding had not ended when the change was made.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, arguing that the trial court had illegally increased his sentence after it was imposed, in violation of Maryland Rule 4-345, which restricts a court’s ability to modify a sentence once it has been imposed. The Appellate Court determined that the sentence was not illegally increased because the sentencing proceeding had not concluded when the change occurred, and thus, Rule 4-345 did not yet apply.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to decide when a sentence is considered “imposed” under Maryland Rule 4-345 and whether the trial court’s increase was illegal. The Court held that a sentence is not imposed until the sentencing proceeding ends, which generally occurs when the judge signals the conclusion of the case, such as by remanding the defendant or calling the next case. Therefore, because the sentence was changed before the proceeding ended, the trial court retained authority to revise it, and Rule 4-345 was not triggered. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Reyes v. State" on Justia Law