Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a defendant who was charged in December 2017 with one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, based on allegations that she had inappropriately touched a six-year-old girl, A.G., who was the daughter of her then-boyfriend. Before trial, the court allowed both the admission of the child’s statements from a 2017 police interview and permitted A.G. to testify. In 2019, the State requested that A.G. testify outside the defendant’s presence via video, citing potential trauma. After a hearing in 2020, the trial court granted this request, finding that testifying in front of the defendant would traumatize and impair A.G.’s ability to testify. In 2023, as A.G. had aged, the defense sought a new hearing on this issue. At the new hearing, a school counselor testified about A.G.’s general emotional state and possible trauma but did not specifically link trauma to testifying in the defendant’s presence.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, relying on the counselor’s testimony, again permitted A.G. to testify outside the defendant’s presence. A jury trial followed in October 2023, during which A.G. testified by video and the jury found the defendant guilty. The court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that although the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s post-arrest silence, this was harmless error.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the requirements of Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Confrontation Clause were met. The Court held that the trial court’s finding—that requiring A.G. to testify in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma substantially impairing her ability to testify—was clearly erroneous because the evidence did not specifically support such trauma would result from the defendant’s presence. As a result, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated. View "State v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after a jury trial relating to the disappearance of a fellow college student with whom he was last seen. The defense’s strategy at trial was to present alternative explanations for the missing person’s fate, including accidental hypothermia, and called a forensic pathologist as an expert witness. During cross-examination, the expert stated that if someone purposely placed another person in a dangerous situation where they could not return to safety, that would be considered a homicide. Trial counsel did not object or further clarify the testimony. The jury found the appellant guilty of second degree murder.Following conviction and sentencing, the appellant’s counsel filed a direct appeal, which challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The appellant then filed a motion for postconviction relief in the District Court for Gage County, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based mainly on the handling of the expert’s testimony. After an evidentiary hearing—including depositions of trial counsel—the district court found that counsel’s decisions about the expert’s testimony were strategic and did not amount to deficient performance. The district court denied postconviction relief.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions independently. The court held that trial counsel’s response to the expert’s testimony was a strategic decision and not objectively unreasonable. The court also found that additional claims raised for the first time on appeal could not be considered. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying postconviction relief. View "State v. Keadle" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who forcibly entered the home of his former partner, S.E., with whom he shared a child. On May 12, 2023, after their relationship had deteriorated and following multiple threats by him against S.E., he kicked in the door of the house where S.E. was staying. He struck S.E. and, when her brother Jordan attempted to intervene while armed, the defendant shot and killed Jordan. He then shot S.E. in both legs, including while she was holding their child, though the child was not physically harmed. The defendant was charged with eight felony offenses, including first degree murder (premeditated and felony murder), use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, domestic assault, burglary, and child abuse.The Washington County District Court allowed the State to introduce evidence of prior uncharged assaults by the defendant against S.E., finding this evidence inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes. The court denied the defendant’s request for a self-defense jury instruction, reasoning that he had unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way by breaking into the residence. The court also permitted S.E. to remain in the courtroom during the trial as an essential witness. The defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, some to run concurrently.On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of prior assaults was properly admitted as it provided necessary context for the charged crimes. The Court found no error in the refusal to instruct on self-defense or in allowing S.E. to be present during trial, as the defendant failed to show prejudice. However, the Court held that it was error to sentence the defendant both for felony murder and for the predicate felony of burglary, and that sentences for use of a deadly weapon must be served consecutively, not concurrently. All sentences were vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing, but the convictions were affirmed. View "State v. Logan" on Justia Law

