Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant charged with several sex offenses who asserted his right to a speedy trial. The prosecution sought multiple continuances, arguing that the assigned prosecutor was unavailable due to involvement in another sex offense trial (the Lopez Perez case). However, at the time the continuances were granted, the judge assigned to the Lopez Perez case was still engaged in a different trial and was not available to begin the Lopez Perez trial to conclusion. The defendant objected to the continuances and later moved to dismiss the charges, claiming his statutory speedy trial rights were violated.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted the prosecution’s requests for continuances under Penal Code section 1050(g)(2), finding that the prosecutor’s involvement in the Lopez Perez case constituted good cause. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the prosecutor was engaged in another trial “in progress” as required by the statute.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that, under the standard articulated in Burgos v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 817, a trial is “in progress” for purposes of section 1050(g)(2) only if the judge is available and ready to try the case to conclusion, the court has committed its resources, and the parties are ready to proceed. The appellate court found that, at the time of the continuances, the Lopez Perez trial was not “in progress” because the assigned judge was not available to try the case to conclusion. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the continuances and in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its order denying dismissal and to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Hernandez v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 1996, the defendant broke into a home, raped a woman at knifepoint, and carried a child at knifepoint while stealing a firearm and ammunition. He was charged with multiple offenses, including kidnapping to commit robbery and, later, a one-strike rape allegation. After a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury and the emergence of DNA evidence linking him to the crime, the defendant pled guilty in 1998 to several charges under a plea agreement. The plea resulted in the dismissal of the rape charge and the one-strike allegation, and the kidnapping charge was amended. He was sentenced to a determinate prison term, which was later reduced.In 2024, the defendant, who is ethnically Samoan, filed a motion in the Superior Court of Riverside County seeking discovery under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). He argued that the addition of the one-strike allegation before trial was racially motivated, citing a different case involving a white defendant who was not similarly charged. He requested records of comparable cases, including defendants’ races and charges. The People opposed, arguing that the plea negotiations were driven by DNA evidence, not the added charge, and that the comparison case was not analogous. The trial court granted the discovery motion but limited the scope of the records to be produced.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA because his factual scenario was not plausible in light of the record, the comparison case did not support an inference of racial disparity, and statewide incarceration statistics did not provide specific facts of misconduct in his case. The court granted the writ, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting discovery and to deny the motion. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Lalo)" on Justia Law

Devin Seats was convicted in Illinois state court in 2012 of three felonies related to a shooting, including aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. His pre-sentence investigation report listed six prior felonies, three of which were for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The sentencing judge referenced Seats’s “considerable criminal background” but did not specifically mention the vacated convictions. Seats was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.After his conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review, Illinois law changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that certain subsections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute were unconstitutional, which affected two of Seats’s prior convictions. Seats sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information due to the inclusion of these now-invalid convictions. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated his armed habitual criminal conviction but declined to order resentencing, finding that the vacated convictions did not result in a greater sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Seats then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information and that the statute of limitations should run from the date his prior convictions were vacated. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, calculating the limitations period from the date his conviction became final. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Seats forfeited his argument for a later limitations period by not raising it in the district court and that the circumstances did not warrant plain error review. The court also found that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably determined the sentencing judge did not rely on the vacated convictions. View "Seats v Nurse" on Justia Law

Otis Elion pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court in 2017. His sentence was enhanced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a “career offender” based on three prior convictions, including two Illinois state convictions for delivery of a look-alike substance. The enhancement depended on whether those state convictions qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, which required a categorical approach comparing the elements of the state statutes to the federal definition.After sentencing, Elion filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the career offender enhancement. The district court initially denied relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (in Elion I) found Elion was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington.On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Elion’s attorney had identified the correct legal issues, researched the relevant law, and reasonably applied the categorical approach, even though she ultimately reached an incorrect legal conclusion. The district court concluded her performance was not deficient.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that an attorney’s reasonable but mistaken legal conclusion does not automatically constitute deficient performance under Strickland. The court found that, at the time of sentencing, existing caselaw did not sufficiently foreshadow the argument that ultimately succeeded, and that counsel’s overall performance met prevailing professional norms. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Elion v USA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition involving a minor. He pleaded guilty to several counts, after which his defense counsel withdrew and new counsel was appointed. Despite being represented, the defendant filed several motions on his own, including a motion to withdraw his pleas and a motion to represent himself. The trial court allowed him to represent himself but denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. Before sentencing, he requested and was granted new counsel, and was ultimately sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The defendant appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court failed to obtain a proper waiver of counsel. The appellate court agreed, finding that the trial court erred in accepting the waiver and failed to comply with procedural requirements, so it reversed and remanded. On remand, the trial court determined that the guilty pleas remained valid and resentenced the defendant. The defendant appealed again, but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. He then filed an application to reopen his appeal under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B), claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Ninth District granted the application but later confirmed its prior judgment, finding that the defendant had not adequately addressed how his prior appellate counsel was deficient or how he was prejudiced by that deficiency.