Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence investigation report determined that the defendant’s offense level was increased due to two prior Louisiana felony convictions: aggravated battery and distribution of cocaine. The report also applied enhancements for a stolen firearm and use of the firearm in connection with another felony. The defendant objected to these enhancements and the classification of his prior aggravated battery conviction as a “crime of violence.” The district court overruled the objections, adopted the report’s findings, and sentenced the defendant to 120 months in prison, the statutory maximum.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, and that the district court erred in treating his prior aggravated battery conviction as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. The defendant had not raised these arguments in the district court, so the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.The Fifth Circuit held that, under existing precedent, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) does not constitute plain error, and there has been no development in the law to suggest otherwise. Regarding the sentencing enhancement, the court found that the defendant failed to show a “realistic probability” that Louisiana courts would uphold an aggravated battery conviction based on reckless or negligent conduct, as required to demonstrate clear or obvious error under the categorical approach. The court concluded that neither the conviction nor the sentence was reversible under plain error review and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v. Sereal" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

Marquis Smalls pleaded guilty in 2013 to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to 110 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. His supervised release was conditioned on compliance with certain terms, including not committing new crimes or illegally possessing controlled substances. After his release in December 2020, Smalls repeatedly violated these conditions, resulting in multiple periods of home detention. In June 2024, he was arrested by state officials on heroin-trafficking charges, and the United States Probation Office charged him with eight violations of supervised release, successfully petitioning for a federal arrest warrant. Upon release from state custody, Smalls was transferred to federal custody and presented before the District Court for an initial appearance, where he was ordered detained pending a final revocation hearing. Smalls waived his right to a preliminary hearing.Smalls later moved for release from custody, citing a district court opinion from the District of Connecticut in United States v. Mercado, which held that no statute authorized pre-revocation detention for supervised release violations. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Smalls’s motion, finding it had authority to detain him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1), based on flight risk and danger to the community. Smalls appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which denied his motion for release in a summary order. Smalls then filed a petition for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the petition for rehearing to provide a precedential explanation but again denied Smalls’s motion for release. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) authorizes detention of a defendant alleged to have violated supervised release pending revocation proceedings, as such detention is part of the execution of the original sentence. The court affirmed the District Court’s authority to detain Smalls pending his final revocation hearing. View "USA v. Smalls" on Justia Law

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal car accident that occurred in February 2017 on a state highway within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation in Oklahoma. Lloyd Ray Hatley, while driving slightly above the speed limit, glanced at a vehicle parked on the shoulder. When he looked back, he saw another car, driven by Gay Ott and carrying Mary Nappa, had swerved into his lane and was braking. Hatley was unable to stop in time and collided with the car, resulting in Nappa’s death. Emergency responders extricated the passengers, but Nappa was pronounced dead at the scene. Hatley was not injured. Data from the vehicles indicated the Pontiac attempted an illegal left turn and Hatley was accelerating before braking sharply to avoid the collision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Hatley on four counts related to the accident, including involuntary manslaughter in Indian country. The government sought to prove Hatley’s Indian status—an essential element for federal jurisdiction—using a tribal verification letter and testimony from Derrick Vann, a Cherokee Nation records custodian. Hatley objected to the admissibility of this evidence, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The district court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Hatley of involuntary manslaughter under Count 4, acquitting him on other counts. Hatley was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the government was required to prove Hatley’s Indian status at the time of the offense. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the tribal verification letter and Vann’s testimony, as neither was properly authenticated nor admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because no other competent evidence established Hatley’s Indian status at the relevant time, the error was not harmless. The Tenth Circuit reversed Hatley’s conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant was convicted by a jury in Hennepin County District Court of first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder for the shooting death of Lavelle Jackson. The conviction was based in part on testimony from a jailhouse witness, S.P., who claimed the appellant confessed to the crime. After sentencing, the appellant sought postconviction relief, arguing that newly discovered evidence—specifically, testimony from Dequarn Bell, another inmate—would have undermined S.P.’s credibility and potentially changed the outcome of the trial.Following a stay of the direct appeal, the appellant petitioned for postconviction relief in the Hennepin County District Court, presenting affidavits and testimony from Bell and his trial attorney. Bell’s testimony suggested that S.P. was motivated by self-interest and that the appellant had maintained his innocence. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition, finding Bell’s testimony not credible. In making this determination, the district court relied on detailed information about Bell’s criminal history, including facts not presented by either party at the hearing. These extra-record facts were obtained through the judge’s own independent investigation.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the denial of postconviction relief. The court held that the district court’s deliberate investigation and consideration of facts outside the record violated the appellant’s constitutional right to an impartial judge under the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. This violation constituted structural error, requiring automatic reversal without a harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of postconviction relief in part and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing before an impartial judge. View "State of Minnesota vs. Duol" on Justia Law

