Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a man who, shortly after being released from prison, was staying at his grandmother’s house and had a contentious relationship with her husband. On the day of the incident, after an argument, he stabbed his grandmother’s husband more than twenty-five times in the kitchen, dragged the body outside, and threatened bystanders while holding the murder weapon. Forensic evidence indicated a violent struggle, with numerous defensive wounds on the victim. The defendant claimed self-defense, stating that the victim attacked him first, but his account was inconsistent and uncorroborated.The Desha County Circuit Court presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant sought to exclude testimony from a neighbor who said the defendant had expressed a desire to harm the victim and burn down the house if his grandmother was not present. The court found this statement relevant to the defendant’s intent and admitted it. At trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing only that the State had not proven he acted purposely, but did not specifically argue that the State failed to disprove self-defense. The jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life in prison.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It held that the sufficiency challenge regarding self-defense was not preserved for appeal because the defendant did not raise it with specificity at trial, as required by Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant purposely killed the victim, based on the nature and extent of the wounds and the defendant’s conduct. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the neighbor’s testimony, as it was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The conviction was affirmed. View "MCDANIELS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A juvenile, K.I.B., was adjudicated delinquent in June 2024 by the Juvenile Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, for promoting a sexual performance by a minor and possession of prohibited materials, both felonies under North Dakota law, as well as giving false information to law enforcement. In January 2025, the court held a hearing to determine whether K.I.B. was required to register as a sexual offender. The court found that K.I.B. had no prior sexual offender offenses and did not exhibit mental abnormality or predatory conduct during the commission of the offenses, and therefore exempted K.I.B. from the registration requirement.The State appealed the exemption order to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the juvenile court erred in interpreting its discretion under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15. The State asserted its standing to appeal based on statutory language and public safety interests. The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo, focusing on whether the juvenile court had discretion to exempt K.I.B. from registration under the relevant statute.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a) mandates registration for individuals adjudicated as felonious sexual offenders, including juveniles, unless the offense falls under a specific exception listed in subdivision (c), which did not apply to K.I.B. The court concluded that the juvenile court misapplied the law and abused its discretion by exempting K.I.B. from registration. The Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court’s order and remanded the case for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion, requiring K.I.B. to register as a sexual offender. View "Interest of K.I.B." on Justia Law

Taylor Kraft was charged in two separate criminal cases in Burleigh County, North Dakota, with multiple counts of theft and unauthorized use of personal identifying information. The cases were joined for trial, and in October 2024, Kraft, represented by counsel, pled guilty to all charges. In March 2025, Kraft filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and other grounds.The State responded to Kraft’s application by filing an answer and a motion for summary dismissal in April 2025. The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, granted the State’s motion on May 2, 2025, summarily dismissing Kraft’s application for postconviction relief. Kraft appealed, arguing that he was not given the required thirty days to respond to the State’s motion, as mandated when a motion for summary disposition is filed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and determined that, although the State labeled its motion as one for summary dismissal, it actually argued and relied upon the summary disposition (summary judgment) standard. The district court also applied the summary disposition standard in its ruling. Under North Dakota law, when a motion for summary disposition is filed, the applicant must be given thirty days to respond. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by not providing Kraft the required response time. The order summarily dismissing Kraft’s application for postconviction relief was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Kraft v. State" on Justia Law

