Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was the caretaker for an elderly man, Lawrence Turner, and lived with him in the same trailer. Over a period of about 15 months, the caretaker withdrew a total of $76,880 from Turner’s bank account through 120 transactions, using the money for gambling rather than Turner’s care. Turner’s health deteriorated significantly during this period, culminating in a severe, life-threatening ulcer and signs of neglect when paramedics responded to an emergency. The State charged the caretaker with 15 counts each of elder exploitation and theft, corresponding to each month of the alleged criminal activity, and one count of elder neglect.The case was first reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, where the State aggregated the theft and exploitation charges monthly. At trial, the jury convicted the caretaker on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term. The appellant timely appealed, raising several issues, including whether multiple counts for elder exploitation and theft were proper under Nevada law, whether jury instructions for elder neglect were accurate, and whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada addressed these issues on appeal. It held that, under its recent decision in Smith v. State, the unit of prosecution for elder exploitation is one count per victim, and thus vacated 14 of the 15 elder exploitation convictions. With respect to theft, the court interpreted Nevada’s aggregation statute to permit only a single count for theft committed pursuant to a single scheme or continuous course of conduct, vacating 14 of the 15 theft convictions. The court found that errors in jury instructions for elder neglect were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of neglect and affirmed that conviction. The court affirmed the remaining elder exploitation and theft convictions and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "ROBINSON VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of the 2008 murder of Nimoy Johnson and related offenses following a complex series of events involving armed kidnapping and robbery. After staying with relatives near Johnson’s home, the defendant was implicated in a burglary of Johnson’s residence. Tensions arose between Johnson and the defendant’s relatives, but matters seemed resolved. About a week later, the defendant was present at Johnson’s home when several women arrived. The defendant, armed and masked, held the women and Johnson at gunpoint, ordered them to be restrained, and later shot Johnson in the head while he was bound, before fleeing in one of the women’s vehicles. The defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, and physical evidence linked him to the crime scene and the murder weapon.At trial in the Circuit Court for Broward County, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, multiple counts of armed kidnapping, and armed robbery. The penalty phase resulted in a seven to five jury recommendation for death. The court found four statutory aggravators and several nonstatutory mitigators, but determined the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced the defendant to death, with additional life sentences on the other counts. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding any errors to be harmless.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief and a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, errors under Hurst v. Florida and related cases, Brady and Giglio violations, and newly discovered evidence. After proceedings including an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied all claims. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this denial, holding that counsel’s performance was not deficient, that there was no prejudice, and that none of the defendant’s legal or constitutional claims merited relief. The court also denied habeas relief on all grounds. View "Wilcox v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to two years in prison. After the conviction, he filed a timely motion for a new trial, arguing that the indictment was defective. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial while still within its plenary power. The State sought to appeal this order, initially filing a notice of appeal signed by the elected District Attorney, but referencing a non-existent order. The State clarified its intent to appeal the actual order granting a new trial and subsequently filed amended notices, one signed by an Assistant District Attorney due to an emergency, and later another signed by the elected District Attorney.The Thirteenth Court of Appeals received several notices and motions related to the State’s appeal. The appellate court granted the State’s motion to retain the appeal and allowed the State to correct the notice. The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the notice of appeal was defective because it was not signed by the elected District Attorney as required by statute. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded with the State’s appeal.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed whether the Thirteenth Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction due to the signature defect and whether it properly denied the motion to dismiss. The Court held that the appellate jurisdiction was properly invoked from the initial timely notice of appeal signed by the District Attorney, and that subsequent amendments, including those signed by an Assistant District Attorney with proper authorization, did not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the Thirteenth Court of Appeals had jurisdiction throughout and did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. LAMBERT" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple violations involving domestic violence protection orders, stalking, and criminal impersonation. During trial, after the State presented significant evidence, the defendant chose to waive his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to all counts, also admitting to facts supporting an aggravating factor. Before entering his guilty plea, the defendant had attempted to represent himself but ultimately decided against it after conferring with his attorney. The trial court conducted a full plea colloquy and found the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.At sentencing, the defendant informed the court he wished to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. His appointed attorney characterized the motion as a collateral attack and declined to argue it, so the trial court permitted the defendant to present the motion himself. The trial judge denied the motion, determining it lacked merit under the applicable standard for withdrawal before judgment. No new counsel was appointed. The court then sentenced the defendant. The Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court was not required to appoint substitute counsel or hold a hearing on the withdrawal motion if it found the defendant’s claims lacked merit.