Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Shana L. Jarmer was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) after failing a breath alcohol test. At the time of the arrest, Jarmer was in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a muddy ditch. Despite her efforts to move the vehicle, it remained stationary due to the muddy conditions. Following her arrest, Jarmer was notified that her driving privileges would be suspended by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 8-1014. Jarmer challenged the suspension, arguing that she was merely attempting to operate the vehicle, not actually operating it, as the vehicle was not moving.The KDR upheld the suspension, finding that Jarmer was operating the vehicle. Jarmer sought judicial review of this decision in Sumner County District Court, which denied her petition, agreeing with the KDR that Jarmer was operating the vehicle since the engine was running, she was behind the wheel, and the tires were spinning. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Jarmer operated the vehicle because she caused it to function or work when she engaged the transmission and pressed the gas pedal.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reversed the decisions of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that to "operate" a vehicle means to "drive" it, which requires motion on the part of the vehicle. The court found that while Jarmer unquestionably attempted to operate the vehicle, her car did not move, despite her best efforts. Therefore, it was factually impossible for Jarmer to "move"—and, under the court's precedent, "operate"—the vehicle. The court concluded that Jarmer's unsuccessful effort to drive her car out of a muddy ditch fails to satisfy K.S.A. 8-1002(a)(2)(A)'s requirement that she was "operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both." The court reversed the suspension of Jarmer's driver's license and remanded the matter to the KDR for further proceedings. View "Jarmer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Jesse McCollaugh was found guilty of child exploitation after his wife discovered videos on his phone of her 15-year-old sister using the bathroom, which McCollaugh had secretly recorded. The videos showed the minor partially nude, unaware she was being filmed. McCollaugh admitted to recording the videos and having a sexual problem. He was charged with one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, to which he pleaded not guilty. After a bench trial, the district court found McCollaugh guilty and sentenced him to a prison term not exceeding two years, and required him to register as a sex offender.Before the Supreme Court of Iowa, McCollaugh appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it failed to establish that the minor had the purpose of engaging in nudity to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of a person who may view the visual depiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with McCollaugh's interpretation of the statute, stating that the relevant "purpose" that the State must prove is identified after the word "purpose" in the definition, not before. The court held that the State must prove the purpose of purchasing or possessing a visual depiction of the nude minor—not the minor’s purpose in being nude. The court found sufficient evidence to prove McCollaugh’s purpose for taking the videos was for his sexual gratification and affirmed his conviction. McCollaugh also argued that the district court relied on an improper factor in its sentencing order, but the Supreme Court found no evidence that the district court relied on the improper factor and affirmed the sentence. View "State v. McCollaugh" on Justia Law

