Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2018, Jodeci K. Norvel entered a negotiated guilty plea and received an eighteen-year sentence for battery in the first degree and possession of firearms by certain persons. His sentencing order included a note that he had two prior residential burglaries and should serve flat time. Norvel later filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus, arguing that under Act 683 of 2023, he was eligible for parole because his sentencing order did not expressly designate that he was sentenced under the relevant statute.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted Norvel’s petition, finding that Act 683 applied to him and that he was eligible for parole. The court determined that Norvel’s sentencing order did not contain an express designation under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B), as required by the statute.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the notation on Norvel’s sentencing order did not constitute an express designation that he was sentenced under section 16-93-609. The court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and unmistakable reference to the specific section, which was not present in Norvel’s sentencing order. The court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the circuit court’s interpretation of Act 683 led to absurd results contrary to legislative intent, citing its previous decision in Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board. Consequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, granting Norvel the relief he sought. View "ARKANSAS POST-PRISON TRANSFER BOARD v. NORVEL" on Justia Law

Amber Dawn Waterman was charged in Benton County, Arkansas, with two counts of premeditated and deliberated capital murder for the deaths of Ashley Bush and her unborn child, Valkyrie Grace Willis. Waterman had previously pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri to kidnapping resulting in death and kidnapping resulting in the death of an unborn child. She was sentenced to two life sentences in federal court.In the Benton County Circuit Court, Waterman entered pleas of not guilty and former jeopardy, and filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114 and the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court denied her motion, finding that the state charges were not barred by double jeopardy.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the federal and state charges each required proof of different facts and were intended to prevent substantially different harms or evils. The federal charges required proof of kidnapping and interstate transport, while the state charges required proof of premeditated and deliberated intent to cause death. Therefore, the prosecution in Arkansas was not barred by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-114.Additionally, the court declined Waterman's request to interpret the Arkansas Constitution's double jeopardy provision more broadly than the federal provision, thereby upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine. The court concluded that the Arkansas Constitution does not prohibit Waterman’s state prosecution under these circumstances. The decision of the Benton County Circuit Court was affirmed. View "WATERMAN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

James P. Ellis, an inmate at Marion Correctional Institution, has been incarcerated since his 1995 convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated murder. He contends that the Ohio Adult Parole Authority unlawfully corrected an error in his sentencing entry and has been using this correction in his parole hearings. Ellis sought a writ of prohibition from the Tenth District Court of Appeals to prevent the parole authority from conducting future parole screenings and to compel it to contact the sentencing court for corrective procedures.The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed Ellis's complaint. The court reasoned that Ellis did not sufficiently demonstrate that the parole authority lacked jurisdiction or relied on erroneous information. Additionally, the court noted that compelling the parole authority to contact a court is beyond the scope of relief provided by a writ of prohibition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal. The court held that the parole authority has jurisdiction to hold parole proceedings for all parole-eligible inmates, including Ellis. The court found that Ellis's parole eligibility is determined by statute, and the parole authority's actions were authorized by law. Consequently, Ellis failed to prove the elements required for a writ of prohibition. The court also noted that Ellis's request to compel the parole authority to contact the sentencing court was not appropriate for a writ of prohibition, which is typically used to prevent unauthorized actions rather than to compel specific actions. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Adult Parole Auth." on Justia Law

Marcus Dixon, while on supervised release after a federal prison sentence, was arrested based on his suspected involvement in a hit-and-run accident and drug dealing. Probation officers conducted warrantless searches of his property, including a Pontiac, a cellphone, a home in Silvis, Illinois, an Audi, and a duffel bag, finding evidence of drug distribution and firearms. Dixon was convicted on multiple counts related to drug possession and firearms. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from these searches, arguing they exceeded the scope authorized by his supervised release conditions. The district court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Dixon's motion to suppress, concluding that he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches were supported by reasonable suspicion. Dixon was subsequently convicted on all counts by a jury and sentenced to 260 months in prison. He appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, challenging the searches' legality and the denial of an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Dixon failed to establish Fourth Amendment standing as he did not provide evidence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched items and places. The court also found that the searches of the Pontiac and cellphone were reasonable and permissible under Dixon's supervised release conditions. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing, as Dixon did not identify any disputed material facts warranting such a hearing. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In October 2018, a sheriff’s deputy in Smyth County, Virginia, stopped Ashley Langley for erratic driving. Langley admitted there were drugs in the vehicle, and a search revealed methamphetamine, distribution paraphernalia, and a firearm. Langley and her passengers informed officers that more drugs were at Langley’s residence, where her out-of-state supplier, Jerada Henderson, was staying. Officers obtained a warrant to search Langley’s home, where they found more methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and two cell phones belonging to Henderson. Henderson was arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied Henderson’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, finding the warrant valid and the officers’ reliance on it reasonable. The court also rejected Henderson’s proposed jury instruction regarding the insufficiency of a single drug transaction to prove conspiracy. Henderson was convicted of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy but acquitted of firearm charges. The district court calculated his sentence, attributing to him drugs sold by Langley before his October 2018 delivery and applying a firearm enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable. The court also upheld the rejection of Henderson’s proposed jury instruction, noting that evidence of a substantial drug quantity can support a conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation or the application of the firearm enhancement, affirming Henderson’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Patrick Barkers-Woode and Nana Mensah were involved in a conspiracy to defraud Sprint Corporation by exploiting a sales promotion that offered smartphones to new customers at no upfront cost. Conspirators in Ghana obtained personal information of unsuspecting individuals and used it to sign them up as new Sprint customers, arranging for the smartphones to be sent to vacant homes. Barkers-Woode, Mensah, and others tracked, retrieved, and delivered the smartphones to a buyer. The conspiracy was responsible for 274 orders of 833 smartphones, resulting in $357,565.92 in actual loss and $595,399.76 in intended loss. A jury convicted both defendants of mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit these offenses.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced Barkers-Woode to 111 months’ imprisonment and Mensah to 99 months’ imprisonment. Both defendants appealed, challenging their sentences and, in Barkers-Woode’s case, the admission of certain evidence during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the District Court erred in applying a 14-point enhancement based on intended loss rather than actual loss, as required by the court's decision in United States v. Banks. This error affected the defendants' substantial rights, leading the court to reverse and remand for resentencing based on actual loss. The court also upheld the District Court's application of a 2-point enhancement for the number of victims, recognizing that victims of identity theft are included within the definition of "victim" under the Sentencing Guidelines.Additionally, the court affirmed the District Court's decision to admit testimony about a related fraud against Walmart, as it directly proved the conspiratorial agreement. The court also upheld the decision to require Barkers-Woode to proceed pro se after his sixth attorney withdrew, citing his extremely dilatory conduct. Finally, the court rejected Mensah's argument that sentencing enhancements should be based on facts charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, reaffirming the precedent set in United States v. Grier. View "USA v. Barkers-Woode" on Justia Law

