Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who, after pleading guilty in 2018 to felony larceny with intent to sell and driving with a revoked license, received suspended sentences conditioned on supervised probation. After completing his active sentences in 2021, he began probation but soon failed multiple urine screens, tested positive for cocaine, missed treatment appointments, failed to report to his probation officer, and was arrested for new crimes. His probation officer filed several reports alleging violations of various probation conditions, including failing to report, absconding, and committing new offenses. At his probation revocation hearing, he pleaded guilty to violations based on new convictions but not guilty to technical violations related to reporting and compliance.The Circuit Court of Loudoun County found him guilty of all alleged violations. During sentencing, the court remarked on the defendant’s failure to accept responsibility, among other factors, when determining the sentence. The court ultimately revoked a portion of the suspended sentence, resulting in an active term of incarceration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the circuit court improperly considered the defendant’s not-guilty pleas to the technical violations as an aggravating factor at sentencing and reversed for resentencing.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not enhance the sentence as punishment for the defendant’s exercise of his right to plead not guilty. Instead, the comments about the failure to accept responsibility were permissible considerations of rehabilitation potential and not explicitly linked to the plea. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Jason Starr, following a contentious divorce from his ex-wife Sara Starr, was required to pay substantial monthly support and other financial obligations. Evidence showed Jason was deeply frustrated by these requirements and expressed anger in personal writings. After Sara moved out, she confided to a friend that she feared Jason would kill her. Prior to the murder, Jason suggested to a friend that his brother Darin could “take care of” marital problems for a fee. Darin, living in Texas, purchased a motorcycle with Jason’s financial assistance and received additional payments from Jason through a third party. Cell-site data and witness testimony placed Darin near Sara’s Alabama residence in the days leading up to her murder. Sara was shot and killed outside her home, and surveillance footage showed a motorcycle leaving the scene shortly after. Darin returned to Texas the same day. Later, while in jail for an unrelated offense, Darin made statements implying Jason owed him a significant favor.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama indicted Jason and Darin Starr for using interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. At trial, the government presented circumstantial evidence linking both brothers to the crime. The jury convicted both Jason and Darin, and the district court imposed mandatory life sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed claims that the district court erred by excluding alternate perpetrator evidence, admitting certain hearsay and investigative testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly excluded speculative alternate perpetrator evidence, correctly admitted the challenged statements under evidentiary rules, and found the evidence sufficient for conviction. The court affirmed both convictions and sentences. View "USA v. Starr" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and two related misdemeanors. He and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement under which he would plead guilty to the felony, the misdemeanors would be dismissed, and he would receive a suspended sentence with probation, provided he complied with certain conditions. The agreement included a clause stating it would be “null and void” if the defendant failed to appear for his presentence appointment or sentencing without good cause. After entering his guilty plea, the defendant failed to appear for both the presentence appointment and sentencing, leading to his arrest on a bench warrant.Following these events, the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez Perce County, determined that the “null and void” clause released the State and the court from their obligations under the plea agreement, but held that the defendant remained bound by his guilty plea. The court imposed a sentence inconsistent with the plea agreement and did not allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment.On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “null and void” clause. The Supreme Court concluded that, under general contract principles, the clause rendered the entire plea agreement unenforceable by either party upon breach, not just by the State. The court further held that, under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(4), once the plea agreement was rendered unenforceable and the court declined to be bound by its terms, the defendant was entitled to an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the district court failed to provide this opportunity, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. McGarvey" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Eastwood was convicted of murder after the body of Cara Hodges was found strangled in a wooded area. Eastwood was the last person seen with the victim and, after being interviewed by police, he confessed to the crime both to his employer and later to law enforcement. During the investigation, Eastwood took a polygraph test and was told by police that he had failed. He subsequently confessed to the murder, describing details of the crime and disposal of evidence. At trial, Eastwood did not testify but presented a false confession expert who opined that his confession was consistent with an internalized false confession, citing factors such as alcohol use, sleep deprivation, and being confronted by police with allegedly objective evidence of guilt.The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Orangeburg County. Eastwood sought to introduce evidence through his expert that police told him he failed the polygraph, arguing it was relevant to his false confession defense. The trial court excluded this evidence, relying on Rule 702 and Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, finding that polygraph evidence was unreliable and that its admission would confuse the jury and potentially prejudice Eastwood by bolstering the confession’s truthfulness.