Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent with the complainant, K.R., who had spent the afternoon and evening drinking at several bars. The two were acquaintances and exchanged messages on Facebook, with K.R. inviting the defendant to her home. K.R. later testified that she did not remember the events after leaving the bar, including her communications with the defendant, driving home, or leaving her door unlocked. She recalled regaining awareness during a sexual encounter at her home, at which point she told the man to stop. The defendant asserted that he did not know K.R. was unable to consent, pointing to her actions and communications as evidence that she appeared functional.The Second Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the trial. The court excluded evidence of K.R.’s past alcohol use and denied the defense’s request to present expert testimony on the effects of regular alcohol consumption. The court also instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if he was aware of a “high probability” that K.R. was unable to consent, rather than requiring actual knowledge. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on the mental state required for conviction and its exclusion of certain evidence constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by giving a result-based instruction for “knowingly,” which lowered the State’s burden of proof and violated the defendant’s due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of K.R.’s past drinking habits or the expert testimony as offered. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Lewistown, Montana, investigated David Allen Pein for suspected marijuana distribution in 2016, using a confidential informant to conduct controlled purchases. A search of Pein’s residence yielded marijuana, paraphernalia, cash, and other evidence. Pein was charged with nine counts related to possession and distribution of marijuana. In 2017, Pein entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute (Count VI), while six other charges were dismissed. Two additional counts—felony Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs (Count IV) and felony Use or Possession of Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture (Count VIII)—were subject to a deferred prosecution agreement incorporated by reference into the plea agreement.The Tenth Judicial District Court deferred Pein’s sentence on Count VI. After Pein violated the terms of his deferred sentence and deferred prosecution agreement, the State reinstated prosecution on Counts IV and VIII. Pein was convicted by a jury on these counts in 2024 and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Pein appealed, challenging the validity of incorporating a deferred prosecution agreement into a plea agreement, as well as the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Montana’s plea agreement statute (§ 46-12-211, MCA) does not authorize the incorporation of a deferred prosecution agreement under the pretrial diversion statute (§ 46-16-130, MCA) into a plea agreement. The Court vacated Pein’s convictions for Counts IV and VIII and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed Pein’s conviction on Count VI, rejecting his argument that marijuana is incorrectly classified as a Schedule I drug. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "State v. Pein" on Justia Law

The petitioner was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree robbery and child neglect, in Kanawha County, West Virginia. After concerns about his competency arose during arraignment, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County ordered psychological evaluations. The petitioner was found incompetent to stand trial but likely to regain competency within ninety days, leading to his commitment to a state hospital for competency restoration. While initially participating in treatment, the petitioner later refused both group sessions and prescribed medication, prompting the hospital to seek court approval for involuntary medication to restore competency.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County held an evidentiary hearing, considering expert testimony and the petitioner’s objections. The court found that involuntary medication was necessary and appropriate, relying on the four-part test from Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The court granted the hospital’s request, authorizing involuntary administration of medication if the petitioner continued to refuse treatment. The petitioner then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, arguing that the state constitution provided greater protections than the federal standard and challenging the court’s authority to order involuntary medication.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the statutory framework and the constitutional arguments. It held that West Virginia law authorizes circuit courts to order involuntary medication for competency restoration and adopted the Sell test as the governing standard. The court further held that the State must prove the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence. Although the circuit court applied a lower standard, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient under the higher standard and denied the writ of prohibition, affirming the lower court’s order permitting involuntary medication for competency restoration. View "State of West Virginia ex rel. Urban v. The Honorable David Hardy" on Justia Law

On June 4, 2022, a Parkersburg police officer arrested Michael Keith Allman pursuant to an outstanding warrant. At the time of arrest, Mr. Allman was carrying a backpack, which he set down before being handcuffed. After backup officers arrived and secured the scene, police searched the backpack and discovered drugs, digital scales, and ammunition. These items formed the basis for multiple charges against Mr. Allman, including felony possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and related offenses.Following indictment by a Wood County Grand Jury, Mr. Allman moved to suppress the evidence found in the backpack, arguing that the warrantless search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the West Virginia Constitution. The Circuit Court of Wood County held a suppression hearing, where the arresting officer testified about the circumstances of the arrest and search. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the search was lawful as incident to arrest and justified by concerns for officer safety and preservation of evidence. Mr. Allman was subsequently convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The high court held that, although the seizure of the backpack was lawful, the warrantless search was not justified as a search incident to arrest because Mr. Allman was handcuffed and the backpack was not within his immediate control at the time of the search. The court found no applicable exception to the warrant requirement and concluded that the search violated Mr. Allman’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The court vacated Mr. Allman’s drug-related convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State of West Virginia v. Allman" on Justia Law

A violent home invasion occurred in Huntington, Cabell County, West Virginia, on November 22, 2020, when Nathan Dolen attacked Ronald and Orlinda Adkins, robbing them, inflicting serious injuries, and restraining them with handcuffs. Dolen stole firearms and other property, including a truck that he later burned. Both victims required hospitalization and rehabilitation. Dolen was indicted on thirteen felony counts, including kidnapping, robbery, assault, and arson. At trial, the State introduced cell site data and a PowerPoint mapping the locations of a phone associated with Dolen, which became a focus of the appeal. The jury convicted Dolen on all counts except one malicious assault charge.The Circuit Court of Cabell County presided over the trial. During trial, Dolen’s counsel objected to the admission of the PowerPoint, arguing it was not disclosed in discovery and that expert testimony about it violated Dolen’s confrontation rights because the testifying expert did not create the presentation. The court found that Dolen had received the underlying AT&T data and had time to review the PowerPoint before its admission, and allowed the expert to testify, finding no prejudice. Dolen also moved for acquittal on the kidnapping charges, arguing insufficient evidence and lack of intent for ransom, reward, or concession, but the court denied the motion. Dolen did not argue that the kidnapping was incidental to the robbery until appeal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the PowerPoint and expert testimony, finding no discovery violation or Confrontation Clause breach, as the expert independently verified the data. The court also found sufficient evidence for the kidnapping convictions and declined to review the “incidental to robbery” argument, as it was not preserved below. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "State of West Virginia v. Dolen" on Justia Law