After police responded to a noise complaint, they found the defendant asleep in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle with two tires on a driveway and two tires touching a public street. Officers detected alcohol and obtained a breath sample showing a blood alcohol level of .127. The defendant admitted to drinking earlier. He was charged with driving under the influence, third offense, based on alleged prior DUI convictions.The County Court for Lancaster County initially accepted the defendant’s no contest plea, but the District Court for Lancaster County vacated the sentence, finding the plea was not properly elicited. On remand, a new plea hearing was held and several exhibits were reoffered, but the exhibits intended to show the defendant’s prior convictions were not offered or received. The County Court, mistakenly believing these exhibits were in evidence, enhanced the conviction and sentenced the defendant for a third-offense DUI. The District Court affirmed, finding the plea proper and the sentence within statutory limits.The Nebraska Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that the defendant could not challenge the enhancement because he had not raised the issue previously and had, through defense counsel’s statements, invited any error regarding the admission of prior convictions. The appellate court treated the enhancement as falling under the invited error doctrine and declined to address whether the sentence was excessive absent proof of prior convictions.The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that plain error occurred because there was no evidence in the record establishing prior convictions to support a third-offense DUI enhancement. The Court held that the lower courts erred by enhancing and sentencing the defendant absent such proof and that the invited error doctrine did not apply. The Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for a new enhancement and sentencing hearing. View "State v. Molina" on Justia Law

A woman called 9-1-1 to report a suspicious four-door Chevrolet Silverado driving slowly in a rural area of Willacy County, Texas. Thirty minutes later, Officer Garcia arrived and saw only the appellant’s pickup truck, which was not a Chevrolet Silverado, driving down a dirt road. Without witnessing any traffic violation or confirming the vehicle matched the caller’s description, Officer Garcia activated his emergency lights to initiate a stop. The appellant continued at a slow pace, stopped to open a gate, and was ultimately arrested after a physical altercation. The appellant was charged with evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle.At trial in the 197th District Court of Willacy County, the jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State failed to prove the lawfulness of the attempted detention, but the motion was denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the appellant was sentenced to two years’ confinement, probated for three years. On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Officer Garcia’s testimony and the circumstances were sufficient to support a finding that the detention was lawful beyond a reasonable doubt.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case on petition for discretionary review. The court held that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer Garcia’s initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The court found insufficient specific, articulable facts linking the appellant’s vehicle to any criminal activity and concluded that the lawful-arrest element of the offense was not satisfied. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A convenience store employee in Plentywood, Montana, discovered a small bag containing methamphetamine on the store floor during her shift and called law enforcement. Surveillance footage was reviewed, and a deputy identified Shawn Andersen as a person who had been in the area where the bag was found. The deputy did not watch all of the footage but focused on the time around when the bag appeared. Later, another bag of methamphetamine was found in Andersen’s pocket when he was arrested at the county jail. Both baggies tested positive for methamphetamine. At trial, the State’s case relied heavily on the surveillance footage and related testimony to link Andersen to the drugs found at the store.The Fifteenth Judicial District Court in Sheridan County presided over Andersen’s jury trial. During deliberations, the jury asked to review the surveillance footage. While they watched, the State’s legal assistant audibly commented, “There it is,” as the video showed the disputed moment. Andersen’s counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing that the comment could have improperly influenced the jury. The District Court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Andersen on all counts. Andersen was sentenced to a combination of suspended and consecutive sentences for possession of dangerous drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Andersen’s motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the legal assistant’s comment constituted improper third-party jury misconduct, creating a presumption of prejudice. Because the District Court neither declared a mistrial nor conducted an inquiry to rebut this presumption, the Supreme Court found this to be an abuse of discretion. The conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on all counts. View "State v. Andersen" on Justia Law

Joe’Veon Penson Willis operated a residence used for drug trafficking with his half-brother. On Christmas Day 2021, the two streamed a Facebook Live video describing their drug business, which drew the attention of federal authorities. Shortly afterward, agents from the ATF and DEA executed a search warrant at their house, discovering significant quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl, multiple firearms, and drug paraphernalia in various rooms. Further investigation established that Willis had used a straw purchaser to acquire at least some of the firearms.Willis was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio with maintaining a drug premises and two counts of aiding and abetting false statements in the purchase of firearms. He pled guilty without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, Willis objected to a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining a drug premises, arguing that it constituted impermissible double-counting because the underlying offense and enhancement addressed the same conduct. He also challenged the attribution of certain drugs found in shared spaces to him. The district court rejected these objections, adopted the presentence report in full, and imposed three concurrent sentences of 135 months, which was below the advisory Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed Willis’s arguments de novo for double-counting and for abuse of discretion regarding substantive reasonableness. The court held that applying the two-level enhancement for maintaining a drug premises, even when the underlying conviction was for that same conduct, was permissible given clear Congressional intent. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable and adequately supported by the record. Although the court acknowledged a technical error in the length of the firearm-related sentences exceeding statutory maximums, it determined this had no practical effect because all sentences ran concurrently. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

