Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who responded to an online advertisement posted by an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a woman offering sexual services, including access to two fictitious underage girls, one purportedly 12 years old. The defendant agreed to meet at a hotel to engage in sexual conduct with the supposed minors and was arrested upon arrival. He was charged with two counts of Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law, with enhanced penalties based on the alleged ages of the victims.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied the defendant’s motion to strike the mandatory sentencing enhancements, which imposed a 25-year parole restriction for offenses involving victims 12 years old or younger. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Sexual Abuse of Children, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion regarding the sentencing enhancement. The court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, including the mandatory enhancement, and dismissed the second count.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement for sexual child abuse applies when the “victim” is a fictitious child created by law enforcement in a sting operation. The court held that the statutory language requiring enhanced penalties based on the age of “the victim” refers to actual, specified child victims, not to fictional or simulated victims. The court concluded that the Legislature’s use of different language in the statute—distinguishing between “a child” in defining the offense and “the victim” in penalty enhancements—demonstrates an intent to limit enhanced penalties to cases involving real children. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s imposition of the mandatory enhancement and remanded for resentencing under the general penalty provision. View "State v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Douglas Baertsch was convicted in January 2023 by the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, for burglary with disorderly conduct as the predicate offense, partner or family member assault (PFMA), and criminal mischief. The incident occurred on May 21, 2020, when Baertsch and his girlfriend, K.W., argued after a night out. The argument escalated at K.W.'s home, leading to Baertsch forcibly taking K.W.'s phone and later kicking in her front door to retrieve his wallet. Inside the house, Baertsch called K.W. derogatory names before leaving.The District Court jury found Baertsch guilty of criminal mischief for breaking the door, PFMA for causing K.W. reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, and burglary with disorderly conduct for using abusive language inside the house. The court sentenced him to two consecutive five-year suspended prison terms for PFMA and burglary, and six months jail-time (all but 60 days suspended) for criminal mischief. Additionally, the court imposed a seven-year restriction on Baertsch’s ability to seek early termination of his sentence.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction with disorderly conduct as the predicate offense. The court found that the abusive language used by Baertsch inside K.W.'s private home did not disturb the public peace, a necessary element for disorderly conduct under the statute. Consequently, the court vacated the burglary conviction. Additionally, the court ruled that the District Court's seven-year restriction on Baertsch’s right to seek early termination of his sentence was illegal, as it exceeded statutory authorization. The case was remanded to the District Court to strike the illegal sentencing condition. View "State v. Baertsch" on Justia Law

Kevin Gray, a sexually violent predator (SVP), was found suitable for conditional release. The State Department of State Hospitals identified a proposed placement for Gray, but the Stanislaus County District Attorney opposed it due to its proximity to a home where a child engaged in a public charter school’s independent study program. The court ruled that the home constituted a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f), making the location ineligible for Gray’s placement.The trial court initially determined Gray was suitable for conditional release and ordered a housing search. After an extensive search, a proposed site was identified. The People opposed the site, arguing it was too close to a home-based school. The court agreed, ruling the home was a “school” under the statute, and barred the placement.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a home where a child engages in a public school independent study program does not constitute a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f). The court distinguished this case from People v. Superior Court (Cheek), which involved a private home school. The court noted that independent study is a program, not a type of school, and the legislative intent behind the placement restriction was to protect children in traditional school settings. The court declined to consider alternative arguments regarding the proximity of children fitting Gray’s victim profile, as these were not addressed by the trial court.The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order barring Gray’s placement at the proposed site. View "Gray v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Shelby Ragner was charged with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, alleging he had sexual intercourse with C.M. while she was severely intoxicated. Ragner's attorney, Alexander Jacobi, did not interview or present Max Weimer as a witness, who later testified that he saw minor injuries on Ragner the morning after the incident. Ragner was found not guilty of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent but was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC). He was sentenced to ten years in prison, with four years suspended. Ragner's direct appeal was denied.Ragner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to Jacobi's failure to interview and call exculpatory witnesses, including Weimer. The District Court found that Jacobi's failure to investigate Weimer's potential testimony fell below the standard of care and granted Ragner's petition, concluding that Jacobi's performance prejudiced Ragner.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that even if Jacobi's performance was deficient, Ragner did not demonstrate prejudice as required under the second prong of the Strickland test. The court found that Weimer's limited observation of Ragner's injuries did not significantly alter the evidentiary picture presented to the jury, which included overwhelming evidence of C.M.'s severe intoxication, extensive documented injuries, and Ragner's own admissions. The court concluded that Weimer's testimony would not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, holding that Ragner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and remanded the case for amendment of the order consistent with its opinion. View "Ragner v. State" on Justia Law

Stephen Walks was charged with two counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of felony sexual assault based on allegations made by his step-granddaughters, K.P. and K. The charges arose after K.P. disclosed to her mother that Walks had touched her inappropriately. Forensic interviews were conducted with both girls, during which they drew pictures depicting the alleged incidents. These drawings, along with their testimonies, were presented as evidence during the trial.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, presided over the trial. The jury found Walks guilty of felony sexual assault and two counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent. During deliberations, the jury was given unrestricted access to the drawings made by K.P. and K. during their forensic interviews and at trial. Walks objected to this, arguing that the drawings were testimonial in nature and should not have been available to the jury without supervision. The District Court overruled his objection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the forensic interview drawings were not testimonial evidence and could be reviewed by the jury during deliberations. However, the court acknowledged that the trial drawings were testimonial but concluded that allowing the jury unsupervised access to these drawings was harmless error. The court reasoned that other substantial evidence presented at trial proved the same facts as the trial drawings, and there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to Walks' conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Walks' judgment of conviction. View "State v. Walks" on Justia Law

