Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of forcible rape against two victims on separate occasions, one of whom was 16 years old, and unlawful sexual intercourse with another 16-year-old minor. The offenses involved aggravated circumstances, including kidnapping, physical violence, and prior conviction for a similar offense. The evidence included DNA matching and testimony regarding the assaults, which involved threats, use of force, and infliction of injuries on the victims.After trial in the Superior Court of San Diego County, the jury made several true findings on special circumstances, including aggravated kidnapping, prior convictions, and multiple victims, under California's One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole for one rape count, 50 years to life for the other, and additional determinate terms for robbery and unlawful sexual intercourse. The court also imposed and stayed alternative sentences based on unused One Strike law circumstances and the Habitual Sexual Offender law.On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, the defendant challenged certain aspects of the sentencing, including alleged dual use of facts and the imposition of stayed terms under alternative sentencing schemes. The appellate court rejected the claim of impermissible dual use of facts in imposing the upper term for robbery. However, it held that imposing and staying sentences under both the One Strike law and the Habitual Sexual Offender law was unauthorized, given that these are alternative sentencing schemes, and only one may be used per qualifying count. Similarly, the court struck the additional stayed sentences based on unused One Strike circumstances, concluding the statute authorizes only one One Strike sentence per count. The judgment was affirmed as modified, with the unauthorized stayed sentences ordered stricken. View "P. v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, observed activity consistent with drug transactions in the parking lot of Jim’s Foods, a location known for narcotics activity. Officers saw a man leave a nearby house, interact with vehicles, and enter the back seat of a Chevrolet Cruze, with Antonio Clarence Robertson in the front seat. After further observation, including witnessing a hand-to-hand transaction, officers noticed the Chevy leave its parking spot and exit the lot without coming to a complete stop before entering the roadway. The officers initiated a traffic stop for violation of Iowa Code § 321.353, which requires vehicles emerging from private driveways to stop before entering public roads. A search, conducted with the driver’s consent, uncovered prescription pills and marijuana on Robertson, leading to his charge for possession with intent to distribute.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa heard Robertson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, which he argued was unlawful because the parking lot did not qualify as a “private driveway” under Iowa law. The district court found the officers’ testimony credible regarding the private nature of the lot and concluded the stop was lawful. Robertson pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe a traffic violation occurred, as the lot was not open to the public as a matter of right and thus was a “private driveway” within the meaning of Iowa law. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the conviction. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Two men approached a van in a Denny’s parking lot in Los Angeles in the early morning hours of December 19, 1981. One of the men, holding a gun, demanded valuables from the occupants, Toney Lewis and Carolyn Spence. After robbing them, the gunman shot Lewis, who died from the wound. At trial, there was conflicting eyewitness identification as to whether the defendant or his brother was the shooter. An accomplice, who testified in exchange for a plea deal, stated that the defendant was the gunman and shot Lewis. Other witnesses recounted statements by the defendant suggesting his brother was not the killer and that he was the one who shot Lewis.The defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County of murder, robbery, and attempted robbery, with the jury finding true that a principal was armed with a firearm but not true that the defendant personally used a firearm or that the robbery special circumstance (which, as instructed, required the defendant to have personally killed the victim) applied. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. Subsequently, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly 1170.95), which provides relief for certain felony-murder convictions. The resentencing court initially denied relief, finding the defendant aided and abetted the murder. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, instructing reconsideration under the theories that the defendant was either the actual killer or a major participant acting with reckless indifference.In the most recent proceeding, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the jury’s not-true findings on the firearm enhancement and special circumstance did not preclude the resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer. The court found substantial evidence supported that finding and affirmed the denial of resentencing. View "People v. Player" on Justia Law

In 2016, law enforcement officers were tasked with apprehending an individual, Jamarion Robinson, who had several outstanding felony warrants. The officers, including two federal task force members, located Robinson at an apartment and conducted a raid that resulted in his death. Five years after the incident, a state grand jury in Georgia indicted these officers on charges including felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, making a false statement, and violation of oath by a public officer. The officers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, arguing they were entitled to a federal forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 as federal officers.After removal, the State of Georgia sought to have the case remanded to state court, but the district court denied the motion. Later, the State requested a “limited remand” to return to state court solely to seek a superseding indictment that would modify the charges. The district court denied this request, concluding it lacked statutory authority for such a remand and noting the State had alternative means for pursuing additional charges. The court also found the State’s request untimely and speculative regarding necessity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to consider the district court’s denial of the “limited remand.” The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the order was not final and did not qualify under the collateral order doctrine or as an appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The court reasoned that federal law did not prohibit the State from seeking a superseding indictment in state court, and the district court’s order did not prevent the State from doing so. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Georgia v. Heinze" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers found six grams of heroin and 453 grams of methamphetamine in Edgar Mejia’s car outside a casino, Mejia informed them he also owned a trailer. Upon searching the trailer, officers discovered a hidden compartment containing two firearms and 541 grams of heroin. Mejia attempted to have Gregory Johnson, his alleged co-conspirator, remove the drugs and guns before police could find them, but Johnson was unsuccessful. Recorded jailhouse calls captured Mejia instructing Johnson on accessing the compartment and discussing the contents and their value. Mejia faced four federal charges, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was tried and convicted by a jury on conspiracy to distribute heroin and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced Mejia to 322 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including work or community service requirements. Mejia appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his conspiracy conviction and two aspects of his sentencing: the inclusion of an expunged marijuana conviction in his criminal history calculation and the community service condition of his supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, as the jailhouse calls and circumstances supported a reasonable inference that Mejia and at least one other person agreed to distribute heroin. The court also concluded that any error in counting the expunged conviction was harmless because the district court made clear that the sentence would be the same regardless. The appellate court dismissed Mejia’s challenge to the community service condition as unripe, since it would not take effect for decades and was contingent on future events. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Mejia" on Justia Law