Two individuals engaged in a recurring scheme to steal merchandise from Walmart. Their method involved purchasing items, then re-entering the store to take identical items without paying, using the original receipt as false proof of purchase if confronted. The stolen goods were then returned to different Walmart locations for cash or gift cards. After being caught, one of the participants pled guilty to two third-degree felonies and admitted that Walmart suffered over $10,000 in damages due to their actions.In the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the defendant agreed in his plea to pay restitution, suggesting it should be split with his codefendant. At sentencing, he did not dispute the total damages or his responsibility but argued that the restitution should be apportioned equally between him and his codefendant based on comparative fault principles, as he believed both were equally culpable. The district court rejected this argument, holding that precedent from the Utah Court of Appeals required joint and several liability, and ordered both defendants to be responsible for the full amount until it was paid in full.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed whether the Crime Victims Restitution Act allows a sentencing court to apportion restitution among codefendants based on comparative fault, or whether each must be held jointly and severally liable for the damages proximately caused. The court held that the Act requires each defendant to pay restitution for the entire amount of damages proximately caused by their criminal conduct, even if those damages overlap with amounts owed by codefendants. The court concluded that comparative fault apportionment is not permitted under the Act and affirmed the district court’s order imposing joint and several liability for the full restitution amount. View "State v. Debrok" on Justia Law

Anthony Campbell was convicted of murder in 2016 following a jury trial. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Campbell filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and the existence of newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. His claims included that his trial counsel failed to investigate alternative suspects, call certain witnesses, obtain and preserve cell phone records, object to improper character evidence, challenge courtroom closures, address juror and prosecutorial misconduct, request independent forensic testing, and submit lesser included offenses for jury consideration. He also argued that his counsel had a conflict of interest and violated attorney-client privilege.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, initially dismissed Campbell’s postconviction application summarily. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed that dismissal and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. After the hearing, the district court denied Campbell’s application, finding he failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel or the existence of newly discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial. The court found that Campbell’s counsel’s actions were within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment and that Campbell did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the alleged errors. The court also found no evidence of a conflict of interest or violation of attorney-client privilege, and determined that the alleged newly discovered evidence was known at trial and not material.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and legal conclusions de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, holding that Campbell failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or the existence of newly discovered evidence, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief. View "Campbell v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns James Smith, who was charged with multiple counts of child sexual assault involving two minor victims, the daughters of a friend, in Philadelphia. Before trial, Smith requested that the jury panel be asked during voir dire whether they were more likely to believe the testimony of a child alleging sexual abuse because they did not believe a child could lie about such abuse. The trial court declined to ask this specific question but did inform jurors about the nature of the charges, asked about their ability to be impartial, and conducted individual voir dire regarding experiences with sexual assault or child abuse, dismissing several jurors for cause based on their responses.Smith was convicted on all counts, including rape of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and aggravated indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age. He appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed voir dire question and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for unlawful contact with a minor. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no error in the voir dire process and concluding that Smith’s communications with the victims met the statutory requirements for unlawful contact.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed two issues: whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to ask the proposed voir dire question about bias toward child victim testimony, and whether the Superior Court had impermissibly expanded the scope of criminal liability under the unlawful contact statute. The Supreme Court held that, on the record presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the voir dire question. Regarding the unlawful contact conviction, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Commonwealth v. Strunk, which clarified the scope of the relevant statute. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Police officers on patrol in Philadelphia observed a group of men on the 1200 block of West Dauphin Street who appeared to be gambling, an activity prohibited by city ordinance. As the officers approached, Anthony Lewis, who was among the group and carrying a black leather bag, made eye contact with one of the officers, appeared startled, and fled. The officers pursued Lewis, who was apprehended after discarding his bag over a fence. The bag was recovered and found to contain a loaded firearm, and DNA evidence later linked Lewis to the gun.Lewis moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to pursue him. At the suppression hearing in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the officers, who described the area as known for gambling, narcotics sales, and recent violent crimes. The trial court credited the officers’ testimony, found the area to be high in crime, and concluded that Lewis’s unprovoked flight in that context gave rise to reasonable suspicion. The court denied the suppression motion, and Lewis was subsequently convicted of several firearm offenses. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the officers’ observations, combined with the high-crime nature of the area and Lewis’s flight, supported reasonable suspicion for the stop and that the firearm was not the product of coerced abandonment.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the area as high in crime and whether the firearm should have been suppressed. The court held that the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving an area is high in crime but declined to impose a rigid, multi-element test for such a designation. Instead, the court left the determination to the discretion of suppression courts, emphasizing that mere invocation of “high-crime area” is insufficient. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, holding that the evidence supported the finding of a high-crime area and that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue Lewis. View "Commonwealth v. Lewis" on Justia Law

