Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. These charges stemmed from two prior cases involving allegations of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, both concerning a minor family member. In each prior case, the Superior Court issued protective orders requiring the defendant to surrender firearms and ammunition. In 2022, the defendant was arrested for allegedly possessing firearms or ammunition in violation of those protective orders.After the 2022 arrest, the defendant moved to dismiss the new charges, arguing that the protective orders were not issued "in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force" as required by Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(4)(A), since the underlying offenses did not explicitly include use of physical force as an element. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant then entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to one count each of criminal possession of a firearm or ammunition and criminal violation of a protective order. The state entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining charges. The defendant appealed, and the case was transferred from the Appellate Court to the Connecticut Supreme Court.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It held that the phrase "a case involving" in § 53a-217(a)(4)(A) is broadly inclusive and refers to the overall proceeding, not just the elements of the charged offense. Therefore, protective orders issued during prosecutions for sex offenses, where the use or threat of physical force or superior physical strength was present in any aspect, satisfy the statute. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, finding it provided sufficient guidance. Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to the validity of the protective orders was barred by the collateral bar rule. View "State v. Enrrique H." on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged in three separate criminal cases for drug-related offenses in Solano County. Two of these cases involved charges under Health and Safety Code section 11395, which was newly established by Proposition 36 and criminalizes possession of a hard drug with two prior drug-related convictions. The third case concerned possession for sale of a controlled substance. The petitioner sought pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 for all pending charges, arguing that he had a qualifying mental health diagnosis and was a suitable candidate for diversion, while also requesting treatment under section 11395.The Solano County Superior Court ruled that the petitioner was ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion for the section 11395 charges, interpreting the statute as precluding diversion due to its “notwithstanding any other law” language. The court granted pretrial mental health diversion for the possession for sale charge but denied it for the section 11395 charges, reasoning that the treatment-mandated felony provisions of section 11395 superseded the diversion option. After denial of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner sought relief via a writ of mandate.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the statutory interplay between section 11395 and Penal Code section 1001.36 de novo. The court held that section 11395 does not expressly or impliedly preclude trial courts from granting pretrial mental health diversion to defendants charged under section 11395. It found that both statutes can coexist, as section 11395 provides a postconviction treatment path and does not bar the pretrial diversion process. Accordingly, the appellate court directed the superior court to vacate its denial and to reconsider the petitioner’s requests for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. View "Reed v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After serving nearly 19 years in prison for a series of robberies, the defendant was released on parole. Within eight months, at age 57, he committed 10 new robberies, each involving the use of a pellet gun to threaten employees and take cash. He did not physically harm anyone during these offenses. The jury convicted him of 13 counts of second-degree robbery, finding he had used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and the trial court determined he had three prior serious felony convictions. The defendant was sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law to a total of 369 years to life.Following a change in sentencing law that gave trial judges discretion to strike five-year prior conviction enhancements, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended resentencing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County recalled the defendant’s sentence, struck the prior conviction and weapon enhancements, and resentenced him to 225 years to life. The defendant appealed, arguing that the resentencing was not a “meaningful modification” as suggested by the uncodified statement of intent from the 2023 bill amending Penal Code section 1172.1, and that his postconviction rehabilitation and low risk of reoffending were not properly considered. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the trial court’s calculation of postsentence conduct credits.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the uncodified statement of legislative intent does not create a mandate for resentencing to advance release or parole dates. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave the Three Strikes sentence intact, given the defendant’s extensive recidivism. The ineffective assistance claims lacked merit, as the arguments were unsupported. However, the appellate court modified the judgment to remove postsentence conduct credits, which should be calculated by the Department of Corrections. The judgment was affirmed as modified, and a separate appeal from the trial court’s decision not to act on the defendant’s motion to vacate the new sentence was dismissed as non-appealable. View "People v. Brammer" on Justia Law

