Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jerron Williams was involved in an altercation with a United States Postal Service letter carrier in Gary, Indiana. After a brief dispute, Williams fired several shots into the carrier's vehicle as she attempted to leave, causing her physical injuries. A grand jury indicted Williams on three counts: assaulting a federal employee with a deadly weapon causing bodily injury, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Williams entered into a plea agreement, admitting guilt to the first two counts and waiving his right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, held a change of plea hearing where the magistrate judge explained the charges and their elements. Williams, with his attorney’s agreement, confirmed his understanding and acceptance of the facts and the charges. Prior to sentencing, Williams changed attorneys and sought to withdraw his plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion to withdraw the plea, and sentenced Williams to 153 months in prison.On appeal, Williams argued for the first time that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid because the predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) was not a “crime of violence.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case for plain error and determined that Williams had waived this argument multiple times: by pleading guilty, by waiving his right to appeal, and by not raising the argument in his motion to withdraw the plea. The court also found that the magistrate judge properly explained the charges and ensured Williams’s understanding. As a result, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. View "USA v JWilliams" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was stopped by law enforcement officers in Seward County, Nebraska, after officers observed his vehicle turn without signaling and swerve as it drove. The officers approached the vehicle and observed signs of intoxication, including the smell of alcohol and the defendant’s slurred speech. The defendant admitted to drinking and was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and transported to the county detention center, where he submitted to a breath test. His blood alcohol content was measured at .131 grams per 210 liters of breath. After the breath test, an officer informed the defendant, incorrectly, that he could seek an independent chemical test only after being released, when in fact he had the statutory right to do so while still in custody.The County Court for Seward County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test results, finding that the officers had probable cause to stop the vehicle based on a traffic violation and did not hamper or prevent the defendant from obtaining an independent test. A bench trial resulted in a conviction for DUI and an open container violation. Upon appeal, the District Court for Seward County affirmed, concluding that the officer’s incorrect statement did not amount to a refusal or denial of the defendant’s statutory right to an independent test.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the officer’s mistaken or incomplete advisement regarding the timing of the independent test did not constitute a refusal to permit such a test under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,199. The court found the officers had probable cause for the initial stop, and the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights were not violated. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal stabbing involving a 14-year-old, Damore, who was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. The incident began with an altercation between two groups of teenagers at a convenience store in Lincoln, Nebraska, which escalated when the victim’s vehicle was damaged. The victim’s mother went to Damore’s residence to address the damage, leading to a confrontation. The victim arrived, a physical altercation ensued, and Damore stabbed the victim twice, resulting in the victim’s death. Damore was subsequently charged and sought to have his case transferred from district court to juvenile court.After Damore was bound over to the District Court for Lancaster County, he filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing, considering testimony from various witnesses and extensive documentary evidence. The district court made specific findings and evaluated each statutory factor required by Nebraska law, ultimately finding that most factors supported retaining the case in district court and denying the motion to transfer. Damore timely appealed.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed, concluding that the lower court’s findings and ultimate decision were not clearly untenable. Damore then sought further review, arguing that the Court of Appeals misstated and misapplied the abuse of discretion standard, and incorrectly reviewed the case.The Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed Damore’s arguments, clarified the abuse of discretion standard, and explained that the Court of Appeals had properly applied the standard. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not misstate or misapply the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed its decision, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Damore’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. View "State v. Damore" on Justia Law

The case involves Stephanie Vance, who was convicted of first-degree murder after the shooting death of her husband, Christopher Bland, in their Philadelphia, Mississippi residence. Bland called 911 stating he had been shot, and when officers arrived, they found him unresponsive with a gunshot wound to the chest. Vance claimed the shooting was accidental, occurring when Bland grabbed her arm as she was leaving with her gun to go to a women’s shelter. Physical evidence included gunshot residue on Vance’s hands and conflicting accounts about whether the gun was holstered. The autopsy showed no evidence of close-range discharge.The Neshoba County Circuit Court presided over the jury trial and found Vance guilty of first-degree murder. Vance appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing a culpable-negligence-manslaughter instruction, excluding lay-opinion testimony about abuse, and that the evidence was insufficient for a murder conviction. She also asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to introduce video evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It found that Vance was procedurally barred from challenging the manslaughter instruction due to lack of objection at trial, and the instruction was warranted based on the evidence. The exclusion of the lay-opinion testimony was affirmed, as the witness lacked first-hand knowledge of the events at the time of the shooting. The Court determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude deliberate design, and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of evidence. The ineffective assistance claim regarding the video was dismissed without prejudice due to insufficient record. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction for first-degree murder. View "Vance v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with possessing a firearm after having been convicted of felonies, including drug trafficking and DUI. At the time he allegedly possessed the firearm, he was on supervised release for the DUI offense. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by felons. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional on multiple grounds. After the district court denied his motion, he pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting his constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1). Following his guilty plea, the defendant appealed, raising several arguments: that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment (both facially and as applied), violated Equal Protection, exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and was unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed all arguments except the vagueness challenge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved vagueness challenge de novo. The court held that § 922(g)(1) is not void for vagueness, emphasizing that the statute clearly defines the prohibited conduct—possession of a firearm by a felon. The court further held that recent developments in Second Amendment jurisprudence, including New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Diaz, did not render the statute vague in the defendant’s case, as these precedents did not affect the clarity of the statutory language or create confusion for ordinary persons. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Landrum" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon after allegedly committing a series of violent, racially motivated attacks using a metal pipe. The defendant, who has a documented history of serious mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment, moved for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The motion was supported by a psychological report indicating that the defendant’s mental disorder was treatable and played a significant role in the offenses, but the expert’s opinion that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety was conditioned on his compliance with treatment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion for diversion, ordering the defendant into a community-based mental health program with regular medication, monitoring, and court oversight. The People, represented by the district attorney, opposed the diversion and subsequently petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. They argued that no evidence demonstrated the defendant would actually comply with treatment if released into the community, and thus, there was insufficient support for the trial court’s implied finding that he would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the record and found that there was no express or substantial evidence supporting the trial court's implicit determination that the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community. The appellate court held that, where there is a history of noncompliance with treatment and no evidence of likely future compliance, a court abuses its discretion in granting diversion. Accordingly, the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order granting mental health diversion and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Police officers in Rock Island, Illinois, attempted to stop an unregistered minivan driven by Atoris Slater in July 2020. Slater fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase that ended when they discontinued pursuit after he nearly caused a collision. Slater abandoned the minivan and tried to hide in a dumpster but was found shortly after. Police searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cannabis edibles. Upon his arrest and transport to jail, Slater attempted to discard a bag containing crack cocaine. He was indicted for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Slater pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement, and the presentence report (PSR) initially calculated his sentencing range using a 1:1 drug-conversion ratio for marijuana and cannabis edibles. The government did not object to the PSR within the standard 14-day period. On the eve of sentencing, the prosecutor learned that the edibles contained THC, which required a higher 1:167 conversion ratio, and raised a late objection. The judge granted a continuance, allowed for lab testing, and ultimately adopted the new calculations, resulting in a higher sentencing range. Slater did not renew his objection to the revised PSR and was sentenced below the revised Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district judge properly allowed the government’s untimely objection to the PSR and whether the higher THC conversion ratio applied. The Seventh Circuit held that the district judge did not abuse her discretion by permitting the late objection for good cause. The court also found that Slater had waived any challenge to the THC ratio by affirmatively accepting the revised PSR at sentencing. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Slater" on Justia Law

