Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a man who was convicted of murdering his estranged wife by shooting her in the back seat of a car outside a police station, in the presence of children. He was arrested the day before the murder for domestic violence, released on bond, and the next day followed his wife and her friend to the police station, where the shooting occurred. The prosecution presented evidence of prior domestic abuse and a previous conviction for a violent offense. The defense focused on the defendant’s troubled upbringing, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits. The jury found him guilty and recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, the defendant filed for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the Circuit Court for Spartanburg County, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly regarding the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The PCR court initially denied relief in an order that was identical to the State’s proposed order. The Supreme Court of South Carolina vacated that order and remanded for a new order with specific findings. On remand, the PCR court again denied relief, issuing an amended order after reviewing the parties’ proposed orders and making some corrections. The defendant’s requests for a new hearing or for the judge’s recusal were denied.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred by adopting the State’s proposed order and whether trial counsel was ineffective in preparing and presenting mitigation. The court held that the PCR court did not violate the defendant’s rights by adopting the State’s proposed order after adequate review, and that any deficiencies in trial counsel’s mitigation investigation or presentation did not prejudice the defendant. The court found no reasonable probability that additional mitigation evidence would have changed the jury’s recommendation. The decision of the PCR court was affirmed in result. View "Lindsey v. The State" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felonies and a misdemeanor after breaking into an airport hangar, causing over $1 million in property damage to the hangar, an airplane, and vehicles, and stealing an ATV. He had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for theft, burglary, and other offenses. He entered an open guilty plea to all charges. The district court sentenced him to consecutive terms totaling 51 years in prison, 3 years of probation, and ordered restitution of $306,400, reflecting damages not covered by insurance.After sentencing, the defendant filed a motion under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, arguing his sentence was illegal and seeking leniency. The District Court of Pierce County partially granted the motion, finding the sentence was not illegal but reducing the total imprisonment to 30 years as an act of leniency. The defendant appealed from the order denying further relief and from the amended judgment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as the sentence was within statutory limits and justified by the gravity of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history. The court also found no violation of statutory law regarding mandatory minimum sentences, as none of the offenses required such minimums and the consecutive sentences were authorized by law. The court declined to address additional arguments regarding judicial conduct and equal protection, finding they were not adequately raised or supported. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order and the amended judgment. View "State v. Wallette" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted after pleading guilty to several offenses, including aggravated assault, terrorizing, felonious restraint, child neglect, and domestic violence. He was sentenced to jail time and placed on probation for two years, with conditions that included abstaining from drugs and alcohol and not violating any laws. The State later petitioned to revoke his probation, alleging that he had used controlled substances, been charged with new crimes, and pled guilty to additional offenses.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, held a probation revocation hearing. During the hearing, the defendant indicated he had applied for counsel but had not received a response. The court offered to continue the hearing and provide another application for counsel, especially after the State indicated it would recommend a significant sentence. The defendant, however, repeatedly stated he wished to proceed without counsel, and the court confirmed multiple times that he understood his right to counsel and was waiving it voluntarily. The State withdrew one allegation, and the defendant admitted to the remaining two. The court found he violated probation and resentenced him to five years, with certain sentences to run concurrently and others consecutively.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant argued that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at the revocation hearing. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing in North Dakota arises from a rule of criminal procedure, not the Constitution, and that the district court’s finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended criminal judgment revoking probation and resentencing the defendant. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A prisoner who was serving a sentence for multiple felony offenses believed that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had miscalculated the length of his prison term. Initially, the department determined his sentence to be 11 years, but before his anticipated release, it recalculated the sentence as 13 years. After his original release date passed, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that his maximum sentence had expired and he was being unlawfully held. The trial court found the sentencing entry ambiguous regarding the sentence length, resolved the ambiguity in the prisoner’s favor, and ordered his immediate release.The warden requested a stay of the trial court’s order, which was denied. The warden then appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals and again sought a stay, but the appellate court denied the request due to a procedural deficiency. Without addressing the merits of the appeal, the Ninth District dismissed the case as moot, reasoning that the prisoner’s release and the warden’s failure to secure a stay rendered the appeal moot.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine whether the prisoner’s release rendered the warden’s appeal moot. The court held that the appeal was not moot because, if the warden prevailed, the prisoner could be returned to custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. The court explained that an actual controversy remained, as effective relief could still be granted. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the warden’s appeal. View "Maurent v. Spatny" on Justia Law

Mark French, representing himself, was convicted of a misdemeanor in the Sanders County Justice Court, which is not a court of record. He appealed the conviction to the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. After Judge John W. Larson assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, French moved to disqualify him, citing perceived injustices related to the rescheduling of the trial. When that motion was denied, French filed an alternative motion for substitution of judge under Montana law.The Montana Supreme Court previously denied French’s motion to disqualify Judge Larson, finding the issue moot because the trial date had been vacated. The Supreme Court also clarified that Judge Larson had jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of French’s subsequent motion for substitution. Judge Larson then denied French’s motion for substitution, relying on precedent from D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, which addressed substitution in a different context. French then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for supervisory control, arguing that his substitution motion was timely and authorized, that his right to a jury trial was denied, and that the District Court improperly relied on the Justice Court record.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that, when a criminal case is appealed from a justice court that is not a court of record for a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to one substitution of a district judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, as if the case had originated in district court. