Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the appellant, Willie James Hardy, was convicted of first-degree murder in 1993 and again in 1996 after being granted a new trial. Hardy has consistently maintained his innocence. In 2020, Hardy filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under Pennsylvania's Section 9543.1, seeking to test evidence from his case using modern DNA technology that was not available at the time of his trials. The evidence against Hardy was circumstantial, and previous DNA testing excluded him as a contributor.The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County denied Hardy's petition, reasoning that the request was untimely based on the precedent set by Commonwealth v. Edmiston, and that further testing would not provide substantially more accurate or probative results. The Superior Court affirmed this decision, emphasizing the delay in Hardy's request and the strength of the circumstantial evidence against him.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on three main issues: the timeliness of Hardy's request, the applicability of Section 9543.1(a)(2) regarding previously tested and untested evidence, and whether Hardy presented a prima facie case that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence. The court noted that the 2018 amendments to Section 9543.1 allow for DNA testing "at any time" and authorize retesting with newer technology.The Supreme Court held that Hardy's petition was timely, as the statute permits requests for DNA testing at any time and there was no indication that Hardy's request was intended to cause delay. The court also found that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of Section 9543.1(a)(2), as the statute allows for retesting with newer technology and does not preclude testing of previously untested evidence. Finally, the court concluded that Hardy met the prima facie burden by demonstrating a reasonable possibility that DNA testing could produce exculpatory evidence establishing his actual innocence.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ahmed Abdalla Allam was charged with possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of school grounds, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). Allam challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him. The district court rejected his challenges, and Allam subsequently pled guilty. He then appealed the denial of his as-applied challenge.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas upheld the statute as constitutional, both facially and as applied to Allam, and denied his motion to dismiss. The court applied the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, finding no historical precursor to § 922(q)(2)(A) but concluded that late 19th-century prohibitions on possessing firearms in schools and near polling places were relevantly similar historical analogues. Following the denial of his motion, Allam pled guilty and was sentenced to 60 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Bruen framework, determining that the Second Amendment's plain text covered Allam's conduct. However, the court found that § 922(q)(2)(A) was consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, particularly when considering historical laws like the Statute of Northampton and going-armed laws, which restricted carrying firearms in a manner that posed a threat to public safety. The court also considered historical firearm regulations in educational settings and buffer zones around polling places, which supported the constitutionality of disarming a visibly threatening individual near a school.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of Allam's as-applied challenge and upheld his guilty-plea conviction. View "USA v. Allam" on Justia Law

Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

In 1987, Pervis Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, receiving two death sentences and a thirty-year imprisonment term. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, anticipating potential future commutation of the death sentences to life sentences. Decades later, following a legal pathway established by the Tennessee legislature, Payne was adjudicated intellectually disabled, leading to the vacating of his death sentences and their replacement with life sentences. The trial court also ordered that Payne’s sentences be served concurrently, making him eligible for parole in 2026.The Shelby County Criminal Court adjudicated Payne intellectually disabled and vacated his death sentences, substituting them with life sentences. The court also revisited the consecutive sentencing determination and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the trial court had discretion to consider the manner of service of the sentences after vacating the death penalty.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to realign Payne’s sentences. The court affirmed the modification of Payne’s death sentences to life imprisonment but vacated the part of the trial court’s judgment that ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The court emphasized that once a criminal judgment becomes final, it may not be modified unless a statute or rule authorizes its modification. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State of Tennessee v. Payne" on Justia Law

Michael Williams was convicted by a Wisconsin jury of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He appealed his convictions to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing that a jury instruction unconstitutionally lowered the government's burden of proof and that the prosecutor's closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof to him. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review.Williams then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court held that the state appellate court reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in concluding that it was not reasonably likely the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. The court also held that Williams had not demonstrated that the prosecutor's remarks violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Williams raised the same two arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent regarding the jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The court also found that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not shift the burden of proof to the defense in a manner that violated due process, especially considering the trial court's curative instructions. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Williams had not shown that the state court's rulings were so lacking in justification as to constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Williams v Meisner" on Justia Law

Defendants Jerrold Chavarria and Jerry Romero were accused of kidnapping and murdering a woman in Eddy County, New Mexico. They were charged with the federal crime of kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). The indictment claimed that the defendants used a motor vehicle, a Jeep, as an instrumentality of interstate commerce in committing the crime. However, the indictment did not provide details on how the kidnapping affected interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the superseding indictment, ruling that it lacked an adequate nexus to interstate commerce. The court found that the use of a motor vehicle alone, without more, was insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that not all motor vehicles are per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce. It emphasized that for an object to be considered an instrumentality of interstate commerce, it must serve the end of commerce. The court found that the government’s indictment was insufficient because it did not allege how the use of the motor vehicle in this case affected interstate commerce. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the superseding indictment, concluding that the federal kidnapping statute did not apply in this instance due to the lack of a sufficient connection to interstate commerce. View "United States v. Chavarria" on Justia Law

Donald Ferguson was convicted by a jury of sexually abusing his adopted daughter, Jane Doe, under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(5). Ferguson appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted the first nine and a half minutes of Doe’s forty-five-minute forensic interview. This portion of the interview included rapport-building and rule-explanation segments conducted by NCIS Agent Hannah Gottardi.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia admitted the entire video recording of the forensic interview, including the first nine and a half minutes, over Ferguson’s objection. The court found the evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Ferguson was subsequently convicted based on the evidence presented, including the forensic interview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the first nine and a half minutes of the forensic interview. The appellate court found that the initial segments of the interview were relevant as they demonstrated that the interview followed the National Children’s Advocacy Center protocol, which is designed to elicit accurate recall from the child. The court also determined that the statements made during these segments were not hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but to show the interview’s adherence to the protocol.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court acted within its discretion under Rule 403, finding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed Ferguson’s conviction. View "US v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

On December 21, 2022, Oklahoma City Police officers received a tip that Karen Gonzalez, who had an outstanding arrest warrant, was at a Days Inn. Officers surveilled the area and followed a car they believed she entered to a gas station. They confirmed her identity and arrested her. Jonas Tyler, who was near the car, was detained, handcuffed, and placed in a police car. Despite his compliance and lack of suspicion, officers detained him further while waiting for a K-9 unit, which eventually led to the discovery of a firearm and drugs in his car.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Mr. Tyler's motion to suppress the evidence found in his car, ruling that his continued detention was reasonable. Mr. Tyler then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Mr. Tyler's continued detention after the arrest of Ms. Gonzalez was unreasonable and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the government did not have a sufficient justification for detaining Mr. Tyler beyond the initial arrest of Ms. Gonzalez, as there was no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing or dangerousness on his part. Consequently, the court vacated Mr. Tyler's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. View "United States v. Tyler" on Justia Law

The case involves the Attorney General's request to empanel a special grand jury to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by clergy within the Catholic Church in New Jersey. The Diocese of Camden challenged the grand jury's authority to issue a presentment on this subject, arguing that such a presentment would not relate to public affairs or conditions as required by law.The trial court denied the Attorney General's request to empanel a special grand jury and found that the anticipated presentment was not authorized by law. The court cited the substantial commitment of time and resources needed to select unbiased grand jurors, the financial hardship on jurors, and the fact that priests are not public officials and the Catholic Church is not a public entity. The court also noted that the presentment would be fundamentally unfair to those accused, as they would not have the same protections as defendants charged by indictment. The Appellate Division summarily affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that it was premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment had to be suppressed, as no grand jury had completed an investigation or issued a presentment. The Court emphasized that the relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. The Court found that the State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined by the Court. The Court vacated the trial court's analysis and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury" on Justia Law