Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

John G. Strawn entered a plea agreement to plead no contest to two counts of third-degree assault. The State agreed not to mention any sexual contact in the factual basis for the charges. However, the county court found that Strawn had subjected a victim to sexual contact based on information in the presentence investigation report (PSR) and ordered him to register as a sex offender under Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).Strawn appealed to the district court, arguing that the county court erred in requiring him to register as a sex offender because the factual basis provided by the State did not include any evidence of sexual contact. He also contended that the county court should have made a specific credibility finding and that he was denied procedural due process. Additionally, Strawn challenged the county court's advisement that his conviction might result in a federal firearms prohibition. The district court rejected Strawn's arguments and affirmed the county court's judgment.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no merit in Strawn's arguments. The court held that SORA does not require evidence of sexual contact to be present in both the factual basis and the PSR; it is sufficient if such evidence is found in the record, which includes both the factual basis and the PSR. The court also determined that the county court was not required to make an express credibility finding and that there was sufficient evidence in the PSR to support the finding of sexual contact. The court concluded that Strawn was afforded procedural due process, as he was given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding SORA registration. Finally, the court noted that the county court's advisement about the potential federal firearms prohibition did not impose any prohibition itself. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "State v. Strawn" on Justia Law

In 2022, Jayme Lynn Tubbs was indicted by a Quitman County Grand Jury along with Keith Coleman Jr. for conspiring to commit murder, first-degree murder, and desecration of a human corpse. They were tried jointly, and after the State rested its case, the trial judge dismissed the conspiracy charges. The jury found both defendants guilty on all other counts. Tubbs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied. After Tubbs appealed, the trial court granted Coleman a new trial due to a discovery violation. Tubbs's appeal was stayed for an evidentiary hearing, which found a Brady violation, leading to a new trial for Tubbs.In September 2023, Tubbs and Coleman were retried and found guilty on all counts. Tubbs was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murders and three years for desecration of a human corpse, to run concurrently. Tubbs again moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. Tubbs raised two issues: the sufficiency of the evidence for her murder convictions and the admissibility of Chief Deputy Peter Clinton’s testimony regarding her confession. The court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, noting Tubbs's active participation in the planning, execution, and aftermath of the murders. The court also ruled that Clinton’s testimony was not hearsay under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) and that the best evidence rule did not apply to exclude his testimony. The court affirmed Tubbs's convictions and sentences. View "Tubbs v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendants, Kimesha Williams and Candace Townsel, were convicted by a jury of felony murder, robbery, and elder abuse. The victim, an 84-year-old woman, was attacked in a casino restroom, resulting in her death. The jury found that the murder occurred during the robbery and that the victim, who was over 70 years old, suffered elder abuse that caused her death. The trial court sentenced both defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole.The defendants appealed on several grounds. They argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that force or fear was used in stealing the victim’s property. Townsel also contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that she aided and abetted the robbery and that she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in the elder abuse jury instruction and that the suspended parole revocation fine should be stricken.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that force was used in the robbery, that Townsel aided and abetted the robbery, and that Townsel acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court also concluded that any error in the elder abuse jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury’s other findings demonstrated that the defendants caused the victim’s injuries and death. Finally, the court agreed that the parole revocation fines should be stricken because the defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.The court affirmed the judgments with directions to strike the parole revocation fines and issue amended abstracts of judgment. View "P. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Lori Anne Whipple was charged with first-degree murder and arson of property, with an additional allegation that the murder occurred during a robbery or attempted robbery. In November 2019, she was convicted on both charges, and the jury found that she was a major participant in the robbery or attempted robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Whipple was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. She did not raise any issues regarding jury instructions in her direct appeal, which focused on the improper exclusion of evidence and sentencing. Her conviction was affirmed.Whipple later petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that the jury was not properly instructed on the felony murder theory as required by People v. Banks and People v. Clark. The trial court found her ineligible for relief and denied the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court noted that Whipple's conviction occurred after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule and added section 1172.6. The court held that Whipple's failure to raise the instructional error in her direct appeal rendered the jury's findings conclusively valid. The court emphasized that findings made after Banks and Clark are generally conclusive and preclude a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. Since Whipple's conviction was final and she did not demonstrate a significant change in the law or other basis for an exception, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of her petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Whipple" on Justia Law

Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Dugan, who was convicted and sentenced in the Southern District of West Virginia for accessing child pornography. Dugan raised three main issues on appeal: the denial of his motion to compel discovery related to a foreign law enforcement agency's investigation, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant, and the restitution order requiring him to pay $22,000 to five child victims.In the lower court, Dugan was convicted by a jury of accessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $22,000 in restitution. Dugan filed pretrial motions to compel discovery and suppress evidence, both of which were denied by the district court. The court found that the foreign agency's tip was reliable and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court also ruled that the officers acted in good faith when executing the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the denial of the motion to compel discovery was appropriate because Dugan's request was speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was based on probable cause, given the deliberate steps required to access the child pornography website. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order, as the district court had carefully considered the relevant factors and evidence in determining the amounts.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dugan's conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. View "US v. Dugan" on Justia Law

Tyler Ford was involved in a fatal car accident where he raced his friend, Kyle Fischer, towards a busy intersection, ran a red light, and collided with another vehicle, killing its driver, Nathaniel Milton. Ford was driving at a high speed, weaving through traffic, and did not brake before the collision. He later claimed that his brakes were malfunctioning, but a mechanic found no issues with them. Ford was charged with second-degree murder, driving under the influence, improper passing, and disregarding a red light.The Superior Court of Delaware held a jury trial where Ford was convicted of second-degree murder and related traffic offenses but acquitted of one DUI charge. Ford moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, both of which were denied by the Superior Court. The court found that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the jury instructions were appropriate.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Ford guilty of second-degree murder, as his actions demonstrated a "cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference to human life." The court also found that the jury instructions were correct and that any minor errors in the oral instructions were harmless, as the written instructions provided to the jury were accurate. Additionally, the court ruled that the video of the collision was admissible and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in any of its rulings, and Ford's convictions were upheld. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with second-degree disorderly conduct, second-degree criminal trespass, harassment, and resisting arrest after an incident at a Fred Meyer store. The defendant was reportedly loud and yelling in the parking lot, refused to leave when asked by store employees, and subsequently engaged in aggressive behavior, including hitting an employee with a piece of cardboard and attempting to touch her with a lit cigarette. When police arrived, the defendant resisted arrest.At trial, the state presented testimony from witnesses and video evidence. The defendant testified, admitting to some actions but claiming intoxication and challenging certain aspects of the charges. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had plainly erred by not intervening sua sponte to address improper comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding the comments plainly improper and prejudicial, warranting reversal.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court examined whether the prosecutor's comments were plainly improper and so prejudicial that they denied the defendant a fair trial. The court concluded that the comments, while inartful, were not obviously improper. The prosecutor's statements about the purpose of the trial and the lack of a factual controversy were found to be within the bounds of permissible argument, given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the defendant had not demonstrated plain error. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

The defendant is being prosecuted for the murder of DB. The state challenged a trial court order that suppressed statements the defendant made about DB while in custody for an unrelated crime. At the time of his arrest for the unrelated crime, the defendant was already a suspect in DB's death and was represented by counsel in connection with the DB investigation. The counsel had instructed officers to contact her before questioning the defendant about DB. However, when officers arrested the defendant for the unrelated crime, they advised him of his right to remain silent and to speak with an attorney but did not notify his attorney before conducting an interrogation that led to incriminating statements about DB.The Deschutes County Circuit Court granted the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the statements, ruling that officers violated the defendant's right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution by conducting the interrogation without notifying the defendant's counsel. The state pursued an immediate and direct appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court.The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, was not triggered by the defendant's arrest and custodial interrogation regarding crimes for which he had not been charged. The court emphasized that protections under Article I, section 11, ordinarily do not arise until a person has been charged with a crime. The court also declined to consider the defendant's alternative argument that Article I, section 12, provided a basis for affirming the trial court's decision. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Kilby" on Justia Law

A homicide occurred in downtown Minneapolis on August 26, 2020, leading to protests and unrest. Leroy Williams Jr. was recorded on Facebook Live making incendiary comments and was later seen on surveillance footage participating in looting and attempting to ignite a cardboard box at the Target Headquarters. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) found no physical evidence of attempted arson. Williams was arrested and initially indicted for conspiracy to commit arson. He was conditionally released but violated terms, leading to his pretrial detention. Williams pleaded guilty to attempted arson but later withdrew his plea, leading to a trial where he was found guilty.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota sentenced Williams to 120 months’ imprisonment, considering his criminal history, mental illness, substance abuse, and the serious nature of the offense. Williams objected, citing a sentencing disparity with his codefendants, who received lesser sentences despite causing more damage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Williams argued insufficient evidence for his conviction, procedural error in sentencing, and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Williams, as his actions and statements supported the verdict. The court found no procedural error, as the district court adequately considered the sentencing factors and provided a reasoned basis for its decision. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, given the district court’s thorough consideration of the relevant factors.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Williams’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law