Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Christopher Arthur was investigated after founding a business that sold military gear and later provided training and manuals on tactics including the use of explosives. The FBI became involved after a customer, Joshua Blessed, died in a shootout and was found to possess pipe bombs and Arthur’s manuals. Subsequently, an undercover informant, “Buckshot,” sought training from Arthur, who instructed him on fortifying his home and making explosive devices, knowing Buckshot claimed he wanted to use such tactics against federal agents. Arthur was arrested in January 2022 and a search of his home revealed illegal firearms and improvised explosives.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina indicted Arthur under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) for teaching explosives use with knowledge of criminal intent, and on additional firearms and explosives charges. Arthur moved to dismiss the primary count, arguing the statute was facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding the statute’s knowledge requirement limited its scope to conduct integral to criminal acts, not protected speech. After a three-day trial, the jury found Arthur guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the court applied the U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, increasing his guidelines range, and sentenced Arthur to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) is not unconstitutionally overbroad, concluding that the statute targets speech integral to criminal conduct and does not criminalize a substantial amount of protected expressive activity. The Fourth Circuit also found no reversible error in applying the terrorism enhancement, and determined any alleged guidelines error was harmless given the district court’s alternative sentencing rationale. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Arthur" on Justia Law

In June 2021, Ulysses Rubalcava was discovered by his then-wife in the act of sexually abusing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. A search of Rubalcava’s cellphone revealed numerous images and videos documenting his sexual abuse of both his eight-year-old daughter and his stepdaughter. Both children reported that the abuse had occurred over several years and involved physical and psychological harm, including being forced to watch pornographic videos and recordings of their own abuse. Law enforcement found nearly two hundred images and one video on Rubalcava’s devices that depicted these acts.Rubalcava was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on one count of possessing child pornography and two counts of sexual exploitation of children. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an offense level of 50, which was reduced to 43 under the sentencing guidelines. With a criminal history category of I, Rubalcava faced a guidelines range of life imprisonment, capped by statutory maximums. The report also detailed his financial resources, including a residence, a vehicle, and a special needs trust.The district court sentenced Rubalcava to concurrent prison terms of 240 and 360 months, imposed restitution of $10,000, and assessed $45,300 in criminal monetary penalties, including a $30,000 special assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act. Rubalcava appealed, challenging the restitution order, the AVAA assessment, several sentencing enhancements, and the guidelines calculation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the restitution award was supported by reasonable evidence, the AVAA assessment properly considered Rubalcava’s financial resources including his home and trust, and the sentencing enhancements and guidelines calculation were correctly applied or, alternatively, any error was harmless given the statutory maximums. View "USA v. Rubalcava" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after a police chase in which he discarded a loaded firearm in a residential area. Prior to this incident, law enforcement had evidence linking the same firearm to a gang-related murder occurring about two weeks earlier. Cell phone records, surveillance footage, and the defendant’s online activity connected him to other gang members and to the murder scene. The firearm discarded during the police chase was later found to have been used in that murder.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant’s presentence investigation report initially recommended a base offense level based solely on the firearm possession charge. However, after the government presented evidence tying him to the earlier murder, it sought to apply the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ cross-reference for homicide, leading to a much higher base offense level. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was culpable in the murder and applied both the murder cross-reference and a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment resulting from his act of tossing the loaded gun during his flight. The court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 15 years.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and for clear error its factual findings. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the homicide cross-reference and the reckless endangerment enhancement, and found the sentence not substantively unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v Taylor" on Justia Law