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the defendant was completely denied counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution—specifically, during his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The court held that, because the defendant’s counsel remained appointed and available, and there was no actual conflict of interest or deprivation of counsel, there was not a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Korsakas" on Justia Law

An individual was charged with a felony offense in Cook County, Illinois, and as a result, the Illinois State Police suspended his Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card under state and federal law. After the felony charge was dismissed, he successfully appealed to the Illinois State Police for reinstatement of his FOID card. However, before the administrative process concluded, he filed a lawsuit in the circuit court of Randolph County, alleging his constitutional rights were violated by the suspension of his FOID card and seeking its reinstatement, as well as a broad injunction preventing future suspensions based solely on criminal charges.After the plaintiff’s FOID card was reinstated, the defendant argued that the case was moot. Nevertheless, the circuit court denied summary judgment on that ground, invoking the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The court then ruled that section 8(n) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act was facially unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized suspension or revocation of FOID cards for individuals charged, but not convicted, of felonies. The court issued declaratory and injunctive relief affecting all similarly situated individuals, not just the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case on direct appeal, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and remanded with directions to dismiss the action. The Supreme Court held that the case was moot because the plaintiff’s FOID card had already been reinstated and no established exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Court further held that the trial court erred by granting relief beyond the plaintiff’s as-applied claim, improperly expanding the case into a facial constitutional challenge and issuing remedies for nonparties. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion on the underlying constitutional issues. View "Bright v. Yenchko" on Justia Law

A woman disappeared from her workplace in Alton, Illinois in 2010, and her body was not discovered. Eight years later, the defendant was charged with her murder after new information came to light, including testimony from his son, who received immunity and described in detail how the killing and concealment took place. Physical evidence included fingerprint matches to the defendant on the victim’s truck, a firearm linked to the crime scene, and bone fragments found on the defendant’s property, though DNA evidence was inconclusive. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, and he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.On direct appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The defendant then filed a postconviction petition in the Circuit Court of Jersey County, raising seven claims of ineffective assistance based largely on evidence and affidavits not in the trial record. The circuit court dismissed the petition at the second stage, finding most claims forfeited because they could have been raised on direct appeal and rejecting the remaining claims on the merits. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed, holding all claims were forfeited and, alternatively, that none demonstrated a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case. It held that the appellate court erred in finding the postconviction claims forfeited, as they relied on facts outside the original appellate record. Nevertheless, the court concluded all seven claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel failed on their merits under the Strickland v. Washington standard, as the defendant could not show deficient performance or prejudice. The court also found no unreasonable assistance by postconviction counsel. The judgment dismissing the postconviction petition was affirmed. View "People v. Carroll" on Justia Law

A man was charged with multiple firearm-related offenses after a traffic stop, during which police discovered a loaded firearm in a vehicle where he was a passenger. The charges included aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), possession of a firearm without a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF). The defendant successfully moved to sever the UPWF count from the others to avoid jury prejudice. The State elected to proceed first on the UPWF count, and at trial, the parties stipulated that the defendant was a felon; the only contested issue was whether he possessed the firearm. The jury acquitted him on the UPWF charge.Following his acquittal, the defendant moved to dismiss the remaining counts, arguing that the jury’s finding on possession precluded further prosecution on those charges. The Circuit Court of Kane County dismissed the FOID count but denied the motion as to the AUUW count, reasoning that carrying a firearm (as required for AUUW) was not identical to possessing a firearm (as required for UPWF). Both parties appealed. The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the FOID count and, in a published opinion, reversed the circuit court’s denial regarding the AUUW count, holding that issue preclusion barred prosecution of the AUUW count because the possession issue had already been decided in the defendant’s favor.