Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A resident of Billings, Montana, who lived across the street from a public elementary school, began carrying a shotgun outside his home, including on the sidewalk, during the summer of 2023. He did so to protect himself and his mother from a former neighbor who had repeatedly violated a protection order. Local police received several complaints about his conduct but did not charge him with any crime and told him he was complying with state law. After the resident contacted the FBI to complain about police harassment, federal authorities indicted him for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendant argued that he was exempt from the federal prohibition because, under Montana law, he was considered licensed to possess a firearm in a school zone. The district court found that Montana’s licensing scheme did not meet the federal requirements for the statutory exception, and also rejected the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge. The defendant then pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s order, directing that the indictment be dismissed. The Ninth Circuit held that the statutory exception for state-licensed individuals in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was ambiguous as applied to Montana’s licensing scheme. Given this ambiguity, and considering the rule of lenity, constitutional avoidance, and the presumption in favor of scienter as articulated in Rehaif v. United States, the court concluded that the defendant lacked fair notice that his conduct was criminal. The court did not address the Second Amendment argument. View "USA V. METCALF" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, in 2005, forcibly entered his estranged wife’s home, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. He was convicted by a jury in Allen County, Indiana, of rape, burglary, and related offenses, and sentenced to 70 years in prison. The evidence at trial included testimony from the victim, their daughter, and other witnesses, as well as the defendant’s own statements to police. The defendant had a history of domestic abuse and was subject to a protective order at the time of the offenses.After his conviction, the defendant appealed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied review. He then filed a state postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to pursue plea negotiations and made poor decisions regarding witness strategy. For over a decade, his postconviction attorneys took no substantive action to develop the record. When he proceeded pro se, the state court required him to submit affidavits, but he was unable to obtain one from his trial counsel. The state trial court denied relief, finding insufficient evidence that plea negotiations would have changed the outcome, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the lack of corroborating evidence for his claims. The Indiana Supreme Court again denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case after the district court denied federal habeas relief and an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit held that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the failure of postconviction counsel to develop the record is attributed to the petitioner, and the statutory exceptions for evidentiary hearings did not apply. The court also found that the state appellate court’s decision was not unreasonable under federal law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Ford v Reagle" on Justia Law

A licensed veterinarian developed and manufactured undetectable performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) for use in professional horse racing, selling them to trainers who administered them to horses to gain a competitive edge. His salesperson assisted in these activities, operating a company that distributed the drugs without prescriptions or FDA approval. The drugs were misbranded or adulterated, and the operation involved deceptive practices such as misleading labeling and falsified customs forms. The PEDs were credited by trainers for their horses’ successes, and evidence showed the drugs could be harmful if misused.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over two separate trials, resulting in convictions for both the veterinarian and his salesperson for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute misbranded or adulterated drugs with intent to defraud or mislead, in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, admitted evidence from a prior state investigation, and imposed sentences including imprisonment, restitution, and forfeiture. The court calculated loss for sentencing based on the veterinarian’s gains and ordered restitution to racetracks based on winnings by a coconspirator’s doped horses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the statute’s “intent to defraud or mislead” element is not limited to particular categories of victims; it is sufficient if the intent relates to the underlying violation. The court found no error in the admission of evidence from the 2011 investigation or in the use of gain as a proxy for loss in sentencing. However, it vacated the restitution order to racetracks, finding no evidence they suffered pecuniary loss, and vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the relevant statute is not a civil forfeiture statute subject to criminal forfeiture procedures. The convictions and sentence were otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Fishman" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who participated in a home invasion robbery during which he and several accomplices entered a residence, brandished firearms, assaulted the inhabitants, and stole valuables. During their escape, a gun battle erupted between the intruders and a neighbor, resulting in the death of one of the defendant’s accomplices. The identity of the shooter who killed the accomplice was never determined. The defendant was later identified by a victim and arrested after driving the wounded accomplice to the hospital.Following a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold the defendant to answer for murder under a provocative act theory, as well as for other related charges. The defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison. In 2022, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes in the law rendered him ineligible for a murder conviction under the theory applied in his case. The superior court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately denying the petition after finding the defendant was convicted under a still-valid provocative act murder theory.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant made a prima facie case for resentencing relief. The court held that because the defendant was convicted after the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Concha, which requires a personal finding of malice for provocative act murder, and because this theory remains valid under current law, the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the resentencing petition. View "People v. Venancio" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas in 2010 for the killing of his fiancée’s thirteen-month-old daughter. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on DNA evidence and forensic testimony. Over the years, the petitioner pursued multiple avenues of postconviction relief, including direct appeal, state habeas petitions, and federal habeas petitions, all of which were denied. In 2024, he sought access to additional electronic DNA data from the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences, arguing that this information was necessary to evaluate the reliability of the forensic evidence used at trial. After being denied access by the district attorney and the convicting court, he filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures violated his due process rights by giving prosecutors unreviewable discretion to withhold evidence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a due process violation and that his request for an injunction resembled an improper petition for a writ of mandamus. The district court also denied his motion for discovery. The petitioner appealed and, in the interim, sought a stay of execution and authorization to file a successive habeas petition based on new evidence and scientific developments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that Texas’ postconviction relief procedures do not violate due process, as they provide adequate opportunities for discovery and judicial review in habeas proceedings. The court also denied the motions for a stay of execution and for authorization to file a successive habeas petition, finding that the petitioner failed to meet the stringent requirements for such relief. The court granted leave to file a motion in excess of the word limit. View "In Re: Milam" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted in North Carolina of indecent