Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries
State v. Sherwood
Law enforcement officers stopped John Michael Sherwood for a suspected violation of Idaho Code section 49-456 because the Rhode Island license plate on the car he was driving was registered to a different vehicle. During the stop, a deputy discovered over 100 pounds of marijuana, leading to Sherwood's arrest for trafficking in marijuana. Sherwood moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was illegal as his license plate complied with Rhode Island law. The district court denied the motion. Sherwood also moved to dismiss the case, claiming his speedy trial rights were violated due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court denied this motion as well, citing the pandemic and related orders as good cause for the delay. A jury found Sherwood guilty of trafficking in marijuana.Sherwood appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that Idaho Code section 49-456 only applies to vehicles registered in Idaho and that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss without evaluating the factors in Idaho Criminal Rule 28. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the plain language of Idaho Code section 49-456 applies to all vehicles driven in Idaho, regardless of where they are registered, and affirmed the district court's denial of Sherwood's motion to suppress. The court also held that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the delay in Sherwood's trial, affirming the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Sherwood's judgment of conviction. View "State v. Sherwood" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal
Sockwell v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
In March 1988, Isaiah Harris, a sheriff in Montgomery County, Alabama, was killed. His wife, Louise, was having an affair and conspired with her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to have Harris killed for insurance money. McCarter recruited Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood to carry out the murder. Sockwell was later convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced to death.Sockwell appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude Black jurors in a discriminatory manner, violating Batson v. Kentucky. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) affirmed his conviction, finding no clear error in the trial court’s denial of the Batson challenge. The Alabama Supreme Court also affirmed, stating that the prosecutor’s identification of a juror’s race was merely descriptive and not a race-based reason for the strike.Sockwell then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which was denied. The district court found the strike of a Black juror, Eric Davis, problematic but concluded that the Alabama Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Batson. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on the Batson issue, and Sockwell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Alabama Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law by not properly considering all relevant circumstances under Batson’s third step. The court found that the prosecutor’s history of Batson violations, statistical evidence of disproportionate strikes against Black jurors, and the comparison of Davis to similarly situated white jurors indicated purposeful discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and directed it to issue a writ of habeas corpus, allowing Alabama the right to retry Sockwell. View "Sockwell v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law
Commonwealth v. Diaz
The defendant, Manuel Diaz, was subjected to an unlawful traffic stop by Officer Mark Shlosser of the Wilbraham police department. Upon being stopped, Diaz fled in his car, lost control, and then fled on foot into the woods, where drugs were later found along his path. Diaz was charged with trafficking cocaine, and his motion to suppress the drugs and evidence of identity obtained from his car was denied.In the Superior Court, Diaz's motion to suppress was initially denied despite the judge finding the stop unjustified under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment. The judge concluded that Diaz's flight was an independent intervening act, triggering the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Diaz's motion for reconsideration was also denied after a Long hearing, where the judge reaffirmed that the attenuation exception applied.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the attenuation exception did not apply to either the art. 14 violation or the equal protection violation under arts. 1 and 10. The court found that the temporal proximity between the stop and Diaz's flight, the lack of credible justification for the stop, and the inherently flagrant nature of racially selective traffic enforcement weighed against attenuation. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's denial of Diaz's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "Commonwealth v. Diaz" on Justia Law
People v. Bray
Daniel Bray pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to two years of formal probation with several conditions, including restrictions on Internet use, dating or socializing with individuals who have custody of minors, and prohibitions on possessing or frequenting places with pornography. Bray challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.The Santa Clara County Superior Court imposed these conditions, and Bray objected to the conditions regarding Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography. The trial court overruled his objections, finding the conditions reasonable and related to the offense. Bray then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the Internet use restriction was overbroad, as it unduly burdened Bray's ability to perform daily tasks and maintain employment. The court also found the condition on dating and socializing overbroad, as it infringed on Bray's right to freedom of association without being closely tailored to the goal of protecting minors. Additionally, the court agreed with the Attorney General's concession that the conditions regarding pornography were unconstitutionally vague and needed modification.The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to strike or modify the conditions on Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography to ensure they are narrowly tailored and specific. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Bray" on Justia Law
People v. Miller
Armani Miller appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019, and subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life.The Alameda County Superior Court denied Miller's petition, finding he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the felony-murder rule was amended, and he could not show he could not be convicted of murder due to changes effective January 1, 2019.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief because the amended information against him was filed after the felony-murder rule was amended by Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, the prosecution was precluded from proceeding under the old, invalid theory of felony murder. The court concluded that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), as the charging document did not allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder that imputed malice based solely on his participation in the crime. The order denying Miller's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law
Posted in:
California Courts of Appeal, Criminal Law
Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.