The appellant moved to Texas in 2009 and married Wasam Moussa in Jordan in 2018. Moussa requested a divorce shortly after their marriage but did not follow through. In May 2019, Moussa moved to Texas to live with the appellant. Three days later, the appellant called a friend, Vernie “Alicia” Smith, and confessed to hitting Moussa, covering her mouth, and that she stopped breathing. Moussa was found unresponsive and later pronounced dead. The appellant was charged with murder, with the indictment alleging two theories: intentional or knowing causation of death and intent to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death.The trial court presented a jury charge that failed to include the element "causes the death of" in the second theory of murder. The appellant did not object to this omission. The jury convicted the appellant of murder. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals found that the omission resulted in egregious harm, since it allowed the jury to convict without finding that the appellant caused Moussa’s death. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court's finding of egregious harm. The court held that the jury charge error affected the very basis of the case, depriving the appellant of a fair trial. The court emphasized that the omission of the causation element in the jury charge's application paragraph allowed the jury to convict without determining whether the appellant's actions caused Moussa's death. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, maintaining that the appellant suffered egregious harm due to the jury charge error. View "Alkayyali v. State" on Justia Law

In May 2016, a jury convicted the appellant of two counts of capital murder for fatally shooting his son and his partner's son. The trial court sentenced him to death based on the jury's punishment phase verdicts. The appellant raised twenty-six points of error and five supplemental points of error on direct appeal.The trial court's judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the death sentences were reversed and remanded for a new punishment trial. The appellant's competency to stand trial was challenged, leading to a retrospective competency trial where a jury found him competent during his 2016 trial. The appellant's supplemental points of error regarding the retrospective competency proceedings were overruled, including the trial court's determination of feasibility, evidentiary rulings, denial of a mistrial, and cumulative error claims.The appellant's requests for substitute counsel and to represent himself were denied, with the court finding he did not clearly and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation and suffered from severe mental illness. His pro se motion for a speedy trial was disregarded as he was represented by counsel. The trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a hotel room and a Jeep was upheld, as he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both.The appellant's absence from the courtroom during certain proceedings did not constitute constitutional error. The jury charge errors in the punishment phase, including the incorrect formulation of the verdict form and the erroneous burden of proof on the mitigation issue, resulted in egregious harm, leading to the reversal of the death sentences and a remand for a new punishment trial. Other punishment phase issues raised by the appellant were dismissed as moot. View "BLUNTSON v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

In December 2019, Andrew Christian Temple, Vanessa Marquez, David Deschepper, and others were part of the homeless community in Temecula, California. On December 21, 2019, Temple fatally stabbed Deschepper in a Motel 6 parking lot after an altercation. Temple claimed self-defense, stating that Deschepper had attacked him first. However, evidence showed that Temple used excessive force, including pursuing and repeatedly stabbing Deschepper even after he fell to the ground.The Superior Court of Riverside convicted Temple of second-degree murder, finding that he used a deadly weapon and inflicted great bodily injury. Temple was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred in jury instructions regarding imperfect self-defense and mental disorders, in using CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224, and in denying a trial continuance to locate a material witness.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that any instructional error regarding imperfect self-defense was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Temple used excessive force. The court also found no error in using CALCRIM No. 225, as the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence only for Temple’s mental state. Lastly, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, as there was no indication the witness could be located within a reasonable time.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, upholding Temple’s conviction and sentence. View "People v. Temple" on Justia Law

In April 2019, the State of Montana charged Cheyene Leilani-Amber Zielie with several offenses, including felony possession of dangerous drugs. In September 2019, she pled guilty to the felony charge and received a three-year suspended sentence. In March 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke her suspended sentence due to violations, but later moved to dismiss the petition with prejudice, which the District Court granted. Subsequently, in May 2021, the State filed a second petition to revoke her suspended sentence based on new criminal charges.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District initially dismissed the first petition with prejudice, which led to confusion about whether the entire case was dismissed. When the State filed the second petition, the District Court issued an arrest warrant, and the case proceeded. During a hearing in November 2022, the defense argued that the case had been dismissed with prejudice, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, interpreting the original dismissal as pertaining only to the petition, not the entire case. The court then revoked Zielie’s suspended sentence and sentenced her to three years with the Department of Corrections.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court only had the authority to dismiss the petition to revoke, not the entire sentence, and that the dismissal order was a clerical error. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss but reversed the decision regarding the additional 66 days of credit for time served. The case was remanded for resentencing to include the additional credit. View "State v. Zielie" on Justia Law