Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dennis McKay pled guilty to three counts of Hobbs Act robbery affecting commerce and one count of discharging a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. In his plea agreement, he also admitted to four additional robberies and to possessing a firearm as a felon. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report recommending, among other terms, Special Condition 13 for supervised release, which would require McKay to notify third parties of any “risk” he posed, as determined by a probation officer. McKay submitted written objections to two other conditions but did not object in writing to Special Condition 13. At sentencing, defense counsel did not initially object but, when specifically asked by the district judge, argued that the condition was unwarranted because McKay’s history did not show a persistent threat of violence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, imposed Special Condition 13 despite defense counsel’s oral objection, noting the lack of an initial objection but allowing the defense to respond after hearing from probation and the government. The district judge stated that she would reconsider the condition if there were evidence of it being abused in the future. McKay then appealed, challenging only Special Condition 13.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether McKay’s objection was waived and found that his oral objection at sentencing was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, even though his arguments on appeal were broader than those made at sentencing. On the merits, the Seventh Circuit held that Special Condition 13 was impermissibly vague, following its own precedents, and vacated the condition. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to clarify or modify the condition. View "USA v. McKay" on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed a Michigan home in 2017, investigators determined it was intentionally set, focusing their investigation on the homeowner, Steve Karacson. Evidence included the smell of gasoline, multiple fire origins, cell phone location data placing Karacson near the house just before the fire, and a receipt for gas and gloves purchased hours before the incident. Karacson, who had fire insurance, claimed he was out of state but evidence contradicted this. He was subsequently charged with arson and insurance fraud.Following his plea of not guilty, Karacson sought to replace his court-appointed attorney due to disagreements and grievances. The trial court initially denied his request, but his attorney withdrew, and a second attorney was appointed. This relationship also deteriorated, leading Karacson to request self-representation. On the day of jury selection, after warnings from the court about the risks and complexities of self-representation, Karacson affirmed his desire to proceed pro se, with standby counsel available. After a lunch break, he again requested new counsel, which the court denied due to the timing. Karacson proceeded to represent himself, and a jury convicted him on all counts. He received a seven-year sentence.Karacson appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, alleging deprivation of counsel, among other claims. The court rejected his arguments, finding that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and was not entitled to substitute counsel at trial. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and reconsideration. Karacson then petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for habeas relief, claiming a Sixth Amendment violation. The district court denied relief, finding the state court’s determination reasonable, but granted a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The court held that under AEDPA’s highly deferential standard, the Michigan appellate court reasonably found Karacson’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court also determined that Karacson was not faced with a choice between unprepared counsel and no counsel, and thus was not deprived of a voluntary waiver. View "Karacson v. Shaver" on Justia Law

Federal agents identified the defendant as the source of fentanyl that caused a fatal overdose in Goleta, California. Their investigation revealed that he had been selling drugs for years, frequently operating from his apartment. A search of the apartment uncovered nearly $13,000 in cash, various tools associated with drug distribution, and significant quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and Alprazolam. The defendant admitted that the cash was proceeds from drug dealing and that a safe in his bedroom was primarily used to store drugs and drug proceeds. His phone also contained substantial evidence indicating his apartment functioned as the center of his drug-trafficking activities.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute multiple controlled substances. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Central District of California considered—over defense objection—a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. The defendant argued that his apartment was primarily his residence, not a stash house, and that the enhancement should not apply. The district court found ample evidence that the apartment was used as a place to sell drugs and imposed the enhancement, ultimately sentencing the defendant to 105 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement for abuse of discretion and affirmed the sentence. The court held that the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) applies when a defendant regularly uses his home for substantial drug trafficking, even if the residence also serves as his primary home. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that drug trafficking was a primary or principal use of the apartment. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. TEKOLA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was on parole and placed in county jail after violating a condition by moving residences without notifying his parole officer. Seeking release, the defendant called his mother and instructed her to lie to his parole officer, specifically telling her to say he was still in the process of moving rather than admitting he had already moved. The mother complied and conveyed this false information to the parole officer as instructed. Recordings of these phone calls were later reviewed, forming the basis for criminal charges.Following these events, the defendant was charged with attempting to influence a public servant by means of deceit under Colorado law, section 18-8-306. At trial, the prosecution introduced the recorded phone calls as evidence, and the defendant was convicted. He appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, arguing that the statute required him to personally deceive the public servant and that his mother’s actions did not constitute his own deceit. The division of the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the statutory language encompassed the defendant’s use of his mother to convey false information to the parole officer. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support it.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case on certiorari. The Court held that the phrase “by means of deceit” in section 18-8-306 includes a defendant’s use of a third party to engage in deception on the defendant's behalf. The Court determined that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant attempted to influence a public servant by means of deceit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Hupke v. People" on Justia Law

The case involves allegations by two relators, acting on behalf of the United States, that Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services, LLC facilitated and conspired with foreign manufacturers to submit false records to the U.S. government. The relators claimed that these manufacturers, who sold fur products via Amazon’s platform, provided false information on Customs Declarations to avoid paying mandatory tariffs and inspection fees on imported fur products. According to the complaint, Amazon was not the importer of record, but the relators alleged that Amazon either knew or should have known about the fraudulent conduct due to discrepancies in documentation and the absence of required forms, and that Amazon nonetheless continued to market, store, and deliver the products.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the relators’ second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court dismissed the claims, concluding that the relators failed to adequately allege that Amazon had the requisite knowledge or causation necessary for liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (the “reverse false claims” provision of the False Claims Act), and failed to plead the essential elements of a conspiracy claim under § 3729(a)(1)(C), including an agreement to violate the statute and overt acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Second Circuit held that the relators did not plausibly allege that Amazon had actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard regarding the foreign manufacturers’ false claims, as required by the statute. The court also determined the relators had not alleged facts showing an agreement or overt act necessary to support a conspiracy claim. Thus, the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety was affirmed. View "United States of America v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Bayan Aleksey, who was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a South Carolina state trooper during a traffic stop in 1997. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Aleksey filed a post-conviction relief application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, establishing that intellectually disabled persons cannot be executed, Aleksey filed a second post-conviction relief application asserting intellectual disability as a bar to execution.The Orangeburg County post-conviction relief (PCR) court held a hearing to determine Aleksey’s intellectual disability. Aleksey submitted five affidavits, including the Hammock affidavit, as evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning. The PCR court excluded the Hammock affidavit because the affiant was unavailable for cross-examination, leaving only non-expert evidence on adaptive functioning. After reviewing IQ scores, expert testimony, and school records, the PCR court found Aleksey failed to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence, as his developmental-period IQ scores were above the threshold, his adaptive deficits stemmed from ADHD and emotional disturbance rather than intellectual disability, and no intellectual disability diagnosis manifested during his developmental years.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed whether the PCR court erred in its findings and evidentiary rulings. The Court affirmed the PCR court’s decision, holding that the finding Aleksey is not intellectually disabled was supported by the evidence and not against its preponderance. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the Hammock affidavit, emphasizing the necessity of cross-examination for contested issues. The PCR court’s denial of relief was therefore affirmed. View "Aleksey v. State" on Justia Law

The case involved a fatal shooting following a fight between two rival groups in Hartford in 2008. The defendant was associated with one group, while the victim was affiliated with the other. During a concert, a conflict erupted and continued outside the venue, where the defendant and his associates armed themselves. The victim, after the confrontation, was shot multiple times by the defendant and later died from his wounds. The case, initially unsolved, was revived years later based on sworn statements from several eyewitnesses and acquaintances, some of whom identified the defendant as the shooter or recounted his admissions.After the defendant was charged with murder, the case proceeded to trial before the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford. During the trial, an incident arose involving Juror 7, who reportedly expressed safety concerns after interactions with trial attendees. The trial court excused Juror 7 following a canvass but, after a thorough individual canvass of the remaining jurors, denied the defense's motion for a mistrial and refused to excuse three other jurors who were alleged to have overheard or been affected by Juror 7’s concerns. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison.On direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial or excusing additional jurors, and also claimed prosecutorial impropriety during witness examination. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion or in excusing only Juror 7, finding no evidence of prejudicial juror tampering or bias. The court further held there was no prosecutorial impropriety that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

