Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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Casa Express Corp. obtained a $40 million judgment in the Southern District of New York against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for unpaid bonds and a global note. After Venezuela failed to pay, Casa sought to enforce the judgment in Florida by targeting eight Miami properties owned by corporate entities allegedly controlled by Raul Gorrin Belisario. Casa claimed that Gorrin, through a bribery and currency-exchange scheme involving Venezuelan officials, used misappropriated Venezuelan funds to purchase these properties, and argued that the properties should be subject to a constructive trust in favor of Venezuela.Casa registered the New York judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and initiated supplementary proceedings under Florida law, seeking to execute the judgment against the properties. Casa impleaded Gorrin, several individuals, and six corporate entities as third-party defendants. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing, among other things, that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s claims. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of ancillary jurisdiction, and the district court adopted this recommendation, also finding a lack of personal jurisdiction over Gorrin. Casa appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s supplementary proceedings. The court reasoned that Casa’s action sought to impose liability on third parties not previously found liable for the New York judgment and was based on new facts and legal theories unrelated to the original breach of contract claims against Venezuela. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional ruling, vacated its alternative merits rulings, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Casa Express Corp v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

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Over several months, the defendant participated in four carjackings targeting Lyft drivers in Detroit. In each incident, two assailants, including the defendant, brandished firearms, demanded money and property, and forced the victims to remove their clothing before fleeing in the stolen vehicles. One victim was pistol-whipped and sustained bodily injury. Extensive evidence, including phone records, cell site data, and identification by a victim, linked the defendant to each carjacking. A search of his residence uncovered multiple firearms and stolen vehicles. The defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of carjacking, aiding and abetting, admitting involvement but attempting to minimize his role in some attacks.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan prepared a presentence report recommending several offense level enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, including increases for brandishing and using firearms and for causing bodily injury. The defendant objected, arguing for a mitigating role reduction based on his claimed minor participation. The district court rejected his arguments, found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a principal in each carjacking, and applied all recommended enhancements. The court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 180 months, citing the severity and humiliating nature of the crimes, the defendant’s prior criminal history, and his lack of respect for the law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings or in applying the offense level enhancements, nor did it plainly err in denying a mitigating role reduction or in considering the defendant’s age and rehabilitation potential. The appellate court found the upward variance substantively reasonable, given the egregious nature of the offenses and the impact on the victims. The sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. Haile" on Justia Law

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In this case, police in Denver were investigating a shooting that occurred early in the morning. They identified a suspect described as a light-skinned Black male with a bald head, thick beard, and muscular build, and circulated a photo of him. Later that day, officers surveilled a vehicle believed to be connected to the suspect. When a group, including a Black male with some similar clothing but not matching the suspect’s physical description, arrived in a different car and then left in a third vehicle, officers decided to stop that vehicle at a gas station. During the stop, officers detained Noah Huerta, a passenger, and conducted a patdown, finding a firearm magazine on him. A subsequent search of the vehicle, after obtaining the driver’s consent, revealed a handgun near Huerta’s seat.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Huerta’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous, and also ruled that the firearm would have been inevitably discovered. The court also denied Huerta’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under recent Supreme Court precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Huerta was armed and dangerous, as the connection between the group and the shooting suspect was tenuous and based on a mere hunch, and the conduct of the vehicle’s occupants was innocuous. The court also found that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment, as binding circuit precedent foreclosed Huerta’s constitutional challenge. The court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Huerta" on Justia Law

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Darrell Sanders was arrested after two separate incidents in Kirkwood, Missouri, where he approached two minor girls, C.B. and P.H., near an elementary school. Sanders circled the school in his minivan, asked C.B. to see her feet, and invited P.H. to his van, making a suggestive statement. Upon arrest, Sanders admitted to having sexual thoughts about children, acknowledged his interactions with the girls made him feel excited and scared, and confessed to possessing and viewing child pornography on the same day as the incidents. A search of his devices revealed multiple images and videos of child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri accepted Sanders’s guilty plea to receipt and possession of child pornography. At sentencing, the court applied a five-level increase under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, based on Sanders’s conduct with C.B. and P.H. The court determined an advisory guideline range of 121 to 151 months and sentenced Sanders to 132 months’ imprisonment. Sanders objected to the application of the enhancement and to certain factual statements in the presentence report, but the district court overruled his objections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the guidelines de novo. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Sanders’s conduct constituted attempted enticement of a minor under Missouri law, supporting the five-level enhancement. The court also found that any factual error in the presentence report was harmless and did not affect the outcome. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

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A man was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and armed assault with intent to murder, following a shooting outside a residence in Boston. Surveillance footage and cell phone records linked him to the scene, and police later recovered clothing matching that worn by the shooter from an apartment where he was staying. The defendant was arrested about a week after the incident. The police obtained a search warrant for the apartment, and the search yielded evidence used at trial.In the Superior Court, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the apartment, arguing that the search warrant was tainted by a statement he made to police that was later suppressed, and that the warrant affidavit omitted material information. The judge denied both the motion to suppress and the request for a Franks hearing. During jury selection, the judge allowed the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike against a Black juror after finding the prosecutor’s reason was race-neutral and genuine, and excused another juror for cause based on her views about police credibility, which the defendant challenged. The judge also excused two jurors who could not serve due to a religious holiday. At trial, the judge permitted a police officer familiar with the defendant to identify him in surveillance footage, and denied a motion for mistrial after a dispute over the officer’s testimony about prior encounters with the defendant.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. It held that the search warrant was valid under the independent source doctrine and that the affidavit established probable cause without the suppressed statement. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the jury selection rulings or in admitting the identification testimony. The Court affirmed the convictions for murder, aggravated assault and battery, and armed assault with intent to murder, but vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and remanded for further proceedings on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Almeida" on Justia Law

