Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jonathan Russell Wright was convicted by a jury in 2012 for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, a federal offense, and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Controlled Substances Act. The life sentence was imposed due to three prior convictions under Arkansas law for cocaine-related offenses, which triggered a mandatory minimum enhancement. Years later, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which reduced mandatory minimum penalties for certain drug offenses but did not apply retroactively. Wright sought a sentence reduction in 2024, arguing that changes in law, including the First Step Act and recent case law, created a gross disparity between his sentence and what he would receive today. He claimed his prior Arkansas convictions should no longer qualify as predicate offenses for enhancement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas-Central granted Wright’s motion in part, reducing his sentence to 420 months and imposing ten years of supervised release. The court acknowledged the disparity created by the First Step Act as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for reduction but rejected Wright’s argument that his prior Arkansas convictions could not serve as predicate offenses, citing prior decisions. Wright appealed, arguing for a lower sentence and challenging the district court’s treatment of his prior convictions and its weighing of sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, first addressing whether President Biden’s commutation of Wright’s sentence to 330 months mooted the appeal. The Eighth Circuit held that the commutation did not moot the case, as courts retain authority over judicial sentences. On the merits, the court found that Wright’s Arkansas convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses under federal law and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider this legal development. The Eighth Circuit vacated Wright’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with its ruling. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 2020, an activist named Sir Maejor Page created and operated a Facebook page for an organization called Black Lives Matter of Greater Atlanta (BLMGA), which he registered as a nonprofit in Georgia and obtained tax-exempt status. After failing to file required tax forms for three years, BLMGA’s tax-exempt status was revoked, but the organization continued to appear as a nonprofit on Facebook and receive donations. Following the death of George Floyd, donations surged to over $490,000. Page assured donors that the money would support protests and related activities, but he instead used the funds for personal expenses, including luxury items, a house, home renovations, firearms, and hiring a prostitute.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio indicted Page on one count of wire fraud and three counts of money laundering, alleging he defrauded donors by misrepresenting the intended use of their contributions. At trial, Page testified in his defense, but the jury found him guilty on all counts. During sentencing, the district court adopted the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendations, overruling Page’s objections regarding obstruction of justice, loss amount, and number of victims. The court imposed a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Page’s convictions and sentence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the wire fraud and money laundering convictions, finding Page’s misrepresentations induced donations and that the funds were used for personal benefit. The court also upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing enhancements, concluding there was no plain or prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Page’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Page" on Justia Law

Richard Neil Burkett was involved in a physical altercation with his brother-in-law at a convenience store in Texas County, Missouri. Witnesses stated that after being separated from his brother-in-law, Burkett pointed a semiautomatic handgun at him, threatened him, and pulled the trigger, although the gun did not fire. Burkett gave several inconsistent accounts to law enforcement, at first denying having a gun, then claiming self-defense, and finally admitting to pointing the gun after the fight was over. At trial, Burkett’s defense was that he never intended to harm his brother-in-law and only sought to scare him, arguing his gun was unloaded and he lacked intent to injure.The Circuit Court of Texas County conducted a jury trial, where Burkett was found guilty of first-degree assault and armed criminal action. During trial, Burkett did not request a self-defense instruction nor object to the jury instructions, and his counsel did not object to the State’s closing argument, which inaccurately stated that intent was not required for first-degree assault. Burkett’s post-trial motion did not raise these issues.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Burkett’s appeal, in which he requested plain error review on two grounds: the lack of a self-defense instruction and the absence of a curative instruction after the State’s misstatement of law in closing argument. The court held that although Burkett may have injected self-defense into the case through his testimony, he failed to request the instruction or object to its absence, and his trial strategy was inconsistent with self-defense. Similarly, Burkett did not object to the State’s closing argument or request a curative instruction. The Supreme Court of Missouri exercised its discretion to decline plain error review for both claims and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "State v. Burkett" on Justia Law