Early one morning in November 2021, law enforcement responded to reports of a driver exhibiting erratic behavior in Billings Heights, Montana. The driver, Cleve Ernest Spang, was observed swerving, driving at inconsistent speeds, and nearly colliding with a guard rail. Upon confrontation, Spang displayed signs of alcohol impairment, failed field sobriety tests, and admitted to drinking, though he refused breath and blood tests. Further investigation revealed Spang had four prior DUI convictions.Following his arrest, Spang entered into a plea agreement in August 2022, agreeing to plead guilty to felony DUI in exchange for a recommended sentence of five years with the Department of Corrections, all suspended, participation in a treatment program, and a $5,000 fine. After Spang was not accepted into the treatment program, the State recommended, and the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court imposed, a 13-month commitment to the Department of Corrections, a five-year suspended sentence, and a $5,000 fine.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Spang challenged only the imposition of the $5,000 fine. He argued that the fine was illegal based on a prior Montana Supreme Court decision, State v. Gibbons, which had held the relevant statute unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana recently overruled Gibbons in State v. Cole, holding that the mandatory fine provisions can be harmonized with statutes requiring consideration of a defendant’s financial ability to pay. The court held that Spang did not waive his right to appeal the fine by entering the plea agreement. Affirming the imposition of the fine, the court remanded the case to the District Court to evaluate Spang’s ability to pay, as required by statute. View "State v. Spang" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement in Teton County, Montana, conducted a home search at the defendant’s residence in January 2015 as part of a probation check on his brother. During the search, officers discovered marijuana and two laptops in the defendant’s bedroom. The laptops were later forfeited to the sheriff’s office. Over a year later, a Department of Homeland Security agent forensically examined the laptops and found thousands of images and multiple videos of child pornography on one of them, attributed to a single user account. Based on these findings, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of Sexual Abuse of Children.After charges were filed in April 2017, the defendant could not be located, having absconded from probation. He was arrested in Mexico in June 2021, deported to Texas, and extradited to Montana shortly thereafter. The trial was initially set for early 2022 but was continued several times due to various reasons, including ongoing plea negotiations, defense counsel’s unavailability, and logistical issues. The defendant’s counsel sought access to the original laptop hard drives to verify the forensic findings but was only allowed to view cloned copies under law enforcement supervision. When denied broader access, the defense moved to compel, and also moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motions. The Supreme Court held that the delay in bringing the case to trial was largely attributable to the defendant’s own actions in absconding, and the State’s delays were mostly institutional rather than deliberate. The Court found no speedy trial violation, no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to compel access to the original hard drives, and no abuse of discretion in admitting contested trial exhibits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In February 1994, Tony Carruthers, along with James and Jonathan Montgomery, was involved in the murders of Marcellos Anderson, Delois Anderson, and Freddrick Tucker. The victims were killed and buried beneath a casket in a Memphis cemetery. The prosecution presented evidence at trial that Carruthers had planned the crimes in advance and discussed the murders with others. Multiple witnesses placed Carruthers at the scene, and there was testimony that he confessed to the murders. Carruthers was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. Over the years, he has repeatedly claimed innocence and sought relief through various post-conviction and habeas proceedings, including requests for DNA and fingerprint testing on evidence from the crime scene.After the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, Carruthers pursued post-conviction relief in state and federal courts, but these efforts were unsuccessful. He previously sought DNA testing under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021, but the courts denied his motions, finding that the results would not have changed the outcome of his conviction or sentence. Most recently, less than two months before his scheduled execution, Carruthers filed a motion for last-minute DNA testing of fingernail scrapings and bindings from the victims. The post-conviction court denied the motion, finding he failed to meet the statutory criteria for DNA testing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals was set to review the case when the Tennessee Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. The court held that Carruthers failed to meet the first and fourth statutory criteria under both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the DNA Act: there was not a reasonable probability that favorable DNA results would have prevented his prosecution or conviction, and the motion appeared designed to unreasonably delay his execution. The court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for DNA testing. View "Carruthers v. State" on Justia Law