The defendant, Christopher James Wilson, was charged with two counts of indecent exposure after he was seen masturbating in public by two women, E.H. and T.A., at a gas station. Wilson followed the women to another location where he continued his actions. He was subsequently arrested and charged. After a jury trial, he was convicted on both counts and sentenced to an enhanced sentence under Iowa Code section 901A.2(1) to an indeterminate prison term of two years for the first count and an indeterminate prison term of two years for the second count. The sentence for count one was ordered to run consecutively to the sentence for count two.Wilson appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is per exposure, not per viewer. Therefore, he contended that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on two separate counts of indecent exposure. He also argued that the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d).The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is one count per viewer, not one count per exposure. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction on two counts of indecent exposure. The court also found that the district court provided sufficient reasoning for imposing a consecutive sentence. The court noted that the district court's reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences may be the same reasons the court relied on for the imposition of incarceration. The court concluded that the district court's statement that the only appropriate sentence was to send Wilson to prison for as long of a period of time as possible implied that the sentences should run consecutively. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case involves Clayton Curtis Brown, who was convicted of possession of a firearm as a felon, aggravated eluding, and driving while barred. The charges stemmed from an incident where Brown eluded a police officer's attempt to initiate a traffic stop. The officer later found the car abandoned and discovered a loaded handgun under the driver's seat and ammunition in the center console and under the front passenger seat. Brown's personal items were also found in the car.The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed Brown's convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding, concluding there was insufficient evidence to show that Brown knowingly possessed the handgun. Brown also contested the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove his identity as the driver of the car that eluded the officer.The Supreme Court of Iowa disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the State's evidence, including the officer's testimony, the location of the firearm, and the presence of Brown's personal effects in the car, was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Brown had constructive possession of the firearm. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Brown was driving the car when it eluded the officer. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the portion of the court of appeals decision reversing those convictions and affirmed the district court judgment in full. View "State of Iowa v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gail Robinson, who was convicted of heat-of-passion manslaughter for the killing of Bobby Pruitt. The two had a tumultuous relationship, with both having been convicted of domestic violence against each other in the past. On the night of the incident, after a series of altercations, Robinson stabbed Pruitt, who later succumbed to his injuries. Robinson admitted to the stabbing, stating that she was the one who put the knife in Pruitt's chest, not her son who was also present at the scene.Prior to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was heard in the Alcorn County Circuit Court. Robinson was charged with heat-of-passion manslaughter, and the jury was instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter, self-defense, and reasonable use of force. Robinson was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty years, with eight years suspended and twelve years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Robinson's post-trial motion was denied by the trial court.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Robinson challenged her conviction on two grounds. First, she argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer a jury instruction on her right to stand her ground in self-defense. Second, she contended that the State presented insufficient evidence to show she did not act in self-defense. The court affirmed her conviction, stating that the record was not clear enough to address her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The court also found that the State's evidence was sufficient to disprove Robinson's claim of self-defense. The court noted that Robinson continued to attack Pruitt past the point of any reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm, and the jury had rejected her self-defense claim after weighing the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague. View "Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, D.C. Jr., who was charged with murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. Jr., who has an IQ of 66, was 14 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. His counsel requested a competency determination before proceeding to the certification hearing. After an initial finding of incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile court declared D.C. Jr. competent to proceed. However, the court did not explicitly address the conflicting expert testimony regarding D.C. Jr.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel.The juvenile court certified D.C. Jr. for prosecution as an adult. The court's decision was based on the assumption that the competency standards for juvenile court applied, which was a mistake. The court did not adequately support its determination with findings, and it appears to have applied an incorrect standard.The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the certification order and the competency determination. The court held that a juvenile facing the possibility of prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges must meet the adult criminal court standard for competence. The court remanded the case for the juvenile court to reassess D.C. Jr.'s competency using the correct standard. The court emphasized that the stakes were high, and the record did not show that the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C. Jr.'s competency to proceed. The court also vacated the order certifying D.C. Jr. for criminal proceedings as an adult, which followed the competency determination. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

The case involves Ricardo Perez-Delgado, who was sentenced to forty years in prison for his role in a violent robbery that resulted in the death of a businessman. The sentence was significantly higher than the guideline sentencing range (GSR), which had a maximum of thirty years and five months. Perez-Delgado appealed, arguing that the district court did not adequately explain its rationale for imposing a sentence nearly a decade over the top of the GSR.The district court had adopted the probation office's GSR calculation and considered the relevant statutory factors, Perez-Delgado's background, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the arguments of both parties. However, the court's explanation for the upward variance was limited to a single sentence stating that the recommended sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, protect the public from further crimes by Perez-Delgado, or address issues of deterrence and punishment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with Perez-Delgado's argument. The court found that the district court's explanation was insufficient to justify the significant upward variance from the GSR. The court noted that the greater the variance, the greater the explanation must be. The court vacated Perez-Delgado's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to provide an individualized explanation proportional to the length of the variance if it decided to upwardly vary again. View "United States v. Perez-Delgado" on Justia Law

Antonio Davis, who was serving a 210-month prison sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, petitioned the district court for compassionate release due to his elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and a change in the law regarding his career offender status. The district court denied his request, concluding that Davis was not due compassionate release based on his susceptibility to COVID-19 and did not fully consider each of Davis’s arguments.Davis was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in January 2013. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in June of that year. Davis received a career offender enhancement because he had previously been convicted of certain other offenses and because the offense at issue here was a “controlled substance offense” at the time of conviction. In February 2021, Davis filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he was uniquely susceptible to the potential spread of COVID-19 due to his type-2 diabetes and hypertension. He also argued that a recent court decision invalidated his career offender Guidelines designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on the pandemic. However, the court found that the district court did not properly address Davis’s arguments regarding intervening changes in law and rehabilitation. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate relief and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Victor Ramirez, who was pulled over by police officers for traffic violations. Recognizing Ramirez as a gang member from a previous encounter, one of the officers asked him about his parole status. Ramirez confirmed he was on parole for a firearm-related offense. During the stop, the officers discovered a loaded firearm in Ramirez's car. Ramirez was subsequently indicted for possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon.Ramirez moved to suppress the gun and ammunition, arguing that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop by asking about his parole status, which he claimed was unrelated to the traffic stop. The district court denied Ramirez's motion to suppress, and Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that asking about parole status during a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment as it reasonably relates to the officer's safety and imposes a negligible burden. The court also remanded the case in part so that the district court could correct the written judgment to conform it to the oral pronouncement of sentence. View "United States V. Ramirez" on Justia Law