Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and pled guilty to the charge. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, three years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. The district court specified that these monetary penalties were “due immediately,” but, recognizing the defendant’s indigency, also established a payment schedule: while incarcerated, he was to make nominal payments through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and during supervised release, he was to pay a percentage of his income, subject to a minimum monthly amount.After sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered judgment reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment schedule. The government sent a letter demanding immediate payment of the full amount and warning of a possible judgment lien. The defendant appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) does not permit a court to make monetary penalties due immediately while also setting a payment schedule, contending that the statute requires the court to choose only one of these options.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by making the fine and special assessment due immediately while also providing a payment schedule. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute allows for the total amount to be due immediately, with a payment schedule reflecting the defendant’s ability to pay, and that this approach is consistent with its own precedent and that of other circuits. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was indicted by a Rhode Island grand jury, along with several co-defendants, on charges related to an alleged mortgage fraud conspiracy. He filed multiple motions to dismiss the charges in Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the indictment was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and the presentation of misleading or missing evidence. After evidentiary hearings, a Magistrate denied his motions, and an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, on de novo review, adopted the Magistrate’s decision and added that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to justify dismissal. The plaintiff did not appeal this ruling. Later, the charges against him were dismissed by the state as part of a plea agreement with a co-defendant.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against state law enforcement defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating whether the indictment was procured by fraud or misconduct, since that issue had already been decided in state court. The plaintiff responded only that the issues were not identical, and did not contest the “final judgment” or “full and fair opportunity to litigate” elements of collateral estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff had waived his arguments regarding the “final judgment” and “full and fair opportunity” elements by failing to raise them in the district court, and that no exceptional circumstances justified excusing this waiver. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that collateral estoppel applied and barred the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Costs were awarded to the defendants. View "Shabshelowitz v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Timothy Baker, a registered sex offender, was in a relationship with Shaelyn Fann and expressed sexual interest in Fann’s eleven-year-old daughter, S.H. Over several months, Baker and Fann groomed S.H. for sexual activity, with Fann sending Baker sexually explicit photographs of S.H. at his request. Baker provided detailed instructions to Fann on how to obtain these images and discussed plans to sexually abuse S.H. Law enforcement discovered Baker’s activities while investigating him for another alleged sexual assault involving a minor.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan indicted Baker on three counts: conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor, coercion and enticement of a minor, and committing these offenses while required to register as a sex offender. The indictment also alleged that Baker had two prior convictions for sexually exploiting minors under Michigan law. Before trial, Baker moved to strike the sentencing enhancement based on his prior convictions, arguing they were juvenile adjudications, not convictions. He also sought to sever the count related to his sex offender status and to exclude testimony from two other minors, L.H. and I.B., who alleged prior sexual assaults by Baker. The district court denied all these motions, admitted the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, and the jury convicted Baker on all counts. The court imposed a total sentence of 600 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Baker’s prior Michigan offenses constituted convictions under federal law, supporting the enhanced sentence. The court also found that cumulative punishments under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e) and 2260A did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, as Congress clearly intended such cumulative sentences. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of L.H. and I.B. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was indicted for murder and attempted murder following a shooting incident in Kona, Hawaii. The indictment included sentencing enhancements under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 706-660.1, which allows for mandatory minimum sentences if a firearm is possessed, used, or its use is threatened during the commission of a felony. The indictment did not specify a state of mind (mens rea) for the sentencing enhancement, though it did for the underlying offenses. At trial, the defendant was convicted on several counts, and the jury found the firearm enhancement applied. The defendant was sentenced accordingly.After the initial conviction, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction on certain counts due to evidentiary errors and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the defendant, for the first time, challenged the sufficiency of the indictment, arguing that the sentencing enhancement was an element of the offense and thus required a state of mind to be alleged. The Circuit Court agreed and struck the enhancements from the indictment, finding that the omission of a state of mind violated due process and the requirements set forth in prior case law.The State appealed, and the ICA reversed the Circuit Court’s order, holding that the sentencing enhancement under HRS § 706-660.1 is not an element of the underlying offense and does not require a state of mind to be pled in the indictment. The Hawaii Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ICA’s decision. The Court held that sentencing enhancements under HRS § 706-660.1 are not elements of the offense and that due process is satisfied if the defendant is notified that the enhancement will be sought and the indictment contains sufficient factual allegations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Brandon Glen Jackson was indicted in Arizona for a state-law felony related to possessing a short-barreled rifle. While released on bail and with the felony charge still pending, Jackson lawfully acquired a handgun and traveled from Arizona to Maryland, bringing the handgun with him. In Maryland, he was arrested for carrying the gun without a permit. Upon discovering his pending Arizona felony indictment, federal prosecutors charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which prohibits individuals under felony indictment from transporting firearms in interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Jackson’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. Jackson then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue. He was sentenced to time served, and subsequently appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Supreme Court’s “text-and-history” standard from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fourth Circuit held that Jackson’s conduct—transporting a handgun across state lines while under felony indictment—was presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. However, the court found that the government met its burden to show that § 922(n), as applied to Jackson, was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on historical surety laws and the tradition of disarming dangerous persons, as well as its own precedent in United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), to conclude that temporary disarmament of those under felony indictment is constitutionally permissible. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Jackson" on Justia Law

