Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on the death of an individual, Adam, from a mixed-drug overdose. The defendant, a neighbor named Seymour, facilitated the purchase of heroin for Adam, who had a history of opioid addiction but had reportedly avoided heroin for years prior to the incident. On the day in question, Seymour drove Adam to buy heroin, which he consumed after returning home. He was found dead about an hour later. An autopsy revealed that his death was caused by the combined effects of heroin, mitragynine (kratom), methylphenidate, and diphenhydramine. Expert testimony indicated that while all four drugs had a synergistic effect, heroin was the most likely to result in overdose death among them.After a bench trial, Seymour was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, corrupting another with drugs, and heroin trafficking. She appealed only her convictions for involuntary manslaughter and corrupting another with drugs. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed those convictions, holding that the state had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the heroin Seymour provided was a but-for cause of Adam’s death, as no witness had testified that heroin alone caused the death.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under the correct standard, emphasizing the role of circumstantial as well as direct evidence. The court held that the but-for test for causation does not require proof that the defendant’s conduct alone caused the harm, only that the harm would not have occurred absent the defendant’s conduct. The presence of other contributing causes does not negate but-for causation. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, finding sufficient evidence that the heroin Seymour provided was a but-for cause of Adam’s death. View "State v. Seymour" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of voting in more than one state during the 2016 general election. He maintained residences in both New Hampshire and Massachusetts and was alleged to have voted in Holderness, New Hampshire by absentee ballot and in Belmont, Massachusetts in person. The State introduced evidence of his voting history in both states from 1996 to 2018 and sought to exclude statements by an acquaintance, William Botelho, who had previously admitted to voting in the defendant's name in Massachusetts.The Grafton County Superior Court allowed the State to admit the defendant’s prior voting records under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluded Botelho’s statements as inadmissible propensity evidence, also denying the defendant’s request for a Richards hearing regarding Botelho’s potential testimony. After a jury found the defendant guilty, the Superior Court denied his post-trial motions for dismissal based on territorial jurisdiction, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to set aside the verdict.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that the Superior Court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior voting history because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value, especially since the prior alleged acts were nearly identical to the charged crime. The court also held that evidence of Botelho’s confession to voting in the defendant’s name in the 2016 election was not evidence of other bad acts under Rule 404(b) and should not have been categorically excluded. The Supreme Court further ruled that, if Botelho asserts his Fifth Amendment rights on remand, the trial court must hold a Richards hearing.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motions regarding territorial jurisdiction, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence, but reversed the conviction due to the evidentiary errors and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The case concerns Cedric Lamont Berry, who was convicted for his role in the kidnapping and murder of Monique Baugh and the attempted murder of her boyfriend, J.M-M., on December 31, 2019. Berry and his accomplice were indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree premeditated murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and felony murder. The prosecution presented extensive circumstantial evidence, including surveillance footage, cell-site location data, DNA, and physical evidence, linking Berry to the crimes. A jury found Berry guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.Following the convictions, Berry appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, where his appellate counsel challenged the admissibility of cell-site location information and raised other procedural arguments. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. Berry then filed a petition for postconviction relief in Hennepin County District Court, acting pro se. He argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising additional claims, including alleged procedural errors during his initial court appearances, insufficiency of evidence regarding his mental state as an aider and abettor, issues with jury instructions, and trial counsel’s handling of potentially prejudicial conduct by the prosecution.The Hennepin County District Court summarily denied Berry’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that even if Berry’s factual allegations were true, they did not entitle him to relief under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and the underlying ineffective assistance claims de novo. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed, finding that Berry’s petition did not allege facts that, if proven, would establish ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. View "Berry vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of killing his girlfriend and her brother. The defendant and the girlfriend had lived together for years, and the girlfriend’s brother moved into their apartment. After neighbors heard shrieking and family received disturbing text messages from the defendant, the bodies of the girlfriend and her brother were discovered in the apartment, wrapped in rugs and placed near an air conditioner that had been set up to slow decomposition. Both victims had been stabbed multiple times. The defendant was later found in Mexico and extradited.At trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the prosecution charged the defendant with two counts of murder. A central issue was whether the defendant acted with premeditation or in the heat of passion. The defense sought to introduce a handwritten note found at the crime scene in which the defendant admitted to the killings and stated he was filled with rage after allegedly discovering the victims having sex. The trial court excluded the note during the prosecution’s case, ruling its probative value was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, but allowed the note when the defendant testified to introduce it himself. The jury convicted him of first degree murder for the girlfriend and second degree murder for the brother.