Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2024, Christopher Bauer was charged with disorderly conduct following an incident in Williston, North Dakota. He retained legal counsel and the case proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which Bauer was acquitted. After his acquittal, Bauer submitted a motion seeking reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs incurred during the defense of his criminal prosecution.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over by Judge Kirsten M. Sjue, reviewed Bauer’s post-judgment motion. The court denied his request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Bauer had not established a legal basis for recovering such expenses in the context of the criminal proceeding. Bauer also argued that the district court judge committed misconduct warranting discipline, but the court’s order did not address this allegation, and there was no indication that the issue had been properly raised or preserved during district court proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the district court’s post-judgment order was appealable and addressed the merits of Bauer’s requests. The Supreme Court held that Bauer’s motion for recovery of attorney’s fees, which sought reimbursement of property allegedly expended in connection with the criminal action, constituted a substantial right under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(5), making the order appealable. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Bauer’s motion, finding he had not shown entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs in the criminal case. The Supreme Court also declined to consider Bauer’s judicial misconduct claim on appeal, as it had not been preserved in the trial court. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "City of Williston v. Bauer" on Justia Law

In June 2023, Kenneth Swanson was subject to multiple outstanding arrest warrants and was suspected by police of selling crack cocaine in Wilmington, Delaware. Acting on a tip from a confidential informant, police surveilled Swanson and observed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction. After stopping Swanson’s vehicle at a gas station, officers arrested him and conducted a search, which resulted in the discovery of a plastic bag containing cocaine hidden in his pants. Laboratory analysis confirmed the substance was cocaine.Swanson was indicted by a grand jury in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware on several charges, but ultimately tried only for possession of cocaine in a Tier 3 quantity. He waived his right to a jury trial, and the bench trial proceeded with the State presenting video and testimony from the arresting officers. Swanson did not file any pretrial motions to suppress the evidence nor object to its admission during trial. The court found him guilty of the possession charge and, after declaring him a habitual offender, sentenced him to ten years of incarceration, suspended after six years.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Swanson argued for the first time that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that under Superior Court Criminal Rule 12, motions to suppress must be made prior to trial and failure to do so constitutes waiver, absent good cause. Because Swanson did not file a suppression motion or show cause for his failure, the Court declined to review his Fourth Amendment claim and affirmed his conviction. The Court clarified that plain-error review does not apply to unpreserved suppression issues except in limited circumstances, such as when the basis for suppression arises too late or is confined to the four corners of a warrant. View "Swanson v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. These charges stemmed from two prior cases involving allegations of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, both concerning a minor family member. In each prior case, the Superior Court issued protective orders requiring the defendant to surrender firearms and ammunition. In 2022, the defendant was arrested for allegedly possessing firearms or ammunition in violation of those protective orders.After the 2022 arrest, the defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, arguing that the protective orders were not issued "in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force" as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(4)(A), since the underlying offenses did not explicitly include use of physical force as an element. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to one count each of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. The state entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining charges. The defendant appealed, and the case was transferred from the Appellate Court to the Connecticut Supreme Court.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It held that the phrase "a case involving" in § 53a-217(a)(4)(A) is broadly inclusive and refers to the overall proceeding, not just the elements of the charged offense. Therefore, protective orders issued during prosecutions for sex offenses, where the use or threat of physical force or superior physical strength was present in any aspect, satisfy the statute. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, finding it provided sufficient guidance. Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to the validity of the protective orders was barred by the collateral bar rule. View "State v. Enrrique H." on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged in three separate criminal cases for drug-related offenses in Solano County. Two of these cases involved charges under Health and Safety Code section 11395, which was newly established by Proposition 36 and criminalizes possession of a hard drug with two prior drug-related convictions. The third case concerned possession for sale of a controlled substance. The petitioner sought pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 for all pending charges, arguing that he had a qualifying mental health diagnosis and was a suitable candidate for diversion, while also requesting treatment under section 11395.The Solano County Superior Court ruled that the petitioner was ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion for the section 11395 charges, interpreting the statute as precluding diversion due to its “notwithstanding any other law” language. The court granted pretrial mental health diversion for the possession for sale charge but denied it for the section 11395 charges, reasoning that the treatment-mandated felony provisions of section 11395 superseded the diversion option. After denial of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner sought relief via a writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the statutory interplay between section 11395 and Penal Code section 1001.36 de novo. The court held that section 11395 does not expressly or impliedly preclude trial courts from granting pretrial mental health diversion to defendants charged under section 11395. It found that both statutes can coexist, as section 11395 provides a postconviction treatment path and does not bar the pretrial diversion process. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its denial and to reconsider the petitioner’s requests for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. View "Reed v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After serving nearly 19 years in prison for a series of robberies, the defendant was released on parole. Within eight months, at age 57, he committed 10 new robberies, each involving the use of a pellet gun to threaten employees and take cash. He did not physically harm anyone during these offenses. The jury convicted him of 13 counts of second-degree robbery, finding he had used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and the trial court determined he had three prior serious felony convictions. The defendant was sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to a total of 369 years to life.Following a change in sentencing law that gave trial judges discretion to strike five-year prior conviction enhancements, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County recalled the defendant’s sentence, struck the prior conviction and weapon enhancements, and resentenced him to 225 years to life. The defendant appealed, arguing that the resentencing was not a “meaningful modification” as suggested by the uncodified statement of intent from the 2023 bill amending Penal Code section 1172.1, and that his postconviction rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending were not properly considered. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the trial court’s calculation of postsentence conduct credits.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the uncodified statement of legislative intent does not create a mandate for resentencing to advance release or parole dates. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave the Three Strikes sentence intact, given the defendant’s extensive recidivism. The ineffective assistance claims lacked merit, as the arguments were unsupported. However, the appellate court modified the judgment to remove postsentence conduct credits, which should be calculated by the Department of Corrections. The judgment was affirmed as modified, and a separate appeal from the trial court’s decision not to act on the defendant’s motion to vacate the new sentence was dismissed as non-appealable. View "People v. Brammer" on Justia Law

