Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery for an offense committed at age 17, resulting in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole under Massachusetts law. Decades later, following developments in constitutional law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional and ordered that such sentences be modified to life with the possibility of parole. As a result, the petitioner’s sentence was changed; he became parole eligible, was granted parole, and was released.After this modification, the petitioner sought to file a second habeas corpus petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that this petition was “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and thus subject to its “gatekeeping” requirements, concluding that the addition of parole eligibility did not constitute a new judgment for purposes of federal habeas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the sentence modification constituted a new judgment. The court held that the change from life without parole to life with parole eligibility was a material change, making the sentence a new judgment under federal law. The court reasoned that, because the petitioner’s current custody was authorized by this new judgment, his second-in-time habeas petition did not trigger the restrictions of § 2244(b).Therefore, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the petitioner need not obtain pre-authorization to file his habeas petition, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

Investigators from the DEA and Owensboro Police Department began an investigation in September 2021 into suspected methamphetamine trafficking involving Cedric Swanagan and Courtland Reed. Wiretap evidence, corroborated by intercepted communications and witness testimony, linked Swanagan and Reed to multiple drug transactions, including a key February 2022 incident where Reed paid Nicole Toliver for methamphetamine that was found in her car during a traffic stop. Both defendants were ultimately indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky presided over the consolidated trial. Swanagan moved to suppress evidence from the wiretap, arguing the supporting affidavit contained intentional or reckless falsehoods, but the court denied his motion without a Franks hearing, finding no substantial preliminary showing of falsity. At trial, law enforcement officers testified about intercepted calls, interpreting slang and summarizing conversations. The district court managed objections to this testimony, ensuring officers spoke from personal experience and refrained from narrating facts beyond their direct knowledge. Reed was shackled during trial, but the court took steps to conceal this from the jury. After jurors potentially saw defendants in shackles in the courthouse lobby, the court conducted voir dire and found no actual prejudice. Both defendants were convicted, and the court denied motions for acquittal and new trial. Swanagan was sentenced to 360 months based on enhancements for his leadership in the conspiracy and prior convictions; Reed received a 300-month sentence based in part on a prior burglary conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and Swanagan’s sentence, finding no reversible error in evidentiary rulings, jury management, or sufficiency of the evidence. The court vacated Reed’s sentence, holding that his Kentucky burglary conviction did not qualify as a “serious violent felony” for sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Juan Carlos Alvarez, a member of the Southwest Cholos gang, was convicted of capital murder for his involvement in two separate fatal shootings in Houston, Texas in June 1998. The first incident resulted in the deaths of Adrian and Michael Aguirre at an apartment complex, while the second led to the murder of sixteen-year-old Jose Varela and Hugo Perez. Alvarez was identified through eyewitness accounts, testimony from co-participants, forensic evidence, and his own admissions to police. The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence, including ballistics linking Alvarez’s firearm to the shootings and DNA evidence connecting his shotgun to one of the victims. At trial, Alvarez was represented by two attorneys; the defense focused on challenging witness credibility and provided mitigation evidence through family members and a psychologist.On appeal, Alvarez’s counsel raised numerous claims in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), which affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Subsequent state habeas proceedings involved multiple attorneys and filings, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and issues regarding consultation with the Mexican consulate. Alvarez also asserted the introduction of tainted DNA evidence and misconduct by the Houston Crime Lab. The TCCA dismissed some of these habeas applications as an abuse of the writ, finding certain claims procedurally barred. Alvarez then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which denied all claims and refused to grant investigative funding or a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, analyzing three certified claims: deprivation of counsel due to one attorney allegedly sleeping during trial, ineffective assistance for failing to present additional mitigation evidence, and claims regarding tainted DNA evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that Alvarez was not constitutionally deprived of counsel since his second attorney was actively engaged, and there was no unreasonable application of federal law or unreasonable factual determination by the state courts. It also found no ineffective assistance in the mitigation phase and concluded the DNA-related claims were procedurally barred and, alternatively, meritless. