Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Two healthcare professionals operated a clinic specializing in pain management in Kentucky. One owned and managed the clinic, while the other served as its medical director. Together, they implemented a scheme to maximize profits by routinely ordering and billing insurers for both basic and more expensive, specialized urine drug tests for patients, regardless of actual medical need. The clinic eventually acquired in-house testing equipment to further increase billing. Staff raised concerns about the medical necessity of the tests and the reliability of the equipment, but the practice continued. The clinic also billed for tests conducted on malfunctioning equipment and for tests whose results could not be used for patient care due to processing delays.A grand jury indicted both individuals for conspiracy to commit health care fraud, substantive health care fraud, and (for one defendant) unlawful distribution of controlled substances. Both defendants went to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The jury convicted one defendant of health care fraud, and the other of both health care fraud and conspiracy to commit health care fraud. After denying post-trial motions for acquittal and new trial, the district court sentenced both to below-Guidelines imprisonment terms, after calculating loss amounts based on insurer payments for unnecessary testing, with a discount for tests likely to have been medically necessary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held there was sufficient evidence to support both defendants’ convictions, upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings (including admission of propensity and patient death evidence with limiting instructions), found no variance between the indictment and proof at trial, and determined that one defendant’s conflict-of-interest waiver was valid. The court also affirmed the district court’s methodology for estimating loss amounts for sentencing and restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Siefert" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence that included enhancements for firearm use and gang involvement, resulting in a total sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, and his sentence was reduced to 32 years to life. Years later, the defendant filed several petitions for resentencing, arguing that he was improperly sentenced due to changes in the law and because he was not the actual shooter. The trial court eventually acknowledged that the defendant was serving a longer sentence than he should have, as he was not eligible for the firearm enhancement once the gang enhancement was stricken, but believed it lacked the authority to correct the sentence absent a habeas corpus petition or a request from the district attorney or the Department of Corrections.The Los Angeles County Superior Court repeatedly denied the defendant’s requests for resentencing, finding either that he failed to make a prima facie case under the applicable statutes or that the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Although the trial court recognized a sentencing error, it maintained that procedural limitations prevented it from acting unless prompted by a specific type of petition or an external agency.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that the trial court did have the authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of procedural posture or the form of the defendant’s petition. The appellate court concluded that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the usual statutory restrictions and time limits, and it reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a prompt resentencing hearing and correct the sentence if it is found to be unauthorized. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

On July 30, 2022, police responded to Omar Johnson's home after a 911 call reported domestic violence. While investigating, officers discovered a loaded pistol in Johnson's moped and determined he did not possess a valid firearm license. Johnson was arrested and indicted for multiple counts of criminal weapon possession and possession of ammunition. These events occurred shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, but before New York amended its firearm licensing laws.Johnson moved to dismiss the indictment in the Supreme Court of New York County, arguing that Bruen invalidated the state's "proper cause" requirement for firearm licenses and, by extension, rendered the entire licensing scheme unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Johnson lacked standing because he had not applied for a license and that Bruen invalidated only the "proper cause" requirement, not the entire scheme. Johnson pleaded guilty, waiving his right to appeal, and was sentenced to probation. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, concluding that the appeal waiver was valid, Johnson lacked standing, and his conviction was not unconstitutional under Bruen.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that Johnson’s facial constitutional challenge to the licensing scheme was not waived by his appeal waiver, as such claims implicate broader societal interests. The Court determined that Johnson had standing to raise a facial challenge, even though he never applied for a license, because his conviction directly resulted from the licensing scheme. On the merits, the Court concluded that Bruen’s invalidation of only the "proper cause" requirement did not render the entire New York firearm licensing scheme unconstitutional, as the requirement is severable. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Johnson" on Justia Law