Francisco Padilla-Canales, a Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrant, was arrested after breaking into a residence where his estranged wife was staying with another man, Lesman Escobar Andara. Upon discovering them together, Padilla-Canales stabbed Andara, who died at the scene. Padilla-Canales attempted to have his wife report the incident as a suicide and performed CPR until emergency services arrived. He was advised soon after arrest, in Spanish, that a conviction could lead to deportation, and signed documentation acknowledging this warning. More than a year later, he pled guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide under a nonbinding plea agreement.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County, Montana, accepted Padilla-Canales’s guilty plea after confirming he understood the charges and potential penalties, and that there were no communication barriers due to language. However, at the change-of-plea hearing, the court did not specifically advise Padilla-Canales of the immigration consequences of his plea or confirm his understanding of those consequences, as required by Montana law. Both the State and defense counsel referenced his immigration status during sentencing, discussing that deportation would likely follow his prison term. The District Court sentenced Padilla-Canales to forty years in prison without parole restrictions.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Padilla-Canales argued for the first time that his guilty plea was involuntary due to the District Court’s failure to properly advise him about potential deportation. The Supreme Court recognized the advisement failure but concluded that, in this case, Padilla-Canales was aware of the immigration consequences through discussions in open court and with counsel. The Court declined to exercise plain error review, holding that the record did not reveal a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the fairness of the proceedings, and affirmed the District Court’s sentencing order. View "State v. Padilla-Canales" on Justia Law

