Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the shooting death of Oshane Scott at his apartment in Lilburn, Georgia. Karre Rivers arranged to meet Scott to purchase marijuana and other controlled substances. After Rivers arrived, he and Scott went upstairs to the apartment, where Wright, Scott’s girlfriend, heard multiple gunshots. Rivers fled the scene, leaving his cell phone behind. Evidence showed Scott had a gun that was damaged and could not have fired the spent shell casings found at the scene. Rivers initially gave conflicting stories to investigators, eventually admitting he shot Scott with his own firearm and disposed of it afterward. Testimony indicated Scott was shot multiple times, including while he was already on the ground.The Superior Court of Gwinnett County indicted Rivers for several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession. At trial, Rivers was found guilty of four counts; the fifth count was nolle prossed. Rivers was sentenced to life without parole and a consecutive five-year term. He filed a motion for new trial, which was denied without a hearing. Rivers then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on excessive force in connection with his self-defense claim.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. Applying the plain error standard, the court found that the trial court did not commit plain error in giving the excessive force jury instruction. The evidence provided at least slight support for the instruction, as required under Georgia law. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "RIVERS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Two individuals, Pendrak and Reynolds, were shot and killed in the early morning hours at a park in Gwinnett County, Georgia. Prior to the incident, Reynolds received messages and video calls via Instagram from an account later determined to belong to Dempsey, inquiring about purchasing marijuana. Both victims coordinated with Dempsey’s account for the drug deal and arrived at the park with a third person, Black, who witnessed suspicious activity and later heard gunshots. Evidence at the scene included cartridge casings from a 9mm firearm and revealed that a backpack carried by Pendrak was missing. Investigators traced communications and video evidence linking Dempsey to the Amy Road house near the crime scene, and cell phone and Instagram data further implicated him. Witnesses testified to seeing Dempsey with a firearm and described post-crime statements by Dempsey referencing his probation status.After a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Dempsey on multiple counts including felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and firearm possession, a jury in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Dempsey to life without parole and additional consecutive terms. Dempsey moved for a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence and improper admission of probation-related evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and Dempsey appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the evidence was legally sufficient for a rational jury to convict Dempsey beyond a reasonable doubt, under both constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law. The Court also held that evidence of Dempsey’s probation status was relevant, intrinsic to the crimes charged, and not unfairly prejudicial, thus properly admitted by the trial court. The convictions and evidentiary rulings were affirmed. View "DEMPSEY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Donald Carter was convicted of malice murder and other related charges following the shooting death of Samuel Sanders. The incident occurred after Carter, Sanders, and Sanders’s grandson completed a moving job between Philadelphia and Georgia. On their return trip, Carter consumed alcohol, became agitated, harassed Sanders’s grandson, and ultimately shot Sanders while traveling on the highway. Carter fled the scene and was later found by law enforcement asleep in a shed with the firearm. He claimed to have no memory of the events, attributing his blackout to either alcohol or a substance sprayed in his face by Sanders’s grandson.After indictment by the Jackson County grand jury, Carter was tried before the Superior Court of Jackson County, where a jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court imposed a life sentence for malice murder, merging and vacating some counts as required by law. Carter filed a motion for new trial, which was amended and eventually denied after an evidentiary hearing.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Carter’s appeal, focusing on whether the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing on Carter’s mental competence to stand trial after the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities found him competent. The Court held that, under the applicable statutes, a hearing on competency was only required if a special plea of incompetency was filed, which Carter did not do. The Court also determined that Carter’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to file such a plea, as there was insufficient evidence that a competency trial would have changed the outcome. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Carter’s convictions and the trial court’s rulings. View "CARTER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