Martin Flanagan, a former employee of Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against his former employer. He alleged that Fresenius engaged in a fraudulent kickback scheme to induce referrals to its dialysis clinics, violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Flanagan claimed that Fresenius offered below-cost contracts to hospitals, overcompensated medical directors, and provided other benefits to secure patient referrals, which were then billed to Medicare and Medicaid.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland initially handled the case, which was later transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed Flanagan's complaint for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the amended complaint did not adequately allege specific false claims or provide representative examples. Additionally, the court ruled that some of Flanagan's claims were barred by the FCA's public-disclosure and first-to-file rules. The district court also denied Flanagan's motion to amend his complaint, citing undue delay and potential prejudice to Fresenius.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Flanagan failed to plead the alleged fraud with the required particularity. The appellate court also upheld the denial of the motion to amend, noting that Flanagan had ample time to address the deficiencies in his complaint but failed to do so. The First Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law
United States v. Edwards
Shadon Edwards was suspected of being a high-level organizer in a drug-trafficking organization in South Florida. After obtaining an arrest warrant, law enforcement officials observed Edwards driving, followed him, and arrested him. A search incident to his arrest revealed a loaded Glock 43 nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. Edwards was indicted for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the gun and ammunition, which the district court denied. Edwards then pleaded guilty without expressly preserving or waiving his right to appeal.The district court for the Southern District of Florida accepted Edwards's guilty plea and sentenced him to 180 months in prison, applying an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior convictions. Edwards did not object to the ACCA enhancement at sentencing. He later sought to appeal the denial of his suppression motion and the ACCA enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not informed that he would waive his right to appeal the suppression motion. The court found no plain error, noting that there was no indication during the plea hearing that Edwards misunderstood the consequences of his plea. Edwards also contended that the ACCA enhancement was improper because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, as required by Erlinger v. United States. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that a jury would have found the offenses occurred on the same occasion, thus not meeting the plain-error standard.Lastly, Edwards challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause. The court reaffirmed its precedent that § 922(g) is constitutional both facially and as applied, given the firearm and ammunition had moved in interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law
State v. Thomas
The applicant was convicted of second-degree murder by a Lafourche Parish jury for the shooting death of Deeric Raymond during a confrontation outside the applicant’s home. The incident occurred when Deeric and his brother Javonnie arrived to collect a debt and exchange custody of a child. A physical altercation ensued, resulting in Deeric’s death from a gunshot wound. The central issue at trial was whether the applicant acted in self-defense or was the initial aggressor. The jury rejected the self-defense claim and found the applicant guilty.The trial court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of the self-defense claim. The applicant then filed for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief, stating no new evidence was presented that would have changed the jury’s verdict. The Court of Appeal denied writs without explanation, leading the applicant to seek review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana found merit in some of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court determined that the applicant’s trial attorney failed to use available evidence to impeach the testimony of Javonnie, did not consult a forensic expert, and advised the applicant not to testify. These errors were deemed unreasonable and prejudicial, undermining confidence in the trial’s outcome. The court held that the applicant’s counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for these errors. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law
Williams v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections
Gerald Williams, an inmate in Louisiana, filed a suit for judicial review after the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole. Williams was originally convicted of armed robbery in 1985 and sentenced to 99 years without parole. After serving 28 years, he was released on parole in 2013. In 2021, Williams was arrested for aggravated assault, pleaded guilty to simple assault, and subsequently had his parole revoked. He later claimed his waivers of the revocation hearings were not knowing and voluntary and argued that his parole violation should be considered a "technical violation."The district court dismissed Williams' suit with prejudice, based on a recommendation from a commissioner, for failure to state a claim and because it was perempted under La. R.S. 15:574.11(D). The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and addressed three main issues: whether Williams' petition was perempted, whether his procedural due process rights were violated, and whether his parole violation could be classified as a "technical violation." The court found that Williams' petition was perempted as it was filed 507 days after the parole revocation, well beyond the 90-day period allowed by law. The court also determined that Williams' waiver of his revocation hearings was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as he had signed and acknowledged the waiver in writing. Lastly, the court held that Williams' parole violation could not be classified as a "technical violation" due to his original conviction for a violent crime and his guilty plea to an intentional misdemeanor directly affecting a person.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision to dismiss Williams' petition with prejudice. View "Williams v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Louisiana Supreme Court
In re D.D.
D.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree rape at the age of fourteen and was committed to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Upon release, he was required to register as a sex offender. D.D. challenged the constitutionality of this registration requirement, arguing it violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The juvenile court denied his motion.D.D. appealed to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, which affirmed both the adjudication and the denial of his constitutional claims. D.D. then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which granted his writ application.The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the sex offender registration requirement for juveniles does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as it is a civil regulatory measure intended to protect public safety rather than a punitive action. The court also found that the registration requirement does not implicate the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial, as juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from adult criminal trials and do not require a jury trial for due process. The court affirmed D.D.'s adjudication and the denial of his motion to declare the registration requirement unconstitutional. View "In re D.D." on Justia Law