Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Law enforcement in Cass County, Missouri received a report on July 12, 2021, alleging that Israel Barrera molested a fourteen-year-old girl over several years. A subsequent medical examination confirmed that the girl had contracted trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease, and she denied having any consensual sexual partners. Barrera was taken into custody on September 1, 2021, and officers initially seized a urine sample and buccal swab pursuant to a warrant. However, the urine sample was unusable, leading law enforcement to seek new warrants: one to seize another urine sample (warrant 1) and one to test that sample (warrant 2). The urine sample seized under warrant 1 tested positive for trichomoniasis.The Circuit Court of Cass County found that warrant 1 failed to establish probable cause to seize and test Barrera’s urine, and consequently suppressed the urine test results. The court also determined that the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the supporting affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not rely on it. The court further found warrant 2 unnecessary, as warrant 1 authorized both the seizure and search of the urine. The state appealed this suppression order.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause supported the application for warrant 1. The Court found that the corroborative details in the affidavit—such as medical confirmation of the STD and the victim’s denial of consensual partners—provided sufficient factual support for probable cause under a commonsense, totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Circuit Court’s suppression of the urine test results and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court also affirmed the finding that warrant 2 was unnecessary. View "State v. Barrera" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2003 of voluntary manslaughter, robbery, possession of a firearm, and received various sentence enhancements, including a prior strike, a firearm enhancement, and seven prior prison term enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years and four months. Two restitution fines of $5,000 each were also imposed. In 2023, following legislative changes, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements. The defendant sought to have those enhancements stricken and also requested further modifications, including striking the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and imposing a lesser term for the manslaughter conviction.At the Superior Court of Sacramento County, during the resentencing hearing held in October 2024, the court struck the seven prior prison term enhancements, reducing the sentence to 35 years and four months. However, the court declined to strike the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and reimposed the original restitution fines and victim restitution. The updated abstract of judgment noted the restitution fines were “stayed.” The defendant appealed, raising constitutional and statutory challenges to the reimposition of the upper term, the denial of his request to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385, and the continued imposition of the restitution fine.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court did not err by reimposing the upper term for voluntary manslaughter without requiring new findings of aggravating circumstances under amended section 1170, subdivision (b), because section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) exempts previously imposed upper terms from these requirements. The court also found no abuse of discretion or statutory error in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement, as no applicable mitigating factors were established. However, the court concluded that the restitution fine originally imposed in 2003 must be vacated under section 1465.9, as more than ten years had elapsed. The judgment was affirmed as modified to vacate the restitution fine. View "P. v. Salstrom" on Justia Law

One defendant in this case was a high-ranking member of the Varrio Fallbrook Locos gang and the Mexican Mafia, while a codefendant acted as a secretary within the gang structure. In December 2013, the defendant participated in a meeting regarding methamphetamine sales, which resulted in the violent assault of another gang member, A.C., after accusations of unpaid debts. Following the assault, the defendant attempted to prevent A.C. from testifying and conspired to arrange the murder of another gang affiliate. The defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including assault with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to dissuade a witness, among others. The trial court imposed a lengthy prison sentence and ordered the defendant to pay various fines and ancillary costs, despite defense counsel’s request to consider the defendant’s inability to pay.The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the monetary orders. It held that the trial court should have considered the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing ancillary costs but rejected the argument that an ability-to-pay finding was required for punitive fines. The appellate court clarified that fines could still be challenged under the excessive fines clauses of the federal and state constitutions and remanded the case for resentencing and further proceedings regarding the fines and costs.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve inconsistent approaches among lower courts concerning court-ordered financial obligations. The Court held that challenges to the amount of criminal fines must be reviewed under the excessive fines clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. Separately, the Court held that, upon request, a sentencing court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing court operations and facilities assessments, as failing to do so violates equal protection. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "P. v. Kopp" on Justia Law

The defendant and his girlfriend entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher, where they stabbed and suffocated the victims, stole their valuables, and fled in the victims’ car. Harty died immediately. Fisher, a nonambulatory, seventy-seven-year-old woman who used a wheelchair, survived initially but later died from complications due to multiple stab wounds. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for both victims and, as to Fisher, also of attempted murder.Previously, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed and affirmed the convictions, but noted that the jury instruction for attempted murder incorrectly included the failure to complete murder as an element. The court allowed the defendant to raise the issue of legally inconsistent verdicts in a postconviction motion. The Superior Court, after considering whether the acts supporting the attempted murder and murder convictions were sufficiently separate and whether the defendant had notice of alternate theories, found both questions answered in the affirmative and denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions.On further appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the verdicts were not legally inconsistent. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant’s act of attempting to smother Fisher with pillows was separate from the subsequent fatal stabbing, and each act could support distinct convictions. The court also found that the defendant received adequate notice of the theories underlying each charge. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions, holding that no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice resulted from the erroneous jury instruction. View "Commonwealth v. Hart" on Justia Law