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether an appellate court may presume ineffective assistance of counsel in a reopened appeal when the appellant fails to specifically argue counsel’s deficiency and resulting prejudice, as required by App.R. 26(B)(7). The court held that the requirements of App.R. 26(B)(7) are mandatory: an appellant must address both the deficiency of prior appellate counsel and the resulting prejudice in their brief. Because the defendant failed to do so, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He filed three post-conviction motions under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking DNA testing on a golf club used in the offense. The trial court denied all three motions, finding that identity was not an issue and that exculpatory DNA results would not have affected the outcome. The appellant received notice of the denial of his third motion several months after the order was signed.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals previously affirmed the trial court’s denial of the first two DNA testing motions. When the appellant attempted to appeal the denial of his third motion, he filed two separate motions for extension of time to file his notice of appeal: one under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.6, which is specific to DNA appeals, and another under Rule 26.3, which applies generally to criminal appeals. The Rule 26.3 motion was filed in the court of appeals, while the Rule 4.6 motion was filed in the trial court. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the Rule 4.6 motion was pending in the trial court.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing the general motion for extension while the DNA-specific motion was pending. The court held that neither motion properly invoked the appellate court’s jurisdiction: the Rule 26.3 motion was untimely, and the Rule 4.6 motion was unsworn and therefore did not meet the requirements to serve as a notice of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder and risk of injury to a child after fatally stabbing his long-term girlfriend in the presence of her twelve-year-old son. The relationship had deteriorated due to the defendant’s substance abuse and lack of financial contribution, leading the victim to attempt to end the relationship and remove the defendant from their shared home. On the morning of the incident, after a series of escalating arguments and failed attempts to have the defendant leave, the victim was attacked and killed. The defendant fled the scene, evaded police, and was eventually apprehended several days later.The case was tried before the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London. At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, arguing that his mental state at the time of the killing warranted consideration of a lesser offense. The trial court denied this request, finding insufficient evidence that the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance, and the jury convicted him of both charges. The defendant appealed his conviction directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, challenging the denial of the requested jury instruction.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Court held that the trial court acted properly, concluding that no rational juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant experienced an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. The Court emphasized the defendant’s actions before and after the crime, which demonstrated self-control and consciousness of guilt, and found that the evidence did not support the required loss of self-control. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The defendant was cited for a third offense of driving under the influence (DUI) and for driving with a suspended license, both misdemeanors, in November 2021. He was initially convicted in Justice Court and then sought a trial de novo in the District Court. At trial, a jury found him guilty of both offenses. During sentencing, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that the defendant was on a limited income, receiving disability and social security, and requested that the court consider his financial situation when imposing fines and fees, including a request to waive the public defender fee.After the jury verdict in the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, the court sentenced the defendant to jail time, most of which was suspended, and imposed a $3,000 fine with statutory surcharges and a $250 public defender fee. The written judgment also included a $10 technology fee and $50 in prosecution costs, which were not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral sentence and that the court failed to consider his ability to pay the fines and fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral sentence controls, and thus the $10 technology fee and $50 prosecution costs should not have been included. The court further held that the District Court erred by failing to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay the public defender fee, the $3,000 fine, and the statutory surcharges, as required by Montana statutes. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Post" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was found in possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of multiple felonies, including several burglaries. When law enforcement approached his girlfriend’s home, he cooperated and led them to a pistol hidden in the woods, which bore his fingerprints. He was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The presentence report listed twenty-two prior felony convictions, eleven of which were for burglary, with the offenses occurring over several years and involving different victims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee accepted the defendant’s guilty plea. At sentencing, the court determined, based on the presentence report, that the defendant qualified as an Armed Career Criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum sentence for those with three prior violent felony convictions committed on different occasions. The court imposed a 180-month sentence. The defendant did not object to the factual accuracy of the presentence report but later challenged the application of the ACCA enhancement, arguing that the determination of whether his prior offenses were committed on different occasions should have been made by a jury, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Erlinger v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the failure to submit the “different occasions” question to a jury was not structural error and that, under harmless error review, no reasonable jury could have found that the defendant’s predicate burglaries occurred on the same occasion, given the significant gaps in time and different victims. The court also rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy argument, finding no plain error. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the enhanced sentence under the ACCA. View "United States v. Ballinger" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted on multiple counts of sexual conduct with a minor and one count of public sexual indecency to a minor. The State made a plea offer that would have capped his sentence at 27 years, but his trial counsel failed to adequately communicate the offer or explain the sentencing consequences if he went to trial. The defendant only learned the full extent of his potential sentence immediately before trial and attempted to accept the plea, but the offer had expired. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 79.5 years in prison.After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the defendant filed a timely first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Maricopa County Superior Court, raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims but not specifically focusing on the plea offer issue. His PCR counsel chose not to pursue that claim, and the petition was denied. Subsequent federal habeas proceedings were also unsuccessful. Years later, the defendant filed a successive PCR petition, this time specifically alleging IAC related to the plea offer. The Superior Court found the claim was not precluded and excused the untimeliness, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claim was precluded under prior Arizona Supreme Court precedent.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed whether the successive IAC claim was precluded and whether the untimely filing was excusable. The court held that a claim based on counsel’s failure to adequately communicate a plea offer implicates a constitutional right of such magnitude—the right to decide whether to plead guilty and waive a jury trial—that it can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the defendant. Therefore, the claim was not precluded. The court also held that the defendant adequately explained the delay, so the untimely filing was excused. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on preclusion and timeliness, vacated part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v TRAVERSO" on Justia Law