John Seiwert, who had a long history of daily heroin and crack cocaine use, was found in possession of firearms at his home in Illinois shortly after his father’s death. Law enforcement, investigating Seiwert’s drug dealer, observed frequent contact between the two and recovered firearms and drug paraphernalia from Seiwert’s residence. Seiwert admitted to using crack cocaine just hours before police arrived and to being a daily user for twenty years. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of, or addict to, a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Seiwert’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Second Amendment, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. At trial, the government presented evidence of Seiwert’s drug use and firearm possession, and the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court denied Seiwert’s post-trial motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Seiwert’s arguments that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court held that, under the Bruen framework, § 922(g)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Seiwert, finding it analogous to historical laws disarming the intoxicated and mentally ill. The court also found that its prior decision in United States v. Cook foreclosed Seiwert’s vagueness challenge, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Seiwert" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged with one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and four counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, based on allegations made by his stepdaughter (IB) and his biological daughter (TL). The allegations surfaced during a Department of Family Services investigation into the household, which led to forensic interviews of the children. Both IB and TL described incidents of sexual abuse involving the defendant. The defendant challenged the competency of the two minor victims to testify and, during trial, objected to the late disclosure of a follow-up interview with another child, JL, which contained statements about attempted abuse.The District Court of Campbell County held a pretrial hearing to determine the competency of IB and TL, ultimately finding both children competent to testify. During trial, after a forensic interviewer referenced JL’s follow-up interview, the defense moved for a mistrial, arguing a discovery violation. The district court denied the motion, instead striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it, while also providing the defense with the interview recording and the opportunity to recall witnesses. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the district court imposed consecutive and concurrent sentences totaling several decades in prison.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in finding the children competent to testify and in denying the motions for mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either respect. The court found the children’s testimony established their competency and that the late disclosure of JL’s interview did not constitute a Brady or Giglio violation, as the evidence was made available during trial and was not material to the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the district court’s rulings. View "Lake v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was convicted of first-degree arson after a fire occurred in his trailer home in Gillette, Wyoming. On the morning of the incident, a neighbor saw him borrow a lighter and leave the area; shortly after, smoke was observed coming from his trailer. The man was later seen at a nearby business, covered in bleach, and subsequently changed clothes before arriving at his ex-girlfriend’s house, where he smelled of cleaning supplies. Firefighters found multiple intentionally set fires inside the locked trailer, with no evidence of forced entry or accidental cause. The trailer was uninsured, and the defendant denied starting the fire, testifying that he was searching for his dogs at the time.The District Court of Campbell County held a jury trial, during which the defendant was found guilty of first-degree arson and sentenced to eight to fourteen years in prison. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the court erred by excluding evidence suggesting an alternative suspect—a former tenant who had previously threatened to burn down the trailer.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including his presence at the scene, the locked state of the trailer, the use of bleach, and the lack of evidence of another perpetrator. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the alternative suspect evidence, finding it to be inadmissible hearsay and lacking a direct nexus to the crime. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the conviction. View "Boyer v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with aggravated stalking, violation of an abuse-prevention order, and violation of conditions of release. The charges stemmed from allegations that the defendant, who was subject to a relief-from-abuse order and criminal conditions of release due to an earlier assault, approached the complainant in a Walmart parking lot, maintained eye contact, circled the lot, and parked behind her, in violation of the orders prohibiting contact.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Criminal Division, granted the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail, finding that aggravated stalking was a felony involving an act of violence, as required by the Vermont Constitution and relevant statutes. The defendant appealed the hold-without-bail order. A specially assigned single Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and concluded that aggravated stalking did not necessarily involve an act of violence as an element of the offense. The single Justice reversed the hold-without-bail order, imposed interim conditions, and remanded the case for the trial court to set conditions of release. The trial court then imposed conditions of release. The State subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the single Justice’s order.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the State had a statutory right to appeal the single Justice’s decision. The Court held that the State does not have a statutory right to appeal a single Justice’s order reversing a hold-without-bail decision under the relevant statutes. The Court reasoned that the statutory language only provides the State with a right to appeal from trial court orders regarding release, not from decisions of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal. View "State v. Beldiman" on Justia Law

A woman was involved in a car accident in which her passenger suffered severe injuries. She admitted to consuming alcohol and marijuana before driving, and chemical tests confirmed her blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. The passenger was hospitalized in a vegetative state and died several months after the accident. Initially, the woman was charged and convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in serious bodily injury, for which she received a sentence of incarceration, post-release supervision, and license revocation.After the passenger’s death, the State charged her with motor vehicle homicide while operating under the influence. She argued that this subsequent prosecution violated her double jeopardy rights. The District Court for Douglas County agreed and dismissed the new charge, finding the two offenses to be the same under the Blockburger v. United States test. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court, referencing Diaz v. United States, reversed that decision, holding that double jeopardy did not bar the second prosecution because the death, a necessary element of the more serious charge, had not occurred at the time of the first prosecution.On remand, the district court held a bench trial and found her guilty of motor vehicle homicide/DUI, relying on expert testimony that the collision was the proximate cause of the passenger’s death. The court sentenced her to probation, to run concurrently with any other sentence. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the expert testimony was admissible, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and that cumulative punishment for both offenses was permitted because the legislature clearly authorized it. The court affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law