Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was indicted on 22 counts of theft after embezzling nearly $600,000 from his employer over several years. He sought treatment at an addiction center, where he was diagnosed as a pathological gambler and was provisionally approved as a candidate for gambler’s diversion court, a specialty court for defendants whose crimes are related to gambling addiction. He pleaded guilty to all counts and moved for admission into the diversion program, arguing that his crimes were committed to fund his gambling addiction. At an evidentiary hearing, he testified to this effect, but the State presented financial records showing that only a small fraction of the stolen funds was actually used for gambling.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion for admission into gambler’s diversion court. The court found that the majority of the embezzled money was used to support a lavish lifestyle rather than to further a gambling addiction. The court determined that the State had met its burden of proof under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, showing that the crimes were not committed in furtherance of or as a result of problem gambling. The appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and appealed the denial of admission to the specialty court.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified the standard for admission into gambler’s diversion court under NRS 458A.220. The court held that district courts have wide discretion in deciding whether to admit a defendant, and the defendant bears the burden of proving eligibility by showing a rational nexus between the crime and problem gambling. The court found that, although the district court had incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the State, this error did not prejudice the appellant. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s denial of admission to gambler’s diversion court. View "PIZARRO VS STATE" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony, after allegedly taking a vehicle from a relative without permission. Following her arrest, she was released with conditions but repeatedly failed to appear for scheduled court dates, resulting in multiple arrest warrants and brief periods of detention. The State ultimately filed a petition for sanctions due to her repeated absences, but did not file a petition seeking her pretrial detention under the Pretrial Fairness Act. The defendant’s absences were sometimes explained by hospitalization, though she did not always provide documentation.The case was heard in the Circuit Court of Cook County, where the presiding judge declared the Pretrial Fairness Act unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. The judge asserted an inherent judicial authority to detain defendants indefinitely pretrial, arguing that the Act’s limitations on judicial discretion violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. The judge ordered the defendant detained until trial, despite statutory provisions limiting detention to a 30-day sanction period for failure to appear and requiring a State petition for further detention. The defendant’s motion to reconsider was denied, and she sought appellate relief, including habeas corpus, mandamus, and supervisory orders.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case after transfer from the appellate court and consolidation of related proceedings. The court held that the Pretrial Fairness Act does not violate the separation of powers clause as applied to this case. It found that the circuit court lacked authority to detain the defendant indefinitely without a statutory basis and that the Act’s procedures for pretrial release and sanctions do not unduly infringe on judicial powers. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, granted habeas corpus relief, and ordered the defendant’s immediate release. View "Stewart v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted by a jury in Boone County, Illinois, of driving while his license was revoked. He had two prior convictions for the same offense. Under the Illinois Vehicle Code, a third or subsequent conviction for this offense requires the court to impose either a minimum term of 30 days’ imprisonment or 300 hours of community service, as determined by the court. The County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act further provides that a defendant sentenced for an offense with a mandatory minimum sentence cannot receive good-behavior credit that would reduce the sentence below that minimum.The Circuit Court of Boone County, presided over by Judge Robert Tobin, sentenced the defendant to 14 days in jail, with day-for-day credit for good behavior. The judge reasoned that because the statute allowed for community service as an alternative, it did not establish a mandatory minimum jail term, and thus a shorter jail sentence with good-behavior credit was permissible.The State’s Attorney of Boone County sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, arguing that the circuit court’s sentence did not comply with the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the statutory language de novo and found it unambiguous. The court held that when the circuit court chooses imprisonment rather than community service, the Vehicle Code requires a minimum of 30 days in jail, and the Behavior Act prohibits any good-behavior credit that would reduce the sentence below that minimum.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois vacated the circuit court’s sentencing order and issued a writ of mandamus, directing the circuit court to resentence the defendant in compliance with the Vehicle Code and the Behavior Act. The court clarified that the statutes set a mandatory minimum sentence when imprisonment is chosen, and good-behavior credit cannot reduce the sentence below that minimum. View "People ex rel Smith v. Tobin" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was in a romantic relationship with the victim, Barbara Rose, and lived with her and her children in Danville, Illinois. In October 2017, Rose disappeared, and her body was later found dismembered and burned. Evidence at trial included testimony from acquaintances, video surveillance showing the defendant purchasing items such as gasoline and plastic, forensic evidence linking the defendant to the crime scene and the victim’s remains, and statements made by the defendant to a jail informant. The defendant was charged in three separate Vermilion County cases with first degree murder, multiple counts of concealment of a homicidal death, and multiple counts of dismembering a human body, all relating to acts taken to conceal and dismember Rose’s body at different times and locations.After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 94 years. The Circuit Court of Vermilion County denied posttrial motions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and arguments that the multiple convictions for concealment and dismemberment were improper. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence was sufficient, counsel was not ineffective, and multiple convictions were proper because the acts occurred on separate dates and involved discrete conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that the defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective, as there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different even if counsel had acted as the defendant argued. However, the court found that the statutes for concealment of a homicidal death and dismemberment of a human body do not authorize multiple convictions for acts taken as part of the same course of conduct to conceal the same death or dismember the same body. Accordingly, the court affirmed the murder conviction, but reversed and vacated one dismemberment conviction and two concealment convictions, leaving only one conviction for each of those offenses. View "People v. Keys" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of being a violent career criminal (VCC) in possession of a firearm, following an incident in which he brandished and fired a gun during an argument. To establish his VCC status, the State relied on three prior convictions: aggravated battery, burglary, and escape. While the defendant did not contest the first two convictions as qualifying offenses, he argued that his 1995 escape conviction, which arose from an escape from a juvenile detention facility, should not count as a predicate offense under the VCC statute.On direct appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant that the juvenile escape conviction was not a qualifying offense under the VCC statute. However, the court affirmed the conviction because the defendant had not preserved this argument at trial, and the error was not considered “fundamental” under the standard set by the Supreme Court of Florida in F.B. v. State. The Second District found that, since the evidence at trial established at least the lesser included offense of felon in possession of a firearm, the error did not reach the level of fundamental error requiring reversal.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case due to a conflict with other district courts on the issue of fundamental error in evidence insufficiency cases. The Court ultimately held that the defendant’s 1995 juvenile escape conviction does qualify as a predicate offense for VCC status. The Court reasoned that the relevant statutes expressly state that escape from a juvenile facility constitutes escape within the meaning of the adult escape statute, and the legislative scheme supports treating such convictions as qualifying offenses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the judgment affirming the defendant’s conviction. View "Pryor v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Ava Creech, a 62-year-old woman with severe scoliosis, was found dead in her Lexington apartment in October 2020, bound and gagged in a closet. The investigation revealed that William P. Brown, who had been staying with Creech, was the last person seen with her. Evidence linked Brown to Creech’s stolen car and necklace, both of which he possessed or pawned after her disappearance. Brown’s fingerprints and DNA were found on items in the apartment, and he was later arrested in possession of Creech’s pill bottles. At trial, Brown testified, offering alternative explanations for his possession of Creech’s property and his presence in her apartment.The Fayette Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, where Brown was convicted of murder, receiving stolen property, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The jury recommended a life sentence, which the trial court imposed. Brown appealed as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, raising several issues including prosecutorial misconduct, discovery violations, and Confrontation Clause errors.The Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose recorded jail phone calls between Brown and his sister constituted a discovery violation. The Court held that this nondisclosure may have substantially impacted Brown’s defense strategy and presentation, warranting reversal. Additionally, the Court identified errors in the prosecutor’s comments regarding Brown’s decision to testify and the admission of hearsay testimony about a Post-It note’s authorship, which violated Brown’s Confrontation Clause rights. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the judgment and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court and remanded the case for a new trial. View "BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of two counts of murder following the deaths of his aunt and cousin, who were found shot in the aunt’s home. The investigation revealed that the defendant had previously lived at the home, and evidence such as spent shell casings, a magazine, and drug paraphernalia was found at the scene and in his apartment. The defendant was located in California days after the murders, having left Kentucky and nearly emptied his bank account. He was apprehended and questioned by law enforcement, during which he made statements about the case.The Trigg Circuit Court conducted an eight-day trial, during which the defendant raised several objections. He challenged the inclusion of certain jurors for cause, the admission of evidence regarding prior drug use and related activities under Kentucky Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the admission of statements made after he referenced wanting a lawyer during police questioning. He also objected to the conduct of a law enforcement officer at trial, alleging that the officer’s nonverbal reactions could have influenced the jury. After the jury found him guilty and recommended life without parole, the trial court denied his motion for a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed each of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the challenged jurors for cause, admitting the contested 404(b) evidence, or admitting the defendant’s statements made before an unequivocal request for counsel. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial based on the officer’s conduct, as there was insufficient proof of jury influence. The court further held that the cumulative error doctrine did not apply, as no individual errors were found. The judgment of the Trigg Circuit Court was affirmed. View "STINSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, distribution of obscene material to a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, first-degree sexual abuse, and sixty-eight counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The charges arose from incidents in which the appellant, while babysitting two children, sexually abused an eight-year-old girl and, over a period of time, also abused a boy who lived with him. The investigation began after the girl disclosed the abuse to her mother, leading to police involvement, the seizure of the appellant’s cellphone, and the discovery of child pornography, including images of the boy.The Madison Circuit Court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone, finding that the warrantless seizure was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was reasonable. At trial, the court admitted images of child pornography extracted from the cellphone, over the appellant’s objections regarding authentication and Confrontation Clause rights. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions. The Court held that raw, machine-extracted data from the Cellebrite forensic tool is not testimonial hearsay and does not implicate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, as such data is not a statement by a person. The Court also found that the photographs were properly authenticated, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and there was no double jeopardy violation in convicting the appellant for both use of a minor in a sexual performance and possession of the same image. The Court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction and found no cumulative error. View "BALDWIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case involved a violent confrontation between two former friends, Raiantez Shackles and Marvin Yarbrough, which escalated after a series of personal disputes, including threats and a romantic entanglement. On January 5, 2021, after a prior shooting incident involving their vehicles, Marvin and his wife Cassandra returned home from a funeral to find their residence under threat. Upon arrival, they were confronted by two armed men, and Shackles emerged from behind a tree, pointing a gun at them. A shootout ensued, resulting in both Marvin and Cassandra being shot, while their four children and Marvin’s brother were inside the home. The scene was chaotic, with multiple bullet holes found throughout the residence and a neighbor’s home.A jury in the Jefferson Circuit Court convicted Shackles of two counts of first-degree assault, six counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, possession of a handgun by a felon, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The jury recommended a sixty-year sentence, which the trial court reduced to forty-five years under Kentucky law. Shackles appealed, raising several claims of error regarding jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the conduct of the sentencing phase.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a self-defense instruction, as there was no evidence that Marvin used unlawful force. The Court found that while the admission of certain hearsay evidence was erroneous, it was harmless given the other evidence presented. The Court also upheld the admission of body camera footage and crime scene photographs, denied the directed verdict motions on the wanton endangerment charges, and found no manifest injustice in the jury polling or the admission of victim impact testimony. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "SHACKLES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A woman was carjacked at gunpoint while filling her car at a gas station in Southeast D.C. The assailant, a stranger to her, wore a hood and brandished a gun, demanding her car keys. She focused mainly on the weapon during the brief encounter, only glancing at his face at the very end. Several hours later, police arrested Andrew Patrick driving her stolen vehicle about four miles away. Officers called the victim to the scene, where Patrick was handcuffed and positioned next to her car, flanked by police. She identified him as her assailant during two drive-by show-up procedures and later in court.The case was tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Patrick moved to suppress the victim’s identifications, arguing the show-up procedures were highly suggestive and unnecessary, given that he was already under arrest and a lineup or photo array could have been used. The trial court denied the motion, finding the procedures were not unduly suggestive and that the identifications were reliable, citing the victim’s opportunity to observe the assailant and her certainty.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether admitting the identifications violated Patrick’s due process rights. The court held that the show-up procedures were extraordinarily and unnecessarily suggestive, as Patrick was already under arrest and there was no urgency requiring a show-up. The identifications lacked independent indicia of reliability, given the victim’s limited opportunity to observe the assailant and her generic description. The court found constitutional error in admitting the identifications and reversed Patrick’s convictions for armed carjacking and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, but affirmed his other weapons-related convictions, finding those were not impacted by the identifications. View "Patrick v. United States" on Justia Law