Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Roberto Adams, a police officer, was convicted of wire fraud and money laundering related to the misuse of a small-business loan he received under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Adams did not testify at his trial, and his counsel requested a jury instruction to not draw any adverse inference from this decision. The district court agreed but inadvertently omitted the instruction. Adams' counsel failed to object until after the jury's verdict, which led to a motion for a new trial.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted Adams' motion for a new trial, finding that the omission of the no-adverse-inference instruction was plain error and prejudicial. The court noted that the government's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence to prove Adams' knowledge and intent, and the jury's split verdict indicated that the case was close. The court concluded that the error likely affected the outcome of the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the omission of the instruction was plain error and that it affected Adams' substantial rights. The court emphasized that the government's case was not overwhelming and relied on inferences from circumstantial evidence. The appellate court also found that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings, warranting a new trial. View "USA v. Adams" on Justia Law

Lauren, a thirteen-year-old girl, alleged that her father, Jobert Molde, sexually assaulted her between January 2011 and January 2012. These allegations surfaced in 2017 after Lauren attempted suicide. Molde was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child under twelve and incest with a child. The key evidence against Molde included Lauren's in-court testimony and a recording of her forensic interview.The Dunn County Circuit Court allowed a nurse practitioner to testify as an expert, but she was unavailable, so Dr. Alice Swenson, a licensed child abuse pediatrician, testified instead. Dr. Swenson supervised Lauren's forensic interview but did not personally evaluate her. During the trial, a juror asked Dr. Swenson about the frequency of false sexual abuse disclosures, to which she responded that false disclosures are extraordinarily rare, around one percent. Molde's counsel did not object to this testimony. The jury found Molde guilty on both counts. Molde then moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to Dr. Swenson's testimony. The circuit court denied the motion.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Dr. Swenson's testimony constituted impermissible vouching and that Molde's attorney was ineffective for not objecting. The state petitioned for review, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted it.The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Swenson's statistical testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule, which prohibits witnesses from vouching for another witness's credibility. The court held that statistical evidence alone about the prevalence of false reporting does not constitute impermissible vouching. Since Dr. Swenson did not opine on Lauren's truthfulness, Molde's counsel was not deficient for failing to object. Therefore, Molde's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, and the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. Molde" on Justia Law

In 2023, police in Des Moines, Iowa, received a tip about suspected narcotics trafficking at a residence. Acting under Iowa Code section 808.16, officers conducted warrantless searches of garbage bags placed curbside for collection. The searches revealed evidence of drug dealing, which was used to obtain a warrant to search the home, leading to further evidence and charges against two occupants, Charles Amble and John Mandracchia. The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that section 808.16 was unconstitutional.The Iowa District Court for Polk County ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring Iowa Code section 808.16 facially unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, as interpreted in State v. Wright. The court suppressed the evidence obtained from the garbage searches and the subsequent home search. The State appealed the decision.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in its ruling. The court held that the specific provision in Iowa Code section 808.16(3), which deems garbage placed outside for collection in a publicly accessible area as abandoned property, is constitutional both facially and as applied in this case. This provision preempts conflicting local ordinances and negates any reasonable expectation of privacy in such garbage. Consequently, the warrantless trash pulls conducted by the police were lawful, and the evidence obtained was admissible.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's suppression ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State of Iowa v. Amble" on Justia Law

Aldrick Scott was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and tampering with physical evidence after he shot and killed his former girlfriend, Cari Allen, in her home, buried her body, and disposed of other evidence. Scott claimed self-defense, stating that Allen had pulled a gun on him during an argument. However, evidence showed Scott had driven from Topeka to Omaha, where Allen lived, and waited outside her house before the incident. Scott's actions after the shooting, including disposing of Allen's body and other evidence, and fleeing to Belize, were also presented at trial.The District Court for Douglas County denied Scott's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his arrest and search by Belizean police, which included his cell phone. Scott argued that his arrest and search violated Belizean law and the extradition treaty between the United States and Belize, and that the evidence should be excluded under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that U.S. law enforcement did not substantially participate in Scott's arrest and search, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the involvement of U.S. law enforcement did not amount to a joint venture with Belizean police, and thus, the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule did not apply. The court also found that any error in admitting the cell phone evidence was harmless, as it was cumulative of Scott's own testimony. Additionally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find Scott guilty of all charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The court affirmed Scott's convictions and sentences. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, Kordell L. Grady was charged with multiple criminal offenses. He accepted a plea deal, pleading no contest to three charges. The dispute arose over whether Grady's due process rights were violated during a restitution hearing, where he was ordered to pay for damages caused to a law enforcement vehicle during the chase. Grady's counsel argued he lacked the ability to pay, and Grady, attending via Zoom, interrupted the proceedings. The court allowed him to speak with his attorney but warned that the conversation could be heard by everyone in the courtroom. Grady's statements undermined his counsel's argument, and the court ordered him to pay the full restitution amount.Grady filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his due process rights were violated because he could not consult confidentially with his counsel, and that the Assistant District Attorney improperly used his statements. The circuit court rejected these arguments, finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation to be confidential. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and deferred to the circuit court's factual finding that Grady did not intend for his conversation with his counsel to be confidential. The Supreme Court held that Grady's due process rights were not violated, as he did not seek a confidential conversation. Consequently, his conversation was not privileged under Wisconsin Statute § 905.03(2). The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "State v. Grady" on Justia Law

