Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who, after losing his law license, became involved in schemes such as romance scams and business email compromises, which defrauded victims of millions of dollars. He opened bank accounts for shell companies, received funds from victims deceived by his co-conspirators, and transferred or withdrew the money for personal or further illicit purposes. Even after being confronted by bank investigators, he continued these activities.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted him on charges including wire fraud and money-laundering conspiracy, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed only some of those convictions, vacated others, and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment—below the advisory guidelines range of 108 to 135 months—and reimposed more than $2 million in restitution. The defendant appealed again, challenging both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the amount and scope of restitution ordered.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed and rejected all of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the district judge correctly applied the sentencing guidelines, including the base offense level, loss amount calculation, and enhancements for money laundering and sophisticated means. The court also found that the district judge properly denied a reduction for zero-point offenders, reasonably found the sentence substantively appropriate given the facts, and correctly ordered restitution, including for losses suffered by a foreign victim through a domestic bank account. The First Circuit affirmed the new sentence and restitution order in full. View "United States v. Abbas" on Justia Law

Police discovered the body of Brandon McGaskey in petitioner Thomas Williams’s apartment after responding to a call in Sparks, Nevada. Williams admitted to shooting McGaskey during an argument, claiming self-defense. Video evidence showed Williams leaving the apartment with a black shoulder bag, which, when found, contained methamphetamines. Williams was charged with murder, illegal possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and being a habitual criminal. He moved to sever the drug possession charge from the murder charge, but the State’s opposition included a factual assertion—that the bag contained fentanyl—which was unsupported by prior testimony. The district court denied the motion to sever, adopting the State’s unsupported facts and repeatedly making findings that Williams was guilty of murder and had not acted in self-defense, even though the case had not yet been tried.Following the written order, Williams moved to disqualify the presiding judge, Judge Kathleen Sigurdson, for bias, arguing that her findings prejudged his guilt. Judge Sigurdson denied having bias. The matter was referred to Judge David Hardy, who denied the motion to disqualify after finding no evidence of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” under the applicable legal standard.Williams then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus to require Judge Sigurdson’s disqualification or, alternatively, reassignment of the case. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that, although the standard for judicial disqualification due to bias arising from proceedings was not met, the circumstances nonetheless warranted reassignment under its supervisory authority. Specifically, the court found that the district court’s repeated, unnecessary findings of guilt compromised the appearance of justice. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition as to disqualification but granted it in part, ordering reassignment of the case to a different district judge. View "WILLIAMS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped the defendant for traffic violations. During the stop, a certified drug detection dog conducted a sniff of the defendant’s vehicle and alerted near the driver’s door. Based on this alert, the officer searched the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently charged with drug possession offenses. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unconstitutional because the drug dog’s field alerts over the previous two weeks had resulted in the recovery of drugs only 43% of the time, suggesting the alert was not a sufficiently reliable indicator of the presence of drugs.The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, reviewed the suppression motion. The court considered evidence of the dog’s training, certification, and performance in controlled environments, where the dog had demonstrated 100% accuracy. The district court found that the dog’s performance in controlled settings, along with the officer’s explanations for field alerts that did not yield drugs, established the dog’s reliability under the totality of the circumstances. The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court properly denied the suppression motion. The Idaho Supreme Court held that under the United States Supreme Court decision in Florida v. Harris, proof of a drug dog’s reliability in controlled certification or training programs can provide sufficient reason to trust its alert. The Court concluded that the dog’s field performance alone does not undermine probable cause when the dog’s training and certification are uncontested and reliable, affirming the conviction. View "State v. Barritt" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop for a minor violation, Sacramento Police officers pulled over a vehicle driven by Kayla Sepulveda, with Davonyae Sellers as a passenger. The officers observed a rolling tray on the backseat and what they described as “weed crumbs” scattered on the rear floorboard behind and under the passenger seat. The occupants were cooperative, and there was no suspicion of impaired driving. After having Sepulveda and Sellers exit the vehicle, the officers searched the car and Sepulveda’s purse, finding only 0.36 grams of loose marijuana on the floor and an unregistered firearm near the front passenger seat. Sellers was charged with unlawful firearm possession and moved to suppress the gun evidence, arguing the search was unlawful.A magistrate judge denied Sellers’s suppression motion, reasoning that the presence of loose marijuana constituted “contraband” under the open container law, thus providing probable cause for the search. The Sacramento County Superior Court affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District also upheld the search, holding that any marijuana not in a sealed container violated the open container statute and, alternatively, that the totality of circumstances supported probable cause for the search. One justice dissented, arguing the law required the presence of an actual container and that the facts did not support a violation or probable cause.