Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1990, Robert Raso pled nolo contendere to multiple criminal charges, including second-degree sexual assault, arson, and various robberies. He was sentenced to forty years, with twelve years to serve and twenty-eight years suspended with probation. After serving his time, Raso was released on probation. In 2011, a probation-violation report was filed against Raso, alleging he had sexually assaulted his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, Natalie. During the probation-violation hearing, Natalie testified about the abuse, and despite a coerced recantation, the court found her original testimony credible. The court revoked Raso’s suspended sentence, ordering him to serve twenty-five years.Raso appealed the probation-violation determination, which was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Subsequently, Raso filed a motion to terminate his imprisonment under G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18(b)(5), arguing that the dismissal of the first-degree sexual assault charge indicated a lack of probable cause. The Superior Court denied this motion, finding no doubt about Raso’s culpability or probable cause.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the Superior Court’s decision. The court found that the state’s dismissal of the first-degree sexual assault charge was motivated by a desire to spare Natalie further trauma and satisfaction with the twenty-five-year sentence, not due to a lack of probable cause or doubt about Raso’s culpability. The court emphasized that Raso had received a full evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial justices were supported by the record. The order denying the motion to terminate imprisonment was affirmed. View "State v. Raso" on Justia Law

Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of continuous sexual abuse of a child and related charges. After failing to obtain relief through direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, Rivers filed his first federal habeas petition in August 2017, which was denied by the District Court in September 2018. The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in July 2020. While his appeal was pending, Rivers discovered new evidence in his trial counsel’s client file and filed a second federal habeas petition based on this evidence.The District Court classified Rivers's second petition as a "second or successive" habeas application under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit for authorization. Rivers appealed the transfer order, arguing that his second petition should not be considered "second or successive" because his first petition was still on appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the pending appeal did not exempt Rivers from the requirements for successive petitions under §2244.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that once a district court enters its judgment on a first-filed habeas petition, any subsequent filing qualifies as a "second or successive" application subject to the requirements of §2244(b). The Court emphasized that the existence of a final judgment, not the status of an appeal, determines whether a filing is considered second or successive. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, rejecting Rivers's argument that his second filing should be treated as an amendment to his initial petition. View "Rivers v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Tracey Brown was convicted by a Nevada jury of multiple offenses related to a series of convenience store robberies. During the trial, an incident of juror misconduct occurred when several jurors shared an elevator with a prosecution witness, Teshae Gallon, and her friend. The friend made comments about the case, including references to surveillance videos and Gallon’s truthfulness. Brown moved for a mistrial based on this misconduct, but the trial court denied the motion, finding that the misconduct did not prejudice Brown. The court offered to replace two jurors who recalled the incident with alternates, but Brown chose to keep the original jurors.The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Brown’s convictions on direct appeal, concluding that although juror misconduct had occurred, Brown failed to show it was prejudicial. The court relied on Meyer v. State, which requires the defendant to demonstrate that juror misconduct probably affected the verdict.Brown then filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court, which was denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the juror misconduct constituted trial error, not egregious misconduct, and thus required Brown to show actual prejudice under Brecht v. Abrahamson. The court found that the Nevada Supreme Court’s application of Meyer did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent and that the state court’s factual determinations were reasonable based on the record. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that habeas relief was not warranted and affirmed the denial of Brown’s petition. View "BROWN V. ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA" on Justia Law

In 2015, Shirley Carter was found dead in her home from gunshot wounds. Jason Carter, her son, was later found civilly liable for her wrongful death. Following this, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation Agent Mark Ludwick and Marion County Deputy Sheriff Reed Kious arrested Jason for first-degree murder. However, Jason was acquitted in a jury trial. Jason then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Ludwick and Kious, alleging violations of his constitutional and state-law rights during the investigation of his mother's murder.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed Jason's complaint, granting Ludwick and Kious qualified immunity on all federal claims and ruling that Jason failed to state a claim for his state law claims. The court also dismissed Marion County from the suit, as Jason did not allege a pattern of unconstitutional conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that Ludwick and Kious were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Jason failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation for false arrest, as the arrest was conducted pursuant to a facially valid warrant. The court also held that Jason's claim of evidence concealment did not constitute a clearly established constitutional violation. Additionally, the court ruled that Jason's failure-to-investigate claim did not meet the threshold for a substantive due process violation. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jason's state law claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, noting the presence of probable cause and the lack of improper motive. View "Carter v. Ludwick" on Justia Law

Sammy Shepley, acting pro se, pled no contest to failing to provide notice of a new address as a registered sex offender and admitted to being a habitual offender. He was sentenced to a suspended five-year penitentiary term with two years of probation. Shepley appealed, arguing that the circuit court failed to adequately advise him of the risks of self-representation and abused its discretion by denying his request for substitute counsel.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Hughes County initially appointed attorney Katie Thompson to represent Shepley, but she withdrew due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Attorney Cody Honeywell was then appointed but also withdrew after Shepley expressed a desire to represent himself. The court allowed Shepley to proceed pro se with Honeywell as standby counsel. Shepley later negotiated a plea agreement directly with the State, resulting in a no contest plea and an admission to the habitual offender charge.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court found that the circuit court had adequately informed Shepley of the risks of self-representation, noting that Shepley had extensive experience with the criminal justice system and had been informed of the nature of the charges, his right to counsel, and the potential penalties. The court also determined that Shepley’s request to represent himself was unequivocal and that he had not made a formal request for substitute counsel after Honeywell’s withdrawal.The Supreme Court held that Shepley’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing Shepley to represent himself and in not appointing substitute counsel. View "State v. Shepley" on Justia Law

