Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A woman who immigrated from Vietnam to the United States and became active in the Vietnamese community in Sioux City, Iowa, organized a campaign in 2020 to assist Vietnamese Americans—many of whom had limited English proficiency and were unfamiliar with the U.S. election system—in registering to vote and casting absentee ballots. Her efforts were not solely for civic engagement; she hoped these voters would support her husband, who was a candidate in the election. She facilitated the process by providing forms, translating, and returning completed documents to the county auditor. However, she also engaged in fraudulent conduct by instructing family members to complete and submit voting documents for absent adult children, and in some cases, she filled out and signed the forms herself. In total, she submitted 26 documents with forged signatures. The county auditor became suspicious and contacted the FBI, leading to her arrest and indictment on 52 counts of voter fraud under two federal statutes.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa presided over her trial. The court used model jury instructions that did not require the jury to find that she knew her conduct was illegal or that the children did not consent to her actions, despite her request for such an instruction. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and her motion for judgment of acquittal was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the jury instructions accurately reflected the law and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the instructions properly conveyed the required mental states—knowledge and willfulness—and did not need to require knowledge of the specific law violated. The court also found the evidence sufficient for conviction, including for counts involving equivocal testimony, based on the defendant’s pattern of conduct. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Adam Gomez was charged with receiving and possessing a firearm that had an obliterated serial number. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), was unconstitutional. After the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied his motion, Gomez pleaded guilty to the offense. His appeal centers on the claim that the statute is facially unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, which clarified the scope of the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Gomez’s motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting his constitutional challenge to § 922(k). Following this denial, Gomez entered a guilty plea and was convicted. He then appealed the judgment, arguing that the statute violates the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bruen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) is facially constitutional. The court reasoned that the statute does not infringe upon the right to bear arms because it does not prevent anyone from possessing any type of firearm, and firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not weapons in common use for lawful purposes. The court also noted that Gomez’s facial challenge failed because he did not demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional in all its applications or that it lacks a plainly legitimate sweep. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Three men were prosecuted for their roles in the fatal shooting of Ahmaud Arbery, a Black man, in the Satilla Shores neighborhood of Glynn County, Georgia. On February 23, 2020, Arbery was running through the neighborhood and stopped at a house under construction, which he had visited before. Gregory and Travis McMichael, who lived nearby, saw Arbery and, suspecting him of recent burglaries, armed themselves and pursued him in a truck. William Bryan, a neighbor, joined the chase in his own vehicle. The men used their trucks to block and pursue Arbery through public streets, ultimately leading to a confrontation in which Travis McMichael shot and killed Arbery.After being convicted of murder and other charges in Georgia state court and sentenced to life imprisonment, the defendants were tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. There, they were convicted of interference with rights under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), attempted kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), and, for the McMichaels, firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court denied their motions for acquittal, finding sufficient evidence that the defendants acted because of Arbery’s race and his use of public streets, that the streets were provided or administered by the county, and that the attempted kidnapping was for a benefit and involved an instrumentality of interstate commerce.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings on all challenged elements, including racial motivation, use of public facilities, and use of an automobile as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions. View "USA v. Bryan" on Justia Law

The petitioner was arrested on December 21, 2019, on warrants issued by both Marion County and Clackamas County. The Marion County warrants were for alleged probation violations, while the Clackamas County warrant was based on new criminal charges. After pleading guilty in Clackamas County and being sentenced on March 11, 2020, the petitioner was transported to Department of Corrections (DOC) custody rather than to Marion County Jail, despite a court order for transport to Marion County to resolve the probation matters. During the subsequent 43-day period, the petitioner remained in DOC physical custody but was under the legal custody of Marion County Jail due to the unresolved probation violation warrants. On April 24, 2020, the Marion County Circuit Court revoked the petitioner’s probations and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, ordering credit for time served since December 21, 2019, including the period credited to the Clackamas County case.The Oregon Court of Appeals previously reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the Marion County Circuit Court had authority under ORS 137.370(4) to grant presentence incarceration credit for the time the petitioner was held in custody, even though the time overlapped with the sentence imposed in Clackamas County. The appellate court agreed that the trial court had expressly ordered credit for the relevant period.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, upon reconsideration, corrected a factual error regarding the petitioner’s physical location during the 43-day period but held that the petitioner’s legal custody by Marion County Jail was sufficient to constitute “time served in jail” under ORS 137.370(4). The court concluded that physical custody in a jail is not required for presentence incarceration credit if the sentencing court expressly orders such credit. The court adhered to its prior opinion as modified, allowing the credit as ordered. View "State ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion" on Justia Law