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the State’s appeal. The court held that Illinois common law and statutory law, specifically section 3-4(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012, provide broader issue preclusion protections than the federal double jeopardy clause, and that the defendant’s motion to sever did not waive his right to assert issue preclusion. The court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, barring further prosecution on the AUUW count. View "People v. Collins" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was tried for attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and second-degree assault related to an incident in which the victim was struck multiple times with a metal object, resulting in serious injuries. The first trial ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. At the second trial, a key witness who had previously testified did not appear, and the State introduced the transcript of this witness’s prior testimony. The defendant’s attorney agreed to the admission of the transcript, and the trial proceeded without the witness’s live testimony.Following conviction and sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. He argued that the district court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by admitting the prior testimony without securing a personal, on-the-record waiver of the confrontation right from him, as opposed to a waiver by his attorney. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that any error was not plain because there was no binding authority requiring a defendant’s personal waiver of the confrontation right under these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not plainly err by admitting the prior testimony without obtaining a personal waiver from the defendant. The court explained that there is no clear or binding legal authority holding that a defendant must personally waive the confrontation right, as opposed to allowing counsel to do so. Because any error by the district court was not “plain” under existing law, the court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Minnesota thus concluded that, on plain-error review, a district court does not plainly err by accepting counsel’s waiver of the confrontation right for the admission of prior testimony when no binding precedent requires a personal waiver from the defendant. View "State of Minnesota vs. Nelson" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to possessing a firearm as a prohibited person and received a sentence of forty-one months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Conditions of supervised release included prohibitions on committing new crimes, unlawful drug use, and failing to participate in substance abuse treatment. After beginning supervised release, the defendant tested positive for marijuana and cocaine on multiple occasions, failed to comply with drug treatment programs, and was observed under the influence of controlled substances. The probation officer filed motions with the district court detailing these violations and requested continued supervision or, later, an arrest warrant.A Magistrate Judge advised the defendant of the violations alleged in the probation officer's motion, appointed counsel, and found probable cause. The case was then referred to a district judge of the District of Puerto Rico, who held a revocation hearing. The defendant did not contest the factual allegations and, through counsel, requested a sentence below the guideline range, citing personal hardships and partial compliance with other conditions. The government did not oppose this request. The district court found the violations to constitute a Grade B violation (more serious due to being punishable by over one year’s imprisonment under Puerto Rico law) and imposed a fourteen-month sentence, overruling the defense's objections regarding the grade of violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the defendant had adequate notice of the basis for the revocation and sentence, particularly the recharacterization of drug use as felony possession. The court held that although there was a lack of notice regarding the Grade B violation, the defendant failed to show prejudice or that his substantial rights were affected, as required under plain error review. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Ortiz-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

A defendant pled guilty to federal bank robbery and faced sentencing in the District of Massachusetts. Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office calculated a guidelines range based on his criminal history and offense level. The government objected, arguing that the defendant should be classified as a "career offender" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines because he had two prior felony convictions it asserted were "crimes of violence": a federal bank robbery and a Massachusetts carjacking. The defendant conceded the federal conviction qualified, but challenged the classification of the Massachusetts carjacking as a crime of violence. Probation ultimately revised its report to apply the enhancement, doubling his guidelines range. The district court agreed with the government, found the carjacking conviction to be a crime of violence, applied the career offender enhancement, and imposed a 120-month sentence. The defendant appealed.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued that the sentencing enhancement was improper because Massachusetts carjacking is not categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The First Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the guidelines de novo and examined whether the state carjacking statute necessarily required the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force. The court rejected the government’s reliance on dicta from a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision, and followed the Supreme Court’s guidance that the meaning of “physical force” in federal law is a federal question.Applying the categorical approach, the First Circuit found that at least one means of committing Massachusetts carjacking—by assault—did not necessarily involve violent force, making the statute broader than the federal definition. The court held that Massachusetts carjacking is not a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender guideline. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pimental" on Justia Law