Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gary Matthews and Monte Brannan collaborated on a project to redevelop a landmark hotel in Peoria, Illinois. Instead of fulfilling their financial obligations to lenders, they diverted project revenue for personal gain. This led to federal charges of mail fraud and money laundering, resulting in guilty verdicts by a jury.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois oversaw the initial trial. Matthews and Brannan were convicted of mail fraud, money laundering, and, in Brannan’s case, conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed their convictions, raising multiple issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the evidence against Matthews and Brannan overwhelming, affirming their convictions. The court noted that Matthews and Brannan failed to comply with Circuit Rule 30(b)(1) by not including necessary district court rulings in their appendices, which hindered the appellate review process. Despite this, the court ensured a fair review by independently locating the relevant rulings. The court ordered Matthews’s and Brannan’s counsel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for their violations of Circuit Rule 30. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, ensuring that Matthews and Brannan received fair consideration of their appeals. View "USA v Brannan" on Justia Law

Nicole Lee Hunt was observed by Detective Nicholas Monaco of the Ravalli County Sheriff’s Office driving a vehicle without license plates. Monaco had prior intelligence linking Hunt and her residence, Apartment 1, to drug activity, specifically methamphetamine trafficking. During the traffic stop, Hunt exhibited signs of nervousness, had glassy red eyes, and made inconsistent statements about her activities. Monaco expanded the stop into a drug investigation, conducted a canine sniff, and found a package containing methamphetamine in Hunt’s vehicle.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, denied Hunt’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, finding that Monaco had particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug investigation. During the trial, Hunt testified that she knew the package contained drugs but claimed it belonged to her dealer, Trent Parker, and denied any intent to distribute. The State called Katrina Conway as a rebuttal witness, who testified that Hunt had previously sold her methamphetamine. The District Court allowed this testimony, concluding that Hunt’s testimony opened the door to evidence of her prior bad acts. The jury found Hunt guilty of felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s denial of Hunt’s suppression motion, agreeing that there was particularized suspicion to justify the expanded investigation. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in allowing Conway’s rebuttal testimony, as Hunt’s cross-examination responses did not open the door to such evidence. The Supreme Court reversed Hunt’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. N. Hunt" on Justia Law

The defendant returned home after a period away and, while intoxicated, became upset upon discovering his brother’s marijuana plants in his basement. After confronting his brother, the defendant visited a neighbor’s house, where he found the neighbor’s daughter and another individual, Bill, using methamphetamine. Concerned that the neighbor, recently released from prison, could get into trouble, the defendant confronted those present. A verbal altercation escalated, resulting in the defendant punching Bill unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, Bill struck the defendant with a hammer, leading to a physical struggle involving the defendant’s son and friend. The group retreated outside, but Bill followed, allegedly threatening to kill the defendant and his family. The defendant’s son retrieved a gun, which the defendant used to shoot and kill Bill after warning him to stop approaching.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders County, presided over the trial. The defense did not object to the jury instructions regarding self-defense and the use of force to prevent a forcible felony, and stipulated to the remaining instructions. The jury found the defendant guilty of deliberate homicide with a dangerous weapon. The defendant appealed, arguing that the District Court erred by not providing a specific defense of others instruction and that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting one.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury, as the instructions given adequately covered the law regarding self-defense and defense of others through the “forcible felony” instruction. The Court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a plausible justification for counsel’s actions and no reasonable probability that a different instruction would have changed the outcome. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. C. Rossbach" on Justia Law

In 1993, a man was convicted by a jury of multiple crimes, including torture, mayhem, corporal injury to a child, and child abuse, after he bound his then-girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter with tape and forced her into scalding water, causing severe burns and permanent injuries. The child, R.P., suffered extensive medical trauma, permanent disfigurement, and lifelong disabilities. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a restitution fine but did not order direct victim restitution. Decades later, after the defendant was granted parole, the prosecution sought restitution for R.P. and her parents to cover medical expenses and lost wages.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a restitution hearing in 2023, where R.P. and her parents testified about the economic impact of the injuries. The court found their testimony credible and awarded restitution for medical expenses and both past and future lost wages. The defendant objected, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution so long after sentencing, that the delay violated his constitutional rights, and that the discount rate used to calculate present value of future wages was unsupported. He did not challenge the amounts claimed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that there is no time limit restricting a court’s authority to order victim restitution in a criminal case, even decades after sentencing, when the original sentence omitted such an order. The court also found no violation of constitutional rights due to the delay, noting the defendant forfeited some arguments by not raising them earlier, and upheld the trial court’s use of the discount rate. The restitution order was affirmed. View "P. v. Sinay" on Justia Law

