Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Augustine Perez was on federal supervised release in North Carolina, subject to conditions that allowed warrantless searches of his “person and property” by probation officers. Perez moved from a residence at Teal Drive to Lawndale Drive, reporting the change as required, but retained ownership of Teal Drive and leased it to Deanna Coleman, who moved in with her daughter. About a year later, probation officers received a tip from a confidential informant that Perez was living at Teal Drive and involved in drug trafficking. Without a warrant, officers searched both Lawndale Drive and Teal Drive on the same day. At Teal Drive, Coleman objected to the search, but officers proceeded, finding cash and items they alleged were connected to drug trafficking.In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, Perez and Coleman moved to suppress the evidence from the Teal Drive search, claiming it was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion to suppress and granted summary judgment to the government, ruling that the currency found was subject to forfeiture as drug proceeds, largely relying on the evidence seized during the search.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, vacated, and remanded. The court held that a supervised release condition permitting warrantless searches of a supervisee’s “property” does not authorize the search of real property owned by the supervisee but leased and occupied by a third party. The court further held that, to lawfully search Coleman’s residence under Perez’s supervision conditions, officers needed probable cause to believe Perez resided there. The government failed to meet this standard, rendering the search of Teal Drive unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit ordered suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the forfeiture complaint. View "US v. Perez" on Justia Law

Three men—Clifton Mosley, Davon Carter, and Matthew Hightower—were involved in marijuana trafficking together. Hightower, who worked at a medical supply company, was indicted for healthcare fraud based on information provided by his coworker, Lisa Edmonds. After Hightower’s indictment, he, Carter, and Mosley allegedly conspired to retaliate against Edmonds, who was expected to testify against Hightower. On the morning Edmonds was scheduled for a court appearance, Carter fatally shot Edmonds’ neighbor, Latrina Ashburne, having apparently mistaken her for Edmonds. Surveillance footage, phone records, and witness testimony connected Mosley and Carter to the murder and to each other in the hours before the shooting.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the criminal proceedings. Carter and Mosley were jointly tried and convicted by a jury of witness-murder and marijuana trafficking. Mosley had moved to sever the murder and marijuana charges and to suppress evidence found on Carter, but the district court denied these motions, finding the offenses were properly joined under the Federal Rules, and that Mosley lacked standing to challenge the search of Carter’s property. A jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and Mosley received life imprisonment for the witness-murder counts and a concurrent sentence for marijuana distribution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Mosley’s appeal. The court held that joinder of the charges was proper, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. The appellate court also held that Mosley lacked standing to challenge the suppression of evidence from Carter’s property. Finally, the Fourth Circuit concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment and upheld Mosley’s convictions. View "US v. Mosley" on Justia Law

Four individuals, including the defendant, regularly used a motel storage room for shelter and drug use. One night, after a dispute over missing drugs, the victim was severely beaten by two members of the group, including the defendant, and left in a bathtub where she died. The defendant was charged with murder under an accomplice liability theory. During trial preparations, the State informed the Allen Superior Court that one witness, Miquan Jones, was incarcerated four hours away and argued that the county lacked resources to transport him. Over the defendant’s objection, the court allowed Jones to testify remotely via live video. Jones testified that the defendant confessed to the murder and threatened him.The jury convicted the defendant, and the court imposed a sixty-three-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting virtual testimony because the State had not shown good cause as required by Interim Administrative Rule 14(C). The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that good cause was shown and that confrontation rights were not violated, though one judge concurred only in result, finding any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the appellate decision. The Supreme Court held that when the State seeks to present remote testimony against a criminal defendant, it must provide case-specific evidence showing that remote testimony is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that cannot otherwise be addressed. The State’s argument based on logistical inconvenience did not meet this standard, so the trial court abused its discretion. However, the Supreme Court found the error harmless given the overwhelming independent evidence of guilt and affirmed the conviction. View "Shabazz v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, as the sole operator of a clean energy startup, misled investors by supplying them with altered documents, forged signatures, and false financial information to exaggerate his company’s position and prospects. After obtaining nearly $1 million from a university-affiliated incubator and several individual investors, he quickly withdrew large sums, routed money through his own accounts in suspicious transfers, and used most of the funds to purchase a personal residence. He repeatedly lied to investors and federal agents to conceal his activities. Despite red flags, the investors disbursed funds based on his representations.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted him on multiple counts, including wire fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. At trial, the defendant made a generalized motion for acquittal under Rule 29, which the District Court denied. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months in prison and imposed over $1.1 million in restitution, later amended to include attorneys’ fees incurred by the victims.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the defendant raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, argued instructional error regarding the aggravated identity theft counts, and disputed the restitution award for attorneys’ fees. The Third Circuit held that a non-specific Rule 29 motion does not preserve all sufficiency arguments for appeal and that, under plain-error review, the evidence supported all convictions. The court found no instructional error or constitutional vagueness in the aggravated identity theft statute. However, it held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees. The convictions and sentence were affirmed, the restitution order for attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "USA v. Abrams" on Justia Law