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that while there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury, the trial court erred in excluding the note during the prosecution’s case, as the note was highly probative of the defendant’s state of mind and the theory of provocation. The appellate court found this error was prejudicial because it likely affected the verdict, especially regarding the degree of murder. The judgment was reversed, and the trial court was directed to vacate the convictions and set the matter for a new trial. View "People v. Tzul" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of forcible rape against two victims on separate occasions, one of whom was 16 years old, and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old minor. The offenses involved aggravated circumstances, including kidnapping, physical violence, and prior conviction for a similar offense. The evidence included DNA matching and testimony regarding the assaults, which involved threats, use of force, and infliction of injuries on the victims.After trial in the Superior Court of San Diego County, the jury made several true findings on special circumstances, including aggravated kidnapping, prior convictions, and multiple victims, under California's One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole for one rape count, 50 years to life for the other, and additional determinate terms for robbery and unlawful sexual intercourse. The court also imposed and stayed alternative sentences based on unused One Strike law circumstances and the Habitual Sexual Offender law.On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant challenged certain aspects of the sentencing, including alleged dual use of facts and the imposition of stayed terms under alternative sentencing schemes. The appellate court rejected the claim of impermissible dual use of facts in imposing the upper term for robbery. However, it held that imposing and staying sentences under both the One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law was unauthorized, given that these are alternative sentencing schemes, and only one may be used per qualifying count. Similarly, the court struck the additional stayed sentences based on unused One Strike circumstances, concluding the statute authorizes only one One Strike sentence per count. The judgment was affirmed as modified, with the unauthorized stayed sentences ordered stricken. View "P. v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, observed activity consistent with drug transactions in the parking lot of Jim’s Foods, a location known for narcotics activity. Officers saw a man leave a nearby house, interact with vehicles, and enter the back seat of a Chevrolet Cruze, with Antonio Clarence Robertson in the front seat. After further observation, including witnessing a hand-to-hand transaction, officers noticed the Chevy leave its parking spot and exit the lot without coming to a complete stop before entering the roadway. The officers initiated a traffic stop for violation of Iowa Code § 321.353, which requires vehicles emerging from private driveways to stop before entering public roads. A search, conducted with the driver’s consent, uncovered prescription pills and marijuana on Robertson, leading to his charge for possession with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa heard Robertson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, which he argued was unlawful because the parking lot did not qualify as a “private driveway” under Iowa law. The district court found the officers’ testimony credible regarding the private nature of the lot and concluded the stop was lawful. Robertson pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe a traffic violation occurred, as the lot was not open to the public as a matter of right and thus was a “private driveway” within the meaning of Iowa law. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the conviction. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Two men approached a van in a Denny’s parking lot in Los Angeles in the early morning hours of December 19, 1981. One of the men, holding a gun, demanded valuables from the occupants, Toney Lewis and Carolyn Spence. After robbing them, the gunman shot Lewis, who died from the wound. At trial, there was conflicting eyewitness identification as to whether the defendant or his brother was the shooter. An accomplice, who testified in exchange for a plea deal, stated that the defendant was the gunman and shot Lewis. Other witnesses recounted statements by the defendant suggesting his brother was not the killer and that he was the one who shot Lewis.The defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County of murder, robbery, and attempted robbery, with the jury finding true that a principal was armed with a firearm but not true that the defendant personally used a firearm or that the robbery special circumstance (which, as instructed, required the defendant to have personally killed the victim) applied. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly 1170.95), which provides relief for certain felony-murder convictions. The resentencing court initially denied relief, finding the defendant aided and abetted the murder. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, instructing reconsideration under the theories that the defendant was either the actual killer or a major participant acting with reckless indifference.In the most recent proceeding, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the jury’s not-true findings on the firearm enhancement and special circumstance did not preclude the resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer. The court found substantial evidence supported that finding and affirmed the denial of resentencing. View "People v. Player" on Justia Law

In 2016, law enforcement officers were tasked with apprehending an individual, Jamarion Robinson, who had several outstanding felony warrants. The officers, including two federal task force members, located Robinson at an apartment and conducted a raid that resulted in his death. Five years after the incident, a state grand jury in Georgia indicted these officers on charges including felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, making a false statement, and violation of oath by a public officer. The officers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, arguing they were entitled to a federal forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 as federal officers.After removal, the State of Georgia sought to have the case remanded to state court, but the district court denied the motion. Later, the State requested a “limited remand” to return to state court solely to seek a superseding indictment that would modify the charges. The district court denied this request, concluding it lacked statutory authority for such a remand and noting the State had alternative means for pursuing additional charges. The court also found the State’s request untimely and speculative regarding necessity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the district court’s denial of the “limited remand.” The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the order was not final and did not qualify under the collateral order doctrine or as an appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The court reasoned that federal law did not prohibit the State from seeking a superseding indictment in state court, and the district court’s order did not prevent the State from doing so. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Georgia v. Heinze" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers found six grams of heroin and 453 grams of methamphetamine in Edgar Mejia’s car outside a casino, Mejia informed them he also owned a trailer. Upon searching the trailer, officers discovered a hidden compartment containing two firearms and 541 grams of heroin. Mejia attempted to have Gregory Johnson, his alleged co-conspirator, remove the drugs and guns before police could find them, but Johnson was unsuccessful. Recorded jailhouse calls captured Mejia instructing Johnson on accessing the compartment and discussing the contents and their value. Mejia faced four federal charges, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was tried and convicted by a jury on conspiracy to distribute heroin and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced Mejia to 322 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including work or community service requirements. Mejia appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction and two aspects of his sentencing: the inclusion of an expunged marijuana conviction in his criminal history calculation and the community service condition of his supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, as the jailhouse calls and circumstances supported a reasonable inference that Mejia and at least one other person agreed to distribute heroin. The court also concluded that any error in counting the expunged conviction was harmless because the district court made clear that the sentence would be the same regardless. The appellate court dismissed Mejia’s challenge to the community service condition as unripe, since it would not take effect for decades and was contingent on future events. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Mejia" on Justia Law