Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

An individual pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offenses committed against two girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, when he was eighteen years old. The offenses included several instances of rape and indecent assault. The individual had a history of psychological diagnoses, including autism spectrum disorder. After his conviction, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) initially classified him as a level three sex offender, which would require the highest level of public notification. The individual challenged this classification, leading to a de novo hearing before a SORB hearing examiner.At the hearing, the examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that the individual posed a moderate risk of reoffense and a moderate degree of danger, resulting in a reclassification to level two. The examiner considered several statutory and regulatory factors, including the number of victims, the nature and location of the offenses, and the individual’s psychological profile. The examiner also considered the fact that the individual committed multiple offenses, including repeated offenses against one victim, as relevant to the degree of dangerousness. The examiner determined that Internet publication of the individual’s registration information would serve a public safety interest. The individual sought judicial review in the Massachusetts Superior Court, which affirmed the SORB’s decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the SORB hearing examiner did not err in considering the individual’s multiple offenses as relevant to dangerousness under regulatory factor thirty-seven, even though such consideration is limited under factor two, which addresses risk of reoffense. The court also declined to find the application of factor thirty-seven unconstitutional due to a lack of empirical evidence, given the statutory mandate to consider the number of offenses. The court affirmed the classification as a level two offender and the requirement for Internet dissemination of registration information. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a Los Angeles County jury in 2000 of eight counts of first-degree special-circumstance murder and numerous other violent crimes, with firearm and gang enhancements found true. He received eight death sentences and a noncapital sentence exceeding 100 years to life, to be served consecutively. While his automatic appeal from the capital judgment was pending before the California Supreme Court, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified him as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidates certain prior prison term enhancements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County set the matter for possible resentencing, appointed counsel, and held several hearings in the defendant’s absence. At the hearing, defense counsel requested the court strike the now-invalidated enhancement and conduct a holistic resentencing, including consideration of the Racial Justice Act and reassessment of the death sentences. The trial court declined to resentence, finding it lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence while the direct appeal was pending before the California Supreme Court, and denied the motion without prejudice to revisiting the issue after the Supreme Court’s decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that, under California law, the filing of a notice of appeal in a capital case vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the California Supreme Court over the entire judgment, including both capital and noncapital convictions and sentences. The court concluded that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not create an exception allowing trial courts to resentence defendants in capital cases while a direct appeal is pending. The appellate court also found no prejudicial error in holding the resentencing hearing in the defendant’s absence. The postjudgment order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Millsap" on Justia Law

Timothy Clevenger was convicted of first-degree murder following the death of his wife, Margaret, who was found unresponsive and covered in blood in their home. The investigation revealed that Margaret had suffered multiple blunt-force head injuries, with evidence of a violent struggle and attempted cleanup at the scene. Clevenger was found with bloodstained clothing and injuries consistent with striking a person or object. His statements to police about his whereabouts and actions on the morning of the murder were contradicted by security footage and other evidence. The couple’s marriage was strained, and Clevenger was the sole beneficiary of a significant life insurance policy on Margaret.The Pulaski County Circuit Court presided over Clevenger’s trial. Clevenger moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home, arguing that the search warrant was improperly issued and that the search violated procedural rules regarding nighttime searches. The circuit court denied the motion, finding no evidence of judicial bias and determining that the search complied with legal requirements. At trial, Clevenger also objected to the admission of certain evidence and witness testimony, but the court overruled or limited these objections, often noting that some arguments were not properly preserved.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case on appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the conviction, including forensic evidence, inconsistencies in Clevenger’s statements, evidence of motive, and his attempt to evade arrest. The court found no error in the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant was properly issued and the search was lawfully conducted. The court also determined that Clevenger’s evidentiary and procedural objections were either without merit or not preserved for review. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "Clevenger v. State" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, after a heated argument with his wife in their home, threatened her with a gun in the presence of their children. The incident escalated to physical violence and a standoff with law enforcement, ending with his surrender. The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, but relevant here are his convictions for second degree assault with a deadly weapon and felony harassment (threat to kill), both arising from the same sequence of conduct.At trial in the Superior Court, the jury convicted the defendant of both second degree assault and felony harassment, each with firearm and domestic violence aggravators. The trial court found these offenses constituted the “same criminal conduct” for sentencing purposes and imposed concurrent sentences with consecutive firearm enhancements. