Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a violent incident in which Daniel Orozco, along with three associates, entered rival gang territory in Los Angeles. During two separate drive-by shootings on the same night, one man was wounded and another, who was not a gang member, was killed. Orozco owned the car used in the shootings, and evidence—including video footage, ballistic matches, and phone location data—linked him and his group to the crimes. Police apprehended the group shortly after the shootings, recovering the firearm and related evidence at the scene.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, was suppressed due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy. On the first day of trial, the prosecution was permitted to amend the information to add a conspiracy to commit murder charge, over Orozco’s objection. At trial, Orozco’s defense introduced the previously suppressed confession to support an intoxication defense. The jury convicted Orozco on all counts, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the addition of the conspiracy charge was improper because the evidence at the preliminary hearing, absent the suppressed confession, did not support such a charge, thus violating Orozco’s right to notice. The court reversed the conspiracy conviction but affirmed the murder and attempted murder convictions, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and improper sentencing notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

Richard Quntan Garcia was convicted by a jury of several offenses, including attempted second degree robbery, second degree robbery, evading an officer, carjacking, misdemeanor resisting a peace officer, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. The incidents occurred over several days in November 2021 in Paso Robles, California, involving Garcia brandishing a firearm during robberies, fleeing police in a BMW, and later carjacking a vehicle. Physical evidence and witness identifications linked Garcia to the crimes. He was sentenced as a third strike offender to 118 years to life in state prison.Prior to this appeal, the case was tried in the Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County. During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a juror perceived to be of mixed race, prompting defense counsel to object under California Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which prohibits peremptory challenges based on race or other protected characteristics. The trial court overruled the objection, finding no prima facie case of bias and accepting the prosecutor’s stated reasons related to the juror’s lack of life experience and timid demeanor. The court also denied Garcia’s motion to sever the carjacking count from the other charges, finding the offenses sufficiently connected.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed Garcia’s appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err in overruling the section 231.7 objection, concluding that the prosecutor’s reasons were supported by the record and not presumptively invalid under the statute. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to sever. The judgment was affirmed except for an amendment to the abstract of judgment to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement regarding fines and fees. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with twenty-one felony counts stemming from a fifteen-minute crime spree in February 2019, during which he attempted to break into homes, engaged in a physical altercation, stopped vehicles at gunpoint, and was ultimately apprehended by police. He was arraigned in May 2019 and held on high bail. Over the next several years, the case was delayed by issues including the Commonwealth’s slow production of mandatory discovery, changes in defense counsel, and the defendant’s own motions and requests. The COVID-19 pandemic led to statewide orders suspending jury trials for extended periods, further delaying proceedings.The case was heard in the Hampden Superior Court, where the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss, arguing that the delay violated both the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (rule 36) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court judge excluded various periods from the speedy trial calculation, including time attributable to COVID-19 orders, delays caused by defense motions, and periods when the defendant changed counsel or requested continuances. The defendant was ultimately convicted on most counts after a bench trial, and he appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that delays resulting from its COVID-19 orders do not weigh against the Commonwealth in evaluating constitutional speedy trial claims. The Court further found that, after excluding periods attributable to the pandemic, defense motions, and other justified delays, the remaining delay did not violate rule 36 or the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment or Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Larace" on Justia Law

In 2009, after a history of domestic violence and threats, the defendant killed his wife and five young children by cutting their throats and then fled to Haiti, where he was apprehended and confessed. He attributed his actions to “bad spirits” and voodoo spells. Upon return to Florida, he pled guilty to six counts of first-degree murder, waived his right to a penalty-phase jury, and declined to present mitigation evidence. Throughout the proceedings, his competency to stand trial was repeatedly evaluated, with findings alternating between competent and incompetent, but ultimately he was found competent at the time of his plea and sentencing. His defense team, which included both public defenders and later court-appointed attorneys, conducted extensive mitigation investigations, including mental health and cultural background assessments, despite the defendant’s lack of cooperation.The Circuit Court for Collier County imposed six death sentences, finding multiple aggravating factors and twelve mitigating factors, including some evidence of mental illness. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting claims regarding self-representation, aggravator duplication, and the constitutionality of the death penalty. The defendant then filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to competency and mitigation, and challenging restrictions on access to public records. The circuit court denied all claims after an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the appeal from the denial of postconviction relief and a related habeas corpus petition. The court held that claims regarding competency were procedurally barred, as they could have been raised on direct appeal, and that the defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of public records requests and rejected the habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief and denied habeas corpus relief. View "Damas v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Juan Alaniz was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Alaniz had prior state felony convictions for illegally possessing a controlled substance and for burglary. He challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds, arguing that the statute exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, violated the Second Amendment on its face, and violated the Second Amendment as applied to him.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case and entered a conviction against Alaniz. On appeal, Alaniz raised the same constitutional arguments before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He specifically argued that only his controlled substance conviction should be considered as the predicate for his § 922(g)(1) conviction, and that his burglary conviction should not be relevant to the constitutional analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Alaniz’s Commerce Clause and facial Second Amendment challenges, citing circuit precedent. The court reviewed his as-applied Second Amendment challenge de novo and held that the government may consider Alaniz’s entire criminal record, including his burglary conviction, when evaluating the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The court found that founding-era laws support the constitutionality of disarming individuals convicted of burglary. Therefore, Alaniz’s as-applied challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Dewayne Keith Parker faced criminal charges in both Fresno and Napa counties, including murder, burglary, and assault. He was found incompetent to stand trial in Fresno County and admitted to Napa State Hospital. While hospitalized, Parker allegedly assaulted another patient, leading to new charges in Napa County. The Napa County Superior Court found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. After Parker was restored to competency, he was discharged to Fresno County due to his primary commitment there. More than a year later, after being arrested on a Napa County bench warrant, Parker was returned to Napa County, where the court again found him incompetent to stand trial.The Napa County Superior Court held a restoration hearing and, relying on equitable tolling, paused the two-year maximum commitment period for Parker’s Napa County charges during the time he was involved in proceedings in Fresno County. Parker argued that this tolling was unauthorized by statute and violated his due process and equal protection rights. The court rejected these arguments, denied his request for release or conservatorship, and set a new commitment expiration date based on the tolled period.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that, although the statutory scheme for competency commitments does not expressly address tolling, courts have inherent equitable powers to pause the running of the commitment period when a defendant is unavailable due to proceedings in another jurisdiction. The court found that the delay caused by Parker’s simultaneous proceedings in Fresno County constituted good cause for tolling. The appellate court affirmed the Napa County Superior Court’s order, concluding that the tolling did not violate Parker’s constitutional rights. View "People v. Parker" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2017, an individual and two accomplices committed a series of armed robberies at Walmart stores in Florida, following a consistent pattern of masked, armed entry, coercion of store managers to access cash, and escape in stolen vehicles. The group obtained approximately $100,000 in total. After law enforcement apprehended the accomplices, one of whom was the individual’s cousin, evidence including cell phone data and testimony from a cooperating accomplice implicated the individual. He was indicted on five robbery and firearm charges.The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The defendant, represented by an attorney who was later disbarred, rejected two plea offers and maintained his innocence, asserting alibis for each incident. His attorney unsuccessfully attempted to secure the cousin’s testimony and sought continuances, which the court denied. At trial, the government presented testimony from the cooperating accomplice and cell phone evidence. The defendant testified in his own defense, denying involvement. The jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to 319 months’ imprisonment. His direct appeal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which found no arguable issues for review.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for misadvising him about plea offers and failing to call his cousin as a witness. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, although counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, concluding there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s errors. View "Catrell Ivory v. USA" on Justia Law