Sheryl Robertson was arrested in Custer County, Idaho, for felony possession of methamphetamine and ultimately pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced her to a ten-year term, retained jurisdiction for one year, and later placed her on probation with additional requirements after she admitted to multiple probation violations. These requirements included completing 100 hours of community service and successfully participating in a treatment court program. Robertson entered the Bonneville County Wood Court but encountered issues with the program and requested transfer to a different treatment court. The State subsequently moved to terminate her participation in Wood Court and revoke her probation, alleging further rule violations.Robertson waived her right to a termination hearing in Wood Court using forms that referenced only the treatment court termination, not probation revocation. The district court proceeded directly to disposition on the alleged probation violation, reasoning that Robertson’s waiver in Wood Court extended to her right to a probation-revocation hearing. Robertson was sentenced to a modified term of incarceration, and she appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, finding that the procedures under the Idaho Rules for Treatment Courts (I.R.T.C.) were followed and provided the required due process, but declined to address whether Robertson had received the process required by the Fourteenth Amendment as articulated in Morrissey v. Brewer.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Robertson’s waiver of her right to a probation-revocation hearing was not knowing and intelligent, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The forms she signed did not clearly communicate that waiving the Wood Court termination hearing also constituted a waiver of the right to a probation-revocation hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order revoking probation and imposing a modified sentence, and remanded the case for a probation-revocation hearing. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Kevin LaMarcus Mitchell, who has a history of criminal conduct, was previously convicted of being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a felony offense. Years later, during the execution of an unrelated arrest warrant, law enforcement found firearms in the room he occupied and Mitchell admitted to daily marijuana use. Based on his prior § 922(g)(3) conviction, Mitchell was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 922(g)(1).After his indictment, Mitchell moved to dismiss the charge on several constitutional grounds, including an as-applied Second Amendment challenge in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. The district court denied his motion, after which Mitchell entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue. He was sentenced to sixty-four months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that, under Bruen and its own precedent, the Second Amendment’s plain text covers Mitchell’s conduct and that the only relevant predicate offense for an as-applied challenge is his prior § 922(g)(3) conviction. The court found that the government failed to identify a historical tradition justifying permanent disarmament of individuals with a predicate offense based solely on habitual marijuana use, in the absence of evidence of active intoxication while possessing a firearm. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mitchell’s predicate offense, reversed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, and vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a Michigan state jury of first-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm. The homicide occurred in a Detroit neighborhood known for drug trafficking, where the victim was found with multiple gunshot wounds and no physical evidence tying any individual to the crime. Two witnesses, both local drug dealers, initially denied knowledge of the shooting but later identified the petitioner as the shooter after being arrested on unrelated charges. Their trial testimony was the primary evidence against the petitioner, as there was no physical evidence or eyewitness identification from the scene.Following his conviction, the petitioner pursued direct appeals and post-conviction relief through the Michigan courts, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Those efforts were unsuccessful. He then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied. Years later, he sought state court relief again, now relying on an affidavit from another individual who claimed to have witnessed the murder and identified a different perpetrator. The state trial court rejected this new evidence as unreliable and insufficient to overcome procedural barriers, and subsequent appeals in the state courts were denied. The petitioner returned to federal court with a second habeas petition, presenting affidavits including recantations and new claims of innocence. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the petition, finding it untimely and failing to meet the stringent requirements for successive habeas petitions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It agreed that the petitioner did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements for successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), nor did he establish grounds for equitable tolling based on actual innocence. The Sixth Circuit held that the new affidavits presented were unreliable and would not clearly and convincingly prevent any reasonable juror from convicting the petitioner. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the habeas petition. View "Houston v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of felony driving under the influence causing injury, with a prior DUI conviction, after causing a crash that injured another person. As part of her plea agreement, the defendant was ordered to serve jail time, complete probation and an alcohol program, and pay over $78,000 in restitution to the victim. After successfully completing her probation, she petitioned the trial court to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17. At the time of her petition, she had paid only a small portion of the restitution, explaining that job and license loss hampered her ability to pay, and that relief would help her restore her employment and ability to pay.The Superior Court of Napa County denied both requests, emphasizing the limited amount of restitution paid as a principal reason for denial, along with the defendant’s prior DUI and delays in completing her alcohol program. The trial court suggested that a more substantial restitution payment might warrant a different result in the future. The People argued that unpaid restitution could be considered among other factors in denying relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of sections 1203.4 and 17. The court held that under both statutes, an unfulfilled order of restitution or restitution fine cannot be relied upon as any basis for denying expungement or reduction of a conviction, not even as a partial factor. Because the trial court based its denial on unpaid restitution, the appellate court found this to be legal error. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration without reliance on the unpaid restitution. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