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting the defendant’s argument that punishing both offenses violated double jeopardy protections.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the two convictions violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. The court held that, although both convictions were based on the same conduct, they were not the same in law because each offense required proof of a fact the other did not: assault required intentional conduct with a deadly weapon causing fear of bodily injury, while harassment required a knowing threat to kill. The court found no clear legislative intent to prohibit separate punishments for these offenses and concluded that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the convictions. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company participated in a federal program that required it to report the average price it received for drugs sold to wholesalers, which in turn affected the rebates it owed the government under Medicaid. From 2005 to 2017, the company sold drugs to wholesalers at an initial price, but if it raised the price before the wholesaler resold the drugs to pharmacies, it required the wholesaler to pay the difference. The company reported only the initial price as the average manufacturer price (AMP), excluding the subsequent price increases, which resulted in lower reported AMPs and thus lower rebate payments to the government. The company justified this exclusion by categorizing the price increases as part of a bona fide service fee to wholesalers, even though the increased value was ultimately paid by pharmacies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case after a qui tam action was filed by a relator, who alleged that the company’s AMP calculations were false and violated the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court granted summary judgment to the relator on the issue of falsity, finding the AMP calculations and related certifications were factually and legally false. The issues of scienter (knowledge) and materiality were tried before a jury, which found in favor of the relator and awarded substantial damages. The company appealed, challenging the findings on falsity, scienter, and materiality, while the relator cross-appealed on the calculation of the number of FCA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the company’s exclusion of price increase values from AMP was unreasonable and contradicted the plain language and purpose of the relevant statutes, regulations, and agreements. The court also held that the jury reasonably found the company acted knowingly and that the false AMPs were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court rejected the cross-appeal on damages, finding the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Streck v Eli Lilly and Company" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both advanced practice registered nurses at a pain management clinic, were charged with multiple felonies, including reckless endangerment and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. The State alleged that they overprescribed controlled substances, creating a substantial risk of serious harm to patients. In each case, the State later reached a civil settlement with the defendant and moved to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice, citing the resolution of the issues through the civil agreement.The North Central Judicial District Court, presided over by Judge Gary Lee, denied the State’s motions to dismiss. The court interpreted North Dakota’s compromise statutes as prohibiting the State from dismissing felony charges based on a civil settlement, and found by clear and convincing evidence that dismissal would be against the public interest. In one case, after the denial, the State attempted to withdraw its motion to dismiss, but the district court did not issue an order recognizing the withdrawal, and the denial remained in effect.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case on a petition for a supervisory writ. The court held that the compromise statutes apply only to misdemeanors or infractions and do not bar the State from seeking dismissal of felony charges under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(a). The court further held that a district court’s discretion to deny a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss under Rule 48(a) is limited; unless the prosecutor is acting in bad faith or for an improper motive, the court should not deny the motion based on its own assessment of the public interest. The Supreme Court concluded that Judge Lee misinterpreted the statutes and abused his discretion, granted the State’s petition, and directed the district court to reverse its orders denying dismissal. View "State v. Lee" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a rental pickup truck driven by the defendant after observing a traffic violation and noticing the vehicle’s dark window tint. Upon approaching, the officer detected the odor of marijuana and learned that the defendant had previously waived his Fourth Amendment rights as part of a plea agreement. After both occupants exited the vehicle, a search revealed marijuana shake and bags containing suspected narcotics. The officer then searched the defendant’s person, finding large amounts of cash and, during a pat-down over the defendant’s underwear, felt a hard object between the defendant’s buttocks and underwear. The defendant resisted as the officer attempted to retrieve the item, which was ultimately removed and found to contain cocaine and crack cocaine. At no point were the defendant’s genitals or buttocks exposed to the public.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was an impermissible, warrantless body cavity search under the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk denied the motion, finding probable cause and exigent circumstances due to the potential danger of fentanyl and risk of evidence destruction. The defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The Court of Appeals of Virginia vacated the conviction, holding that the search was unreasonably intrusive and not justified by exigent circumstances, and that the evidence should have been suppressed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, given the probable cause for arrest, the manner and location of the search, the risks posed by possible fentanyl exposure, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. The Court found the search did not constitute a manual body cavity search and was justified as a search incident to arrest. The defendant’s conviction was reinstated. View "Commonwealth v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