A man was charged after selling pills to an individual who died from a fentanyl overdose. The evidence showed the victim ingested part of a counterfeit oxycodone pill that tested positive for fentanyl, and another similar pill was found nearby. The defendant admitted to buying pills in Denver and selling two pills to the victim the night before his death, but did not admit knowing the pills contained fentanyl. He was charged with involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. The defendant initially had a public defender but retained private counsel under a fee agreement that limited representation to plea negotiations unless further fees were paid.At the preliminary hearing in circuit court, the State presented evidence to establish probable cause, and the court found sufficient evidence for the case to proceed to district court. The defendant pleaded not guilty, then later entered an Alford plea to involuntary manslaughter in district court as part of a plea agreement, with the conspiracy charge dismissed. He was sentenced to 15 to 20 years. He then moved to withdraw his plea, arguing his counsel was ineffective due to the limited scope of representation, failure to challenge the elements of manslaughter, not discussing the preclusive effect of an Alford plea, not filing dispositive motions, and not advising him about the option for a public defender.The District Court of Park County denied the motion after a hearing, finding that counsel’s performance was not deficient and the defendant was adequately advised of his rights, including his right to a public defender. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion and applied the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion; trial counsel was not ineffective, and the plea was knowing and voluntary. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Fuentes v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

While the appellant was serving probation for a felony theft conviction in Crook County, Wyoming, he was charged with and pled guilty to another felony theft in Campbell County. As part of the plea agreement in Campbell County, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that the sentence for the Campbell County conviction run concurrently with the sentence from the Crook County case. After sentencing in Campbell County, the Crook County Attorney filed a petition to revoke the appellant’s probation based on the new offense. At the Crook County dispositional hearing, the prosecutor did not recommend a concurrent sentence or advocate for credit for time served in Campbell County. The district court revoked probation and imposed the original Crook County sentence, granting only credit for time previously served in Crook County.After his conviction in Crook County, the appellant filed a motion for sentence reduction, which the district court granted in part by reducing the minimum sentence but not the maximum. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, arguing that the Crook County Attorney was bound by the Campbell County plea agreement to recommend a concurrent sentence and that not doing so breached the agreement.The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a prosecutor in one county cannot bind a prosecutor in another county to a plea agreement without that prosecutor’s consent or authorization. The Court found that the Campbell County Attorney did not have actual or implied authority to bind the Crook County Attorney to any sentencing recommendation. As a result, the Crook County Attorney was not a party to the Campbell County plea agreement and could not have breached it. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Wells v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The case concerns a daycare provider who was charged with child abuse and operating a childcare facility without a license after allegations arose regarding inappropriate conduct by her teenage son toward children in her care. During the investigation, the provider voluntarily gave a recorded interview to police. Before trial, the county court suppressed part of the interview video, finding a Miranda violation during the latter portion of questioning. The prosecution appealed this suppression order under the applicable procedure and the district court reversed, holding there was no Miranda violation.After remand, as trial approached, the prosecution sought to introduce the entire interview video. The county court excluded portions of the video, not on constitutional grounds but as inadmissible under the Colorado Rules of Evidence due to concerns about relevance, prejudice, and cumulativeness. The prosecution attempted another pretrial interlocutory appeal, claiming the evidentiary ruling was a suppression of evidence. The district court dismissed this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling the order was strictly evidentiary, not a suppression ruling as required for an interlocutory appeal.After being convicted at trial, the defendant argued on appeal to the district court that her statutory speedy trial right was violated because the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal was not a proper interlocutory appeal and did not toll the statutory speedy trial deadline. The district court affirmed, finding the prosecution acted in good faith and their appeal had arguable merit.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the prosecution’s second pretrial appeal lacked arguable merit as an interlocutory appeal because it challenged an evidentiary ruling, not a suppression of evidence in the constitutional sense. Therefore, the speedy trial deadline was not tolled, and the defendant’s statutory right was violated. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice. View "Phillips v. People" on Justia Law

The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Goklu" on Justia Law