Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Caleb Adams in the bedroom of Wendy Hicks on June 13, 2017. Adams was shot twice in the back from more than six inches away, and evidence at the scene suggested he was attempting to leave when shot. Hicks was the only armed individual present. During her interactions with law enforcement and at trial, Hicks provided multiple, inconsistent accounts of the events leading up to the shooting. She claimed Adams was the aggressor and that a struggle over her phone and the gun occurred, but the crime scene and her physical condition did not show signs supporting her account of a violent struggle.After Hicks was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in Randolph County Superior Court, she was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, she argued, among other issues, that the trial court erred in admitting unredacted phone-extraction reports (Exhibits 174 and 175) into evidence without objection or limiting instruction. The Court of Appeals initially reversed her conviction on a different issue, but after remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding plain error in the admission of the phone-extraction exhibits.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that Hicks had not met her burden to show that the admission of the phone-extraction reports constituted plain error. Applying the standard from State v. Lawrence, the Court found the remaining evidence of lack of justifiable self-defense to be substantial, and determined it was not probable the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the disputed evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Julie Ann Mincey operated a travel agency in New Bern, North Carolina, where she defrauded elderly clients by collecting payments for elaborate travel packages that she failed to deliver, resulting in financial losses exceeding $100,000. After her conduct was discovered, a grand jury indicted her on multiple felony charges—specifically, fourteen counts of embezzlement, two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, and for attaining habitual felon status based on prior Colorado felony convictions. At her trial in Superior Court, Craven County, several charges were dismissed, and a jury convicted her on nine counts of embezzlement and one count of obtaining property by false pretenses. Ms. Mincey admitted to habitual felon status, and the trial court conducted a colloquy to confirm her understanding of the plea’s consequences before accepting her guilty plea.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed Ms. Mincey’s appeal after she argued that the trial court failed to determine an adequate factual basis for her habitual felon guilty plea, particularly because one predicate offense had been reclassified as a misdemeanor in Colorado after her conviction. The Court of Appeals concluded that Ms. Mincey had a right to appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a2)(3) and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding the plea was supported by sufficient factual basis. A dissenting judge disagreed on the right to appeal and would have preferred granting certiorari to review the merits.The Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that Ms. Mincey did not have a statutory right to appeal her guilty plea to attaining habitual felon status. The court held that, absent certain exceptions, defendants who plead guilty may only seek appellate review through a writ of certiorari, which was not properly issued here. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case. View "State v. Mincey" on Justia Law

After observing a parked vehicle with a visible handgun in the driver’s door pocket in downtown Greensboro, law enforcement officers conducted surveillance. When four individuals entered the car and departed quickly, officers followed and initiated a traffic stop after pacing the vehicle at ten miles per hour over the speed limit. During the stop, officers noticed an odor of burnt marijuana and a strong, freshly sprayed perfume they identified as a cover scent. The officers conducted background checks revealing that one backseat passenger had previous drug distribution convictions and the other, Tyron Lamont Dobson, had a prior felony conviction and pending violent felony and firearm charges. A search of Dobson’s person and the vehicle led to the discovery of marijuana and a handgun.The Superior Court in Guilford County denied Dobson’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the traffic violation, marijuana odor, the driver's statements about possible marijuana exposure, and the presence of a cover scent provided probable cause for the search. After consulting with counsel, Dobson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the detection of both marijuana odor and a cover scent together supported probable cause.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the “totality of the circumstances” test and instead created a “double odor” rule. The Supreme Court held that the officers relied on more than just the two odors, including the traffic violation and criminal backgrounds. The Court affirmed that, under the totality of the circumstances, the search was supported by probable cause and was objectively reasonable, thus affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Dobson" on Justia Law