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether exclusion of the polygraph evidence was error. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence under Rule 702, as Eastwood was not offering scientific proof of the polygraph’s reliability but rather the fact that police told him he failed. The Supreme Court found the evidence relevant to the defense and not substantially outweighed by confusion or prejudice under Rule 403. However, the court concluded that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict, as the expert was able to present the core theory of false confessions. The conviction was therefore affirmed. View "The State v. Eastwood" on Justia Law

Four police officers entered a Pittsburgh rowhouse searching for a missing person. Inside, Vincent Smith, the appellant, started a fire that endangered the officers, who escaped unharmed. Smith was rescued and treated for smoke inhalation. The bodies of two men, previously killed by Smith, were found in the residence. Smith admitted to the killings and to starting the fire in a suicide attempt. He was charged with two counts of voluntary manslaughter and four counts of arson endangering persons (AEP), one for each officer present.Smith pled guilty to all charges in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms for each manslaughter and each AEP count, totaling 26 to 52 years. Smith challenged the legality of receiving multiple sentences for AEP based on a single act of arson that endangered multiple people. The trial court, relying on Commonwealth v. Frisbie, held that each endangered person constituted a separate unit of prosecution under the AEP statute.Smith appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that only one sentence for AEP should be imposed per arson, regardless of the number of people endangered. Initially, a panel vacated three AEP sentences, but after reargument, the en banc Superior Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the unit of prosecution was each endangered person.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the correct unit of prosecution for AEP under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i). The Court held that the unit of prosecution is each act of arson, not each person endangered. It found the statute ambiguous and applied the rule of lenity, strictly construing it in favor of the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision, vacated Smith’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing consistent with its holding. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Joseph Dwayne Matt was a passenger in Levi Gadaire’s vehicle when it was stopped by law enforcement for erratic driving. Both Matt and Gadaire were probationers, and Matt was flagged as an absconder with an active warrant for his arrest. During the stop, Gadaire admitted to recent methamphetamine use, which led to a search of the vehicle. Officers discovered multiple bags of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the center console. Matt was charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug with intent to distribute by accountability, and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia.The case proceeded to trial in the Montana First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County. The State’s evidence included testimony from the reporting driver, law enforcement officers, body cam footage, surveillance video, and phone records. Gadaire, who had given multiple inconsistent statements during the investigation, testified that Matt was present during the drug pick-up but later recanted aspects of his testimony. At the close of the State’s case, Matt moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State’s evidence was insufficient because it relied on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. The District Court denied the motion, and the jury found Matt guilty of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, but not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying Matt’s motion for a directed verdict due to insufficient corroborating evidence. The Supreme Court held that the State failed to provide independent evidence connecting Matt to the crime, apart from Gadaire’s testimony. Mere presence in the vehicle did not meet the statutory requirement for corroboration. The Supreme Court reversed Matt’s conviction, remanded the case, and ordered the District Court to vacate the judgment and dismiss the charges. View "State v. Matt" on Justia Law

Craig Medoff, after a history of violating federal securities laws and failing to comply with prior court orders and penalties, was subject to a 2016 consent judgment in the District of Massachusetts that barred him and any entity he controlled from participating in the issuance, offer, or sale of any security for ten years. Despite this, Medoff continued to control Nova Capital International LLC and engaged in securities-related activities, using an alias and receiving substantial fees in violation of the judgment. The SEC initiated civil contempt proceedings, but the district court, concerned about the futility of further civil sanctions given Medoff’s history and financial situation, instead initiated criminal contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the criminal contempt case. Medoff’s counsel moved for the judge’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to his comments and conduct during the proceedings. The district court denied the recusal motion, finding no reasonable basis for doubting its impartiality, and proceeded with the criminal