Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was apprehended after two separate incidents in which he was found in possession of firearms and drugs. In the first incident, after a car accident, he attempted to dissuade the other driver from calling the police due to the presence of contraband in his vehicle, then fled but was quickly caught. In the second incident, a traffic stop led to the discovery of additional firearms, ammunition, and drugs. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and pleaded guilty.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines as twenty-two, based in part on a prior Kentucky conviction for second-degree manslaughter, which the court classified as a “crime of violence.” The defendant did not object to this calculation at sentencing and was sentenced to 145 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Kentucky’s second-degree manslaughter qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, applying plain error review because the issue was not raised below. The court held that the Kentucky statute’s “wantonness” mens rea is functionally equivalent to “recklessness” as defined in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), and does not meet the standard for a “crime of violence,” which requires purposeful or knowing conduct. The court found that the district court’s reliance on this conviction to enhance the sentence was plain error, affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and undermined the fairness of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Tooley" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both members of the Gangster Disciples gang, were prosecuted for their roles in a series of violent crimes in Georgia. The Gangster Disciples is a national criminal organization with a hierarchical structure, engaging in various illegal activities. The case centered on the aftermath of a gang member’s murder, which led to retaliatory killings. One defendant, Green, was implicated in the murders of two individuals believed to have violated gang rules, while the other, Chambers, was involved in orchestrating and carrying out another murder, as well as enforcing gang discipline.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia presided over the joint trial of Green, Chambers, and a third co-defendant. The jury convicted Green of participating in a RICO conspiracy, finding he committed or aided in two murders. Chambers was convicted of RICO conspiracy, violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR murder), use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and causing death with a firearm. Chambers received two consecutive life sentences plus an additional term, while Green was sentenced to life imprisonment. Chambers’ attempts to delay the trial, including self-representation and last-minute requests for counsel, were denied by the district court, which found his actions to be calculated efforts to disrupt proceedings. Both defendants challenged their convictions and sentences on various grounds, including evidentiary rulings, jury procedures, and sentencing issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support Green’s RICO conspiracy conviction and that the admission of wiretap evidence, co-conspirator statements, and other challenged exhibits was proper. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying Chambers’ motion for a continuance or in the use of an anonymous jury and shackling procedures. Sentencing and restitution decisions were also affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

The case concerns a criminal defendant who was initially charged with second-degree murder by information and who, through counsel, invoked his statutory right to testify before the grand jury under ORS 132.320(12)(a). The defendant requested to appear in person before the grand jury, but the prosecutor stated that only remote testimony would be permitted. The defendant then moved the Douglas County Circuit Court for an order requiring his in-person appearance before the grand jury, arguing that he had an absolute statutory and constitutional right to do so.The Douglas County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion, reasoning that it lacked authority to dictate the manner in which the grand jury received testimony, other than ensuring the defendant’s rights were upheld. The court stayed the trial court proceedings pending appellate review but expressed uncertainty about its authority to stay the grand jury proceedings themselves. After the grand jury returned an indictment while the stay was in place, the defendant filed additional motions, including to dismiss the indictment, but the trial court declined to lift the stay to consider those motions.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the matter on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that neither the prosecutor nor the defendant has unilateral authority to determine whether a defendant’s grand jury testimony must be in person or remote. Instead, the decision regarding the manner of witness testimony before the grand jury is, at least initially, for the grand jury itself to make, as provided by statute. The court concluded that the trial court did not have a nondiscretionary duty to order the defendant’s in-person appearance and therefore mandamus relief was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of Oregon dismissed the alternative writ of mandamus. View "State v. Wall" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with second-degree murder and other offenses. Facing a potential minimum sentence of 15 years to life if convicted at trial, she entered into a plea agreement. Under this agreement, she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for sentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) to 10 years’ incarceration and five years’ post-release supervision (PRS), and she agreed to waive her right to appeal. The Supreme Court determined, based on the record and submissions, that she would have qualified for DVSJA sentencing and imposed the recommended sentence.On appeal, the defendant argued to the Appellate Division, First Department, that the five-year PRS term was illegal because the Penal Law did not authorize PRS for class A felonies sentenced under the DVSJA. She also contended that her sentence was excessive and that her appeal waiver was invalid, allowing review of her excessive sentence claim. The Appellate Division held that the appeal waiver was valid and barred review of the excessive sentence claim, but that the legality of the sentence could still be reviewed. The court concluded that the relevant statutes did not prohibit the imposition of a five-year PRS term for a class A felony under the DVSJA and affirmed the judgment.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that Penal Law §§ 60.12 and 70.45, when read together, require a five-year PRS term for a defendant convicted of a class A felony and sentenced under the DVSJA to a determinate term. The Court also held that the defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and thus barred her excessive sentence claim. View "People v Hernandez" on Justia Law

The defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint and faced a statutory speedy trial deadline under CPL 30.30. The prosecution was required to announce readiness for trial by August 1, 2022. On that date, at 5:03 p.m., the prosecution submitted a certificate of compliance and a statement of readiness through the court’s Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS), after the clerk’s office had closed. The next morning, the clerk’s office marked the statement as filed as of August 1 and notified the prosecution. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the statement of readiness was untimely because it was filed after business hours and not reviewed by the clerk until the following day.The Criminal Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the prosecution’s filing was invalid because it occurred after the court’s close of business and the prosecution must be capable of actually beginning a trial when announcing readiness. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the prosecution’s readiness and the court’s ability to commence trial are separate issues, and that documents submitted through EDDS can be deemed filed as of the date of electronic submission, even if reviewed later by the clerk.