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. It held that a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4) requires marijuana in a vehicle to be of a usable quantity, in imminently usable condition, and readily accessible to an occupant. The small amount of loose marijuana on the rear floor in this case was neither imminently usable nor readily accessible. The court further held that the circumstances did not provide probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellers v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A man was charged with several sexual offenses after his former partner alleged that he had assaulted her on two occasions at her mother’s house. The complainant did not immediately seek medical attention or report the incident to law enforcement, waiting about 12 days before making a report. During the investigation, a sheriff’s deputy assisted in arranging a pretext video call between the complainant and the defendant, which was recorded. At trial, the state presented testimony from the complainant and a friend to whom the complainant had allegedly texted immediately after the incident. The state did not introduce any text messages or call the investigating deputy as a witness. The defense did not cross-examine the complainant’s friend or the complainant about the texts, and, although the deputy was subpoenaed, the defense did not call her to testify.After the jury found the defendant guilty on one count and acquitted him of the other charges, the defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. He argued that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument improperly shifted the burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that the defendant could have elicited additional evidence through cross-examination of the state’s witnesses. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that such comments amounted to impermissible burden-shifting and were not harmless, and reversed the conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal, which implied that the defendant had an obligation to cross-examine state witnesses to present additional evidence, were improper and inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases. The court concluded that these comments were prejudicial, as they undermined the defendant’s presumption of innocence, particularly in a case dependent on witness credibility. The circuit court’s judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Strain" on Justia Law

A man previously convicted of a felony sex crime in another state moved to Oregon and became subject to Oregon’s sex offender registration requirements. These requirements mandated that he report within ten days of any change in residence and annually within ten days of his birthday. In early 2019, the man was in the process of moving from Albany to Lebanon, Oregon. He attempted to report this change at the Lebanon Police Department before and after his birthday but was told to report in Albany. On February 15, he reported at the Albany police station, stating he was moving but had not yet completed his move. He signed an annual report listing his Albany address. Later, police stopped him in May and arrested him for failing to report his change of residence within ten days, after learning his registration still listed the Albany address though he was living in Lebanon.The Linn County Circuit Court denied his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and his motion for judgment of acquittal, after he argued that the state was pursuing a different factual theory than the evidence showed. The jury convicted him. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state needed to prove he failed to report on the exact date in the indictment, but found sufficient evidence supporting the conviction based on the record.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions below, but for different reasons. It held that the state was bound by its choice at trial to proceed on the theory that the defendant changed residence after his February 15 annual report. The Court further held that while the passage of ten days after a change of residence is a material element of the crime, the state is not required to prove that the offense occurred on the exact date listed in the indictment. Because evidence showed the defendant changed residence after February 15 and failed to report within ten days, the conviction was upheld. View "State v. Ribas" on Justia Law

Between 2019 and 2022, a bookkeeper for a family-owned machine and fabrication business misappropriated approximately $500,000 from her employer. She forged the co-owner’s signature on checks made out to herself and later confessed to the theft in a video-recorded interview with law enforcement. The bookkeeper admitted to taking funds for personal use and acknowledged the significant amount taken. She was charged with theft by unauthorized taking or transfer and forgery, pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to a jury trial.Prior to trial, the defendant sought access to the company’s QuickBooks password through a motion to compel discovery, which she later withdrew. She subsequently moved to suppress her confession as involuntary, but the Unified Criminal Docket (Piscataquis County, Roberts, J.) denied the motion after a hearing. Additional pretrial motions included a request for the trial judge’s recusal, based on his prior professional association with the prosecutor, and a motion to exclude financial evidence due to the State’s failure to produce the QuickBooks password. Both motions were denied. At trial, the prosecution presented testimonial, documentary, and video evidence, including the defendant’s confession. The jury found her guilty on both counts, and she was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, with part of the sentence suspended and probation imposed.