Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals were convicted in separate proceedings in the Huntsville Municipal Court for violating city ordinances. Each person appealed his conviction to the Madison Circuit Court, seeking a trial de novo. Before those trials occurred, each defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the municipal-court complaints failed to properly allege that the ordinances had been duly adopted and, in some cases, that the complaints referenced non-existent sections of the Alabama Code. All of these arguments were raised for the first time in the circuit court.The Madison Circuit Court granted the motions to dismiss in each case, sometimes stating that the complaints failed to confer jurisdiction. The City of Huntsville appealed these dismissals to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, which consolidated the cases, reversed the circuit court’s judgments, and remanded for further proceedings. The defendants then sought review by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which consolidated the cases for decision.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that any defects in the municipal-court complaints did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction, as that jurisdiction is conferred by statute. The Court further held that the defendants did not waive their challenges to the sufficiency of the complaints by failing to raise them in municipal court; such challenges could be raised during the pendency of the proceedings, including in the circuit court. However, the Court concluded that the municipal-court complaints met the requirements of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 13.2(a), and did not need to include formal averments about the adoption of the ordinances. The Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Ex parte Sandifer" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old committed a violent home invasion, during which he sexually assaulted his former neighbor at knifepoint. He was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and related enhancements. The original sentence was a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms, ultimately resulting in a total sentence of 44 years to life in prison, with parole eligibility at age 60 after a later modification.After serving more than 15 years, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Tulare County for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that excluding him from resentencing relief violated equal protection principles. The trial court denied the petition, finding that his sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP and that, under People v. Heard, he was not eligible for relief.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered whether the functional equivalency analysis from People v. Contreras, which is rooted in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, should apply to equal protection challenges under section 1170(d). The court declined to import the Eighth Amendment standard, instead applying a rational basis review as articulated in recent California Supreme Court decisions. The court held that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between juveniles sentenced to explicit LWOP and those, like the appellant, sentenced to lengthy terms with parole eligibility within their expected lifetimes. The court concluded that section 1170(d)’s limitation to LWOP sentences does not violate equal protection as applied to a 44-years-to-life sentence. The trial court’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers obtained and executed a search warrant for “4279 Violet Circle, Lake Worth, FL,” believing it to be a single-family home occupied by the defendant. In reality, the property included a main residence and three efficiency apartments at the back, one of which was occupied by the defendant. These apartments had no separate addresses, mailboxes, or exterior markings. During the search, officers were directed by other residents to the defendant’s apartment, where they found firearms and drugs. The defendant was subsequently charged with multiple firearm and drug offenses.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was defective under the Fourth Amendment because it listed only the main address and not his specific apartment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held an evidentiary hearing, credited the testimony of the investigating officer, and found that the officers reasonably believed the property was a single-family home based on surveillance, property records, and the lack of distinguishing features for the apartments. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion to suppress, and the district court adopted this recommendation. The defendant was found guilty after a stipulated-facts bench trial and sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that the search warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement because the officers reasonably believed, after a diligent investigation, that the property was a single-family home. The court found no evidence that the officers knew or should have known about the separate apartments before executing the warrant. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. View "United States v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

In December 1990, Victor Tony Jones fatally stabbed his employers, Jacob and Matilda Nestor, during a robbery at their business in Miami-Dade County. Jones was found at the scene with the victims’ belongings and admitted to the killings at the hospital. He was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery. The trial court, following the jury’s recommendation, imposed death sentences for both murders, citing three aggravating factors and no mitigation. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1995.Over the following decades, Jones filed multiple unsuccessful motions for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County and petitions for habeas corpus in state and federal courts. After Governor Ron DeSantis signed Jones’s death warrant in August 2025, Jones filed a sixth successive motion for postconviction relief, arguing newly discovered evidence of abuse at the Okeechobee School for Boys, racial disparities in Miami-Dade capital prosecutions, and due process violations in the warrant process. He also made post-warrant demands for public records related to the Okeechobee School. The circuit court summarily denied all claims and records requests.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the appeal and petition. It held that Jones’s claim of newly discovered evidence regarding abuse at the Okeechobee School was procedurally barred and meritless, as the alleged abuse was known to Jones long before trial and did not constitute evidence likely to yield a life sentence on retrial. The court also found no due process violation in the warrant process and no abuse of discretion in denying Jones’s public records requests. The habeas petition was denied as an improper attempt to relitigate previously decided issues. The court affirmed the circuit court’s orders, denied all relief, and refused to entertain any rehearing. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant and his then-wife, J, lived in Deschutes County, Oregon, and their marriage ended in divorce proceedings after J obtained a restraining order against the defendant. The criminal charges arose from two separate incidents: one in December 2016, when the defendant dragged J from their bedroom to the yard in freezing weather, and another in July 2017, when the defendant damaged J’s car with a power drill and made threatening statements. The December incident led to a second-degree kidnapping charge, while the July incident resulted in a menacing charge. The state also filed a motion in limine to limit certain evidence related to the divorce proceedings.The Deschutes County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal on both charges and granted the state’s motion in limine in part, restricting argument about whether J gained a tactical advantage in the divorce from her allegations. The jury convicted the defendant of both kidnapping and menacing. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed both convictions, though several judges dissented on aspects of the kidnapping and menacing rulings and the scope of the motion in limine.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction because the movement of J did not constitute taking her “from one place to another” as required by ORS 163.225(1)(a); specifically, the movement did not increase her isolation or restrict her freedom of movement in the manner contemplated by the statute. The court reversed the kidnapping conviction. However, the court affirmed the menacing conviction, finding that the defendant’s words and conduct were sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude he intended to place J in fear of imminent serious physical injury. The court also affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged in a single indictment with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two minor victims, A and M, who are cousins. The alleged conduct toward A spanned four years and involved repeated touching, while the conduct toward M consisted of two isolated incidents. The defendant moved to sever the charges relating to each victim, arguing that joinder would cause substantial prejudice, particularly because the evidence against M was weaker and the jury might improperly use the stronger evidence regarding A to convict on the charges involving M. The trial court denied the motion to sever, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts involving A and one count involving M.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever, finding that the defendant had not shown substantial prejudice beyond that inherent in joinder. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the mandatory 75-month Measure 11 sentence imposed for the conviction involving M, holding that it was unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Oregon Constitution.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed both issues. It held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever because the defendant had articulated a case-specific theory of substantial prejudice, supported by the record, as required by State v. Delaney. The Supreme Court clarified that when such a showing is made, the trial court must provide some remedy to address the prejudice. However, the error was deemed harmless as to the counts involving A, so those convictions were affirmed. The conviction involving M was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court did not reach the sentencing issue in light of this disposition. The Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Hernandez-Esteban" on Justia Law