On February 4, 2020, Isis S. Jones engaged in a series of phone calls with D.W. while D.W. was at Victim’s apartment. After a heated argument, Victim drove D.W. to her aunt’s house, during which Jones continued calling. Near their destination, Victim heard a gunshot, stopped her car, and Jones approached the vehicle, hitting the driver’s side window with a gun. D.W. exited and fought with Jones, while Victim drove away, hearing a second gunshot. Police later observed a bullet hole in Victim’s vehicle, and Victim identified Jones as the shooter. Jones was charged with unlawful use of a weapon—specifically, the class B felony of shooting at a motor vehicle—and an accompanying charge of armed criminal action.The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis conducted a jury trial, during which the jury was instructed to decide if Jones had shot “into” a motor vehicle, which corresponds to a class E felony, rather than “at” a motor vehicle as charged. Jones did not object to this instruction. The jury found Jones guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and armed criminal action. Jones subsequently entered into a sentencing agreement, receiving a 15-year sentence for the weapon charge (execution suspended for probation) and three years for armed criminal action. Jones appealed, arguing for the first time that the variance between the charged offense and the jury instruction led to manifest injustice due to the greater sentence imposed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Jones’ claim under Rule 30.20 for plain error, which allows discretionary review of unpreserved errors resulting in manifest injustice. The court held that Jones failed to establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error, as the distinction between shooting “at” and “into” a vehicle did not constitute a facially evident, obvious, and clear error. The court declined plain error review and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Cass County, Missouri received a report on July 12, 2021, alleging that Israel Barrera molested a fourteen-year-old girl over several years. A subsequent medical examination confirmed that the girl had contracted trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease, and she denied having any consensual sexual partners. Barrera was taken into custody on September 1, 2021, and officers initially seized a urine sample and buccal swab pursuant to a warrant. However, the urine sample was unusable, leading law enforcement to seek new warrants: one to seize another urine sample (warrant 1) and one to test that sample (warrant 2). The urine sample seized under warrant 1 tested positive for trichomoniasis.The Circuit Court of Cass County found that warrant 1 failed to establish probable cause to seize and test Barrera’s urine, and consequently suppressed the urine test results. The court also determined that the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the supporting affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not rely on it. The court further found warrant 2 unnecessary, as warrant 1 authorized both the seizure and search of the urine. The state appealed this suppression order.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause supported the application for warrant 1. The Court found that the corroborative details in the affidavit—such as medical confirmation of the STD and the victim’s denial of consensual partners—provided sufficient factual support for probable cause under a commonsense, totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the Circuit Court’s suppression of the urine test results and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court also affirmed the finding that warrant 2 was unnecessary. View "State v. Barrera" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2003 of voluntary manslaughter, robbery, possession of a firearm, and received various sentence enhancements, including a prior strike, a firearm enhancement, and seven prior prison term enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 42 years and four months. Two restitution fines of $5,000 each were also imposed. In 2023, following legislative changes, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which invalidated certain prior prison term enhancements. The defendant sought to have those enhancements stricken and also requested further modifications, including striking the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and imposing a lesser term for the manslaughter conviction.At the Superior Court of Sacramento County, during the resentencing hearing held in October 2024, the court struck the seven prior prison term enhancements, reducing the sentence to 35 years and four months. However, the court declined to strike the prior strike and firearm enhancement, and reimposed the original restitution fines and victim restitution. The updated abstract of judgment noted the restitution fines were “stayed.” The defendant appealed, raising constitutional and statutory challenges to the reimposition of the upper term, the denial of his request to strike the firearm enhancement under section 1385, and the continued imposition of the restitution fine.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that the trial court did not err by reimposing the upper term for voluntary manslaughter without requiring new findings of aggravating circumstances under amended section 1170, subdivision (b), because section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) exempts previously imposed upper terms from these requirements. The court also found no abuse of discretion or statutory error in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement, as no applicable mitigating factors were established. However, the court concluded that the restitution fine originally imposed in 2003 must be vacated under section 1465.9, as more than ten years had elapsed. The judgment was affirmed as modified to vacate the restitution fine. View "P. v. Salstrom" on Justia Law

One defendant in this case was a high-ranking member of the Varrio Fallbrook Locos gang and the Mexican Mafia, while a codefendant acted as a secretary within the gang structure. In December 2013, the defendant participated in a meeting regarding methamphetamine sales, which resulted in the violent assault of another gang member, A.C., after accusations of unpaid debts. Following the assault, the defendant attempted to prevent A.C. from testifying and conspired to arrange the murder of another gang affiliate. The defendant was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including assault with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to dissuade a witness, among others. The trial court imposed a lengthy prison sentence and ordered the defendant to pay various fines and ancillary costs, despite defense counsel’s request to consider the defendant’s inability to pay.The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the monetary orders. It held that the trial court should have considered the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing ancillary costs but rejected the argument that an ability-to-pay finding was required for punitive fines. The appellate court clarified that fines could still be challenged under the excessive fines clauses of the federal and state constitutions and remanded the case for resentencing and further proceedings regarding the fines and costs.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve inconsistent approaches among lower courts concerning court-ordered financial obligations. The Court held that challenges to the amount of criminal fines must be reviewed under the excessive fines clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. Separately, the Court held that, upon request, a sentencing court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing court operations and facilities assessments, as failing to do so violates equal protection. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "P. v. Kopp" on Justia Law

The defendant and his girlfriend entered the home of an elderly couple, Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher, where they stabbed and suffocated the victims, stole their valuables, and fled in the victims’ car. Harty died immediately. Fisher, a nonambulatory, seventy-seven-year-old woman who used a wheelchair, survived initially but later died from complications due to multiple stab wounds. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for both victims and, as to Fisher, also of attempted murder.Previously, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed and affirmed the convictions, but noted that the jury instruction for attempted murder incorrectly included the failure to complete murder as an element. The court allowed the defendant to raise the issue of legally inconsistent verdicts in a postconviction motion. The Superior Court, after considering whether the acts supporting the attempted murder and murder convictions were sufficiently separate and whether the defendant had notice of alternate theories, found both questions answered in the affirmative and denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions.On further appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the verdicts were not legally inconsistent. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant’s act of attempting to smother Fisher with pillows was separate from the subsequent fatal stabbing, and each act could support distinct convictions. The court also found that the defendant received adequate notice of the theories underlying each charge. Therefore, the court affirmed the order denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the convictions, holding that no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice resulted from the erroneous jury instruction. View "Commonwealth v. Hart" on Justia Law

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle driven by the appellant for traffic violations and discovered that his driver’s license had been canceled. During the stop, the officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Citing only the odor as justification, the officer conducted a warrantless search of the car. During the search, the officer found ammunition in a locked safe in the backseat. The appellant was prohibited by law from possessing ammunition and was subsequently charged with that offense, as well as with driving after cancellation.The trial court, the Scott County District Court, granted the appellant’s motion to suppress the ammunition, ruling that the search violated his constitutional rights. This ruling came after the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Torgerson, which held that the smell of marijuana alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The State appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because, at the time of the search, officers could reasonably have relied on existing appellate precedent that arguably permitted such searches.The Supreme Court of Minnesota, reviewing the case, rejected the application of the good-faith exception. The court held that there was no binding appellate precedent specifically authorizing warrantless vehicle searches based solely on the smell of marijuana at the time of the search, and previous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions had emphasized the need to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. The court concluded that the good-faith exception did not apply, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Douglas" on Justia Law