Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, an anonymous user uploaded child pornography images to Chatstep, an internet chatroom service. Chatstep identified and reported the uploads to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) using Microsoft’s PhotoDNA. The Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) in New Mexico traced the IP address to Guy Rosenschein and obtained a warrant to search his home, uncovering approximately 21,000 images and videos of child pornography. Rosenschein was indicted on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Rosenschein’s pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, dismiss the case, or compel discovery of the computer programs used by Microsoft and NCMEC. Rosenschein pleaded guilty to one count of possession and seven counts of distribution of child pornography, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of all three motions. The court held that Chatstep and Microsoft were not acting as governmental agents, so the Fourth Amendment did not apply to their conduct. Even if they were considered governmental agents, Rosenschein had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the images he uploaded to a public chatroom. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Rosenschein’s motion to compel discovery of NCMEC’s reporting system, since he had the opportunity to access the information through witness examination. Lastly, the court upheld the district court’s refusal to require expert reports for the government’s witnesses before the suppression hearing, since Rule 16(a)(1)(G) does not apply to suppression hearings. View "U.S. v. Rosenschein" on Justia Law

Zackaria Dahir Mohamed, a native of Somalia, entered the United States as a child refugee in 1998. He was later convicted of several offenses, including theft and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him due to these convictions. An Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered his removal in 2018, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. Mohamed then petitioned for review.The IJ initially found Mohamed removable for aggravated felony theft and crimes of violence. In 2020, the IJ ordered his removal to Somalia. Mohamed appealed to the BIA, which remanded the case to the IJ to assess Mohamed’s competency. On remand, Mohamed presented evidence of his mental health history, including a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jerry Kroll. The IJ ruled in 2021 that Mohamed was competent during the 2020 merits hearing, based on Dr. Kroll’s testimony and the IJ’s observations. The BIA dismissed Mohamed’s appeal on de novo review, leading to the current petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Mohamed argued that the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ’s competency finding was unsupported by the record. The court noted that it has jurisdiction to review final agency removal orders but not factual findings related to criminal offenses. The court found that Mohamed’s competency determination was a factual finding, which is generally affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Mohamed’s claims were barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).Even if Mohamed presented a legal or constitutional claim, the court found no fundamental procedural error or resulting prejudice. The IJ had considered all appropriate evidence, including Dr. Kroll’s testimony and Mohamed’s behavior during proceedings. The court concluded that there was no procedural error in holding a retroactive competency hearing. The petition for review was denied. View "Mohamed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Erick Jose Sandoval Argueta, a Salvadoran national, was lawfully present in the United States when he solicited sex over the internet from someone he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover police officer. He was convicted in Texas of online solicitation of a minor. Based on this conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered him removed for committing a "crime of child abuse." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision.Sandoval Argueta filed two petitions for review. In the first, he challenged the BIA's determination of his removability and its denial of his motion to reconsider. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Sandoval Argueta had been convicted of multiple crimes, including property theft, drug trafficking, and online solicitation of a minor. The government initially charged him with removability based on the solicitation conviction but later added charges related to his drug trafficking conviction. After the drug trafficking conviction was vacated, the government reasserted the "crime of child abuse" charge.The Fifth Circuit held that the best reading of "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) includes convictions for online solicitation of a minor, even if no actual child was involved. The court reasoned that the statute's broad language encompasses offenses that create a high risk of harm to a child, including attempt offenses. Therefore, Sandoval Argueta's conviction under Texas Penal Code § 33.021(c) categorically met the definition of a "crime of child abuse."In his second petition, Sandoval Argueta argued that the BIA erred by not considering his equitable tolling argument when denying his motion to reconsider. The Fifth Circuit found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as it was procedurally barred by statutory limits on the number of motions to reconsider and the prohibition on reconsidering a decision on a prior motion to reconsider.The Fifth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Argueta v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In June 2022, Karen Read was indicted for murder in Massachusetts. She pled not guilty, and the trial in Norfolk County Superior Court ended in a mistrial due to a non-unanimous jury verdict. The case attracted significant public attention and demonstrators gathered near the courthouse. The demonstrators' behavior, including loud protests and displaying materials directed at trial participants, raised concerns about the fairness of the trial.The state court issued an order creating a 200-foot buffer zone around the courthouse to prevent demonstrations during the trial. This order was challenged in state court but upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Before the retrial, the Commonwealth sought a broader order, which the state court granted, expanding the buffer zone to include additional areas around the courthouse. This new order was based on evidence of disruptions during the first trial, including noise from demonstrators that could be heard by jurors.A group of demonstrators filed for a preliminary injunction in the District of Massachusetts to challenge the expanded buffer zone. The district court denied the motion, finding that the order was likely narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit noted that the plaintiffs clarified they did not challenge the order as applied to courthouse property or seek to engage in noisy protests. They only sought to demonstrate quietly on public property without interfering with trial participants. The court vacated the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the order's lack of a mens rea requirement rendered it insufficiently tailored. The court suggested that the state court could amend the order to include a mens rea requirement to address the First Amendment concerns. View "Grant v. Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" on Justia Law