A noncitizen and lawful permanent resident was arrested in Virginia after participating in a cocaine transaction observed and recorded by law enforcement. He was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. Through retained counsel, he negotiated a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, avoiding a mandatory minimum sentence, while the government dropped the other charge. The final agreement omitted certain adverse immigration provisions, but included an acknowledgment that he wished to plead guilty regardless of immigration consequences, including potential automatic removal.After sentencing, the defendant learned he would be subject to mandatory deportation. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that his guilty plea would result in mandatory deportation. The district court initially denied relief, finding he had not shown prejudice, relying on his plea agreement’s language. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he had demonstrated prejudice and remanded for the district court to consider whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.On remand, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the attorney had advised the defendant he was “deportable” and would face deportation proceedings, but did not state he would definitely be deported or was subject to “mandatory deportation.” The court held that, given the complexities and uncertainties of immigration outcomes, counsel’s advice met constitutional standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, when the clear consequence of a plea is deportability, counsel need only advise that the plea will render the defendant deportable and subject to removal proceedings; there is no constitutional requirement for counsel to state that deportation is mandatory or absolutely certain. View "United States v. Murillo" on Justia Law

Between December 2007 and February 2008, the defendant and accomplices robbed seven Florida convenience stores and attempted to rob two others, occasionally stealing cash and cigarettes. In April 2009, a federal grand jury indicted him on twenty-two counts related to conspiracy, robbery, attempted robbery, and using or brandishing a firearm during crimes of violence. A jury convicted him on eighteen counts, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to 196 years in prison, primarily due to consecutive mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, United States v. Davis, and United States v. Taylor clarified the definition of “crime of violence” under § 924(c), the defendant filed petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Eleventh Circuit permitted a limited successive motion challenging only his § 924(c) conviction predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Sixteen). The district court vacated that count and held a de novo resentencing, ultimately imposing a new 173-year sentence. The defendant argued for application of the more lenient sentencing provisions of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) and sought to challenge his other § 924(c) convictions, but the district court declined both requests. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit originally affirmed.After the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v. United States, which held that defendants resentenced after the FSA’s enactment are eligible for its revised penalties, the Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the FSA applies retroactively to the defendant’s resentencing and vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing under the FSA. The court affirmed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider new challenges to other counts not authorized by the appellate court. View "United States v. Ragland" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, following the fatal stabbing of his former girlfriend. The incident occurred after the defendant, who was intoxicated, engaged in a confrontation with the victim and her husband at their residence. The defendant admitted to stabbing the victim, and the victim died from her wounds. Law enforcement apprehended the defendant shortly after the incident.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County presided over the trial. During jury selection, the defendant raised a Batson challenge, arguing that the State used peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The district court denied the challenge at step one, finding insufficient evidence to raise an inference of discrimination. The defense also moved to exclude testimony from a substitute coroner, challenged the admission of a transcript of a 911 call, and disputed limitations placed on their expert's testimony about intoxication. The district court allowed the substitute coroner to testify to her own opinions based on photographs and hospital records, permitted the jury to use the 911 call transcript as a listening aid, and limited but did not exclude the expert's testimony.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying the Batson challenge at step one, as there was insufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose. The court found no Confrontation Clause violation in the substitute coroner’s testimony, as her opinion was based on independent review of admissible evidence. The court held that the limitation on the defense expert's testimony was erroneous under Nevada law but was harmless error. The court also found no abuse of discretion in providing the 911 call transcript to the jury and determined that no cumulative error warranted reversal. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the conviction. View "MATADAMAS-SERRANO (RUBEN) VS. STATE" on Justia Law