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of French’s motion for substitution and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also found that the Justice Court record was properly transferred and relied upon. French’s request for dismissal of the District Court proceeding was denied. View "French v. 20th Judicial District" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent in 2017 and sentenced to 40 years in prison, with 20 years suspended. After an appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the improper admission of statistical evidence and remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial, the defendant was released on bail, returned to work, and cared for his mother. At the second trial, both parties presented expert witnesses who testified about general behaviors of sexual assault victims, but did not opine on the specific facts of the case. The State’s expert, Dr. Vanino, remained in the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony, in violation of a witness exclusion order. The District Court allowed Dr. Vanino to be recalled as a rebuttal witness, and the defense was permitted to recall its own expert in response.After the second conviction, a new psychological evaluation indicated the defendant had made progress in treatment and matured. At resentencing, the defendant requested a sentence consistent with a prior plea offer, while the State sought a harsher sentence. The District Court increased the sentence to 50 years with 30 years suspended, citing the defendant’s decision to appeal, retry the case, lack of remorse, and the impact on the victim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed two main issues. First, it held that the District Court erred in interpreting Montana Rule of Evidence 615 to categorically exempt expert witnesses from exclusion orders, but found the error harmless because both parties’ experts were allowed to rebut each other and neither testified to case-specific facts. Second, the Court held that the increased sentence after retrial violated due process, as it was based on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and not on new, objective information. The Court affirmed the conviction, reversed the increased sentence, and remanded for amendment of the judgment to restore the original suspended term. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Gallatin County, Montana, where his Jeep left the road, struck a sign, and then drove away. Witnesses reported the incident, and law enforcement traced the vehicle to the man’s residence using the license plate information. Upon arrival, officers observed damage to the Jeep and encountered the man, who exhibited signs of impairment such as bloodshot eyes and a dazed demeanor. The man admitted to purchasing and inhaling a can of Dust-Off, a product containing difluoroethane (DFE), and acknowledged that he had passed out while driving. Field sobriety tests indicated impairment, and a subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of DFE.The Gallatin County Justice Court denied the man’s motions to suppress evidence, which alleged a lack of particularized suspicion, unlawful search and seizure, and a Miranda violation. After a bench trial, the court found him guilty of misdemeanor DUI (third offense). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirmed the conviction and the denial of the suppression motions, concluding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion, that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway or the exterior of the Jeep, and that no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had occurred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to investigate for DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, including the crash, the man’s behavior, and his admissions. The Court found no unlawful search or seizure, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched, and the man voluntarily provided the Dust-Off can. The Court also determined that no custodial interrogation occurred before arrest, so Miranda warnings were not required. The Court declined to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim and found sufficient evidence supported the DUI conviction. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Gerardo Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder in Rhode Island for the 2005 killing of Lindsay Ann Burke, with evidence at trial showing a troubled relationship and a violent altercation that ended in Lindsay’s death by stabbing. Martinez’s defense attorney, Mark Smith, obtained a PTSD diagnosis from a forensic psychiatrist but chose not to present this expert testimony at trial. Instead, Smith argued that Martinez lacked premeditation and should be convicted of second-degree murder. The jury found Martinez guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole. On direct appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.Martinez then sought post-conviction relief in the Rhode Island Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for Smith’s decision not to present the PTSD-based diminished capacity defense at trial. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found that Smith’s choices were strategic and not constitutionally deficient, and therefore did not address the issue of prejudice. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied Martinez’s petition for writ of certiorari. Martinez subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which was dismissed, but a certificate of appealability was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the Rhode Island court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The First Circuit held that the state court’s decision was reasonable, emphasizing the strategic nature of Smith’s choices and the deference required under federal habeas review. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s habeas petition, finding no constitutional deficiency in counsel’s performance. View "Martinez v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

The defendant, a long-time drug trafficker, was convicted for conspiring to distribute oxycodone in rural Appalachian communities. His criminal history included two prior drug distribution convictions, and he was previously sentenced as a career offender, resulting in a lengthy prison term, supervised release, and a fine. After a series of unsuccessful post-trial motions and appeals, a change in Sixth Circuit law regarding the definition of a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines made him eligible for resentencing. At resentencing, the defendant presented evidence of rehabilitation and mitigating personal history, and requested a sentence within the recalculated, lower Guidelines range.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky had sentenced the defendant above the Guidelines range, citing his recidivism and lack of remorse. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence. However, after the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Havis, which narrowed the definition of a “controlled substance offense,” the defendant successfully moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, leading to resentencing without the career offender enhancement. At resentencing, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of the new Guidelines range, reduced the term of supervised release, and reimposed the fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, in its consideration of sentencing disparities, or in its treatment of mitigating evidence. The appellate court also found no plain error in the imposition of supervised release conditions. The sentence was affirmed, but the case was remanded to the district court for consideration of a retroactive sentencing amendment (Amendment 821). The request for reassignment to a different judge was denied. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Amanda Mire was charged with driving while intoxicated. She filed two motions in the Circuit Court of Greene County: one to suppress statements she made after emergency medical personnel involuntarily administered a tranquilizing drug, and another to suppress the results of a blood test taken when she was unable to knowingly consent. After a hearing, the circuit court orally ruled in favor of Mire on both motions, finding that her statements and the blood test results should be suppressed due to her inability to knowingly and voluntarily consent while under the influence of the drug.On February 26, 2024, the circuit court entered a docket entry reflecting its ruling, which unequivocally stated that the statements made after administration of the drug and the consent to the blood draw were suppressed. The court scheduled the next setting for the case and invited Mire’s counsel to provide a written order consistent with the oral pronouncement. On March 11, the court entered a formal “judgment and order” that repeated the substance of the February 26 docket entry. The state filed its notice of appeal on March 11, identifying the March 11 order as the one being appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and determined that, under section 547.200.4, the state was required to file its notice of appeal within five days of the entry of the order suppressing evidence. The Court held that the February 26 docket entry constituted the operative order with the substantive effect of suppressing the evidence. Because the state’s notice of appeal was filed more than five days after the February 26 order, the Supreme Court of Missouri dismissed the appeal as untimely. View "State of Missouri vs. Mire" on Justia Law