Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On June 15, 2021, two individuals in Portland, Maine reported being struck from behind by a man who inflicted a sharp pain, with one sustaining a wound on her back. The assailant was described as an African-American male with short spiky hair, wearing a green shirt, and carrying a backpack and tablet. Police identified Saad Zackaria as the likely suspect and located him at the Preble Street Resource Center, where staff permitted officers to enter. Zackaria was found fully dressed near the shower room; after he reentered the shower room with the door partially open, officers observed various sharp objects on the floor, including tweezers, a box cutter, and a wire. Zackaria was subsequently arrested.Following his arrest, Zackaria was charged in June 2021 and indicted in August. The Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket found him incompetent to stand trial in August 2021, but competency was restored in March 2022. Pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence, were denied after a hearing. Delays arose from counsel withdrawal, attorney illness, and a mistrial due to juror unavailability. Zackaria filed motions to dismiss for delay and for a new bail hearing, both denied in early January 2024. After a jury trial in January 2024, Zackaria was found guilty of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and received a sentence including incarceration and probation.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The Court held that Zackaria did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the shower room or common area of the shelter under the Fourth Amendment, due to the circumstances of his use and the openness of the space. Additionally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the speedy trial claim, noting that most delays were not attributable to the State or Zackaria, and that the lengthy pretrial detention did not prejudice the defense. View "State of Maine v. Zackaria" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He pleaded guilty. At sentencing, a dispute arose over whether he was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence based on a prior conviction under California Penal Code § 311.11, which criminalizes possession of images depicting a minor “personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.” The defendant argued that the California statute was broader than the federal definition of child pornography and therefore should not trigger the federal mandatory minimum.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming agreed with the government and found that the prior California conviction qualified as a predicate offense, applying the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The defendant appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the mandatory minimum sentence de novo. Employing the categorical approach, the appellate court examined whether the elements of the California offense categorically matched the federal generic offense of possession of child pornography. The Tenth Circuit concluded that California Penal Code § 311.11, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, criminalizes conduct such as “any touching” with sexual intent, which can include nonexplicit, nonsexual images far removed from the federal definition of child pornography. Because the California statute sweeps more broadly than the federal generic offense, the prior conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 2252A(b)(2).The Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory minimum sentence was improperly applied and therefore vacated the defendant’s sentence, remanding the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of witness intimidation under Wyoming law, based on statements made during a supervised visit with his two daughters and a subsequent Facebook post. The daughters, aged 14 and 11, were residing at a youth home and scheduled to testify at an upcoming Child in Need of Supervision (CHINS) hearing. During the visit, the defendant made comments such as threatening to take away a tablet if one daughter refused to visit, and asked how the girls would feel if he took their kids away. He also referenced his right to bear arms and posted a Facebook rant containing generically threatening statements. Witnesses at the youth home perceived some of the remarks as threatening, but the daughters themselves did not clearly connect the comments to their upcoming court appearance.The District Court of Uinta County presided over the criminal trial. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts of witness intimidation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305(a), and the judge sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of four to eight years. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that his statements did not constitute actionable threats intended to influence or intimidate the witnesses in relation to their duty to testify.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. Applying the standard that witness intimidation under the statute is a specific intent crime, the court determined that the evidence did not establish that the defendant’s statements were intended to influence, intimidate, or impede his daughters in their roles as witnesses. The court found no nexus between the alleged threats and the daughters’ participation in the CHINS hearing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and reversed both counts. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

Amanda Ann Soron, who was unhoused, gave birth outdoors in freezing temperatures behind a retail store. Police discovered her with her newborn, who was still attached by the umbilical cord and subsequently pronounced dead at the hospital. Greenwood Village Police Officer Moreno accompanied Soron in the ambulance and remained present during her treatment, recording procedures and statements with a body-worn camera and documenting evidence during her hospital stay. Four months after the incident, Soron was arrested and charged with child abuse resulting in death. The prosecution sought and obtained a court order for production of all medical records related to Soron and her child’s hospital stay.In the Arapahoe County District Court, Soron moved to prevent the prosecution from accessing her medical records, arguing they were protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the request for records was misleading. After a period during which Soron was found incompetent and later restored to competency, the trial court ruled in her favor. The court found that the child abuse exception to the physician-patient privilege only applied to testimony, not to documents, and that the medical records—including those captured on Officer Moreno’s body-worn camera—were privileged. The court ordered the medical records and camera footage to be sealed and preserved, and denied Soron’s request for a veracity hearing as moot.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the suppression order on interlocutory appeal. It affirmed the trial court’s decision that Soron’s medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the child abuse exception does not extend to documentary evidence. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the order sealing the body-worn camera footage and related notes, remanding for further factual findings to determine whether that material is privileged or subject to other policy considerations. View "People v. Soron" on Justia Law