On July 30, 2020, two individuals, Michael Harbour and Nicole Hatten, were shot and killed in the parking lot of a hotel in Omaha, Nebraska. John L. Parks, Sr., was seen on surveillance video with the victims shortly before the shootings. A subsequent search of Parks’ hotel room uncovered a firearm and cocaine. Parks was charged with two counts of first degree murder and several related felonies. Initially represented by appointed counsel, Parks’ case involved multiple pretrial motions, including several continuances and motions to depose witnesses, some of which Parks later claimed were made without his knowledge or consent. Parks also sought personal access to discovery materials while incarcerated, which was denied.The District Court for Douglas County granted the continuances, finding that Parks’ counsel had confirmed Parks’ understanding and consent to tolling his speedy trial rights. Parks later retained new counsel, who also filed pretrial motions and requested further continuances. On the eve of trial, Parks moved for absolute discharge, arguing that his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated because delays from his counsel’s motions should not be attributed to him. The district court denied the motion, attributing the delays to Parks and finding no violation of his rights. Parks appealed, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the delays were properly excluded and that Parks’ claims regarding his statutory speedy trial rights were without merit. The court also found it lacked jurisdiction to consider his constitutional speedy trial claims on interlocutory appeal.On further appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that Parks’ statutory speedy trial claims were foreclosed by the law-of-the-case doctrine, as they had been conclusively resolved in the prior appeal. The Court further held that Parks had permanently waived his statutory speedy trial rights by seeking discharge and pursuing an interlocutory appeal, which resulted in a trial date outside the statutory period. The Court also found no violation of Parks’ constitutional speedy trial rights, as the delays were attributable to defense motions and not to the State or the court. The denial of Parks’ motions for personal access to discovery and for a mistrial were upheld, and his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed Parks’ convictions. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

The case concerns an altercation in an apartment between Sapireya Smith and Denise Neely. Smith, her boyfriend, and her brother shared the apartment, and Neely, who was married to Smith’s brother, entered to help him collect his belongings. A verbal argument between Smith and Neely escalated, culminating in Smith striking Neely in the head with a frying pan. Neely sustained significant injuries, including a fractured orbital bone and a deep laceration, requiring medical treatment and surgery. Smith admitted to throwing the pan but denied beating Neely with it, while another witness, Smith’s boyfriend, claimed not to have seen the fight’s initiation.The Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County conducted a jury trial, during which two of Neely’s treating physicians testified as lay witnesses about Neely’s injuries and treatment. Smith did not object to their testimony at trial. The jury found Smith guilty of aggravated assault, and she was sentenced to ten years in prison. Smith appealed, arguing that the physicians’ testimony constituted improper expert opinion and that her counsel was ineffective for failing to object.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It found that while some of the treating nurse practitioner’s testimony about potential future complications from Neely’s injuries exceeded the permissible scope of lay opinion, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of aggravated assault. The court also held that the radiologist’s testimony was permissible as lay opinion based on his direct observations and medical records. Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court determined that the failure to object did not amount to constitutional ineffectiveness, as the decisions fell within trial strategy and did not prejudice Smith’s defense. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Smith’s conviction. View "Smith v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Federal agents began investigating an individual due to his connections with a known drug dealer. Over several months, agents conducted multiple controlled purchases of fentanyl and cocaine from him, using an undercover officer. During the final controlled buy, agents tracked the individual’s cell phone to a specific residence, observed him leave that house, conduct the drug sale, and return immediately afterward. Based on these observations, agents obtained a search warrant for the residence, where they found large quantities of drugs, cash, firearms, and drug paraphernalia. The individual and his aunt were present during the search.A grand jury indicted the individual on multiple drug and firearm charges. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the suppression motion. The defendant then pleaded guilty to several counts but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for drug distribution, resulting in a 106-month prison sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, relying on precedent that observing a suspect leave a residence, conduct a drug sale, and return provides a sufficient nexus to justify a search. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancement, finding no clear error in the district court’s determination that the defendant exercised de facto control over the premises, given the evidence found and his admitted possession of the contraband. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in all respects. View "United States v. Florence" on Justia Law

Ricardo Sarabia was involved in a shooting incident on December 23, 2016, where he shot three people: brothers German and Ramon Servin, and Domenica Romero. The altercation began over Sarabia’s missing phone, car keys, and gun. After a heated exchange, Sarabia shot Ramon through a bathroom door, then shot German multiple times, and finally shot Romero as she hid in a closet. German died at the scene, Ramon survived after medical intervention, and Romero also survived. Both Ramon and Romero identified Sarabia, known as “Clover,” as the shooter. Sarabia was later arrested in Arizona, where police recovered evidence from his phone and residence.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over Sarabia’s trial. During the proceedings, the court excluded gang evidence and instructed witnesses to avoid related terminology. Sarabia’s motions for mistrial, based on a witness’s use of the word “moniker,” and to exclude certain evidence, were denied. The court also denied his midtrial requests to substitute counsel and to represent himself, finding them untimely and not knowing. The court admitted prior testimony from Ramon, who asserted his Fifth Amendment right, and allowed impeachment of Romero with her prior inconsistent statements. The jury convicted Sarabia of first degree murder, two counts of attempted murder, dissuading a witness, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, with firearm enhancements. He was sentenced to 90 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of mistrial, refusal to give a heat of passion instruction, or in denying Sarabia’s Marsden and Faretta motions. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the convictions and enhancements. The case was remanded solely to correct the abstract of judgment regarding the sentence and custody credits. View "People v. Sarabia" on Justia Law