Yako Collins was convicted of first-degree sexual assault in 2009 and sentenced to 25 years with five years suspended. Collins requested referral to a three-judge sentencing panel, arguing that his lack of significant criminal history and good character warranted a sentence outside the presumptive range. The superior court denied his request, and Collins appealed.The Alaska Court of Appeals in Collins I identified two non-statutory mitigating factors that could justify referral to the three-judge panel: the defendant's lack of a history of unprosecuted offenses and normal prospects for rehabilitation. The court remanded the case to the superior court for reconsideration. While the case was pending, the Alaska Legislature amended the relevant statutes in 2013, explicitly rejecting these mitigating factors as standalone bases for referral. The superior court, applying the amended statutes, affirmed Collins's original sentence, and Collins appealed again.In Collins II, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 2013 legislative amendments merely clarified existing law and did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court held that Collins could not seek referral to the three-judge panel based solely on the factors identified in Collins I but could argue for referral based on the totality of circumstances.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 2013 amendments could not be applied retroactively to Collins, as they were substantive changes to the law. The court emphasized the separation of powers and the prohibition on ex post facto laws, concluding that the legislature could not retroactively overrule a binding judicial interpretation. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the 2013 amendments were procedural or substantive. View "Collins v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The defendant, Davieontray Lee Breaux, was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and three counts of attempted first-degree murder. The State issued a notice to seek the death penalty for the first-degree murder charges. Breaux filed a motion to quash the indictment, arguing misjoinder of offenses under various legal provisions, including the Louisiana Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that since all convictions now require unanimity, the charges could be tried together.The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal denied Breaux's application for supervisory writs. Breaux then applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which granted the writ to determine whether prosecutors may join capital felony charges with other felony charges.The Louisiana Supreme Court held that prosecutors cannot join capital felony charges with other felony charges. The court emphasized that the Louisiana Constitution and nearly a century of jurisprudence prohibit such joinder. The court noted that the plain text of the Louisiana Constitution, specifically Article I §17, establishes distinct categories of felony trials and does not permit the joinder of capital and non-capital offenses. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. BREAUX" on Justia Law

In this case, Jae Michael Bernard was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Bernard had a prior conviction in 2002 for domestic abuse assault causing injury. In September 2021, investigators found firearms and ammunition at his residence. Bernard pleaded guilty in June 2022 but later moved to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Bernard's motion to dismiss the indictment. Bernard then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Bernard's appeal was based on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9). The court noted that a facial challenge requires showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation, which allows disarming individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court found that the statute is constitutional in at least some of its applications, as it targets individuals convicted of crimes involving actual or attempted violence or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that § 922(g)(9) is not unconstitutional on its face. View "United States v. Bernard" on Justia Law

Kyle D. Young entered a guilty plea to two counts of premeditated first-degree murder for the shooting deaths of George Kirksey and Alicia Roman. Young and Roman had a tumultuous relationship, and after their breakup, Young tracked Roman using a device. On New Year's Day 2020, Young confronted Roman and Kirksey, but Kirksey de-escalated the situation. The next night, Young shot and killed both Kirksey and Roman. Young fled to Mexico but was later apprehended. As part of a plea agreement, the State did not pursue the death penalty and allowed Young to seek a reduced sentence.The Sedgwick District Court, presided over by Judge Jeffrey Goering, reviewed Young's motion to reduce his mandatory life sentences from a minimum of 50 years to 25 years. Young presented expert testimony about his adverse childhood experiences, psychological assessments, and his potential for rehabilitation. Family members also testified about his difficult upbringing. Despite this, the district judge concluded that Young failed to establish substantial and compelling reasons to reduce his sentences and denied the motion, sentencing him to two consecutive life sentences with a minimum of 50 years each.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied an abuse of discretion standard. The court considered Young's arguments, including his limited criminal history, low risk of future violence, adverse childhood experiences, and acceptance of responsibility. The court found that reasonable people could agree with the district judge's decision that none of these factors, individually or collectively, constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny Young's motion for a reduced sentence and upheld his sentences. View "State v. Young " on Justia Law

During an August 2020 car chase, Adam Humphrey fired a bullet that struck a law enforcement officer's foot, causing injuries that required surgery. Humphrey pleaded no contest to aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer and received a 247-month sentence. At sentencing, the State requested over $40,000 in restitution for the officer's medical bills, but the document presented showed medical expenses of only $17,193.19, with the rest categorized under unexplained headings. Humphrey did not challenge the restitution amount at sentencing.The Saline District Court ordered the full restitution amount requested by the State. Humphrey appealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the full restitution award. The Kansas Court of Appeals declined to address the merits, ruling that Humphrey's challenge was unpreserved because he did not object at sentencing.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that Humphrey's challenge was properly preserved for appellate review. The court held that substantial competent evidence must support every restitution award and that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting a restitution amount on appeal without first objecting at sentencing. The court found that the State's evidence did not adequately support the full restitution amount, as only $17,193.19 was explicitly labeled as medical expenses.The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated the district court's restitution order, and remanded the case for a restitution hearing to allow the State to present appropriate evidence to support the restitution amount. View "State v. Humphrey " on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Josue Ortiz, claimed that Detective Mark Stambach fabricated and coerced a confession from him regarding a double homicide in 2004. Ortiz, who suffered from severe mental illness, was subsequently charged and convicted based on this false confession. In 2012, a reinvestigation revealed Ortiz's innocence, leading to the conviction of three other individuals for the murders. Ortiz's conviction was vacated, and he was released in 2014 after over a decade of wrongful imprisonment. A jury found Detective Stambach liable for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and violating Ortiz’s right against self-incrimination, awarding Ortiz $5 million in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied Detective Stambach’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur. Stambach argued that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find in favor of Ortiz on any of the claims and that the damages awarded were excessive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings on all three causes of action. The court noted that the jury could reasonably infer from the circumstantial evidence that Detective Stambach fabricated the confession and acted in bad faith. The court also found that the jury’s award of compensatory and punitive damages was justified based on the evidence presented at trial. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the jury’s verdict and the damages awarded to Ortiz. View "Ortiz v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law