Francisco Padilla-Canales, a Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrant, was arrested after breaking into a residence where his estranged wife was staying with another man, Lesman Escobar Andara. Upon discovering them together, Padilla-Canales stabbed Andara, who died at the scene. Padilla-Canales attempted to have his wife report the incident as a suicide and performed CPR until emergency services arrived. He was advised soon after arrest, in Spanish, that a conviction could lead to deportation, and signed documentation acknowledging this warning. More than a year later, he pled guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide under a nonbinding plea agreement.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County, Montana, accepted Padilla-Canales’s guilty plea after confirming he understood the charges and potential penalties, and that there were no communication barriers due to language. However, at the change-of-plea hearing, the court did not specifically advise Padilla-Canales of the immigration consequences of his plea or confirm his understanding of those consequences, as required by Montana law. Both the State and defense counsel referenced his immigration status during sentencing, discussing that deportation would likely follow his prison term. The District Court sentenced Padilla-Canales to forty years in prison without parole restrictions.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Padilla-Canales argued for the first time that his guilty plea was involuntary due to the District Court’s failure to properly advise him about potential deportation. The Supreme Court recognized the advisement failure but concluded that, in this case, Padilla-Canales was aware of the immigration consequences through discussions in open court and with counsel. The Court declined to exercise plain error review, holding that the record did not reveal a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the fairness of the proceedings, and affirmed the District Court’s sentencing order. View "State v. Padilla-Canales" on Justia Law

In this case, a woman was accused of participating in a staged burglary intended to facilitate an insurance fraud scheme. The orchestrator of the scheme, seeking funds to pay her son's legal fees, enlisted several individuals to help remove and conceal items from her home, including a refrigerator and a boat, while her husband was away. Law enforcement initiated an investigation after the orchestrator’s husband discovered the apparent burglary and contacted police. The accused woman was alleged to have assisted in disassembling and moving the refrigerator and in storing the stolen items at her own residence, knowing that an official investigation was imminent.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Richland County presided over the case. Before trial, the defendant requested that a witness be allowed to testify by video due to travel difficulties, but the court required in-person testimony. The defendant also requested an “accomplice instruction” for the jury, arguing that a key witness’s testimony should be viewed with distrust as that witness was allegedly an accomplice. The court denied both requests, finding the accomplice instruction inapplicable because the relevant charges had been amended. After hearing testimony from the orchestrator, other involved parties, and law enforcement, the jury acquitted the defendant of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud but convicted her of tampering with evidence. The defendant then appealed, arguing errors in jury instructions, witness testimony procedures, and sufficiency of corroborating evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not commit reversible error in denying the accomplice instruction, as it would have been inconsistent with the defendant’s claim of innocence on the tampering charge. The court further determined there was no abuse of discretion in denying the video testimony request and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for tampering with evidence. View "State v. Lord" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after a series of threatening incidents toward his former girlfriend, attacked her and her friend, Daniel Martinez, outside her workplace. The defendant dragged his ex-girlfriend by the hair while wielding a knife. When Martinez intervened, the defendant stabbed him multiple times. These events led to the defendant being charged and later convicted of several offenses, including the attempted murder of Martinez, assault with a deadly weapon, stalking, and battery involving a dating relationship. He was acquitted of the attempted murder charge related to his ex-girlfriend. Enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury were found true, and the defendant was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison.Following his conviction, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that his case might qualify for relief under changes to the law that limited certain doctrines of murder liability. The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, reasoning that the defendant was convicted as a direct perpetrator with intent to kill, not under any vicarious liability theory such as the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court also declined to act on his request for recall of sentence under section 1172.1.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the denial of the section 1172.6 petition, holding that the record of conviction conclusively established the defendant’s ineligibility for relief because he was not convicted under a theory of vicarious liability. The appellate court also dismissed the portion of the appeal pertaining to the section 1172.1 request, finding it was not an appealable order. View "People v. Anaya" on Justia Law

Bryan Repple was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol by a Maitland police officer in Maitland, Florida. After the arrest, the officer transported Repple to a breath test facility located outside the city limits, in Orange County, where the officer read the statutory implied consent warning and requested Repple to submit to a breath test. Repple complied, and the test revealed an illegal breath-alcohol level. The central issue in the case was whether the officer, acting outside his municipal jurisdiction when requesting the breath test, had legal authority to do so under Florida law.The matter first came before a Florida trial court, which granted Repple’s motion to suppress the breath test results, finding that the Maitland officer lacked authority to request the test outside his jurisdiction. The Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed this suppression order, concluding that no legal basis existed for the officer’s extraterritorial action, and rejecting the State’s argument that a continuing investigation exception applied. The district court noted no evidence of a mutual aid agreement and found no statutory or judicial authorization for such extraterritorial police power. The Sixth District certified a direct conflict with a decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Torres, which had held that a municipal officer could request a breath test outside his jurisdiction as part of a continuing DUI investigation.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case based on the certified conflict. It held that, under Florida’s implied consent law, a municipal police officer who makes a DUI arrest within his jurisdiction is implicitly authorized to request a breath test outside his jurisdiction when necessary to complete the statutory process. The Court quashed the Sixth District’s decision in Repple and approved the result in Torres, clarifying that the officer’s authority arose by necessary implication from the statute. View "State v. Repple" on Justia Law