In 2016, a plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Hawai‘i against his uncle, alleging sexual abuse that occurred in 1975 and 1976 when the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery, among other claims. The case was subject to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-1.8, which sets specific time limitations for civil actions arising from the sexual abuse of a minor.The Circuit Court instructed the jury based on criminal statutes in effect at the time the complaint was filed, rather than those in effect when the alleged abuse occurred. The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the instructions should have been based on the criminal statutes in effect during the time of the alleged abuse. The ICA affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, holding that the defendant failed to show that HRS § 657-1.8 violated the ex post facto clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that HRS § 657-1.8(a) establishes a statute of limitations for civil actions based on the sexual abuse of a minor and does not create an independent cause of action. The court concluded that the applicable criminal statutes are those in effect when the alleged conduct occurred. Although the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury on the criminal statutes in effect when the complaint was filed, the Supreme Court found this error to be harmless. The record showed that the defendant admitted to conduct that would have constituted a criminal offense under the statutes in effect at the time of the alleged abuse. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Circuit Court’s final judgment. View "Foresman v. Foresman" on Justia Law

Three defendants, Jose Ordonez-Zometa, Jose Hernandez-Garcia, and Jose Ortega-Ayala, were convicted in the District of Maryland for their involvement in a racketeering enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), murder in aid of racketeering, and conspiracy to destroy and conceal evidence. The case centers around the brutal murder of a 16-year-old gang member, John Doe, by members of the Los Ghettos Criminales Salvatruchas (LGCS), a branch of the MS-13 gang. The defendants were implicated in the planning, execution, and cover-up of the murder, including the disposal of the victim's body and the destruction of evidence.In the lower court, the defendants filed several motions to suppress evidence obtained from traffic stops, custodial interrogations, and searches of residences, cell phones, and social media accounts. The District Court for the District of Maryland denied these motions, finding that the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of Ordonez-Zometa were lawful, the search warrants were supported by probable cause, and the defendants' statements were voluntary. The court also denied Hernandez-Garcia's motion for a new trial, concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The appellate court held that the traffic stop and arrest of Ordonez-Zometa were justified by an outstanding arrest warrant and probable cause. The court also found that the search warrants for Ortega-Ayala's residence, cell phones, and Facebook account were supported by probable cause and were not overly broad. Additionally, the court ruled that Hernandez-Garcia's motion for a new trial was properly denied, as the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the convictions. Finally, the court concluded that the government had presented sufficient evidence to establish that the LGCS enterprise's activities affected interstate commerce, satisfying the requirements for RICO and VICAR convictions. The defendants' convictions and sentences were thus affirmed. View "US v. Ordonez-Zometa" on Justia Law

American Surety Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for Marlon Anibal Valle-Mejia. Valle-Mejia failed to appear at a court hearing on July 19, 2022, despite knowing the date. His attorney did not provide a reason for his absence. The court continued the case to August 8 without forfeiting the bail bond. Valle-Mejia again failed to appear on August 8, and the court continued the case to August 29, ordering him to appear personally. When Valle-Mejia did not appear on August 29, the court forfeited the bail bond and issued a bench warrant.American Surety Company filed motions in the criminal court to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction by not forfeiting the bail after the initial failure to appear. The criminal court denied both motions, and American did not appeal these decisions. Subsequently, a summary judgment against the bond was entered in a civil case, and American filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment, which was denied by the civil court based on issue preclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court was required to forfeit the bail when Valle-Mejia first failed to appear without sufficient excuse on July 19, 2022. By not doing so, the court lost jurisdiction to forfeit the bail later. Consequently, the subsequent forfeiture and summary judgment were void. The appellate court determined that issue preclusion did not apply because the initial forfeiture was beyond the court's fundamental jurisdiction. The judgment was reversed, and American Surety Company was entitled to recover its costs on appeal. View "P. v. American Surety Co." on Justia Law