liberties with a child, which required him to register as a sex offender under federal law. He complied with federal registration requirements after moving to New York in 2017 and again after moving within New York in 2018. However, he failed to comply with New York’s separate annual address verification requirement after 2018. In 2023, after moving to Pennsylvania, he also failed to update his federal sex offender registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). He was indicted and pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to update his federal registration after interstate travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, relying on the Presentence Investigation Report, calculated the defendant’s criminal history score by including three prior sentences from 2010 and 2011. The Probation Office and the District Court reasoned that the “commencement of the instant offense” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines’ criminal history look-back period included not only the conduct underlying the federal conviction but also “relevant conduct,” specifically the earlier New York state registration violations. This interpretation resulted in a higher criminal history category and a longer advisory sentencing range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The Third Circuit held that the phrase “commencement of the instant offense” in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e) unambiguously refers only to the start of the conduct constituting the offense of conviction, not to other “relevant conduct.” Therefore, the District Court erred by including the earlier state-law violations in its calculation. The Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing using the correct criminal history category. View "USA v. Josey" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was convicted of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and first-offense driving under the influence. The defendant, who had a prior felony conviction, was found driving a borrowed vehicle that became stuck on railroad tracks. Law enforcement responded, conducted DUI tests, and allowed a passenger to search the vehicle for his keys and phone due to extreme cold. During this search, an officer assisted and discovered a firearm in the center console. The prosecution also introduced Facebook messages, purportedly sent by the defendant, to establish knowing possession of the firearm.The District Court for Lancaster County denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm, finding that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana. The court also admitted the Facebook messages into evidence, overruling objections regarding foundation, hearsay, and the Confrontation Clause. On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the search was constitutional under both the consent and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that the Facebook messages were properly authenticated and admissible.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the admissibility of the firearm and Facebook messages. The court held that the officer’s search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a community caretaking function, not based on the passenger’s consent or the automobile exception. The court also held that user-generated social media records are not self-authenticating business records under Nebraska’s evidence rules, but found that the Facebook messages were sufficiently authenticated and admissible as statements by a party opponent. The court further found no Confrontation Clause violation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the convictions was affirmed. View "State v. Falcon" on Justia Law

Police responded to a hotel after receiving a report about a missing juvenile. Upon arrival, they found a juvenile matching the description, apparently unclothed under the covers, with visible red marks and empty alcohol containers in the room. The defendant, a 24-year-old man, was present and admitted to meeting the juvenile at a bus stop and consuming alcohol with her, believing she was over eighteen. The officers arrested the defendant for allegedly providing alcohol to a minor and seized his cell phone during a search incident to arrest. Subsequent investigation revealed that the juvenile, who was fourteen or fifteen, had met the defendant online, disclosed her age, and described sexual activity with him. Police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of explicit messages and images, resulting in multiple charges.The Rockingham County Superior Court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the cell phone evidence, during which the State conceded that the arrest was unlawful. The court assumed the arrest and seizure of the phone were unlawful but denied the motion to suppress, finding that the evidence was obtained through an independent source: the search warrant based on information from the juvenile and the missing person investigation, not the arrest itself. The defendant was convicted on all charges after a bench trial on stipulated facts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that, even assuming the arrest and seizure were unlawful, the evidence from the cell phone was admissible under the independent source doctrine. The search warrant was supported by information independent of the unlawful arrest, and the police did not exploit the illegality to obtain the evidence. Therefore, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the cell phone evidence. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Edwin Otero operated a violent drug trafficking organization across Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, distributing heroin and engaging in brutal acts to maintain control. In April 2019, suspecting a member of his group was cooperating with authorities, Otero orchestrated a kidnapping and assault in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where the victim was beaten, stripped, and sexually exploited. Otero recorded the attack and boasted about it to others. A month later, he was involved in another violent incident, ordering a crew member to shoot a drug debtor. Otero was arrested in May 2019 after a DEA investigation uncovered his extensive criminal activities.Otero was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple counts related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, firearms offenses, and obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty to eight counts without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 43, including a six-level enhancement for sexual exploitation during the kidnapping, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Otero to 456 months’ imprisonment, with 336 months for most counts served concurrently and 120 months for a firearms count served consecutively. Otero objected to the sexual exploitation enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, preserving these issues for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Otero’s procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the sexual exploitation enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Otero’s conduct met the relevant statutory definitions. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting it fell within the guidelines and was supported by a plausible rationale. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Otero" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant broke into two gun stores in 2016, stealing a total of sixty-nine guns, a digital video recorder, and a cash register. Many of the stolen guns were later recovered from the defendant’s residence and vehicle. The thefts caused property damage to the stores, and the stores had to close for a week to recover from the incidents. The defendant pleaded guilty to stealing guns from federal firearms licensees and conspiracy, and as part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania initially ordered restitution without accounting for insurance payments or the return of some stolen guns. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, instructing the District Court to subtract any reimbursements. On remand, after an evidentiary hearing with testimony from the store owners and a federal agent, the District Court ordered the defendant to pay $57,044.96 in restitution, including the full retail value of the stolen guns and a week’s worth of lost income for each store.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by awarding restitution for lost income, as this resulted in double-counting the value of the stolen guns and included consequential damages not permitted under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Third Circuit vacated the lost-income portion of the restitution award and remanded for correction, but affirmed the remainder of the award, finding that the evidence supported the calculation of the value of the stolen guns and property damage. View "USA v. McCormack" on Justia Law