During a contentious divorce and custody dispute, Amanda Hovanec, who had returned to Ohio from South Africa with her children, conspired with Anthony Theodorou, her romantic partner, to kill her husband, T.H. After failed attempts to hire hitmen in South Africa, Theodorou, at Hovanec’s direction, obtained and shipped etorphine, a dangerous animal tranquilizer, to the United States. Hovanec ultimately used the drug to fatally inject T.H. at her mother Anita Green’s home. Green assisted after the murder by helping to select a burial site, driving the others to dig a grave, and later transporting them and the body for burial. The group also undertook efforts to conceal the crime, including disposing of T.H.’s belongings and misleading authorities. All three were arrested after an investigation revealed dashcam footage of the crime.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Hovanec pleaded guilty to multiple controlled-substance offenses resulting in death, and Green pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Hovanec received a 480-month sentence; Green received 121 months and was ordered to pay restitution for psychological care for T.H.’s and Hovanec’s children. Both defendants appealed their sentences and, in Green’s case, the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences for both Hovanec and Green. The appellate court upheld the denial of a sentencing reduction for Green based on her lack of candor regarding knowledge of the murder plan. The court also affirmed the sentencing enhancements for Hovanec’s leadership role and obstruction of justice. However, the court reversed the restitution order against Green, holding that under federal law, restitution for psychological care requires evidence of bodily injury, defined as physical harm or physical manifestations of psychological harm, and remanded for further factual findings on this issue. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

After a fatal shooting in Topeka, Wesley Rayton was arrested and charged with several crimes, including first-degree felony murder, after admitting to firing a gun during an altercation that resulted in Michael Comp’s death. Surveillance footage and witness statements corroborated Rayton’s actions. As part of a plea agreement, Rayton pled guilty to first-degree felony murder in exchange for dismissal of all other charges in this case and in a separate pending case. He was thoroughly advised by the court and his attorney about the sentencing consequences, including a mandatory life sentence with parole eligibility after 25 years.Following his plea but before sentencing, Rayton wrote to the Shawnee District Court seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. He alleged he did not fully understand the plea, felt pressured, was under the influence of medication, and had only 24 hours to consider the agreement. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, heard testimony from Rayton and his counsel, and reviewed the plea proceedings. The court found that Rayton had ample time to consider the plea, was not misled or coerced, received competent representation, and entered the plea understandingly and voluntarily. The motion to withdraw the plea was denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed Rayton’s direct appeal of the denial. Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the court considered the factors established in State v. Edgar: counsel’s competence, absence of coercion or misleading information, and whether the plea was understandingly made. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rayton’s motion, as substantial evidence supported the findings that Rayton was competently advised and understood the plea’s consequences. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Rayton " on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, criminal use of weapons, and driving a vehicle without the assigned tag. The victim was found shot multiple times, with his hands bound by rope. The evidence against the defendant was largely circumstantial, relying on testimony from various witnesses, many of whom had credibility issues due to their involvement with drugs and deals with law enforcement. No one testified to witnessing the defendant inflict harm on the victim, and the murder weapon was never recovered. However, forensic evidence and the sequence of events, including video surveillance and statements from associates, connected the defendant to the kidnapping and eventual death of the victim.The case was tried in the Sedgwick District Court, where the defendant did not testify or present any witnesses. During trial, the defense requested jury instructions on lesser included offenses—simple kidnapping and criminal restraint—which the district court denied. The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges and he was sentenced accordingly. On appeal, the defendant argued that prosecutorial error had occurred during closing arguments and that the failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses was reversible error.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the appeal. The court held that the prosecutor’s challenged remark during rebuttal argument was not error when viewed in context, as it was a permissible response to the defense’s arguments and did not comment on the defendant’s failure to testify or shift the burden of proof. Regarding the lesser included offense instructions, the court found that although the district court erred in failing to provide the requested instructions, the error was harmless given the strength of the evidence supporting the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Arroyo " on Justia Law

The case involves a man who was convicted of first-degree murder in Broward County, Florida, after a fatal shooting during a domestic dispute with his girlfriend. The key evidence during trial was a confession obtained by police after the man initially invoked his right to counsel but later agreed to speak with detectives. This confession was not admitted as direct evidence at his second trial but was used extensively to impeach his testimony when he took the stand in his own defense. The prosecution also presented substantial physical and eyewitness evidence, including the testimony of two individuals present at the scene and expert forensic analysis.After his conviction, the defendant challenged the use of his statement in postconviction proceedings. The Florida trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The defendant later argued in a state postconviction proceeding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the statement on the grounds that it was coerced, in violation of the Due Process Clause. The state postconviction