José Miguel Guzmán-Ceballos was sentenced to ninety months' imprisonment for his involvement in transporting 385 kilograms of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. He pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement and sought a mitigating role adjustment under § 3B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which the district court denied. Guzmán-Ceballos argued that he was merely a fisherman recruited for the smuggling operation due to economic hardship and had no significant role in planning or organizing the venture.The District Court of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing where Guzmán-Ceballos pleaded guilty. At the sentencing hearing, he objected to the presentence report (PSR) for not applying the mitigating role adjustment. The district court denied his objection, adopted the PSR's recommendations, and sentenced him to ninety months' imprisonment, noting it considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and his role in the offense. Guzmán-Ceballos timely appealed, arguing the district court failed to conduct the necessary legal analysis for the mitigating role adjustment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Guzmán-Ceballos. The court found that the district court did not engage in the required four-part analysis to determine his role in the offense. Specifically, the district court failed to identify the universe of participants, order them along a continuum of culpability, and compare Guzmán-Ceballos's role to the average participant using the § 3B1.2 factors. The appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to perform the correct mitigating role analysis. View "United States v. Ceballos" on Justia Law

Shaheem Johnson was involved in a multi-state drug-trafficking enterprise during the 1990s, which led to the deaths of five people. Johnson was directly responsible for the deaths of Bernard Franklin and Richard Villa. He was charged with murder in aid of racketeering and other related offenses. Johnson was convicted by a jury and sentenced to two life terms plus 790 months in prison. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.Johnson filed a pro se motion for compassionate release in March 2021, which was supplemented by his counsel. The motion argued that the sentencing disparities between Johnson and his co-conspirators, who received significantly reduced sentences after cooperating with the government, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Johnson's motion in part, reducing his sentence to 35 years in prison, citing the sentencing disparities as a key factor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the sentencing disparities between Johnson and his co-conspirators, Damein Piranti, Rickey Piranti, and Eldon Brown, weighed in favor of granting compassionate release. The court noted that the district court was entitled to consider these disparities, especially given the jury's findings regarding Johnson's lesser role in the killings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's order reducing Johnson's sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Michael Bernard Bell was convicted of the 1993 first-degree murders of Jimmy West and Tamecka Smith. Bell sought revenge for his brother's death and purchased an AK-47. He mistakenly identified West as his target and shot both West and Smith. Bell was sentenced to death, with the trial court finding three aggravating factors and one mitigating circumstance. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.Bell filed multiple postconviction relief motions. The circuit court denied his initial motion, but the Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing, which ultimately resulted in a denial of relief. Subsequent motions were also denied, including claims related to retroactive application of legal decisions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Bell's federal habeas petitions were similarly unsuccessful.Governor Ron DeSantis signed Bell’s death warrant in June 2025, prompting Bell to file a successive motion for postconviction relief, raising claims of newly discovered evidence, Brady and Giglio violations, and racial bias. The circuit court granted an evidentiary hearing on the newly discovered evidence claim but ultimately denied relief.The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's denial of Bell’s successive postconviction motion. The court found that Bell's claims of newly discovered evidence, including alleged recantations and prosecutorial misconduct, were either untimely or lacked merit. The court also rejected Bell's arguments regarding the totality of circumstances and the timeframe of his death warrant. Consequently, the court denied Bell's motion for a stay of execution and his request for oral argument. View "Bell v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Brooklyn Broadway pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter and hit-and-run causing death, while Ana Villanueva was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon, willful cruelty to an elder, and robbery. Both defendants were referred to the San Diego County Behavioral Health Court (BHC) for admission screening over the objections of the People. The People filed peremptory challenges against the assigned BHC judge, Judge Cynthia Davis, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, which Judge Davis denied, concluding that BHC proceedings do not involve contested issues of fact or law.The People sought writs of mandate from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, to direct the trial court to grant their peremptory challenges. The appellate court issued orders to show cause and consolidated the petitions for review.The Court of Appeal held that BHC proceedings do involve contested issues of fact or law, as the BHC judge makes the final decision on whether to admit a defendant into the program, which can be contested by the parties involved. The court concluded that the BHC judge's role in screening and acceptance decisions, as well as in probation violation hearings, constitutes hearings involving contested issues of fact or law. Therefore, the People’s peremptory challenges were timely and appropriate.The Court of Appeal issued writs of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders denying the People’s peremptory challenges and to enter new orders granting the challenges. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Wardy Alfonso Liberato, a Dominican national previously removed from the United States in 2007, was arrested near the U.S.-Mexico border fence in January 2023. He was part of a group of suspected noncitizens. A jury convicted him of entering and being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Liberato appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was free from official restraint before his apprehension.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Liberato’s motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment of conviction. Liberato then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reversed Liberato’s conviction, holding that the government’s evidence was insufficient to establish that Liberato was free from official restraint at any point before his apprehension. The court emphasized that for a conviction under § 1326(a), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was free from official restraint after physically entering U.S. territory. The court found that there was no evidence that Liberato’s group was ever anywhere other than immediately next to the border fence, and no testimony about where Liberato was or what he was doing when first observed in the United States. The court concluded that no rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Liberato was at any point free from official restraint. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "USA V. LIBERATO" on Justia Law