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Alvarez v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Federal agents arrested a defendant after he engaged in explicit online communications with an undercover agent posing as the father of an eight-year-old girl. Over several months, the defendant requested sexually explicit images of the fictitious child, instructed the agent on how to sedate her to facilitate the abuse, and provided detailed suggestions about the nature of the photographs. The defendant attempted to access links purported to contain the requested images, which were in fact fake and used to record his attempts.A grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts: attempted enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, attempted sexual exploitation of a child for the purpose of producing a visual depiction, and attempted receipt of child pornography. At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the government presented evidence through two FBI agents. After the government rested, the court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on the enticement charge but denied it on the other two; the defendant was convicted by a jury on attempted sexual exploitation and attempted receipt of child pornography and was sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for the exploitation charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the conviction for attempted sexual exploitation. The court held that the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge was preserved and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, found sufficient evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the jury was properly instructed that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not require direct communication with a minor, and that the statute covers conduct involving an intermediary. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Carpenter" on Justia Law

Amanda Biteler was arrested and charged with driving under the influence (second offense) and released on bond in Lincoln County, South Dakota. As a condition of her bond, she was required to participate in the 24/7 alcohol monitoring program, initially submitting in-person breath tests and later authorized to use a remote breath device. This device takes a photograph of the person submitting each breath test. On December 9, 2023, her test was flagged by the monitoring software, revealing evidence that another person may have provided the breath sample while Biteler was in front of the camera. Subsequent review identified five additional suspicious incidents. Biteler was charged with six counts of false reporting to authorities under SDCL 22-11-9(3).After a court trial in the Magistrate Court for the Second Judicial Circuit, the judge convicted Biteler for the December 9 incident and acquitted her on the remaining counts. The magistrate court found that the breath test and accompanying photograph constituted a "report" under the statute, that Biteler intentionally transmitted it to law enforcement, that the report concerned law enforcement’s official duties, and that she knew the information was false. Biteler appealed to the Circuit Court, arguing the statutory term “report” was ambiguous and did not encompass her compelled breath submissions. The Circuit Court reversed the conviction, reasoning that her submissions were not “reports” within the statute’s meaning, as they were not voluntary communications.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case, applying de novo review to the statutory interpretation of SDCL 22-11-9(3). The court held that the term “report” under the statute is not limited to formal or voluntary communications but encompasses any transmission furnishing information to law enforcement, regardless of medium or voluntariness. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s decision and reinstated Biteler’s conviction. View "State v. Biteler" on Justia Law

Denis Lemieux pleaded guilty to domestic violence terrorizing and received a partially suspended sentence with probation. The probation terms required that he not contact certain family members, refrain from criminal conduct, seek evaluations and counseling, and notify probation before moving. Several months later, the State alleged that Lemieux violated his probation by making threatening social media statements about two family members he was barred from contacting, failing to comply with required evaluations and counseling, and not notifying probation of a move.The Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket held a hearing, found by a preponderance of the evidence that Lemieux violated multiple probation conditions, and partially revoked his probation, imposing a custodial sanction. Lemieux argued at the sanction hearing that the court should consider the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted, asserting that if the statute was unconstitutional, his conviction and sentence were void. The court rejected this collateral attack, concluding that only a post-conviction review proceeding—not a probation revocation hearing—was the proper procedure for challenging the validity of the underlying conviction. Lemieux’s post-conviction review petition raising the constitutional issue had been stayed pending appeal.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. It held that a defendant may not use a probation revocation proceeding to collaterally attack the constitutionality of the statute underlying the conviction. The court reaffirmed that post-conviction review is the exclusive method for challenging the validity of a conviction, except for direct appeal. The decision to affirm the trial court’s revocation of Lemieux’s probation was based on the proper use of procedural avenues for contesting convictions. The judgment of probation revocation was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Lemieux" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse arising from the abuse of his seven-year-old granddaughter. The alleged abuse occurred when the child and her brother visited their grandparents’ home. The granddaughter testified that the defendant touched her genitals after she asked for a belly rub, and that he told her not to reveal what had happened. Later that day, she disclosed the abuse to her family, and her father, a police officer, confronted the defendant. The defendant made statements about “helping [her] explore her sexuality” to both his son-in-law and his wife. The next day, police arrested the defendant, who was questioned after being transported to the station.In the Iowa District Court for Polk County, the defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing his statutory and constitutional rights were violated. The district court found a violation of his statutory right under Iowa Code section 804.20 to make a phone call, and suppressed his confession, but rejected his constitutional right-to-counsel claim. The jury, without hearing the confession, convicted the defendant. The court also permitted the child to testify via one-way closed-circuit television, over defense objection, and allowed the defendant’s then-wife to testify about his statements to her.