court, adopting the State’s response, found that the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error of his counsel, as the other evidence against him was overwhelming. The Fourth DCA affirmed without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief. The court held that the state court had adjudicated the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance claim on the merits, entitling its decision to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Eleventh Circuit found that the state court’s determination—that the outcome would not have been different even if the statement had been excluded—was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "Calder v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case centers on a defendant who, while driving a semi-truck with a trailer, failed to stop at a stop sign and caused a fatal collision. He was initially charged with felony vehicular manslaughter but was acquitted of that charge by a jury and convicted instead of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter. After the conviction, the defendant was granted a new trial due to an error in the jury instructions. Prior to the retrial, the presiding magistrate judge informed the parties off the record that he would not impose jail time if the defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor, consistent with typical sentencing practices for such offenses.Upon conviction at the second trial, the magistrate judge nonetheless sentenced the defendant to jail. The defendant filed a motion to reduce the sentence, arguing that the sentence was excessive and inconsistent with the judge’s prior assurances. The magistrate court reduced the jail time by one day but denied further relief. On appeal, the district court found that the magistrate’s assurances had tainted the judicial process and vacated the sentence, remanding the case to a different magistrate for resentencing. The new magistrate sentenced the defendant to 90 days in jail. The defendant again appealed, arguing that the new magistrate was bound by the prior assurance of no jail time, but the district court affirmed the sentence.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that the new magistrate was not bound by the prior judge’s assurances regarding sentencing. The Court found that the law of the case doctrine did not require the resentencing judge to follow the prior judge’s off-the-record statement and that the district court properly affirmed the new sentence. The district court’s decision was affirmed. View "State v. Salazar-Cabrera" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded no contest in 2009 to second degree murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and participating in a criminal street gang, following an amended indictment stemming from a 2006 shooting. The plea was supported by a stipulation that police reports and grand jury testimony provided a factual basis for the charges. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 25 years to life. After a direct appeal resulted in a minor modification to presentence custody credits, the conviction stood.Years later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Kern County Superior Court initially denied the petition at the prima facie stage, but the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts from the grand jury proceedings, police reports, witness statements, and related law enforcement documents, over the defendant’s objections. The trial court denied the resentencing petition, finding the defendant was a major participant in the murder who acted with reckless indifference to human life, relying on the challenged evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, found that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury transcript and police reports at the evidentiary hearing, as these did not fall within the exceptions for admissible evidence under section 1172.6(d)(3). The appellate court held that neither the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea nor any other exception permitted their admission. The court vacated the denial of the resentencing petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, explicitly directing that only admissible evidence consistent with section 1172.6 may be considered. The holding does not bar the prosecution from presenting admissible evidence on remand. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

A man required to register as a sex offender in Iowa was charged with violating a statutory provision that requires notification to the county sheriff if a registered sex offender stays away from his principal residence for more than five days. The issue arose after local authorities were unable to find him at his registered address in Pilot Mound, and after his eviction from that residence, he registered a new address in Boone. The prosecution alleged that he failed to properly notify the sheriff of his change in location within the statutory timeframe, basing its case on the assertion that he failed to register his change of residence.The Iowa District Court for Boone County denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and accepted the jury’s guilty verdict under Iowa Code section 692A.105, which concerns temporary lodging away from a principal residence. The court imposed a suspended sentence with probation. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s eviction constituted a change requiring notification under section 692A.105, and that he failed to comply with the five-day reporting requirement.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the proper interpretation of the statute. The court held that section 692A.105 applies only when a sex offender stays away from his principal residence for more than five days, not merely upon a change in residence. The State had not presented evidence that the defendant was away from his principal residence for more than five days to trigger the statutory requirement. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "State of Iowa v. Uranga" on Justia Law