In 1985, a 20-year-old individual committed a burglary that resulted in the fatal stabbing of a 14-year-old boy. The following year, a jury convicted him of aggravated first degree murder. At that time, Washington law required a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for such a conviction, and the sentencing judge stated he had no discretion to impose any other sentence. The individual has been incarcerated for nearly 40 years under this sentence.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Washington Court of Appeals in 1988, the petitioner sought resentencing in 2023, arguing that recent Washington Supreme Court decisions—specifically In re Personal Restraint of Monschke and State v. Carter—rendered his mandatory LWOP sentence unconstitutional. The King County Superior Court transferred his motion to the Court of Appeals, which then certified the case for direct review by the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that its decision in Monschke constituted a significant change in the law, exempting the petitioner’s claim from the one-year time bar for collateral relief. The court found that mandatory LWOP sentences for individuals aged 18 to 20 at the time of their offense, imposed without consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, are unconstitutional under the state constitution’s prohibition on cruel punishment. The court further held that a petitioner in this situation demonstrates actual and substantial prejudice if Monschke is material to their sentence. The court granted the personal restraint petition and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. View "In re Personal Restraint of Schoenhals" on Justia Law

A man was convicted by a jury in Greene County, Arkansas, of five counts of rape involving a minor victim. The case involved evidence obtained from the defendant’s cell phone, including pornographic images, and testimony from the victim describing multiple incidents of sexual abuse, the use of sex toys, and exposure to child pornography. The victim’s account was corroborated by physical evidence, DNA analysis, and expert testimony from a sexual assault nurse examiner. The defendant denied the allegations, attributing the accusations to the victim’s desire to avoid blame for unrelated misconduct.After the conviction, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding error in the admission of certain evidence. The State petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, thereby reviewing the case as if it had been originally filed there. The defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his cell phone, claiming the search warrant was facially deficient and lacked probable cause, and that the court improperly allowed cross-examination about prior orders of protection involving his girlfriend, in violation of evidentiary rules.The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers acted in good faith and the warrant was not so deficient as to preclude reliance on it. The court also found that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence about the orders of protection, but concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the prejudicial effect was slight. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the convictions and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "VASQUEZ v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was charged with capital murder following the shooting death of Zyrique “Zack” Geans in Stuttgart, Arkansas, on February 13, 2019. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, after an earlier altercation with the victim, discharged a firearm from a vehicle toward the victim, who was under a carport at his residence, resulting in the victim’s death. Multiple eyewitnesses testified that the appellant fired a handgun from a purple Camaro convertible toward the residence. Physical evidence, including shell casings and gunshot residue, supported the eyewitness accounts. The defense argued justification, claiming the appellant fired only after being shot at, and presented testimony to support this theory.The Arkansas County Circuit Court held a jury trial in January 2023. The jury found the appellant guilty of capital murder and of using a firearm to commit the offense. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole, plus a fifteen-year firearm enhancement. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the voluntariness of his in-custody statements, and the completeness of the record for appellate review. The circuit court denied these motions, including the motion to suppress statements, finding that the appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of the motion to suppress, and the adequacy of the record. The court held that substantial evidence supported the conviction, that the appellant’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that the supplemented record was sufficient for appellate review. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "HUDSON v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

On January 14, 2023, a motorist, Arva Wilkerson, called 911 to report a speeding vehicle. After following the car and reciting its license plate, Wilkerson stated, “he is on to me.” Dylan Collins, the driver, noticed Wilkerson following him, pulled over, and Wilkerson stopped behind him. Without any communication, Collins exited his car, approached Wilkerson’s truck with a pistol, and fired thirteen shots into the vehicle. Collins then left the scene, destroyed the firearm, and did not contact authorities. Wilkerson died from his injuries the next day. Witnesses testified that Collins immediately fired upon Wilkerson without interaction and that Wilkerson’s gun was found later in a closed console.The case was tried in the Faulkner County Circuit Court. At trial, Collins claimed self-defense, stating he believed Wilkerson was reaching for a gun. However, evidence showed Collins did not see a weapon and did not speak to Wilkerson. Multiple witnesses corroborated that Wilkerson did not display a gun. The defense moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State failed to disprove justification, but the circuit court denied the motion, leaving the question for the jury. The jury convicted Collins of capital murder and firearm enhancement.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Collins challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding justification and the circuit court’s restriction of voir dire about burdens of proof. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Collins was not justified in using deadly force, as he was the initial aggressor and did not reasonably believe Wilkerson posed an imminent threat. The court also found no abuse of discretion in limiting voir dire to the relevant burden of proof. The judgment was affirmed. View "COLLINS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law