A decorated Army sergeant was convicted in Virginia after pleading guilty to two counts of malicious wounding and other charges stemming from separate incidents occurring on a single day in March 2011. At the time, he had recently returned home from combat in Afghanistan, where he had suffered multiple serious injuries, including two traumatic brain injuries. His crimes included shooting a woman during an altercation and, later that day, assaulting a man in a bar. He received a sentence of 46 years, well above the state’s discretionary sentencing guidelines.On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia both affirmed his convictions and sentence, finding no error in the sentencing court’s weighing of mitigating evidence. The defendant then pursued state habeas relief in the Circuit Courts for the City and County of Roanoke, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. He contended his lawyer failed to present readily available mitigating evidence, including details of his military service, combat injuries, mental health struggles (especially PTSD), and failed to object to the use of his expunged juvenile criminal record. The state court denied relief, concluding there was no prejudice, and the Supreme Court of Virginia summarily refused further appeal.In subsequent federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied relief, holding that the state decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held that the state court applied the wrong legal standard for prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, failed to consider the totality of available mitigating evidence, and that there was a reasonable probability of a different sentence had counsel performed adequately. The case was remanded with instructions to grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the Commonwealth provides plenary resentencing within a reasonable time. View "Coleman v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Kortney Elzey, while serving a sentence for home improvement fraud in Huntington County Jail, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. He requested that his petition be forwarded to the State Public Defender because he was indigent. The trial court denied both his request for referral and his petition for post-conviction relief. The record in this appeal involved multiple case numbers, and one appellate issue concerned credit time calculations.The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of credit time, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer but summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on that issue. Elzey argued that the trial court erred by not referring his post-conviction petition to the Public Defender. The State responded that, under the Indiana Rules of Post-Conviction Remedies, referral to the Public Defender is only required for petitioners incarcerated in the Department of Correction, not county jails.The Indiana Supreme Court held that, although the relevant statute (Indiana Code Section 33-40-1-2) requires the Public Defender to represent indigent petitioners confined in any “penal facility,” including county jails, the procedural court rule only required referral when the petitioner was in the Department of Correction. Because the trial court followed the rule as written, no reversible error occurred. The Supreme Court recognized a gap between the statute and the rule and referred the matter to its Rules Committee to amend the rule so it applies to all penal facilities. The Court concluded that the Public Defender’s duty to represent applies to all indigent individuals confined in penal facilities, but procedural referral requirements must be updated. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and initiated rulemaking to address the identified gap. View "Elzey v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Albany County, Wyoming, arrested an individual who had an outstanding warrant and was found in possession of controlled substances. During the arrest, officers located his truck, had a K9 unit alert to it, and towed it to an evidence bay. After obtaining a warrant, they searched the truck and seized substances later determined not to be illegal drugs. The truck was then released by law enforcement to a towing company, where it was placed in storage pending payment of fees. The owner was not notified of this arrangement until several months later. By the time he learned of the truck’s location, storage fees had accumulated to an amount he could not pay, and the truck was eventually sold at auction. The owner asserted he never received notice that the truck could be sold to cover the fees.The District Court of Albany County heard the owner’s pro se motion for return of the truck or, alternatively, for compensation equal to its value. The State responded that it no longer had possession of the vehicle, as it had been released to the towing company and not seized for forfeiture. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority to order return of property it no longer possessed or to award money damages under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and held that a court has no jurisdiction under Rule 41(g) to order the return of property or award damages when the government no longer possesses the property. The court reaffirmed that sovereign immunity bars monetary relief under this rule and that any claim for damages must proceed as a separate civil action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. View "Bressette v. State" on Justia Law