Mercedes B. Clark was stopped by Officer Ricky Robinson for speeding and driving on the wrong side of the road. During the stop, Officer Robinson smelled burnt marijuana and conducted a DUI investigation. A search of Clark's vehicle revealed a clutch bag containing a half-smoked marijuana joint, multicolored pills, and items with Clark's name. Clark admitted the bag was hers but claimed a male acquaintance had put his belongings in it, which she thought was marijuana.A Lauderdale County jury found Clark guilty of trafficking eutylone, a Schedule I controlled substance. The trial court sentenced her to ten years without parole. Clark's appellate counsel filed a brief under Lindsey v. State, stating no arguable issues for appeal. Clark filed a pro se supplemental brief raising three issues: the exclusion of her after-arrest interview, improper jury instructions, and a request for parole eligibility for first-time offenders.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that Clark had agreed to the exclusion of her interview with Agent Wilburn, making her argument on this point meritless. The court also determined that the jury instructions were proper, as they required the jury to find that Clark "unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously" possessed the eutylone, which implicitly included the requirement of knowing possession. Lastly, the court noted that it does not have the authority to amend statutes, thus denying Clark's request for parole eligibility.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence, finding no arguable issues warranting relief. View "Clark v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Brandon Duane Wagstaff was convicted by a jury of felony false imprisonment and related offenses stemming from a domestic violence incident. The trial court sentenced him to 16 months in prison. Wagstaff, who is Black, claimed that the trial court violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) during various stages of the proceedings. However, his trial counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA, leading to the forfeiture of these claims on appeal. Wagstaff also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a specific statement made by the trial court at sentencing, but the appellate court found this claim to be without merit.In the lower court, the prosecution charged Wagstaff with five counts, including felony false imprisonment, attempted second-degree robbery, contempt of court, threatening to commit a crime, and battery upon a person in a dating relationship. The jury found him guilty on four counts but acquitted him of attempted robbery. Wagstaff admitted to a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years and four months, including a term from a separate case.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Wagstaff's claims under the RJA were forfeited due to the lack of objections by his trial counsel. The court also concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment as a lesser included offense was not erroneous because there was no substantial evidence to support such an instruction. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no merit in Wagstaff's claims. View "P. v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

In 1996, Daniel Whalen was convicted of first-degree murder during a robbery and received a death sentence. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the California Supreme Court in 2013, and his first state habeas corpus petition was denied in 2014. Whalen filed a second habeas corpus petition in 2016, raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and constitutional challenges to the death penalty. This petition was transferred to the Stanislaus Superior Court, which denied it in 2022, finding the claims were successive and could have been raised earlier.Whalen appealed the denial and requested a certificate of appealability from the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appellate court initially denied the request, but the California Supreme Court directed it to reconsider whether the superior court had properly ruled the petition as successive under Proposition 66 and its implementing statutes. Upon remand, the superior court reaffirmed its decision that the claims were successive and granted a certificate of appealability without specifying the claims.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found the certificate of appealability fatally defective because it did not indicate which claims were substantial, as required by law. The court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the superior court to either deny the certificate of appealability or issue a new one that complies with the statutory requirements. The appellate court also upheld the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d), which limits successive habeas corpus petitions to claims of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death sentence. View "In re Whalen" on Justia Law

In 1996, Jesse Banda Ortega, then 17 years old, was involved in a gang-related shooting in Santa Ana, California, resulting in one death and one injury. Ortega was convicted of one count of murder and three counts of attempted murder, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 17 years, making him eligible for parole after 42 years.Ortega filed a petition for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) in 2023, arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that he should be eligible for relief under equal protection principles. The Superior Court of Orange County denied his petition, stating that Ortega's sentence included a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration, thus it was neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Ortega's sentence, modified by legislative changes requiring youth offender parole hearings, provided a meaningful opportunity for release after 25 years. Therefore, Ortega was not serving a sentence equivalent to LWOP. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Ortega's petition, concluding that his constitutional claim was moot due to the legislative changes ensuring parole eligibility. The court also found that Ortega's equal protection argument was moot, as his current sentence did not violate constitutional principles. View "P. v. Ortega" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for the killing of Carlos Cardona during a robbery. The jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed in furtherance of a robbery and that the defendant personally used and discharged a firearm causing death. The jury returned a death verdict, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to death, with additional firearm enhancements.The defendant appealed, raising several issues. The California Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found no reversible error in the admission of hearsay statements made by the defendant's accomplice, Fabian Perez, to Manuel Rivera, and subsequently relayed by Detective Carrillo. The court also found that the admission of statements by Benjamin Pinela to Jack Duke, although potentially erroneous, was harmless given the other evidence presented. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's leading questions to Pinela violated his confrontation rights, noting that the questions did not purport to be reading a confession and were not devastating to the defense.The court also addressed the defendant's claim that the jury was improperly instructed on felony murder under current law, concluding that any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury's findings on the firearm enhancements necessarily implied that the defendant was the actual killer. The court found no merit in the defendant's argument that the jury was misled by the "equally guilty" language in the accomplice liability instruction, as the jury's verdicts established that the defendant was the actual killer.The court rejected the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and challenges to California's death penalty law. The court affirmed the death judgment but remanded the case to allow the trial court to consider whether to strike the firearm enhancements under the discretion conferred by Senate Bill No. 620. View "P. v. Jasso" on Justia Law