In 1991, an individual was convicted of the rape and murder of a woman in San Diego County. The crime involved the perpetrator bludgeoning the victim with a metal steering wheel lock, restraining and sexually assaulting her for several hours, and ultimately suffocating her before burying her body in the desert. The perpetrator confessed to the crimes and entered a plea agreement, resulting in a sentence of six years for rape and 25 years to life for first-degree premeditated murder. Over the years, state forensic psychologists consistently diagnosed the individual with sexual sadism disorder and a personality disorder with narcissistic features.After serving decades in prison, the Board of Parole Hearings found the individual suitable for parole in 2019 and again in 2022. On both occasions, the Governor of California exercised his authority to independently review and reverse the Board’s decision, citing concerns about the individual’s insight into the crimes and risk to public safety. The San Diego County Superior Court denied the individual’s petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Governor’s 2022 reversal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the habeas petition. Applying the highly deferential “some evidence” standard, the court examined whether there was a rational nexus between the evidence and the Governor’s determination of current dangerousness. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Governor’s conclusion that the individual lacked sufficient insight into the connection between his sexual disorder and violent conduct, continued to minimize his culpability, and demonstrated lapses in judgment and self-control in recent prison incidents. The court held that these factors, combined with the aggravated nature of the original crimes, provided a sufficient basis for the Governor’s decision. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Rogowski" on Justia Law

Ryan Barry, a probationer subject to warrantless search conditions, was implicated in drug trafficking by an anonymous tipster who reported that a person named "Ryan" was selling drugs from an apartment in Van Nuys, California. The tipster also mentioned that "Ryan" drove a red convertible Ford Mustang. Officer Giovanni Espinoza of the LAPD investigated and found Barry, who matched the description and was on post-release community supervision for felony convictions. Barry was observed driving a red Mustang near the apartment. During a subsequent encounter, Barry was found with drugs and did not deny living at the apartment when informed of the impending search. Barry's possession of a key to the apartment further supported the officers' belief that he resided there.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Barry's motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the apartment, as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing. Barry entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motion, and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard articulated in United States v. Grandberry, which requires probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at the location to be searched. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Barry's responses to Officer Espinoza, the anonymous tip, and Barry's possession of a key, established probable cause that Barry resided at the apartment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "USA V. BARRY" on Justia Law

Michael Cavagnolo was arrested and charged with making a terroristic threat after repeatedly calling the Hyde Park Police Department emergency line and threatening to commit violent acts against officers, their families, and Police Department property. The County Court set bail pursuant to CPL 510.10 (4) (a), which makes all violent felony offenses listed in Penal Law § 70.02 bailable, except for two specific exceptions. However, CPL 510.10 (4) (g) makes bailable the felony crimes of terrorism defined in Penal Law article 490 but explicitly excludes the crime of making a terroristic threat.The Appellate Division granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered Mr. Cavagnolo's release, holding that the authority to set bail for violent felony offenses under CPL 510.10 (4) (a) does not extend to the crime of making a terroristic threat because it is explicitly excluded under paragraph (g). One Justice dissented, arguing that the "specific trumps the general" canon does not apply because both paragraphs (a) and (g) are specific.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense under CPL 510.10 (4) (a). The Court reasoned that the disjunctive structure of CPL 510.10 (4) indicates that each paragraph sets forth a separate and distinct category of offenses qualifying for monetary bail, and one paragraph does not modify another. The Court found that the legislature did not intend to implicitly import paragraph (g)'s exclusion into paragraph (a). Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the habeas corpus proceeding was converted to a declaratory judgment action, with judgment granted in accordance with the opinion. View "People ex rel. Ellis v Imperati" on Justia Law