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed claims of prosecutorial error, denial of recusal, and alleged discovery violations. The Court held that although some prosecutorial statements constituted error, these were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s own confession. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying recusal or in rulings regarding discovery, concluding the State was not obligated to produce information it did not possess. The conviction was affirmed. View "State of Maine v. Moulton" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted of bank robbery in Florida in 2024. His criminal history included a 2010 conviction in New York for attempted second-degree robbery, which involved forcibly stealing property from an elderly woman and causing her injury. After robbing the Florida bank, the defendant fled the state, led police on a high-speed chase in Virginia, and was eventually apprehended.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida accepted the defendant’s guilty plea for the bank robbery charge. During sentencing, the court calculated his sentence using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and applied a career offender enhancement based on two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, one of which was his New York attempted robbery conviction. The defendant objected, arguing that attempted New York robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The district court disagreed, relying on a recent amendment to the Guidelines that expressly included attempts to commit crimes of violence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that, following a 2023 amendment to the Guidelines, any attempt to commit a qualifying crime of violence is itself a crime of violence. The court confirmed that New York second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ elements clause. Therefore, the defendant’s attempt to commit that crime also qualifies. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s arguments to the contrary and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA v. Ott" on Justia Law

During a law enforcement sting operation, the defendant sold fentanyl, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia near a church to a confidential informant. After the transaction, officers attempted to stop him, leading to a brief chase. The defendant was apprehended, and police recovered marked bills, various drugs, digital scales, and, along the route of the chase, a clear bag containing methamphetamine and a black bag containing a handgun and pills. Physical evidence and video footage of the transaction were introduced at trial. The pills were confirmed to contain fentanyl, and the cocaine found was packaged in a manner consistent with distribution.The Arkansas County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of multiple drug offenses, simultaneous possession of drugs and a firearm, and theft by receiving a firearm. He was sentenced to life plus an additional 185 years, with sentences to run consecutively, and a ten-year enhancement for drug crimes near a church. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on all convictions and the sentence enhancement.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and found substantial evidence supporting all the drug-related convictions and the enhancement. The court held that circumstantial evidence sufficiently linked the defendant to the drugs and firearm found during the chase, allowing for the simultaneous possession conviction. However, the court determined there was not substantial evidence to support the theft-by-receiving conviction because the only proof the firearm was stolen was inadmissible hearsay testimony from an officer regarding a database entry. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed all convictions except the theft-by-receiving conviction, which it reversed and remanded for entry of a new sentencing order. View "PARRIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of raping the 14-year-old daughter of his then-live-in girlfriend. The evidence included testimony that he sent the victim sexually explicit messages, gave her alcohol, and raped her while she was intoxicated. Several years later, after the appellant described to the victim’s mother in a series of electronic messages how he had raped his own daughters, the mother reported the abuse. Further testimony was provided by one of the appellant’s daughters, who described a longstanding pattern of sexual abuse and grooming by the appellant. The appellant was sentenced to life in prison.Prior to this appeal, the Garland County Circuit Court presided over the trial. The appellant moved for a continuance after being charged in a separate case with raping another of his daughters, arguing that the new charges impaired his ability to participate in his defense. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the appellant was able to assist his counsel. The court also overruled the appellant’s objections to the admission of explicit electronic messages and testimony from his daughter describing other uncharged sexual offenses, concluding that authentication and evidentiary standards were met. The jury convicted the appellant and imposed a life sentence.On review, the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed the appellant’s challenges to both his conviction and sentence. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the appellant was in a position of authority over the victim as required by Arkansas law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the continuance or in the admission of the challenged evidence, holding that the evidence was properly authenticated and the testimony of the appellant’s daughter was admissible under the “pedophile exception” to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court further held that the life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Arkansas Constitution. The judgment was affirmed. View "FAULKNER V. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law