case. Medoff ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, a variance above the guideline range, and thirty-six months of supervised release, along with a fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Medoff challenged the denial of the recusal motion and the reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal, as the judge’s actions did not display deep-seated antagonism or favoritism. The court also found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Medoff" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant applied for U.S. citizenship in 2011 and, on his application and during an interview, denied ever having committed a crime for which he was not arrested. However, in 2013, he pleaded guilty in North Carolina state court to attempted statutory rape for conduct that occurred in 2008, admitting to engaging in a sexual act with a minor. He did not disclose this conduct on his naturalization application. Years later, a federal grand jury indicted him for naturalization fraud, alleging he knowingly concealed his criminal history to obtain citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional preindictment delay, finding he had not shown actual prejudice from the delay. The court also denied his motion to suppress evidence of his state guilty plea, ruling that he could not collaterally attack the validity of his state conviction in federal court except for a deprivation of counsel, which did not apply here. At trial, the court limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding his cognitive abilities, excluding certain opinions about his capacity to understand the application question. The jury convicted the defendant, finding he knowingly made a false statement, and the court sentenced him to six months in prison and revoked his citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial actual prejudice from the preindictment delay, that the district court properly refused to suppress the state guilty plea, and that while the limitation of the expert’s testimony was error under recent Supreme Court guidance, the error was harmless given the other evidence presented. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed. View "US v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all Cameroonian Americans, participated in a secretive group dedicated to sending firearms and ammunition from Maryland to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon. The group, known as the “Peanut Project,” operated out of a basement in Baltimore County, where they assembled, modified, and packaged weapons and ammunition for overseas shipment. Their concealment methods included obliterating serial numbers from firearms and hiding the items within compressor tanks and other cargo. In 2019, law enforcement intercepted a shipping container en route to Nigeria containing over 35,000 rounds of ammunition and 39 firearms, many with defaced serial numbers. A subsequent search of the group’s base revealed a full-scale operation for manufacturing and preparing firearms for export.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland indicted the defendants on five counts, including conspiracy, illegal exportation, transportation of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and smuggling. After a ten-day jury trial, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy, transporting firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and smuggling, but acquitted on the exportation counts. The district court denied post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and various trial rulings. At sentencing, the court applied enhancements for the number of firearms involved and for trafficking, sentencing each defendant to 63 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary or instructional rulings, and the sentencing enhancements were properly applied. The court also found no error in the oral and written pronouncement of supervised release conditions. The judgments of the district court were affirmed. View "US v. Nji" on Justia Law

Several individuals associated with the Reccless Tigers, a Northern Virginia-based drug gang, were charged with a range of offenses, including drug trafficking, racketeering, kidnapping, and murder. The gang was involved in distributing marijuana and cocaine, and members targeted those who failed to pay drug debts or cooperated with law enforcement. The case centered on the murder of Brandon White, who owed a drug debt and had testified against a gang member. Evidence showed that gang members, including the defendants, orchestrated White’s abduction and murder, with some directly participating in the killing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia presided over a joint trial. The court denied several pretrial motions, including requests for continuances, motions to substitute counsel, and a motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The jury convicted three defendants—Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter—of racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, drug conspiracy, and killing while engaged in drug trafficking, with Lamborn also convicted of using a firearm resulting in death. Tony was convicted of racketeering and drug conspiracy but acquitted of destructive device charges. The court sentenced Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter to life imprisonment and Tony to 312 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the convictions and most sentences, finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of continuances or substitution of counsel, and sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court also upheld the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements and rejected the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment claims. However, it vacated the sentences of Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter due to inconsistencies between the oral pronouncement and written judgments regarding supervised release conditions, remanding for resentencing on that issue. View "US v. Lamborn" on Justia Law