Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police identified the defendant as a suspect in a violent assault and rape after DNA evidence linked him to the crime. During a custodial interview, the defendant denied involvement and offered an implausible explanation for the DNA match. The victim died three days later, and the State charged the defendant with capital murder and rape. A jury convicted him on both counts, and the district court merged the rape conviction into the capital murder conviction at sentencing.Prior to trial in the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to suppress his statements to police, arguing he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights due to cognitive impairments. The court heard testimony from expert witnesses for both sides and ultimately found the defendant had sufficient cognitive ability to understand his rights and denied the motion to suppress. The defendant also objected to the racial composition of the jury pool, requested an implicit bias instruction, and challenged the court’s refusal to remove a juror for cause. The district court overruled these objections and denied a motion for a new trial.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. The court held that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, finding substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion. The court also held that the defendant failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion of a distinctive group from the jury pool or substantial underrepresentation of Black jurors. The court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give an implicit bias instruction, as the requested instruction was not legally appropriate. Finally, the court held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of a for-cause juror challenge because the juror was removed by peremptory strike. The convictions were affirmed. View "State v. McNeal " on Justia Law

Keith Berman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to securities fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of proceedings related to a scheme to fraudulently increase the share price of his company, Decision Diagnostics Corp. (DECN). Berman issued false press releases claiming DECN had developed a blood test for coronavirus, which led to a significant increase in the company's stock price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated and suspended trading of DECN's stock, revealing that Berman's claims were false. Despite this, Berman continued to issue misleading statements and used aliases to discredit the SEC's investigation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Berman to 84 months' imprisonment. The court calculated the loss caused by Berman's fraud using the modified rescissory method, determining a loss amount of $27.8 million. This calculation was based on the difference in DECN's stock price before and after the fraud was disclosed, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. The court also applied enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship to five or more individuals, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, but ultimately imposed a downward variance.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Berman challenged the district court's calculation of the loss amount, arguing that the fraud was disclosed earlier and that the loss was not solely attributable to his fraudulent statements. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit clear error in determining the disclosure date or in its loss causation analysis. The court also upheld the enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship, finding sufficient evidence to support these determinations. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Berman" on Justia Law

In September 2018, six-year-old L.F. made statements to her foster mother about inappropriate touching by her stepfather, Andy LaGore. These statements were recorded and reported to the Department for Children and Families. L.F. later reiterated these allegations during an interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center, identifying LaGore as the perpetrator. LaGore was subsequently charged and convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child.During pretrial motions, LaGore sought to introduce evidence of a 2016 incident where L.F. had made similar allegations against her biological father, Jordan. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the 2016 statements were not relevant and did not demonstrate that L.F. was confused about the identity of the perpetrator in the 2018 incident. The court found no evidence that L.F.’s statements about her biological father were false or that she was confusing the two men.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 2016 statements, as they were not relevant to the 2018 allegations. The court emphasized that the exclusion of irrelevant evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed LaGore’s conviction, finding that the trial court acted within its discretion and that LaGore’s constitutional rights were not violated. View "State v. LaGore" on Justia Law

Shon Brian Blake shot a man twice in the arm during an argument, causing injuries that required medical treatment. The Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC) paid the victim's medical expenses. Blake pled guilty to several charges, and the State sought a restitution order to reimburse UOVC for the medical expenses. The district court ordered Blake to repay part of the expenses, but the court of appeals reversed this order, citing insufficient evidence. The case returned to the district court, which held a second restitution hearing and issued a new restitution order.The district court initially entered a restitution order based on limited evidence, which the court of appeals found insufficient, leading to a reversal. The appellate court did not provide explicit instructions for further proceedings. Upon return to the district court, Blake objected to a second hearing, arguing that the reversal should preclude further action. The district court disagreed, held a second hearing, and issued a new restitution order. Blake appealed again, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court to address whether the district court could hold a second hearing and whether the new order was supported by sufficient evidence.The Utah Supreme Court held that the district court was not prohibited from holding a second restitution hearing. The court concluded that the reversal of the first order did not preclude further proceedings, as the appellate court did not expressly prohibit them. The court also determined that the new restitution order was supported by sufficient evidence, including detailed medical records and testimony from a UOVC representative. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's second restitution order. View "State v. Blake" on Justia Law

Jacob Edward Dolinar was charged with various drug offenses in the county court, and the case was later bound over to the district court, where an information was filed on November 16, 2021. Dolinar initially entered a plea of not guilty but later withdrew it and filed a plea in bar, which the district court overruled. Dolinar appealed this decision, and the appellate court affirmed the district court's order on September 15, 2023, issuing a mandate on October 16, 2023. The district court entered its judgment on the mandate on January 31, 2024, and set the trial for June 24, 2024. Dolinar filed a motion for absolute discharge on June 17, 2024, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.The district court overruled Dolinar's motion for absolute discharge, finding that the State had shown sufficient excludable time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a). The court identified various proceedings and calculated the number of excludable days, concluding that a total of 715 days were excludable, extending the last day for trial beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court also found that Dolinar had waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the statutory period.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, holding that Dolinar was deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial under § 29-1207(4)(b) when he requested a continuance on March 25, 2022, which extended the trial date beyond the statutory 6-month period. The court found that the district court had properly advised Dolinar of his right to a speedy trial and the consequences of waiving it, and that Dolinar had voluntarily waived his right. The court concluded that the State had met its burden of showing sufficient excludable time periods and that Dolinar was not entitled to absolute discharge. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