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order. The Court of Appeals held that electronic submission of a statement of readiness before midnight on the due date satisfies CPL 30.30, regardless of the time of day or whether the clerk’s office is open. The court further held that CPL 30.30 regulates only the prosecution’s submission of the statement of readiness, not the timing of the clerk’s review or acceptance of the filing. Thus, the prosecution’s use of EDDS to deliver the statement at 5:03 p.m. on the last day of the speedy trial period met the statutory requirements. View "People v Licius" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanors following an encounter with a Suffolk County police officer, Danielle Congedo, which led to his arrest. After arraignment, the prosecution filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness, disclosing a spreadsheet referencing a federal lawsuit against Congedo. Later, they provided the complaint, amended complaint, docket report, and notice of the lawsuit, which alleged misconduct by Congedo in an unrelated incident. Before a pretrial hearing, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not disclosed an Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) report related to the lawsuit, which he claimed was required under statutory discovery rules. Upon request, the prosecution turned over the IAB report and additional materials, then filed a supplemental COC.The Suffolk County District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the prosecution’s initial COC and statement of readiness were invalid until the IAB report was disclosed, and thus the prosecution had exceeded the statutory speedy trial period. The Appellate Term, Second Department, Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts, reversed this decision, holding that the IAB files did not relate to the subject matter of the case and were not subject to automatic discovery under the applicable statute.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the prosecution’s COC was valid without prior disclosure of the IAB report. The Court held that, even assuming the statute required disclosure of misconduct allegations from unrelated incidents, the prosecution had disclosed the relevant information before filing its timely COCs. The Court found that the IAB report did not contain additional impeachment material beyond what was already disclosed and did not tend to impeach the credibility of the officer. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, upholding the validity of the prosecution’s COC and statement of readiness. View "People v Fuentes" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was arrested after a physical altercation in Times Square, where he was accused of stealing a bicycle and injuring the victim. Police officers intervened, handcuffed both the defendant and the victim, and questioned them at the scene. During this questioning, while still handcuffed and surrounded by officers, the defendant admitted to punching the victim. The officers did not provide Miranda warnings before obtaining this statement. Surveillance and body camera footage captured the events and the questioning.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement, finding that the police were engaged in investigatory questioning rather than custodial interrogation, and thus Miranda warnings were not required. After a bench trial, the defendant was acquitted of second-degree robbery but convicted of third-degree robbery. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, concluding that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed the police were still gathering information, and any error in admitting the statement was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, making his statement inadmissible. The Court clarified that being handcuffed and questioned by police in these circumstances constituted custody, and the officers’ questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. However, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of the statement affected the trial’s outcome. View "People v Robinson" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree assault and related offenses after being accused of shooting and injuring two people on a Manhattan street. The prosecution’s case included an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the shooter, several other witnesses who implicated him, and physical evidence such as DNA and surveillance video. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the eyewitness’s in-court identification, arguing that it was tainted by a prior suggestive encounter and a subsequent failure to identify him in a non-suggestive lineup. He also contested his sentencing as a second violent felony offender, specifically objecting to the prosecution’s calculation that his prior incarceration tolled the statutory lookback period for predicate felonies.The Supreme Court, New York County, held an independent source hearing and allowed the eyewitness’s in-court identification. At sentencing, the court accepted defense counsel’s concession regarding the predicate felony status and refused to consider the defendant’s personal objections to the tolling calculation. The defendant was sentenced as a second violent felony offender, which increased his minimum term of incarceration. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that, even assuming error in admitting the eyewitness’s identification, any such error was harmless because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. However, the Court found that the sentencing court erred by denying the defendant his statutory right under CPL 400.15 to personally controvert the predicate felony allegations. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order by remitting the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings to allow the defendant to challenge the predicate felony statement, and otherwise affirmed the conviction. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who, in 2003, was charged with four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) in Illinois. Two counts were for carrying a loaded, uncased firearm in public, and two were for carrying a firearm without a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining three counts. He was sentenced to probation, later resentenced to prison after violating probation, and ultimately served time.Years later, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Aguilar found the statute under which the defendant was convicted to be unconstitutional. The defendant’s conviction was vacated, and he then sought a certificate of innocence (COI) under Illinois law, which would allow him to seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The Cook County Circuit Court denied the COI, reasoning that the statute required the petitioner to prove innocence of all offenses charged in the information, not just the one for which he was convicted and incarcerated. The court found the petitioner could not prove innocence on the counts related to possession without a FOID card, as that conduct remained illegal.The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the COI statute required proof of innocence for all charges in the charging instrument, including those dismissed as part of the plea agreement. The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that, under the COI statute, a petitioner must prove innocence of every offense charged in the information, including those nol-prossed as part of a plea agreement, not just the offense for which the petitioner was incarcerated. Because the petitioner could not prove innocence of all charges, he was not entitled to a COI. View "People v. Reed" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged in 2022 with two counts of sexual abuse of a child, based on allegations by C.R. that the abuse occurred between 1988 and 1990. During the investigation, C.R. recalled being pulled out of class in seventh grade and questioned about the abuse. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired because C.R.’s communication in seventh grade constituted a report to law enforcement, triggering the limitations period under the statute in effect at the time.The Third District Court for Salt Lake County held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The State presented testimony from a detective and a records director, but no records of a report from the relevant period were found, and witnesses explained that recordkeeping practices at the time were inconsistent. The defense called former law enforcement officers who testified that not all reports were documented. The district court, relying on the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Pierce, concluded that because the evidence was not clear enough to resolve the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law, the question should be submitted to the jury. The court denied the motion to dismiss and reserved the issue for trial.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by reserving the statute of limitations issue for the jury. The Supreme Court clarified that under Utah Code section 76-1-306, the judge—not the jury—must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether a prosecution is time-barred. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to make the necessary factual findings and apply the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court left to the district court’s discretion whether to take additional evidence on remand. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law