In this case, a woman was accused of participating in a staged burglary intended to facilitate an insurance fraud scheme. The orchestrator of the scheme, seeking funds to pay her son's legal fees, enlisted several individuals to help remove and conceal items from her home, including a refrigerator and a boat, while her husband was away. Law enforcement initiated an investigation after the orchestrator’s husband discovered the apparent burglary and contacted police. The accused woman was alleged to have assisted in disassembling and moving the refrigerator and in storing the stolen items at her own residence, knowing that an official investigation was imminent.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Richland County presided over the case. Before trial, the defendant requested that a witness be allowed to testify by video due to travel difficulties, but the court required in-person testimony. The defendant also requested an “accomplice instruction” for the jury, arguing that a key witness’s testimony should be viewed with distrust as that witness was allegedly an accomplice. The court denied both requests, finding the accomplice instruction inapplicable because the relevant charges had been amended. After hearing testimony from the orchestrator, other involved parties, and law enforcement, the jury acquitted the defendant of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud but convicted her of tampering with evidence. The defendant then appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions, witness testimony procedures, and sufficiency of corroborating evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not commit reversible error in denying the accomplice instruction, as it would have been inconsistent with the defendant’s claim of innocence on the tampering charge. The court further determined there was no abuse of discretion in denying the video testimony request and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for tampering with evidence. View "State v. Lord" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after a series of threatening incidents toward his former girlfriend, attacked her and her friend, Daniel Martinez, outside her workplace. The defendant dragged his ex-girlfriend by the hair while wielding a knife. When Martinez intervened, the defendant stabbed him multiple times. These events led to the defendant being charged and later convicted of several offenses, including the attempted murder of Martinez, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and battery involving a dating relationship. He was acquitted of the attempted murder charge related to his ex-girlfriend. Enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury were found true, and the defendant was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison.Following his conviction, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that his case might qualify for relief under changes to the law that limited certain doctrines of murder liability. The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that the defendant was convicted as a direct perpetrator with intent to kill, not under any vicarious liability theory such as the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court also declined to act on his request for recall of sentence under section 1172.1.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the denial of the section 1172.6 petition, holding that the record of conviction conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief because he was not convicted under a theory of vicarious liability. The appellate court also dismissed the portion of the appeal pertaining to the section 1172.1 request, finding it was not an appealable order. View "People v. Anaya" on Justia Law

Bryan Repple was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol by a Maitland police officer in Maitland, Florida. After the arrest, the officer transported Repple to a breath test facility located outside the city limits, in Orange County, where the officer read the statutory implied consent warning and requested Repple to submit to a breath test. Repple complied, and the test revealed an illegal breath-alcohol level. The central issue in the case was whether the officer, acting outside his municipal jurisdiction when requesting the breath test, had legal authority to do so under Florida law.The matter first came before a Florida trial court, which granted Repple’s motion to suppress the breath test results, finding that the Maitland officer lacked authority to request the test outside his jurisdiction. The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed this suppression order, concluding that no legal basis existed for the officer’s extraterritorial action, and rejecting the State’s argument that a continuing investigation exception applied. The district court noted no evidence of a mutual aid agreement and found no statutory or judicial authorization for such extraterritorial police power. The Sixth District certified a direct conflict with a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Torres, which had held that a municipal officer could request a breath test outside his jurisdiction as part of a continuing DUI investigation.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case based on the certified conflict. It held that, under Florida’s implied consent law, a municipal police officer who makes a DUI arrest within his jurisdiction is implicitly authorized to request a breath test outside his jurisdiction when necessary to complete the statutory process. The Court quashed the Sixth District’s decision in Repple and approved the result in Torres, clarifying that the officer’s authority arose by necessary implication from the statute. View "State v. Repple" on Justia Law

A motel guest noticed a person he did not know walking alongside him as he retrieved an item from his car. When the guest returned to the motel entrance, he used his keycard to unlock the door. At that moment, the other individual quickly grabbed the keycard from the guest’s hand and ran into the motel. The guest followed, asking the individual to go to the front desk to resolve the situation. The individual instead threw the keycard, ran out, and was later found exiting a motel room that was not his. After a short chase, the guest and a motel manager detained him until the police arrived. Throughout the encounter, there were no threats or other contact beyond the grabbing of the keycard.The case was tried in the Baker County Circuit Court, where the defendant was charged with third-degree robbery under Oregon law, which requires the use or threatened use of physical force upon another person during a theft. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not show he used or threatened “physical force.” The trial court denied this motion, relying on prior Oregon Court of Appeals precedent interpreting “physical force” broadly. The defendant was convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding its own precedent controlled.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. The court held that the legislature intended “physical force upon another person” in the robbery statute to mean contact that either causes bodily harm or is reasonably capable of creating a sense of fear or danger that such harm will occur. The court found that the defendant’s actions—quickly grabbing the keycard without other contact or threat—did not meet that standard. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law