Blake Brewer was arrested after stealing a sound system and monitor from a Walmart in Gillette, Wyoming, resulting in a loss of $1,887. At the time, Brewer was on parole for a prior fraud-by-check conviction. He entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to felony theft in exchange for a recommended sentence of 18 to 36 months and agreed to pay restitution. The plea agreement did not specify whether the new sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to any sentence that might be reinstated following a pending parole revocation for his earlier conviction.The District Court of Campbell County accepted Brewer’s guilty plea and imposed the recommended sentence. During the oral pronouncement, the court was silent regarding whether the sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to any reinstated sentence for the prior offense. In its written judgment, however, the court ordered Brewer’s sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence. After a motion from the State, the court issued an order nunc pro tunc to correct the sentence’s duration but retained the consecutive language. Brewer appealed, arguing that the written judgment imposed an illegal sentence because the oral pronouncement did not specify consecutive sentencing and the written order referenced a sentence not yet reinstated by the parole board.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo, applying its precedent from Keefe v. State, 2024 WY 93, 555 P.3d 492 (Wyo. 2024). The court held that when a sentencing court is silent on whether a sentence runs concurrently or consecutively, Wyoming law presumes the sentences run consecutively. The written judgment merely confirmed this presumption. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Brewer’s sentence was not illegal. View "Brewer v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, a felony under Vermont law. At arraignment, the State sought to have the defendant held without bail pending trial, arguing that the charged offense involved an act of violence, which would permit pretrial detention under Vermont’s constitutional and statutory exceptions to the general right to bail. The parties agreed that the offense was a felony and that the evidence of guilt was great, but the defendant contended that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child did not qualify as a crime involving an act of violence for purposes of denying bail.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, denied the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail. The court concluded that, despite a statutory provision designating lewd or lascivious conduct with a child as a violent act for bail purposes, the offense did not have an essential element involving an act of violence as required by the Vermont Constitution. The court relied on prior single-justice decisions, including State v. Madigan, which interpreted “violence” narrowly to require physical force or contact, and declined to give effect to the legislative designation in 13 V.S.A. § 2602(f).On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the definition of “violence” in the context of bail eligibility. The Court held that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child is a felony with an element involving an act of violence, as the offense inherently involves an abusive or unjust use of power over a child, even if physical contact is not required. The Court overruled the contrary reasoning in State v. Madigan, reaffirmed a broader definition of violence, and concluded that the statutory designation in § 2602(f) was consistent with constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on the State’s request to hold the defendant without bail. View "State v. Shores" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance at a home shared by the defendant, his partner, and their children. During the incident, officers found a rifle in the living room. The defendant admitted ownership of the firearm and acknowledged he was on probation. Several months earlier, he had pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery, a conviction that, under Kansas law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm for five years. The defendant was charged with felony criminal use of a weapon for knowingly possessing a firearm within five years of his domestic violence conviction.In the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant was convicted by a jury. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was constitutional and that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case to address the Second Amendment challenge. The court held that the Kansas statute, which temporarily disarms individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that early American laws, such as surety and “going armed” laws, allowed for the disarmament of individuals who posed a threat of violence, and that a recent conviction for domestic violence is sufficient to establish such a threat. The court concluded that the statute imposes a narrow, temporary restriction and is constitutional both on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law

In this case, two women in Boone, Iowa, reported separate incidents in which a man exposed himself to them in retail parking lots in the spring of 2022. Both women described the perpetrator and his vehicle, and law enforcement investigations led to Pat Kepner as a suspect. The identification process included photo arrays and video footage, with one woman identifying Kepner in a photo array and both later identifying him from video. Kepner was charged with two counts of indecent exposure, and at trial, the eyewitnesses’ identifications were central to the State’s case.At trial in the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Kepner sought to introduce expert testimony from Dr. Kim MacLin, a psychologist specializing in memory and eyewitness identification. Dr. MacLin’s proposed testimony focused on general scientific principles regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications and the effects of investigative procedures on witness confidence and accuracy. The district court excluded this testimony, reasoning that it would improperly address witness credibility and could confuse the jury. The jury convicted Kepner on both counts, and the district court entered a suspended sentence. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in excluding the expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and held that the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding Dr. MacLin’s generalized expert testimony. The court clarified that such testimony, which does not directly or indirectly vouch for a witness’s credibility but instead provides general scientific context, is admissible and can assist the jury in evaluating eyewitness identifications. The court further found that the exclusion of this testimony was prejudicial given the centrality of identification to the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State of Iowa v. Kepner" on Justia Law

Frederick Hawkins III was involved in a series of assaults against three women at a church in Ames, Iowa, where a nonprofit organization was serving meals. Over the course of a few minutes, Hawkins assaulted M.B. in a stairwell by grabbing her, rubbing his genitals against her, and putting his hand down her pants. He then slapped or grabbed C.C.’s buttocks as she passed him on the stairs, and shortly after, in an elevator, he touched E.M.’s buttocks while making sexually suggestive remarks and gestures. Hawkins was apprehended at the scene after police were called.The Iowa District Court for Story County, after a bench trial, found Hawkins guilty of three counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, rejecting his diminished responsibility defense and finding sufficient evidence of specific intent for each assault. Hawkins appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence of specific intent to commit sexual abuse regarding the assaults on C.C. and E.M. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings of specific intent, and remanded for resentencing due to a sentencing error.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Hawkins’s specific intent to commit sexual abuse against C.C. and E.M. The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances—including the rapid succession and similarity of the assaults, Hawkins’s conduct, and the context of the events—there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer specific intent for all three assaults. The court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence due to the conceded sentencing error and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State of Iowa v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of theft by shoplifting, third or subsequent offense, after stealing sunglasses from an optometrist’s office, and an additional count of resisting arrest. He ultimately pled guilty to one count of theft by shoplifting, with the other charges dismissed as part of a plea agreement. At sentencing, the court considered evidence of his prior convictions, making the current offense a Class IV felony. The defendant requested a continuance to attend inpatient substance abuse treatment, citing recent efforts to address his addiction, but the court denied the request, noting inconsistencies in his statements about substance use and skepticism about his motives.Previously, the District Court for Lancaster County accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and, after an enhancement and sentencing hearing, sentenced him to a determinate term of two years’ imprisonment. The court found substantial and compelling reasons why probation was not appropriate, including the defendant’s criminal history, risk of reoffending, and doubts about his sincerity regarding treatment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, failing to follow statutory requirements for sentencing, and not providing required advisements.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, as the defendant failed to show prejudice and had control over the timing of his treatment efforts. The court also found that the district court sufficiently stated its reasoning for denying probation and imposing imprisonment, and that any errors in failing to provide advisements were forfeited and, in any event, harmless. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Dawn" on Justia Law