Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a fatal shooting in Iowa, where Sherral Tolbert encountered Levonta Baker, a former friend and rival gang member. Tolbert pursued Baker, stopped alongside his car, and fired six shots, killing him. Tolbert admitted to the shooting but asserted that he acted in the heat of passion, claiming Baker had previously provoked him by shooting at Tolbert’s grandmother’s home. Tolbert argued that his emotional state at the time should mitigate the offense to voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder.The Iowa District Court for Scott County presided over Tolbert’s trial. The jury was instructed to consider first-degree murder, then second-degree murder if the higher charge was not proven, and finally voluntary manslaughter if neither murder charge was established. Tolbert objected to the instructions, arguing the jury should have considered voluntary manslaughter even if murder elements were met, based on Iowa’s statutory language. The district court rejected this argument, using standard “acquittal-first” instructions. The jury acquitted Tolbert of first-degree murder but convicted him of second-degree murder. Tolbert also moved for mistrial due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and sought to disqualify a prosecutor for conflict of interest, both motions denied by the district court.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed Tolbert’s conviction. The Court held that Iowa’s voluntary manslaughter statute does not require the jury to find malice, and passion is incompatible with malice. It upheld the use of acquittal-first instructions, finding no misstatement of law or constitutional violation. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial or the motion to disqualify the prosecutor, as there was no prejudice or conflict established. Tolbert’s conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed. View "State of Iowa v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

A woman alleged that her boyfriend assaulted her during their relationship and filed a petition for protection from abuse (PFA) in Madison Circuit Court. Judge Linda F. Coats, serving as a special circuit-court judge, granted an ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, the boyfriend was charged criminally with domestic violence arising from the same incident. At the PFA hearing, Judge Coats held a pretrial immunity hearing under Alabama’s stand-your-ground statute, determined the boyfriend acted in self-defense, and denied the PFA petition, stating he was immune from criminal and civil prosecution.In the criminal case, Judge Patricia D. Demos dismissed the charge against the boyfriend, relying on Judge Coats’s immunity determination from the PFA case. The State, through the Madison County District Attorney’s Office, petitioned the Madison Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing Judge Coats lacked authority to grant immunity in the PFA proceeding without notice to the State and that Judge Demos erroneously dismissed the criminal charge based on the PFA order. The Madison Circuit Court (Judge Donna S. Pate) granted the writ, ordering Judge Coats to vacate the immunity portion of her PFA order and Judge Demos to reinstate the criminal case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed appeals by Judge Coats and the boyfriend. The Court held that Judge Coats lacked standing to appeal and that the portion of the circuit court’s mandamus order directed to Judge Coats was void, as Judge Pate did not have supervisory jurisdiction over a special circuit-court judge. The Court dismissed Judge Coats’s appeal and the corresponding part of the boyfriend’s appeal. The remaining portion of the boyfriend’s appeal, which concerned the mandamus to Judge Demos in the criminal case, was transferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals, as it fell under its appellate jurisdiction. View "Coats v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

An inmate confined in a Nebraska correctional facility struck a correctional officer twice in the head after a confrontation in the office area of the prison unit. The events were recorded by security cameras, though key moments were obscured from view. Testimony established that the inmate was agitated, refused repeated lawful commands to back away from the doorway, and escalated the situation until the officer unholstered and deployed pepper spray. The inmate then punched the officer and fled. Both parties presented testimony regarding prison policies and their perspectives on the altercation, including conflicting accounts about the timing of the pepper spray’s deployment and the inmate’s motivations.The case was tried in the District Court for Lancaster County, where the defendant requested a jury instruction on self-defense, arguing that the officer’s use of pepper spray constituted unlawful force. The State opposed, emphasizing that prison policies permitted the use of pepper spray in response to escalating threats and that the defendant’s noncompliance with commands was unjustified. The district court found the evidence did not support a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, refused the instruction, submitted the case to the jury, and accepted a guilty verdict for assault by a confined person. The defendant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, consecutive to his current sentence.Reviewing the appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded the lower court correctly refused the self-defense instruction because the defendant unjustifiably placed himself in harm’s way by ignoring lawful commands. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for conviction and that the sentence was within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "State v. Liech" on Justia Law