Two individuals from Colorado, involved in drug trafficking, drew law enforcement attention while driving through South Dakota. After a high-speed chase ended on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, their vehicle ran low on gas. When they stopped, an FBI victim specialist, returning from a work assignment in an official vehicle, stopped to offer assistance. The defendants carjacked him at gunpoint, forced him into the backseat, and drove to a gas station. The victim escaped, and the defendants later abandoned the stolen vehicle. Both men were subsequently arrested in Colorado. The government brought multiple charges, including kidnapping a federal officer, carjacking, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and illegal firearm possession.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota oversaw their joint trial. The court denied Morales’s motions to sever the trials and to obtain the victim’s medical records. It allowed limited portions of a codefendant’s confession and evidence of other drug activity, some as intrinsic and some as extrinsic under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Both defendants were convicted on all counts by a jury and received lengthy sentences. The district court applied enhancements and upward variances based on the facts found at sentencing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed several trial and sentencing issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance or in admitting the challenged evidence. The court found that any error in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the confession did not affect the outcome. The court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, including the statutory elements of kidnapping a federal officer and using a firearm. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentences, finding no clear or obvious error with the enhancements or the upward variance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgments. View "United States v. Alvarez-Sorto" on Justia Law

The case concerns a federal prisoner who was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty to all counts. In preparing for sentencing, the presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender, which increased his guideline sentencing range. At sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence below the career-offender guideline range—414 months in total, including a mandatory minimum of 384 months for the firearm offenses.After his conviction, the defendant sought to vacate his sentence in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender classification. The district court found that the presentence report had mistakenly listed his robbery offenses as controlled substance offenses, but determined that, at the time, binding precedent permitted Hobbs Act robbery to be used as a predicate for the career-offender enhancement. The court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate later precedent, and also found that the defendant had not suffered prejudice because an objection would have been overruled. The district court denied the motion and a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the ineffective assistance issue. Reviewing the case, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant could not show prejudice. The court found that the sentencing judge had imposed a sentence based on factors independent of the erroneous guideline calculation, and explained his reasoning in detail. Because there was no reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different absent the alleged error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate. View "Buckner v. USA" on Justia Law

In 2009, an individual was convicted of receiving child pornography and sentenced to 210 months in prison, followed by a life term of supervised release with specified conditions. After modifications to these conditions, the individual began serving supervised release. In October 2024, a probation officer alleged violations of the release conditions, to which the individual admitted certain allegations. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas revoked supervised release, imposed a 36-month prison term, and reimposed a life term of supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the court orally imposed “the same conditions of release previously imposed and not yet completed.” However, the written judgment incorporated additional discretionary conditions by reference to a district-wide standing order, including a new requirement that the defendant obtain full-time employment of at least thirty hours per week.The defendant appealed the new, unpronounced discretionary conditions in the written judgment that were not mentioned during the oral pronouncement at sentencing. Both parties agreed that the new full-time employment requirement imposed a greater burden than the prior conditions and conflicted with what was orally pronounced, but disagreed on whether duplicative conditions also needed to be removed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that any discretionary condition in a written judgment that conflicts with the oral pronouncement at sentencing must be excised on remand. The court found that the full-time employment requirement conflicted with the oral pronouncement and must be deleted. However, duplicative discretionary conditions that did not broaden the restrictions or requirements could be preserved. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated part of the sentence and remanded the case, instructing the district court to amend the written judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement. View "United States v. Currier" on Justia Law

In this case, a defendant was charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault, all involving minor victims. The events took place in a home where the defendant lived with his partner and her family. The allegations involved three minors: A.M., K.E., and K.K., who reported inappropriate sexual contact by the defendant on different occasions between 2015 and 2018. K.K., the youngest, disclosed the abuse to her parents shortly after spending the night at the defendant’s home, but during trial, she could not recall the events or her prior statements. The prosecution introduced K.K.’s earlier statements to her parents and a forensic interviewer, which described specific acts of sexual assault.The Eighth Judicial District Court, presiding over Cascade County, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss one count (involving K.K.), finding that there was sufficient corroborative evidence to support K.K.’s prior inconsistent statements. The corroborative evidence included the immediate and distressed reaction of K.K.’s parents, the timing of K.K.’s disclosures, and the child’s demeanor in her forensic interview. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. Nearly a year and a half later, the defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that irregularities in the jury selection process violated Montana law. The District Court denied this motion as untimely and found no evidence that the jury was not a fair cross-section of the community or that the selection process had affected the trial’s fairness.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that reliable, independent corroborative evidence supported K.K.’s prior inconsistent statements, satisfying the evidentiary requirements. The Court also held that technical violations in the jury selection process did not render the trial unfair or the jury unrepresentative. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s rulings and the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. French" on Justia Law