An undercover law enforcement operation targeted individuals seeking to purchase sex from minors through an online platform known for prostitution ads. An agent created a fake profile of a 45-year-old woman but, upon contact, informed the defendant that "she" was actually 13 years old. Despite multiple text exchanges in which the defendant expressed reluctance to engage with someone underage, he continued the conversation, eventually requesting photos, discussing sexual acts, and arranging a meeting while being repeatedly reminded of the minor’s age. At the meeting site, agents seized his phone, which he attempted to wipe, erasing relevant evidence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa conducted a trial in which a jury convicted the defendant of attempted sex trafficking of a child and destruction of evidence. The court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 292 months and 240 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the admission of lay-opinion testimony by the undercover agent regarding the perceived maturity of the fictitious minor’s responses, the denial of his request to contact a juror based on alleged outside influence, and the refusal to grant a downward sentencing variance on grounds of purported sentencing manipulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the agent’s lay-opinion testimony was appropriately admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, as it was based on personal knowledge and aided the jury’s understanding. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying juror contact, as the defendant’s claims were speculative and unsupported by evidence of outside influence. Finally, the court rejected the sentencing manipulation claim, determining that law enforcement had a legitimate goal in targeting those seeking sex with very young minors and that the agent’s actions were not solely intended to enhance the sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Yuri Chachanko and an accomplice committed a series of armed robberies in South Dakota and Montana, leading to federal charges in both states. He was first prosecuted in Montana, where he received a 219-month sentence for Hobbs Act violations and firearm use. After completing that sentence, he faced prosecution in South Dakota, where he pleaded guilty to another firearm offense and was sentenced to 300 months, to be served consecutively after the Montana sentence. Years later, after legislative changes under the First Step Act, Chachanko sought a reduction of his South Dakota sentence, arguing that it was unusually long and that his medical conditions warranted relief.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota considered his motion. The court focused on whether Chachanko had served at least 10 years of the South Dakota sentence, as required for a reduction based on an unusually long sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. It found that, although Chachanko had spent 17 years in custody overall, he had only just begun serving the South Dakota sentence, as the sentences were consecutive. The court also found that his medical conditions were adequately managed and did not meet the standard for extraordinary and compelling reasons, and that no combination of circumstances justified relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that the phrase “the term of imprisonment” in the relevant statute and guidelines refers specifically to the sentence imposed by the court reviewing the motion—here, the South Dakota sentence—and not to an aggregate of multiple sentences. As Chachanko had not served 10 years of the South Dakota sentence, he was ineligible for relief on that basis. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying relief based on medical or other circumstances. View "United States v. Chachanko" on Justia Law

After serving more than a decade in the Illinois state legislature, the defendant established a lobbying and consulting firm and also sold life insurance for a private company. For several years, she correctly filed her tax returns and reported her income. However, beginning in 2014, she significantly underreported her income on her personal tax returns or failed to file altogether, despite substantial earnings from her business and insurance work. She was later terminated from her insurance position for fraudulent activity. The IRS discovered unreported income and issued a notice of tax liability, prompting her to amend one return and enter a payment plan, which she later abandoned.A grand jury indicted her on six counts, including making false statements on tax returns and willfully failing to file returns for herself and her company. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, made several evidentiary rulings before and during trial, including excluding evidence of her amended tax return and payment plan, and limiting her expert’s testimony. The jury convicted her on four counts. The court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal and later sentenced her to one year of imprisonment and supervised release. She subsequently filed a motion to modify her sentence to make her eligible for good-time credits, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed her convictions and the district court’s evidentiary rulings de novo and for abuse of discretion, respectively. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find willfulness, affirmed the exclusion of post-offense remedial evidence as within the district court’s discretion, found her challenge to the impeachment ruling waived since she did not testify, upheld the limitation on her expert’s testimony, and agreed that her motion to correct the sentence was untimely and properly denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law