Travis Rockhill was charged with the murder of Gary Matthews, who was shot outside a friend’s home and later died from his injuries. The prosecution presented evidence that Rockhill had a dispute with Matthews over a scooter sale and was angry with him prior to the shooting. The defense argued that another individual, Louie (“Primo”), was involved and that Rockhill was not the shooter. During Rockhill’s first trial, he made incriminating statements to the courtroom bailiff, but the prosecution did not introduce this evidence. The jury deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial.In the second trial, presided over by Judge Emily Cole, Rockhill testified in his own defense. After both sides rested, Judge Cole sent ex parte text messages to a former colleague at the District Attorney’s office, questioning why the prosecutor was not calling the bailiff as a rebuttal witness and suggesting someone should speak to the prosecutor about it. The prosecution did not act on this suggestion, and Rockhill was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. After the verdict, the prosecution disclosed Judge Cole’s ex parte communications to the defense. Judge Cole recused herself, acknowledging the impropriety but maintaining she had been impartial. Rockhill moved for a new trial based on judicial bias, but Judge Denise McLaughlin-Bennett of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion, finding no intent to intervene in the proceedings and no impact on the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Judge Cole’s ex parte communications constituted a due process violation and structural error, as they demonstrated an unconstitutional probability of actual judicial bias. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, directing the lower court to grant Rockhill’s motion for a new trial. View "P. v. Rockhill" on Justia Law

The case concerns Ryan Scott Warner, who was charged with the murder of Kayleigh S., the young daughter of his codefendant, Sara Lynn Krueger. The prosecution alleged that Warner either directly committed the murder or aided and abetted Krueger, with the sole theory presented to the jury being first degree murder by torture. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2017, Warner was found guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill but affirmed the murder conviction, finding ample evidence of intent to inflict extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and imputed malice, Warner petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding Warner had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes. Warner appealed, arguing the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding and that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, independently reviewed the record and affirmed the denial of Warner’s petition. The court held that Warner was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of murder liability—first degree murder by torture—that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. The jury’s findings necessarily established the required mental state for murder under current law, and Warner was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. Therefore, Warner is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "P. v. Warner" on Justia Law

Sara Lynn Krueger was charged with the murder of her young daughter, Kayleigh S., in Napa County, California. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed by torture, and Krueger was tried on the theory that she either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted her codefendant. The jury was instructed only on first degree murder by torture and not on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In May 2017, the jury found Krueger guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child, but the special circumstance finding of torture was later reversed on direct appeal due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill. The conviction for first degree murder was otherwise affirmed, and Krueger was sentenced to 25 years to life.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited certain theories of murder liability, Krueger filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing she was eligible for relief because the jury instructions allegedly permitted malice to be imputed based solely on her participation in torture. The Superior Court of Napa County denied her petition at the prima facie stage, finding she was ineligible for relief as a matter of law since she was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory amendments.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Krueger’s petition. The appellate court held that Krueger was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of first degree murder by torture, which remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. The jury’s findings and instructions required proof of a mental state more culpable than malice, and thus, Krueger could still be convicted under current law. The court concluded she was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Krueger" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested for possession of controlled substances in late December 2021 and released on his own recognizance. The State filed an Information in January 2022, charging him with possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury trials in Bingham County were suspended until late February 2022, creating a backlog of cases. The defendant’s trial was rescheduled multiple times, primarily because of delays in forensic testing and the unavailability of a forensic analyst. The district court repeatedly warned that older cases and limited judicial resources might further delay the trial. Ultimately, the defendant’s trial did not occur within the six-month statutory period, and he moved to dismiss the case, arguing violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights.The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District denied the motion to dismiss, finding good cause for the delay due to the backlog of cases resulting from the pandemic and the need to prioritize older cases. The court also noted that the defendant was not in custody, which lessened the prejudice from the delay. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss under Idaho Code section 19-3501 and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court held that court congestion resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for the trial delay under the statute. The Court also rejected the argument that the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than the federal constitution regarding speedy trial rights, reaffirming the use of the Barker v. Wingo factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Fierro-Garcia" on Justia Law

Gary Wilson was previously convicted under Illinois law for possession of child pornography, a statute that criminalizes possession of sexually explicit images of minors as well as individuals with severe or profound intellectual disabilities. Nearly twenty years later, Wilson used gaming systems and social media to solicit sexually explicit images from minors, leading to his guilty plea on two counts of production of child pornography under federal law.At sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, the government argued that Wilson’s prior Illinois conviction triggered a federal sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), which increases the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for defendants with a prior conviction “relating to” possession of child pornography. Wilson’s attorney did not object to the application of this enhancement, and the district court imposed a sixty-year sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Wilson argued for the first time that the Illinois statute was broader than the federal definition because it also covered images of adults with certain disabilities, and therefore should not trigger the federal enhancement. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue for plain error due to Wilson’s failure to object below. The court held that, under the plain error standard, it was not “clear or obvious” that the Illinois statute did not “relate to” the possession of child pornography as required by § 2251(e), especially given the broad language Congress used and existing circuit precedent. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement and Wilson’s sentence. View "USA v Wilson" on Justia Law