A 45-year-old man encountered a 15-year-old girl, T.K., and her friends at a house party in Butte, Montana. Over two occasions, he purchased alcohol for them. On the night in question, after drinking heavily, T.K. and another friend asked the man for a ride to get more alcohol. He drove them to a gas station, bought whiskey, and later drove them back to Butte. T.K. was heavily intoxicated and, after a series of events including sexual activity in the car involving the man and another adult, T.K. was ultimately taken by the man to his hotel. Surveillance footage showed him carrying an unconscious and limp T.K. into the hotel. She woke later, confused, missing clothes, and feeling sore. A hospital exam found injuries and DNA matching the man. T.K. was underage and highly intoxicated.The State of Montana charged the man with sexual intercourse without consent. At trial in the Second Judicial District Court in Butte-Silver Bow County, the prosecution presented evidence of T.K.’s incapacity due to age and intoxication. The jury was given a stipulation regarding the mental state required (“knowingly”) that used an incorrect, result-based definition. The jury returned a guilty verdict, specifically finding that the man was guilty because T.K. was under 16 and because she was incapacitated.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant argued the erroneous jury instruction violated his rights and that his counsel was ineffective for agreeing to it. The Court held that, although the instruction was incorrect, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated the defendant’s awareness of T.K.’s incapacity. Therefore, he was not prejudiced by the error. The Court declined to exercise plain error review and also rejected the ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Davisson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including Incest, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, and sixteen counts of Sexual Abuse of Children. He entered a binding plea agreement to plead guilty to four counts of Sexual Abuse of Children in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a net sentence of forty years, with twenty suspended. At the plea hearing, the defendant affirmed he understood the agreement, had discussed it with counsel, and was entering his plea voluntarily without coercion. Several weeks later, he sent communications to the court and the State, asserting that his prior counsel had pressured him into accepting the plea.Following these communications, attorney McKittrick formally replaced attorney Martin as defense counsel. The Eighth Judicial District Court held a hearing to address the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel, applying the standards from State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34. At the hearing, the defendant claimed he had been pressured by his previous attorney, referencing conversations about sentencing risks. McKittrick, present during those discussions, described them as a standard risk-versus-reward analysis, not coercion. The District Court found no actual conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication warranting substitution and denied the request.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying substitution of counsel. Applying the abuse of discretion standard and reviewing the procedures and analysis used below, the Supreme Court found the District Court conducted an adequate inquiry and properly applied settled law. The main holding is that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel because the concerns raised did not amount to an actual conflict, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Carlin" on Justia Law

Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez were indicted and convicted for their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of fentanyl in the Orlando area. Both played minor roles but were responsible for distributing several kilograms of fentanyl, which subjected them to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison under federal law. After pleading guilty, both defendants sought sentences below the statutory minimum, citing general sentencing factors and their cooperation with authorities.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida received government motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 to reduce the sentences based on substantial assistance provided by Perez and Rivera Rodriguez. The government requested modest reductions limited to the assistance factors, but the district court granted further reductions based on the general sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), ultimately sentencing Perez to 66 months and Rivera Rodriguez to 60 months in prison. The government appealed, arguing the reductions should have been based solely on assistance-related considerations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the legality of the sentences de novo. The court held that departures from statutory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) must be based exclusively on substantial-assistance factors, not on the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a). The court found that the district court exceeded its authority by considering non-assistance factors in its downward departures. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated both sentences and remanded the cases with instructions to resentence the defendants in accordance with its opinion, limiting any downward departure to substantial assistance only. View "USA v. Perez" on Justia Law