After being convicted of second-degree sexual assault in Garland County, Arkansas, Harl Garrett was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Garrett requested his attorney, Ben Hooten, to file an appeal, but instead, Hooten moved to withdraw as counsel without filing the notice of appeal. Garrett was not informed of the withdrawal order until after the 30-day window for filing a direct appeal had expired. Garrett attempted to file a pro se notice of appeal and later submitted motions for a belated appeal and to proceed in forma pauperis, but these were denied by both the Garland County Circuit Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court. Garrett subsequently filed a state postconviction petition, which was also denied as untimely.Garrett then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, raising the claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a direct appeal due to counsel and court failures. The district court denied the petition as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), finding that the limitations period began when Garrett learned of his attorney’s abandonment and expired before the federal petition was filed. However, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on whether Garrett’s motion for a belated appeal tolled the AEDPA limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and held that a motion for belated appeal in Arkansas constitutes “collateral review” under AEDPA, thus tolling the statute of limitations while the motion is pending. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that Garrett’s federal habeas petition was timely. View "Garrett v. Payne" on Justia Law

A group of individuals with large social media followings was charged with securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The government alleged that these individuals engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme: they would purchase securities, then use their social media platforms to post false or misleading information about those securities to induce their followers to buy, thereby artificially inflating the price. After the price increased, the defendants would sell their holdings for a profit. The indictment claimed that the defendants collectively profited $114 million from this scheme.After indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, one defendant pleaded guilty while the others moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment failed to allege a scheme to deprive victims of a traditional property interest, instead only alleging deprivation of valuable economic information. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States, which held that deprivation of economic information alone does not constitute fraud under federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the indictment adequately alleged both a scheme to defraud and an intent to defraud, as required by the securities fraud statute. The court distinguished the case from Ciminelli, finding that the indictment alleged a fraudulent-inducement theory—whereby the defendants used misrepresentations to induce followers to part with money by purchasing securities—not merely a deprivation of information. The court also held that the fraud statutes do not require proof that the defendants intended to cause economic harm, only that they intended to obtain money or property by deceit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, based on allegations that he engaged in sexual acts with a 15-year-old girl. The alleged conduct included both acts of sexual intrusion and other sexually related behavior. The defendant denied any sexual contact, while the victim and another witness provided testimony about the events. Forensic evidence was inconclusive, and the defendant’s police interview was played for the jury. The jury acquitted the defendant on the two counts of second-degree sexual abuse but convicted him on the third-degree charge.The District Court of Natrona County conducted the trial and provided jury instructions that did not specifically exclude conduct that would qualify as first- or second-degree sexual abuse from the third-degree charge, nor did they specify the factual basis for the third-degree charge. Defense counsel agreed to the instructions as given and specifically requested that the instructions not exclude the conduct alleged in the other counts. After the jury returned its verdict, the defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous for not excluding first- or second-degree conduct from the third-degree charge and for failing to specify the conduct underlying the third-degree charge.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the defendant had affirmatively waived any objection to the lack of an instruction excluding first- or second-degree conduct from the third-degree charge by requesting that such language be omitted, invoking the invited error doctrine. The court further held that the district court did not plainly err by failing to specify the factual basis for the third-degree charge in the jury instructions, as there was no clear and unequivocal rule of law requiring such specificity when only a single count was at issue. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the conviction. View "Townsend v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law