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The petitioner was charged with several felonies stemming from an incident in July 2024, including assault with a weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted person, and tampering with evidence. He was arraigned on these charges in July 2024 and did not seek to substitute the presiding judge at that time. In June 2025, the State filed an Amended Information adding three new felony counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, and the petitioner was arraigned again on these new charges. Within two days of this second arraignment, the petitioner moved to substitute the judge, arguing that the motion was timely because it was filed within ten days of the arraignment on the Amended Information.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, denied the motion, holding it was untimely because the ten-day period for substitution under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, began with the initial arraignment in July 2024, not the subsequent arraignment on the amended charges. The court reasoned that allowing substitution after any arraignment on amended charges could lead to manipulation of the process and disrupt judicial efficiency.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on a petition for writ of supervisory control. The Court held that the right to substitute a judge in a criminal case under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, is triggered by the initial arraignment, not by subsequent arraignments on amended informations, even if new charges are added. The Court concluded that the District Court did not err in denying the motion as untimely and denied the petition for writ of supervisory control, remanding the matter for further proceedings. View "Caye v. 20th Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The case concerns an incident between Taylor Jean Carlson and her ex-boyfriend, Shane Dalke, following a wedding they both attended. After a series of arguments and confrontations at Dalke’s home, Carlson physically assaulted Dalke and attempted to take his phone, which he was using to record her behavior. During the struggle, the phone was dropped, and Carlson picked it up, unsuccessfully tried to access it, and then destroyed it by throwing it on the concrete multiple times, rendering it inoperable. Police were unable to recover any data from the phone due to the damage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over Carlson’s trial. She was charged with misdemeanor Partner Family Member Assault and felony Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence. At trial, Carlson’s attorney requested a jury instruction for the misdemeanor offense of Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device as a lesser included offense of the tampering charge. The State opposed, arguing the statutes required different elements. The District Court denied the request, reasoning that the communication device offense contained an element not present in the tampering statute, and thus was not a lesser included offense as a matter of law. Carlson was convicted of tampering with evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the lesser included offense instruction. The Supreme Court held that Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device is not a lesser included offense of Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence because the two statutes have distinct elements, particularly regarding intent and the nature of the conduct criminalized. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "State v. Carlson" on Justia Law

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Joel Lee Wilson was charged with aggravated burglary, robbery, breach of peace, property destruction, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance after forcibly entering the Wolf family’s home in Casper, Wyoming. The home was occupied by Alexander Wolf, a sheriff’s deputy, his wife, and their daughter. Wilson and another man, Daniel Hemmer, knocked and scratched at the door before Wilson broke it open. Upon entry, Wilson confronted the residents and engaged in a violent altercation with Mr. Wolf, while Hemmer interacted with the daughter. The incident ended with both men fleeing after Ms. Wolf intervened with a firearm. Evidence included Facebook messages between Wilson and Hemmer discussing an opportunity to make money and plans for the night, as well as Wilson’s statements to police about collecting a debt.The case was tried before the District Court of Natrona County. At trial, Wilson argued he lacked intent to commit theft, a required element for aggravated burglary and robbery, emphasizing that no property was taken and challenging the admission of the Facebook messages as co-conspirator statements. The district court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of intent based on the messages, the forceful entry, and the circumstances of the break-in. The jury convicted Wilson on all counts, and he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of intent to commit theft. Applying the standard of review that favors the State’s evidence and reasonable inferences, the court held that both direct and circumstantial evidence—including the Facebook messages, Wilson’s conduct, and the coordinated entry—supported the jury’s verdict. The court affirmed the convictions, concluding the evidence was sufficient to establish Wilson’s intent to commit theft. View "Wilson v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant was stopped by police officers in Aurora, Colorado, for speeding. During the stop, the officers observed the defendant make a dramatic movement toward the passenger side of his vehicle, to the extent that he was no longer visible to them. The officers recognized the defendant as a member of a local violent gang and learned from him that he was on parole for robbery. After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and conducting a pat-down that revealed no weapons, the officers searched the passenger seat area and found a firearm. The defendant was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which argued that the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, based on his furtive movement, gang affiliation, and parole status for a violent crime. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the combination of the defendant’s dramatic movement, his recognized gang membership, and his parole for robbery provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, justifying the protective vehicle search under the officer safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McGregor" on Justia Law

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In 2009, the defendant and two co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, including two young daughters, and robbed them of $30,000. A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted the defendant of four counts of kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to kidnap, and one count of possessing and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The convictions for kidnapping the children were central to the sentencing dispute.Following the initial sentencing, which totaled 600 months, the defendant challenged his convictions and sentences. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously remanded the case for resentencing after the government conceded that the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be vacated, in light of Johnson v. United States, which found the residual clause of “violent felony” unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the district court conducted a de novo resentencing. The government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2) required mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentences for each kidnapping conviction involving a child. The district court agreed and imposed concurrent 300-month sentences for each remaining count.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(f)(2). The appellate court held that kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is not categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Therefore, § 3559(f)(2) did not mandate a twenty-five-year minimum sentence for each conviction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing consistent with its decision. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law