After an argument in a third-floor apartment in northeast Washington, D.C., Clement Austin left the premises. Immediately afterward, five gunshots were detected outside the apartment by the ShotSpotter system. Marcia Austin, his aunt, called 911, identifying her nephew as the shooter and describing his appearance and vehicle. Police responded within minutes, apprehended Mr. Austin nearby, and used a key found on him to unlock a blue-green car parked near the apartment, where they recovered a loaded pistol. DNA analysis of the gun’s magazine indicated a high likelihood that Mr. Austin’s DNA was present. Five shell casings matching the gun’s caliber were found outside the apartment. Ms. Austin initially told police she saw Mr. Austin fire the gun, but at trial, she testified she did not see who fired the shots.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. The government moved to admit the 911 call as an excited utterance. After hearing arguments and Ms. Austin’s testimony about her emotional state and prior traumatic experiences with gun violence, the trial court admitted the call. The government also impeached Ms. Austin’s trial testimony with her prior statements to police. The jury convicted Mr. Austin of unlawful possession of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a license, unlawful discharge of a firearm, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of the 911 call. The court held that ample direct and circumstantial evidence supported the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call as an excited utterance. The court affirmed Mr. Austin’s convictions. View "Austin v. United States" on Justia Law

During a protest in Lafayette Square, Washington, D.C., police officers were called to remove demonstrators attempting to tear down a statue. The government alleged that Luis Rivera threw two large, T-shaped metal objects at a line of law enforcement officers, injuring two officers. Video evidence and witness testimony identified Rivera as the individual who threw the objects. Rivera was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple counts of assault on a police officer (APO), including felony and misdemeanor charges.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The jury acquitted Rivera of the more serious felony charges but found him guilty of two counts of misdemeanor APO. During trial, Rivera’s counsel sought to cross-examine several officers about disciplinary matters and potential biases, but the trial judge limited these inquiries, mostly on relevance grounds. After the jury began deliberations, it asked whether the government needed to prove Rivera intended to injure a specific officer. The trial court responded that it was sufficient for the government to show Rivera intended to harm any officer in the group.On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Rivera challenged the trial court’s response to the jury’s note and the limitations placed on his cross-examination of police witnesses. The appellate court held that any error in the trial court’s instruction regarding intent was harmless, as Rivera conceded the general accuracy of the response. The court also found that any error in limiting cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, since the officers in question did not provide identification evidence and the video evidence was decisive. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Rivera’s convictions. View "Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was convicted by a jury in 2020 of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, larceny of a motor vehicle, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The events leading to the charges began when the defendant, his girlfriend, and the victim lived together in Florida, using proceeds from a house sale to fund hotel stays and drug purchases. After a falling out, the defendant and the victim traveled to Massachusetts, where tensions escalated over money. The defendant ultimately shot the victim in a Massachusetts park after a series of text messages and conversations indicating premeditation. The defendant admitted to the killing but claimed self-defense and mental impairment due to longstanding mental illness and substance use.The Superior Court conducted a twelve-day trial, after which the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to life without parole for murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other convictions. He appealed his convictions and filed a motion for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The trial judge, who also heard the motion for a new trial, denied the motion after evidentiary hearings, finding that counsel’s investigation into the defendant’s mental health history was sufficient and that the strategic decision not to introduce corroborating medical records was reasonable.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. It found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice from counsel’s investigation or strategic decisions, and determined that the prosecutor’s conduct did not improperly shift the burden of proof or prejudice the defendant. The court affirmed the convictions for murder, armed robbery, and larceny, and the denial of the new trial motion. However, it vacated the firearm conviction due to insufficient evidence regarding licensure and remanded for further proceedings on that count. View "Commonwealth v. Noguera" on Justia Law