The case concerns an altercation between Blaine Dale Hague and Thomas “Tommy” Cass, culminating in Hague fatally shooting Cass in a cornfield where Cass and others were hunting doves. Hague, who operated a nearby horse rescue farm, had previously interacted with Cass regarding hunting and firearm use near his property. On the day in question, Hague approached the hunting party after hearing gunshots and finding his horses spooked. An argument ensued with Cass, who pushed Hague to the ground. Hague, claiming to fear for his life due to Cass’s actions and his knowledge of Cass’s felony status and history of carrying firearms, shot Cass. At trial, Hague asserted self-defense and sought to introduce evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions to support the reasonableness of his fear.The Superior Court of Iredell County, presided over by Judge David L. Hall, excluded evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions under Rules 404(a)(2) and 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and also redacted related statements from Hague’s 911 call. The jury found Hague guilty of first-degree murder. Hague appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by excluding the prior convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals also found error in the trial court’s denial of Hague’s motion to dismiss but did not find error in the omission of a stand-your-ground jury instruction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. It held that the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding evidence of Cass’s prior felony convictions under Rule 404(b), as this evidence was relevant to Hague’s state of mind and the reasonableness of his self-defense claim. The court remanded the case for a new trial, dismissed discretionary review of the jury instruction issue, and did not address the motion to dismiss. The court’s disposition was to modify and affirm the appellate decision. View "State v. Hague" on Justia Law

After observing a traffic violation, a sheriff’s deputy attempted to stop a driver who did not immediately pull over, instead proceeding to an apartment complex known for high criminal activity. The deputy observed the driver, who had prior narcotics and weapons convictions, behaving evasively and refusing to answer questions. Both the initial deputy and another responding officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. During a frisk for weapons, an officer found what was believed to be a marijuana blunt in the driver’s pocket; the driver did not claim it was legal hemp. A subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle uncovered a firearm. The driver was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a stolen firearm.In the Superior Court of Forsyth County, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the searches, arguing that the odor and sight of marijuana could not, in light of the legalization of industrial hemp, provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The trial court denied the motion, citing the driver’s failure to stop, the high-crime location, prior convictions, evasive conduct, and the odor of marijuana as sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon but not guilty of possessing a stolen firearm.The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and that the defendant received a fair trial. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that under the totality of the circumstances—including but not limited to the odor of marijuana—officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant and probable cause to search the car. The odor of marijuana remains a relevant factor despite the existence of legal hemp. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed. View "State v. Rowdy" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on several felony charges, including attempted murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of assault by strangulation. The charges stemmed from an incident in which the defendant assaulted his spouse, holding her at gunpoint, dragging her, choking her multiple times, and engaging in forcible intercourse. During the trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss four charges, but specifically stated that he could not move to dismiss the assault by strangulation charges, citing sufficient evidence for those counts. When the trial court questioned the distinction between the two strangulation counts, defense counsel left the matter to the court’s discretion without making a motion to dismiss.Following trial in the Superior Court of Haywood County, the jury found the defendant guilty on all charges except attempted murder. He was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for each conviction. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues, including the sufficiency of evidence supporting the two assault by strangulation charges. The North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that the issue was preserved for appellate review under State v. Golder and found sufficient evidence to support submitting both strangulation charges to the jury. One judge dissented, arguing insufficient evidence for two distinct offenses.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the sufficiency issue was properly preserved under Rule 10(a)(3) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court held that preservation of a sufficiency argument is offense specific and requires a motion to dismiss for each charge at trial. Because the defendant did not move to dismiss either assault by strangulation count, the issue was not preserved. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part the Court of Appeals’ decision, concluding that the appellate court erred in reaching the merits of the sufficiency claim for the strangulation charges. View "State v. Tadlock" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon after an incident in which he confronted his former girlfriend and her uncle, brandished a firearm, struck his former girlfriend with the weapon, and fired several shots in their direction, though no one was injured. The defendant, his attorney, and the State entered into written stipulations acknowledging the defendant’s prior felony conviction and that he possessed a firearm during the incident. Both stipulations were discussed and consented to by the defendant in open court through separate colloquies with the trial judge.A jury in Superior Court, Durham County, found the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and two counts of misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms. On appeal, the defendant argued that his counsel’s closing argument included an implicit admission of guilt to the firearm charge without his knowing consent, which he claimed was per se prejudicial under State v. Harbison and State v. McAllister. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, found the record did not establish whether the defendant knowingly consented to his attorney’s admission of guilt and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the defendant expressly consented on the record to the stipulations concerning his prior felony and firearm possession, following thorough colloquies. The Court further found that defense counsel’s actions did not exceed the scope of those stipulations nor did counsel explicitly or implicitly concede guilt beyond what the defendant had authorized. Therefore, the per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule from Harbison and McAllister was not triggered. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "State v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