Juan Manuel Castorena was charged with first degree murder in Colorado’s Seventeenth Judicial District. At his first trial, a forensic scientist named Yvonne Woods from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation testified regarding DNA evidence. Following that trial, Woods became the subject of an internal and criminal investigation for potential misconduct in DNA analysis, and she was subsequently prosecuted by the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Castorena, preparing for a retrial after his conviction was vacated on appeal due to an evidentiary error, requested materials from Woods’s investigation for his defense, specifically seeking the complete investigative file held by the First Judicial District Attorney.After Castorena’s request, the Adams County District Court ordered the First Judicial District Attorney to disclose Woods’s investigative file to Castorena and his attorneys, requiring that the order be served on the First Judicial District Attorney, who was not a party to Castorena’s criminal case. Castorena’s attorneys emailed and mailed notice of the order, but did not serve it pursuant to the requirements for service of process. The First Judicial District Attorney appeared specially to object, asserting lack of jurisdiction and improper use of criminal discovery rules, and sought relief from the Supreme Court of Colorado under C.A.R. 21.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that while a trial court may order a nonparty governmental entity to produce materials during pretrial discovery under Crim. P. 16(I)(c)(2), such an order is only enforceable if the court has obtained personal jurisdiction over the nonparty through proper service. Because Castorena had not properly served the First Judicial District Attorney, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering its disclosure order void. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Castorena" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felony sexual offenses involving a child in Larimer County, Colorado. Over a period of several years, different attorneys for the defendant requested multiple competency evaluations, all of which were completed by various experts who consistently found the defendant competent to proceed. After each evaluation, neither party objected to the conclusions, and the district court made final competency determinations. In May 2025, the defense requested another competency evaluation, supported by a psychological report diagnosing the defendant with several mental health conditions but not opining on competency. The court granted the request, and the evaluation again resulted in a finding of competency. The defense then moved for a second-opinion competency evaluation and a hearing.The Larimer County District Court denied the request for a second-opinion evaluation, reasoning that there were no new indicators of incompetency and that multiple prior evaluations had already found the defendant competent. The court also suggested that the defense’s request was a dilatory tactic and not genuinely warranted. When the defense sought clarification, the court reiterated its denial of a second-opinion evaluation but granted a hearing. The defense subsequently filed a petition under Colorado Appellate Rule 21 to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado exercised its original jurisdiction, holding that under Colorado law, once a court-ordered competency evaluation is completed, a timely request for a second-opinion evaluation must be granted. The court found that the district court erred by denying the defense’s request and by retroactively questioning the propriety of the initial evaluation. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause and remanded the case, directing the district court to grant the defense’s request for a second-opinion competency evaluation. View "People v. McGee" on Justia Law

The defendant, between the ages of forty-seven and forty-nine, was accused of sexually abusing a child who was eight to ten years old during the relevant period from 2013 to 2015. Based on these allegations, a grand jury indicted the defendant on six counts under a specific subsection of the aggravated child rape statute, which applies when the victim is twelve to sixteen years old and there is more than a ten-year age difference between the defendant and the victim. However, the alleged victim was under twelve years old at the time of the offenses.Recognizing this discrepancy, the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictments to charge the defendant under a different subsection of the statute, which applies when the victim is under twelve and there is more than a five-year age difference. The Superior Court granted this motion over the defendant’s objection, and the defendant was subsequently convicted by a jury on five counts under the amended subsection. The defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty, arguing the amendments were improper, was denied. The Appeals Court later affirmed the convictions.On further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether it was permissible to amend the indictments to change the statutory subsection under which the defendant was charged. The court held that such amendments were substantive, not merely of form, because they changed an essential element—specifically, the age of the victim required for conviction under each subsection. The court found that this type of amendment violated the defendant’s constitutional right to be indicted for the specific crime charged, as guaranteed by Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. As a result, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions for aggravated child rape, set aside the verdicts, and remanded the case for entry of judgments of not guilty on those indictments and for resentencing. View "Commonwealth v. McCaffrey" on Justia Law