David Venkus sought to collect a $13,776,518 criminal restitution judgment against Thomas Lindstrom, his former employee, who had caused the collapse of Venkus’s trading firm through fraudulent activities. Lindstrom later worked for Ryan Building Group, Inc. (RBG), where he earned salary and accumulated stock options but also incurred significant debt to RBG. After Lindstrom was terminated by RBG for embezzlement, RBG paid him $73,090, labeling it a severance payment. This sum was allegedly calculated based on the value of Lindstrom’s expired stock options, offset by his debt to RBG. Venkus, having previously served RBG with a citation to discover assets pursuant to Illinois law, claimed the payment and the handling of the options violated the citation’s asset-transfer prohibitions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Venkus’s motion, finding that because Lindstrom’s options had expired and thus had no value, RBG’s severance payment was hypothetical and not a violation of the citation. The district court also held that the severance was subject to Illinois’s 15% wage garnishment cap and that RBG was not liable for attorney’s fees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that material questions of fact existed regarding the true nature of the severance payment and whether RBG’s actions “frustrated” Venkus’s rights under the citation. The court held that the district court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve these questions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the lower court hold an evidentiary hearing and, if necessary, address whether attorney’s fees should be awarded if a citation violation is found. View "USA v Lindstrom" on Justia Law

The case concerns a shooting incident that occurred late at night in Douglas, Wyoming, when the defendant called 911 to report he had shot his cousin, believing the cousin was breaking into his home. Investigation revealed that the cousin was an invited guest, and the defendant gave inconsistent accounts of the events leading up to the shooting, including claims of memory loss and possible intoxication. Both the defendant and the victim had consumed alcohol and the defendant had used THC. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and pursued defenses including not guilty by reason of mental illness and self-defense. Psychiatric evaluations offered differing opinions on his mental state, one attributing his actions to a PTSD flashback and the other finding his intoxication contributed to his conduct.In the District Court of Converse County, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, asserting immunity under a Wyoming self-defense statute. The district court excluded testimony from one of the psychiatric experts, finding it irrelevant under the governing statutes, and further determined that the defendant failed to present competent evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case for self-defense immunity. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced accordingly.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held that the lower court properly excluded the psychiatric testimony as irrelevant to the self-defense immunity issue. The Supreme Court found the defendant failed to present admissible, competent evidence to support a prima facie self-defense claim. It declined to review the jury instruction challenge due to invited error, as the defendant proposed the instruction in question. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for second-degree murder and affirmed the judgment. View "Helms v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple offenses, including sexual assault and burglary, after a jury trial. At sentencing, the State sought to have him sentenced as a persistent offender under New Jersey’s persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), and presented two certified judgments of prior convictions in support. The trial court, without objection from the defense, found the defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence based on these convictions and imposed a 42-year prison term.After the conviction, the defendant appealed, asserting trial errors. During the appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States, which held that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, any fact increasing a defendant’s sentence—apart from the existence of a prior conviction—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Both parties agreed that, in light of Erlinger, the enhanced sentence was unconstitutional because a judge, not a jury, made the persistent offender findings. The parties disputed whether this error could be considered harmless. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held the error could not be harmless and vacated the sentence, also construing the statute to require jury factfinding in compliance with Erlinger.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that errors of this kind—where a judge, not a jury, makes the findings necessary to impose an enhanced sentence—are subject to harmless error review. In this case, the Court found the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the facts supporting the persistent offender status were undisputed and only one outcome was possible. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the sentence. However, the Court also concluded that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) is inconsistent with Erlinger and urged the Legislature to amend the statute accordingly. View "State v. Carlton" on Justia Law