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa found sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the child’s testimony. However, the court held that allowing the complaining witness to testify via one-way closed-circuit television violated the defendant’s state constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, as interpreted in State v. White. The court concluded this error was not harmless, vacated the conviction, and remanded for a new trial. The court affirmed the admissibility of the wife’s testimony, reversed the suppression of the confession, and rejected the constitutional right-to-counsel claim. View "State of Iowa v. Lindaman" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Aleah Michelle Camp and Danielle Ashley Simons, were each charged by home-rule municipalities in Colorado (Westminster and Aurora, respectively) with non-felony offenses—low-level theft and trespass—under municipal ordinances that prohibited the same conduct as relevant state statutes. Following the enactment of Colorado’s Misdemeanor Reform Act, which lowered sentencing caps for these state offenses, the municipal codes continued to authorize penalties for identical conduct that were significantly harsher than those allowed under state law.In the Westminster Municipal Court and Aurora Municipal Court, both defendants moved to dismiss their charges, arguing that the municipal sentencing provisions were preempted by state law because the penalties exceeded those permitted under the revised state statutes. Both municipal courts denied the motions, relying on precedent that recognized the authority of home-rule municipalities to regulate low-level offenses and to set their own penalties, and found no preemption or conflict with state law.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed these cases under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that when a municipal ordinance and a state statute prohibit identical conduct, municipalities may not authorize penalties that exceed the maximum sentencing caps established by state law for the corresponding offense. The Court found that the establishment of penalties for low-level criminal conduct is a matter of mixed statewide and local concern, but that municipal sentencing provisions which allow harsher penalties than state law create an operational conflict and are thus preempted to the extent of that conflict. The Court made the orders to show cause absolute and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this holding. Camp and Simons may be prosecuted for their ordinance violations, but cannot be subjected to penalties greater than those permitted by state law for the same conduct. View "People v. Michelle" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers arrested the defendant after receiving a tip that a fugitive was staying at a local RV park. Upon stopping the defendant’s car for a traffic violation, deputies observed crystal methamphetamine in the front seat and, during a search, found that the defendant was carrying a handgun. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts: possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, and use of a firearm in relation to a drug crime, which also carries a consecutive five-year mandatory minimum sentence.The defendant entered a plea agreement, wherein the government promised to move for a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence if the defendant provided substantial assistance, reserving discretion over whether and to what extent to make such a motion. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama accepted the plea. The government eventually moved for a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but only with respect to the drug possession count. At sentencing, the district court granted the motion and sentenced the defendant below the statutory minimum for both counts, issuing a time-served sentence on the first count and one day on the second count, served consecutively. The government objected, arguing that its motion pertained only to the first count.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes a departure below a statutory minimum sentence only when the government specifically moves for such a departure as to that particular count. Because the government did not move for a departure on the firearm count, the district court lacked authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum for that count. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence as to the firearm count and remanded for resentencing in accordance with its opinion. View "USA v. Day" on Justia Law

Canon City Police Department officers stopped Thomas James Havens in a Motel 6 parking lot for a traffic infraction. During the stop, officers arrested Havens on outstanding warrants and observed drug paraphernalia in his vehicle. Following a K-9 alert, a search of the vehicle uncovered illegal narcotics, a firearm, bullets, and a ledger. Havens stated he was staying in room 220 of the motel. Officer Modlin, having muted his body-worn camera (BWC) audio during unrelated conversations, entered the motel and spoke with a clerk, who indicated that Havens was actually staying in room 223. Officer Modlin failed to reactivate his BWC audio during this conversation. The clerk’s statement was the sole basis in the affidavit for a warrant to search room 223, where officers subsequently found additional narcotics and paraphernalia, leading to further charges against Havens.Havens moved to suppress the evidence found in room 223, arguing that the prosecution violated its discovery obligations under Colorado Criminal Procedure Rule 16 by failing to provide a report explaining why Officer Modlin muted his BWC audio. He also argued that the clerk’s statement was inadmissible under Colorado’s BWC statute, which creates a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility for unrecorded statements. The Fremont County District Court agreed, barring Officer Modlin’s testimony about the BWC issue and the clerk’s statements as a discovery sanction. The district court found that, without this testimony, the permissive inference of officer misconduct was unrebutted and the search warrant lacked probable cause, leading to suppression of the room 223 evidence.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court misinterpreted both the BWC statute and Rule 16. The Court ruled that the prosecution was not required to provide a report explaining the muted BWC audio and should have been permitted to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility regarding the clerk’s statement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for a hearing as required by the BWC statute. View "People v. Havens" on Justia Law