Wilson and two associates attempted to purchase a firearm from D.J. at a gas station, only to discover that the firearm was fake. In retaliation, Wilson retrieved a handgun modified with a machinegun conversion device and an extended magazine from his vehicle. He confronted D.J. and fired multiple rounds, fatally wounding him. Wilson and his companions then robbed D.J. and fled the scene. Police subsequently located Wilson, who confessed to the shooting and acknowledged the weapon was equipped with a machinegun conversion device.Wilson was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas with unlawful possession of a machinegun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(o) violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied the motion. Wilson pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, the Presentence Investigation Report applied the Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference to second-degree murder due to the death resulting from Wilson's conduct, resulting in a recommended sentence of 120 months, the statutory maximum. Wilson objected, claiming the cross-reference failed to account for his self-defense claim, but the district court overruled his objection, adopted the PSR, and imposed the recommended sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Wilson’s appeal. He challenged his conviction on Second Amendment grounds and the application of the second-degree murder cross-reference during sentencing. The Fifth Circuit held that circuit precedent, specifically Hollis v. Lynch, forecloses any Second Amendment protection for machineguns, and that Supreme Court precedent in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen does not overrule this holding. The court also found no plain error in the district court’s application of the second-degree murder cross-reference. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendant was held alone in a cell at the Tuolumne County jail when a deputy observed him striking the cell window with a broom handle, causing it to crack extensively and necessitate replacement. Evidence at trial established that the actual cost of the window was $245.47, with an additional $161.97 for installation, totaling $407.44 in damages. The prosecution charged the defendant with felony vandalism for damages over $400 and with damaging jail property. The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts and determined the damage exceeded $400.After the trial in the Superior Court of Tuolumne County, the defendant was sentenced to six years on the felony vandalism conviction, with a concurrent six-month sentence on the jail property charge that was stayed. The court ordered victim restitution in the amount of $1,980.83, based on a probation report estimate rather than the trial evidence. The prosecutor noted errors in the probation report regarding the amount and classification of damages for the jail property charge, leading to its amendment to reflect a misdemeanor. The defendant appealed, arguing the felony conviction and restitution order were unsupported by substantial evidence, and, in supplemental briefing, that a more specific statute governed his conduct.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It found substantial evidence supported the damages calculation for felony vandalism but held that prosecution under the general vandalism statute was precluded by the existence of a more specific statute addressing destruction of jail property. Accordingly, the court reversed the felony vandalism conviction and the restitution order, remanding the matter for resentencing under the specific statute and a new restitution hearing. The holding clarified that when a specific statute covers the conduct, prosecution under a general statute is barred, and restitution must reflect actual loss proven at trial. View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

The defendant repeatedly contacted a 13-year-old girl, H.H., via Snapchat, demanding nude photographs and videos of explicit acts. He threatened to expose her, specified the exact nature and timing of the images he wanted, and coerced her compliance by threatening to inform her mother when she refused or delayed. On one occasion, he met H.H. in person, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her despite knowing her age. Electronic evidence later revealed that the defendant had engaged in similar conduct with at least ten other female victims aged 12 to 16. He was charged with one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and pleaded guilty.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the Presentence Report (PSR) recommended a two-level sentencing enhancement for distribution of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). The defendant objected to this enhancement, arguing that his conduct amounted to “mere solicitation” rather than distribution, as he had not transferred the images to others. The probation officer and the district court disagreed, finding that the defendant’s coercive actions in inducing the victim to produce and send child pornography constituted distribution as contemplated by the guideline. The district court overruled the objection, adopted the PSR, and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in applying the distribution enhancement. The Fifth Circuit held that the enhancement was appropriate because the defendant exercised significant control over the victim and actively participated in the distribution by coercing and directing the production and delivery of child sexual abuse material. The court distinguished “mere solicitation” from the defendant’s conduct and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Lowe" on Justia Law