In 2000, Tommie Lawson Lynex, an African American man, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and received a firearm enhancement under California Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), resulting in a sentence of 50 years to life. Twenty years later, California enacted the Racial Justice Act, allowing prisoners to seek habeas relief if their conviction or sentence was influenced by race, ethnicity, or national origin. Lynex filed a habeas petition under this Act, including statistical evidence showing racial disparities in the prosecution of murder charges with firearm enhancements in Los Angeles County.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially denied Lynex’s habeas petition and his request for appointment of counsel, finding the petition procedurally barred as successive and concluding that Lynex had not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the Racial Justice Act. The court also determined that Lynex did not sufficiently allege facts indicating racial animus or bias in the police investigation or prosecution.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring a prima facie showing for appointment of counsel. Under the Racial Justice Act and section 1473, subdivision (e), a petitioner need only plead a plausible allegation of a violation to obtain counsel. The appellate court also found that the trial court erred by not recognizing its discretion to permit amendment of the petition and by improperly invoking procedural bars at the initial stage. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Lynex" on Justia Law

Police responded to a house fire in Grand Forks, North Dakota, where an officer observed Antonio Medina behaving evasively and distancing himself from law enforcement. Medina left the scene in his red Ford Explorer and later returned on foot. Officers located Medina’s unattended, unlocked vehicle in a commercial parking lot nearby. Through the window, they observed keys, a cut straw with white residue, and a box for a digital scale. Officers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, seizing the straw, an electronic scale with residue, and small baggies. The residue tested positive for cocaine.Medina was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, both class A misdemeanors. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unconstitutional. The Northeast Central Judicial District Court denied the motion, ruling the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applied because there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. Medina entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The North Dakota Supreme Court previously remanded the case for correction of the criminal judgment to specify that the plea was conditional, as required by state procedural rules. After the district court entered an amended judgment, Medina appealed again.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception. The court held the exception applied because the vehicle, though parked and unoccupied, was readily mobile and located in a public commercial lot. The court found probable cause based on Medina’s suspicious behavior and the drug-related items visible inside the vehicle. The court concluded that the search was valid under the automobile exception and affirmed the amended judgment. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, tampering with evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and giving false information to law enforcement following the shooting death of Mark Ramon McMillan in the basement of a barbershop in Minot, North Dakota. Both the victim and defendant had been staying in the basement, and the victim’s body was later found wrapped and bound in the boiler room. The defendant admitted to shooting McMillan, claiming self-defense. The prosecution originally charged the defendant with theft of property—firearm, but later moved to amend this count to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon after considering a plea agreement.The District Court of Ward County granted the prosecution’s unopposed motion to amend the criminal information. After the plea agreement was rejected, the amended information remained, and the defendant entered a not guilty plea. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior felony conviction and recent probation termination to prove the elements of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court violated North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure 7(e) by allowing the amendment to the criminal information and committed obvious error by admitting evidence of his prior conviction and probation status, allegedly in violation of Rule 403 and Old Chief v. United States. The Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to review the Rule 7(e) claim because the issue was not preserved or briefed under the obvious error standard. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior conviction, as it was necessary to prove an element of the offense and no stipulation was made. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with several offenses arising from a scheme in which he and others conspired to commit wire fraud by deceiving businesses into transferring funds to accounts they controlled. The conspirators, operating from Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, used phishing emails containing malware to access business computers and steal money. The government linked the defendant to the conspiracy using evidence including overlapping social media handles, email accounts, IP addresses, and testimony connecting his online activity to fraud-related accounts. The government also introduced evidence that one company suffered financial losses and response costs due to the crimes.A grand jury indicted the defendant and his co-conspirators, but only the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. During jury selection, a prospective juror mentioned familiarity with the defendant and the case due to his work in cybersecurity. The court struck this juror for cause and repeatedly instructed the panel on impartiality. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including sentencing enhancements. The defendant moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing that the prospective juror’s comments affected jury impartiality and that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the scheme or to establish the necessary $5,000 loss for an enhanced sentence. The district court denied these motions and sentenced the defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a new trial, finding no prejudicial error in the jury selection process and holding that there was sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the fraud. However, the appellate court reversed the sentencing enhancement for intentional damage to a protected computer, concluding that the government failed to prove $5,000 in qualifying losses as required by statute. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Umeti" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a citizen of Sierra Leone and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in the District of Columbia in 2014 of attempted first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping. The factual basis for his conviction included both forceful digital penetration and forceful penile penetration. After serving his prison sentence, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically as “rape” or “an attempt to commit an aggravated felony,” and also as a crime of violence.In removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the petitioner admitted the factual allegations but disputed that his conviction was an aggravated felony, arguing that the D.C. statute criminalized digital penetration, which he claimed was not covered by the generic federal definition of rape. The Immigration Judge ordered removal, finding the conviction constituted attempted rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on its precedent that the generic definition of rape included digital penetration, and dismissed other removability grounds as unnecessary. The Board also denied the petitioner’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility, but remanded for further consideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture, directing the Immigration Judge to consider aggregate risks of torture. After additional hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the Board affirmed, declining to revisit removability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Board’s removability determination. It held that the generic federal definition of “rape” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) does not include digital penetration, joining other circuits. Consequently, the Board erred in concluding the petitioner’s conviction categorically matched the federal definition of rape. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on other removability grounds. View "Barrie v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Javier Hernandez was a participant in a transnational criminal operation that smuggled Cuban migrants into Mexico for eventual entry into the United States. His primary role involved stealing boats from Southwest Florida, which he delivered to co-conspirators in Mexico. These vessels were used to transport migrants from Cuba or were sold to support the smuggling enterprise, including bribing law enforcement. Hernandez also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico for similar purposes. He was compensated for each delivery and admitted to earning substantial profits from these activities.Federal authorities identified Hernandez through investigative techniques including cell-site location tracking and the recovery of his cell phone, which had been seized by Mexican authorities. The government obtained and executed a warrant to search his phone, extracting relevant data. After initial technical difficulties, a second extraction was performed after the warrant’s nominal expiration date but while the phone was still in government custody. Hernandez was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on five counts, including conspiracy to encourage unlawful entry, transportation of stolen vessels, trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, and money laundering. He moved to suppress the evidence from the second extraction, but the district court denied the motion, applied several sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence of ninety-five months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the second extraction did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or the Fourth Amendment, as Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows for off-site copying and review of electronic information after the warrant period. The court also found that even if there were a procedural violation, suppression would not be warranted due to the agents’ good faith and lack of prejudice. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all convictions and found no reversible error in the sentencing calculations or guideline enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Chadwick Janes was convicted of abuse or cruelty to a minor involving his stepchild, B.S. The case arose after Janes’s stepchildren and biological child disclosed physical abuse to their mother and grandmother, prompting a police report and subsequent forensic interviews at a child advocacy center. The children described incidents such as being beaten with a belt, choked, and pushed. The State charged Janes with aggravated assault and abuse or cruelty to a minor, ultimately dismissing one count before trial.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Minnehaha County, South Dakota held pretrial hearings regarding the admissibility of hearsay and other act evidence, excluding some evidence but permitting others under specific statutory exceptions. At trial, additional evidence—some previously excluded or not addressed—was admitted without objection, including a forensic interview and supplemental report. The jury acquitted Janes of aggravated assault but convicted him of abuse or neglect of a child. The circuit court sentenced Janes to ten years imprisonment with three years suspended and ordered restitution for Tanya’s lost wages and future counseling costs for the children, although the written judgment did not include counseling costs.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Janes raised issues regarding evidentiary errors, sentencing, restitution, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court applied plain error review and found no prejudice from the admission of disputed evidence, as much was cumulative to trial testimony. The Court affirmed Janes’s sentence and the restitution order for Tanya’s lost wages, finding sufficient evidence of causation. However, it reversed the restitution order for future counseling expenses because the amount was unascertainable and unsupported by evidence, remanding for a proper hearing. The Court rejected the ineffective assistance claim, as no prejudice was established. View "State v. Janes" on Justia Law