A motel guest noticed a person he did not know walking alongside him as he retrieved an item from his car. When the guest returned to the motel entrance, he used his keycard to unlock the door. At that moment, the other individual quickly grabbed the keycard from the guest’s hand and ran into the motel. The guest followed, asking the individual to go to the front desk to resolve the situation. The individual instead threw the keycard, ran out, and was later found exiting a motel room that was not his. After a short chase, the guest and a motel manager detained him until the police arrived. Throughout the encounter, there were no threats or other contact beyond the grabbing of the keycard.The case was tried in the Baker County Circuit Court, where the defendant was charged with third-degree robbery under Oregon law, which requires the use or threatened use of physical force upon another person during a theft. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not show he used or threatened “physical force.” The trial court denied this motion, relying on prior Oregon Court of Appeals precedent interpreting “physical force” broadly. The defendant was convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding its own precedent controlled.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. The court held that the legislature intended “physical force upon another person” in the robbery statute to mean contact that either causes bodily harm or is reasonably capable of creating a sense of fear or danger that such harm will occur. The court found that the defendant’s actions—quickly grabbing the keycard without other contact or threat—did not meet that standard. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Jonathan Russell Wright was convicted by a jury in 2012 for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, a federal offense, and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Controlled Substances Act. The life sentence was imposed due to three prior convictions under Arkansas law for cocaine-related offenses, which triggered a mandatory minimum enhancement. Years later, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which reduced mandatory minimum penalties for certain drug offenses but did not apply retroactively. Wright sought a sentence reduction in 2024, arguing that changes in law, including the First Step Act and recent case law, created a gross disparity between his sentence and what he would receive today. He claimed his prior Arkansas convictions should no longer qualify as predicate offenses for enhancement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas-Central granted Wright’s motion in part, reducing his sentence to 420 months and imposing ten years of supervised release. The court acknowledged the disparity created by the First Step Act as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for reduction but rejected Wright’s argument that his prior Arkansas convictions could not serve as predicate offenses, citing prior decisions. Wright appealed, arguing for a lower sentence and challenging the district court’s treatment of his prior convictions and its weighing of sentencing factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, first addressing whether President Biden’s commutation of Wright’s sentence to 330 months mooted the appeal. The Eighth Circuit held that the commutation did not moot the case, as courts retain authority over judicial sentences. On the merits, the court found that Wright’s Arkansas convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses under federal law and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider this legal development. The Eighth Circuit vacated Wright’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with its ruling. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 2020, an activist named Sir Maejor Page created and operated a Facebook page for an organization called Black Lives Matter of Greater Atlanta (BLMGA), which he registered as a nonprofit in Georgia and obtained tax-exempt status. After failing to file required tax forms for three years, BLMGA’s tax-exempt status was revoked, but the organization continued to appear as a nonprofit on Facebook and receive donations. Following the death of George Floyd, donations surged to over $490,000. Page assured donors that the money would support protests and related activities, but he instead used the funds for personal expenses, including luxury items, a house, home renovations, firearms, and hiring a prostitute.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio indicted Page on one count of wire fraud and three counts of money laundering, alleging he defrauded donors by misrepresenting the intended use of their contributions. At trial, Page testified in his defense, but the jury found him guilty on all counts. During sentencing, the district court adopted the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendations, overruling Page’s objections regarding obstruction of justice, loss amount, and number of victims. The court imposed a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Page’s convictions and sentence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the wire fraud and money laundering convictions, finding Page’s misrepresentations induced donations and that the funds were used for personal benefit. The court also upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing enhancements, concluding there was no plain or prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Page’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Page" on Justia Law