A pregnant woman working alone at a gasoline station was killed by ligature strangulation during her shift, resulting in her death and that of her viable, unborn child. The defendant, a man known to frequent the area and drive a distinctive black van, was observed at the station around the time of the killings and was later seen with a large amount of cash. He made incriminating statements to police and fellow detainees, and his DNA matched the major profile found on the ligature used in the crime, as well as DNA recovered from the victim’s fingernails.After his conviction in the Superior Court for two counts of first-degree murder and armed robbery, the defendant appealed and filed several motions for a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court previously affirmed his convictions and denied his first motion for a new trial, vacating only the armed robbery conviction as duplicative. While his direct appeal was pending, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial in the Superior Court, asserting new grounds: the Commonwealth's failure to disclose an exculpatory segment of an audio recording, alleged anomalies in another police interview recording, and ineffective assistance of counsel for not interviewing or calling potential alibi witnesses.On appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the undisclosed audio segment was not prejudicial since its content was substantially similar to evidence already disclosed, and the overwhelming evidence against the defendant precluded a finding of prejudice. The Court also concluded that the alleged recording anomalies were not newly discovered evidence and would not have affected the verdicts. Finally, it found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice regarding counsel’s performance. The order denying the second motion for a new trial was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Bateman" on Justia Law

A witness was subpoenaed to testify in a federal criminal trial in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. After answering a few questions, she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, refusing to answer further questions from the government. The government then sought and obtained an order from the District Court granting her statutory immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, which precluded the use of her compelled testimony or information derived from it against her in any criminal case, except for prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or failing to comply with the order. Despite this grant of immunity and a direct order from the court, the witness continued to refuse to testify.Following her refusal, the District Court found her in criminal contempt and issued an order accordingly. Her attorney argued that the statutory immunity provided was not as broad as her Fifth Amendment privilege, specifically asserting that the immunity did not protect her from potential prosecution for perjury based on her compelled testimony. The District Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the immunity was coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege as it protected against self-incrimination for prior acts but did not extend to potential perjury in the immunized testimony itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s criminal contempt order for abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal questions de novo. The First Circuit held that the statutory immunity granted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 was indeed coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, except for future perjury or false statements given under immunity. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order of criminal contempt. View "United States v. McBreairty" on Justia Law

Three individuals carried out an armed robbery targeting customers at a Chicago convenience store, J&J Food and Grocery. The incident involved robbing a person just outside the store’s vestibule and several customers inside, all at gunpoint. The store, which operates around the clock but limits access to a vestibule in the evenings, temporarily shut down after the robbery for police investigation, resulting in lost business for approximately thirty to sixty minutes. The robbers did not attempt to steal from the store itself or make demands of its employees.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over the trial and ultimately convicted the defendants of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c)(1)(A). The defendants moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that their actions did not affect interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act, since they robbed customers rather than the store. The district court denied this motion, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions de novo and affirmed. The court held that the temporary closure of J&J due to the robbery constituted at least a “realistic probability” of affecting interstate commerce, satisfying the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement. The court also rejected the defendants’ claim that the jury could have convicted them solely based on robbing the customer outside the store, finding that the jury was not presented with separate legal theories for inside and outside robberies. As the Hobbs Act convictions were upheld, the related firearm convictions were affirmed as well. View "United States v. Demus" on Justia Law