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the appellant for traffic violations and discovered that his driver’s license had been canceled. During the stop, the officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Citing only the odor as justification, the officer conducted a warrantless search of the car. During the search, the officer found ammunition in a locked safe in the backseat. The appellant was prohibited by law from possessing ammunition and was subsequently charged with that offense, as well as with driving after cancellation.The trial court, the Scott County District Court, granted the appellant’s motion to suppress the ammunition, ruling that the search violated his constitutional rights. This ruling came after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Torgerson, which held that the smell of marijuana alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The State appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because, at the time of the search, officers could reasonably have relied on existing appellate precedent that arguably permitted such searches.The Supreme Court of Minnesota, reviewing the case, rejected the application of the good-faith exception. The court held that there was no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing warrantless vehicle searches based solely on the smell of marijuana at the time of the search, and previous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions had emphasized the need to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that the good-faith exception did not apply, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Douglas" on Justia Law

The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a fatal shooting during a drug transaction in Hartford, Connecticut. He testified at trial that he acted in self-defense, claiming the victim drew a gun on him during a dispute. However, other witnesses contradicted this account, and no gun was found on or near the victim. After the shooting, the defendant fled the scene and did not report the incident to the police. He was later arrested and charged with murder.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford. At trial, the defendant testified in his own defense. The prosecutor, with approval from the trial court, cross-examined the defendant regarding his failure to report to police that he had acted in self-defense prior to his arrest. The defense objected, arguing that the questioning infringed upon the defendant’s right to remain silent, but the trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that, by testifying, the defendant waived his Fifth Amendment right regarding silence and that his failure to report was inconsistent with a claim of self-defense. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to fifty years in prison.On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his prearrest silence. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the trial court did not commit plain error because established case law allows impeachment using a defendant’s prearrest, pre-Miranda silence, particularly when the defendant testifies and claims self-defense. The Court concluded that the circumstances did not present an obvious or egregious error requiring reversal. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

An individual was accused of sexually assaulting his fiancée’s seven-year-old niece while visiting the child’s home. The child reported the incident to her sibling, who then informed their mother. Law enforcement conducted interviews with the child, her family, and the accused, and collected physical evidence, including a blanket identified by the child. DNA analysis of the blanket matched the accused. The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent. At trial, the child, family members, law enforcement, and crime lab personnel testified. The defense focused on challenging the investigation rather than the child’s credibility. The accused was found guilty on both charges.After conviction, the accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Montana, raising several issues including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the conviction. The accused then sought postconviction relief in the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Fallon County, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective, particularly in the cross-examination of a law enforcement officer. The District Court denied the petition, finding the claims both procedurally barred and without merit. The defense attorney was later disbarred and did not participate in the postconviction proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. The Court held that the accused did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set by Strickland v. Washington. The Court found that the defense counsel’s cross-examination strategy fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and did not prejudice the outcome, given the strong physical evidence and the content presented to the jury. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s denial of postconviction relief. View "Kapps v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, a man was charged with multiple felony counts arising from sexual abuse allegations involving two victims: his adopted daughter, who disclosed in 2021 that she had been repeatedly molested by him from age 10 to 14, and his sister-in-law, who reported a 2009 incident in which he sexually assaulted her when she was 17. After investigations and forensic interviews, the defendant was charged with one count of felony sexual assault and three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent. The charges related to both victims were tried together before a jury.Prior to trial in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, neither party objected to the joinder of charges or moved to sever them. During voir dire, a Yellowstone County Undersheriff, whose office had investigated the case, was seated as a juror without objection or peremptory strike from either party. During trial, the State raised concerns about the Undersheriff’s impartiality, but the defendant’s counsel argued against removing him, and the District Court declined any implied motion to strike. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 100 years in prison.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant raised three issues: whether the presence of the Undersheriff as a juror or the joinder of charges should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine, and whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to either issue. The Supreme Court held that neither issue merited plain error review because the defendant had affirmatively waived challenges below, and there was no manifest miscarriage of justice. The Court further determined that the record was insufficient to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, leaving that question for postconviction proceedings. The Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Soapes" on Justia Law