Nathan Parris was taken into protective custody by law enforcement after making suicidal statements and exhibiting concerning behavior. Officers searched him before transporting him to the hospital for a mental health evaluation and found a small, closed container in his pocket, which contained methamphetamine. Parris was charged with possession of a controlled substance and moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the search of the container was impermissible.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, denied Parris's motion to suppress, finding that the officers had probable cause to take him into protective custody and that the search of the container was permissible. Parris was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance in a court trial based on stipulated facts.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the officers had probable cause to believe that Parris required emergency intervention due to his suicidal statements, emotional distress, and possession of a loaded handgun. The court also held that the search of the closed container was a reasonable administrative step to ensure the safety of Parris, the officers, and the facility, and was not conducted as part of a criminal investigation. Therefore, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, upholding Parris's conviction for possession of a controlled substance. View "State v. Parris" on Justia Law

The case involves Jourdan Parks, who was adjudicated guilty of five charges and sentenced to 25 years in prison as a habitual felony offender. The trial court also imposed a $100 cost for the state attorney as mandated by section 938.27(8) of the Florida Statutes, despite the State not expressly requesting it. Parks moved to correct this alleged sentencing error, arguing that subsection (1) of the same statute required a request by the State for such costs. The trial court rejected this argument, relying on the 2008 amendment to subsection (8) that mandates these costs.The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the minimum cost for the state attorney is mandatory under subsection (8) and does not require a request by the State. This decision conflicted with the Second District Court of Appeal's ruling in D.L.J. v. State, which held that a request by the State was necessary for imposing such costs, based on subsection (1) of the statute.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case to resolve the conflict between the First and Second District Courts of Appeal. The Court concluded that the specific mandate of subsection (8), which requires the imposition of minimum costs for the state attorney without a request by the State, controls over the general language of subsection (1). The Court approved the First District's decision in Parks and disapproved the Second District's decision in D.L.J., holding that the minimum costs for the state attorney must be imposed even in the absence of a request by the State. View "Parks v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Darrell Jones was charged with assault with intent to kill (AWIK) while armed and related counts after repeatedly stabbing his friend, Wayne Pitt. Jones claimed self-defense and argued that his extreme intoxication, from consuming alcohol, marijuana, and PCP, precluded him from forming the specific intent to kill. The trial court precluded Jones from introducing evidence of his PCP use without expert testimony on the drug’s effects. Jones was convicted on all counts and appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding the PCP evidence.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia precluded Jones from presenting evidence of his PCP use, interpreting the case Jackson v. United States to mean that evidence of PCP use requires expert testimony. Jones argued that Jackson was inapplicable because it involved PCP use many hours before the incident, whereas he and Pitt used PCP shortly before the stabbing. The trial court denied Jones’s request to reconsider its ruling, and Jones was convicted by a jury.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in precluding evidence of Jones’s PCP use. The court held that the evidence was highly relevant to Jones’s intoxication defense and that there was no overriding unfair prejudice to the government. The court clarified that Jackson did not establish a categorical rule requiring expert testimony for PCP use evidence. The court vacated Jones’s AWIK while armed conviction but affirmed his other convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a dangerous weapon. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of a 20-year-old in August 2007, when he was 16 years old. The prosecution presented police-arranged single photo identifications made the day after the crime. The defendant moved to suppress these identifications, arguing they were conducted in a suggestive manner. The Supreme Court ordered a Rodriguez/Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identifications, but the hearing was never held. During the trial, the prosecution called an eyewitness who identified the defendant as the perpetrator, despite earlier stating they would not call this witness. The defense counsel did not object to the witness being called or request a Rodriguez/Wade hearing.The Supreme Court convicted the defendant, and he appealed, arguing that the missing transcript of jury deliberation proceedings constituted a mode of proceedings error and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion for a reconstruction hearing. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the defendant's sentence but affirmed the order denying the CPL 440.10 motion, rejecting the defendant's claims.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and rejected the defendant's mode of proceedings claim, holding that a missing transcript alone does not entitle a defendant to vacatur of their conviction. The court stated that the proper remedy for a missing transcript is a reconstruction hearing, provided the defendant's conduct shows a good faith effort to obtain prompt and effective reconstruction. The court also held that the Supreme Court abused its discretion by summarily denying the CPL 440.10 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved without resolving questions of fact. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court for an evidentiary hearing on the CPL 440.10 motion. View "People v Salas" on Justia Law

A husband and wife met at a religious conference, began a relationship, and married after the wife made clear she would not have sex before marriage. After moving to Ohio, the husband began demanding sex more frequently than the wife desired, insisting she submit regardless of her wishes. The wife described a recurring pattern during their marriage in which “date nights” would end with consensual sex, followed by the husband engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse or oral sex while she was asleep or otherwise unwilling. This pattern continued for several years, leading to the wife’s departure, her obtaining a protection order, and the husband’s indictment on three counts of rape, each tied to specific time periods.The case was tried before a jury in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which convicted the husband on all three counts. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and vacated them, finding the evidence insufficient to prove “sexual conduct” as defined by Ohio law for the charged periods. The appellate court reasoned that while the wife’s testimony about “date nights” included explicit descriptions of penetration, her testimony regarding the specific periods in the indictment did not explicitly describe penetration, and the use of phrases like “have sex” was deemed too vague to establish the statutory element.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the wife’s testimony, including her explicit descriptions of vaginal intercourse and her use of the phrase “have sex,” was sufficient to support the element of “sexual conduct” under Ohio’s rape statute when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court concluded that the appellate court erred by refusing to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the State and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for consideration of the husband’s remaining appellate arguments. View "State v. Coker" on Justia Law