A man entered a senior living apartment building in Minneapolis, where he had previously visited several times, and asked to see a vacant apartment. After being shown the apartment by a manager, he pushed her into a closet, choked her, and brandished a knife. The victim fought back and screamed for help, after which the man stopped, apologized, and left. He was later arrested and, after being read his Miranda rights, confessed to police that he had planned to rape the victim but did not follow through. The man was charged with attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct.The Hennepin County District Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession, found him guilty of attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct causing personal injury using force or coercion, and sentenced him to prison. The court found him not guilty of the charge involving use of a dangerous weapon. The defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction violated Minnesota’s corpus delicti statute, which prohibits convictions based solely on a confession. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that for attempt crimes, the statute requires independent evidence of both intent and a substantial step toward the crime, and found that only the confession established intent.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the corpus delicti statute is satisfied for both completed and attempt offenses when there is independent evidence that reasonably tends to prove the defendant committed the charged offense. The court concluded that the State’s evidence, independent of the confession, reasonably tended to show the defendant committed attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for consideration of the defendant’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

During a prison riot at the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution, inmate Michael Galindo was attacked and killed by other inmates. Eric L. Ramos was identified as a primary participant in the attack and was charged with first-degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with evidence. A jury convicted Ramos of all charges.Ramos appealed, arguing several procedural and evidentiary errors. He claimed his constitutional right to a speedy trial and due process were violated due to delays caused by a mistrial and subsequent appeals. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that most of the delay was attributable to Ramos' own motions and appeals, and there was no deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial. The court concluded that Ramos' constitutional rights were not violated.Ramos also challenged the State's peremptory strike of a Latino juror under Batson v. Kentucky, arguing it was racially motivated. The court found the State provided a race-neutral reason for the strike, which was not clearly erroneous.Ramos moved for a mistrial or a continuance after the State disclosed new evidence during his case in chief. The court found no Brady violation as the evidence was disclosed during the trial and was not material enough to change the outcome.Ramos' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and juror misconduct was denied. The court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the trial's outcome and that the allegations of juror misconduct were unsupported.Finally, Ramos argued that the district court erred in allowing lay witness opinion evidence identifying him in surveillance footage. The court found the testimony admissible as it was rationally based on the witnesses' perceptions and helpful to the jury.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no merit in Ramos' assignments of error. View "State v. Ramos" on Justia Law

On November 4, 2015, a resident near a secluded dirt road in Worcester heard a loud bang and saw flames. Firefighters found a burning vehicle with a charred body inside, later identified as Marie Martin. An autopsy revealed a bullet in her skull. The investigation led to Donovan E. Goparian, who was indicted for murder. In 2020, a jury convicted him of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation. Goparian filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence from a Federal inmate implicating a third party. The motion judge denied the request for an evidentiary hearing and did not act on the request for postconviction discovery. The motion for a new trial was also denied.The defendant appealed both his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found that the judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and failing to act on the request for postconviction discovery. The court concluded that the defendant had made an adequate showing that the Commonwealth had possession, custody, or control of the exculpatory information and that its nondisclosure could have prejudiced the defendant.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order denying the motion for a new trial, reversed the order denying the request for an evidentiary hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also ordered postconviction discovery concerning the exculpatory information and deferred plenary review of the defendant's direct appeal pending resolution of the motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Goparian" on Justia Law

The case involves Travis Rashad Shepperson, who was convicted in 2009 of first- and second-degree sexual offenses, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery, and theft. A key piece of evidence at trial was a DNA result showing the presence of the victim’s DNA on the barrel of a gun found in Shepperson’s possession. Sixteen years later, DNA testing on a different portion of the same gun barrel sample detected no DNA, leading Shepperson to file a motion for a new trial based on these new test results.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied Shepperson’s motion for a new trial. The court found that the new DNA test results did not contradict the earlier DNA profile introduced at trial and did not undermine the State’s theory of the case. Additionally, the new result pertained to an act for which Shepperson was acquitted and bore no connection to the sex offenses for which he was convicted. Therefore, the court concluded that the new DNA result did not create a substantial possibility of a different verdict and did not warrant a new trial in the interest of justice.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shepperson’s motion for a new trial. The new DNA evidence was not considered favorable as it did not refute the State’s theory or materially undermine the evidence presented at trial. Furthermore, the absence of detectable DNA on a previously untested portion of the gun barrel swab did not materially undermine the evidence presented at trial. Thus, the new DNA result neither contradicted the State’s theory of the case nor created a substantial possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict. View "Shepperson v. State" on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life.In 2024, Valdez petitioned for resentencing again, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection. The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court clarified that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, making it not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10). The court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing relief and to deny Valdez's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Superior Court (Valdez)" on Justia Law