A former state senator was indicted on two counts of using his official position to secure unwarranted privileges by directing his publicly funded Senate staff to perform campaign work for his 2018 and 2020 reelection efforts. The Senate president received anonymous complaints about this conduct, which led to a Senate ethics committee investigation. The committee found that the senator knowingly had his staff perform campaign and fundraising work during regular business hours, ignored repeated warnings that this was inappropriate, and violated Senate rules and likely state conflict-of-interest and campaign-finance laws. The committee recommended disciplinary measures, and the matter was referred to state ethics and campaign finance authorities, eventually resulting in criminal indictments after a grand jury investigation.A judge of the Massachusetts Superior Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments, which argued for legislative immunity under the Massachusetts Constitution and claimed that the prosecution violated separation of powers principles. The defendant also argued that the prosecutor improperly excluded a grand juror for alleged political bias without court approval. After the motion was denied, the defendant sought interlocutory review in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County under G. L. c. 211, § 3.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on legislative immunity in a criminal case must be sought under G. L. c. 211, § 3, not through the doctrine of present execution. The court further held that the defendant was not immune from prosecution under either the state constitution’s speech or debate clause or separation of powers provisions. Additionally, while the prosecutor erred in excusing a grand juror for bias without judicial involvement, the defendant was not prejudiced, so dismissal was not warranted. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded for entry of judgment denying extraordinary relief. View "Tran v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Daniel Orozco was involved in a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles, where he and three other members or associates of the Varrio Norwalk gang entered rival Chivas gang territory. During two separate incidents about twenty minutes apart, a shooter in Orozco’s car used Orozco’s gun to wound one man and kill another, who was not a gang member. Police quickly connected the car to Orozco, found the group at his home, and recovered the weapon and other evidence. Orozco was arrested along with the others. At trial, Orozco’s defense centered on his alleged intoxication, arguing he was too drunk to form criminal intent.At the preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the magistrate suppressed a confession by the shooter, Martinez Garibo, due to a Miranda violation. Despite this, the magistrate found sufficient evidence to hold Orozco to answer for murder and attempted murder, but not for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence of an agreement to kill. On the day of trial, the prosecution moved to add a conspiracy charge, which the trial court allowed over Orozco’s objection. The jury convicted Orozco of all three charges, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder, with a stayed sentence for conspiracy.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that the conspiracy conviction must be reversed because the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support that charge, and Orozco was not given proper notice. The court affirmed the convictions for murder and attempted murder, finding no merit in Orozco’s other arguments, including ineffective assistance of counsel and alleged prosecutorial error. The court also held that Orozco forfeited his challenge to the attempted murder sentence by failing to object and having adequate notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 2018, the defendant sexually abused three boys, beginning with C.C. in 1994, followed by B.A. around 2005–06, and J.G. in 2017. The abuse included interstate travel with C.C., during which the defendant filmed some of the acts, and the creation of sexually explicit images and videos of all three victims. In 2021, law enforcement recovered thumb drives containing thousands of images of child pornography, including depictions of the three boys. The defendant was indicted on five federal counts: transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity, two counts of child exploitation, possession of child pornography, and committing sexual exploitation while a registered sex offender.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the first three counts, rejecting arguments that Count One was time-barred and that the indictment was insufficient. After the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the court convicted him on all counts and sentenced him to life plus ten years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the statute of limitations, the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the application of a sentencing enhancement based on prior convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the extended statute of limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 3283 applied to Count One, making the prosecution timely. It found the indictment sufficient for all challenged counts, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support each conviction, and upheld the sentencing enhancement, determining that the defendant’s prior Tennessee convictions related to the sexual exploitation of children as required by federal law. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence in all respects. View "United States v. Deakins" on Justia Law