Saul Valenciana was charged with premeditated first-degree murder, burglary, and theft after the killing of Brent Boone. The motive involved Boone’s prior sexual exploitation of Valenciana’s girlfriend, Tehya Turner, and possession of a sex tape. On Thanksgiving 2022, after consuming drugs and alcohol, Valenciana and Turner visited Boone’s house. During a confrontation in Turner’s car, Valenciana slit Boone’s throat and stabbed him multiple times, then disposed of the body and attempted to conceal evidence. Both defendants later broke into Boone’s home, and Turner provided key statements to police after her arrest. Valenciana was ultimately apprehended following a standoff.The case was tried in the Sedgwick District Court. At trial, the district judge denied Valenciana’s request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, finding insufficient legal provocation. The court also gave a modified premeditation instruction incorporating elements from Kansas precedent but omitted critical clarifying language. After closing arguments, Valenciana moved for a mistrial, alleging prosecutorial error regarding references to “heat of passion,” but this motion was denied. The jury convicted Valenciana on all charges, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, plus additional terms for burglary and theft. His criminal history score included a reckless criminal threat conviction.Upon direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas found that the district court’s premeditation instruction was erroneous for failing to include the full clarifying language required by prior cases, but ruled the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of premeditation. The court affirmed the denial of the voluntary manslaughter instruction, finding the provocation insufficient under an objective legal standard. It also held there was no prosecutorial error or abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial. However, the Supreme Court vacated the sentencing due to the improper inclusion of a reckless criminal threat conviction in the criminal history score and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Valenciana " on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was in a troubled relationship with the mother of his children. Following threats and persistent unwanted communication, the woman obtained a temporary, and later a final, protection from stalking order (PFS) against him. The defendant continued to send messages referencing her, which were relayed by his mother to the protected party. The State charged him with violating a protection from abuse order (PFA) under a specific statutory subsection that applies to PFA orders, not PFS orders. The complaint and amended complaint consistently referred to the violation as relating to a PFA order, though all the relevant court orders in the case were PFS orders.The Marion District Court held a bench trial, at which the judge stated that the defendant had violated the PFS order and found him guilty, but the journal entry recorded the conviction as a violation of a PFA order. The defendant appealed, arguing that he could not be convicted of violating a PFA order when no such order existed. The Kansas Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the State had charged him with violating a PFA order but proved only a violation of a PFS order, and thus reversed the conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that a defendant can only be convicted of a crime as charged in the charging document, which in this case alleged violation of a PFA order. Because the evidence and findings pertained exclusively to a PFS order, and no PFA order existed, the conviction could not stand. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence, holding that a conviction for a crime not charged must be reversed. View "State v. Boese " on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident at a convenience store in Guthrie Center, Iowa, where Timothy Hall Jr. was involved in a verbal altercation with the store manager, Joshua Vanhorn. On Hall’s second visit to the store in as many days, Vanhorn approached Hall and asked him to leave. Instead of complying, Hall remained near Vanhorn, cursed at him, and threatened to “bust [his] lip” before exiting the store. As a result, Hall was charged with harassment in the second degree, and a temporary no-contact order was issued to protect Vanhorn.After a bench trial in the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Hall was convicted of harassment in the second degree. The court sentenced Hall to a suspended one-year jail term with probation and incorporated compliance with a no-contact order as a condition of probation. Immediately following sentencing, the judge issued a new, five-year no-contact order prohibiting Hall from any form of contact with Vanhorn.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, Hall argued that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence because he did not initiate the encounter with Vanhorn, and further contended that the harassment conviction alone did not justify the five-year no-contact order. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The court held that the harassment statute does not require the defendant to initiate contact, only that the defendant purposefully have personal contact and make a threat with intent to threaten, intimidate, or alarm. Regarding the no-contact order, the court found that, under Iowa Code section 664A.5, a conviction for harassment authorizes the sentencing court to issue a five-year no-contact order without additional fact-finding or explanation. The judgment and no-contact order were affirmed. View "State of Iowa v. Hall" on Justia Law