Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant and her son were charged in connection with an assault and shooting that took place in the stairwell of an apartment building in Southeast Washington, D.C. The incident followed a dispute earlier in the evening between the appellant and the victim, Shawn Watts. After being told to leave the apartment, the appellant returned with her son, who was armed. Together, they assaulted Mr. Watts, with the son ultimately shooting him in the leg. The appellant was tried separately from her son and faced several charges, including conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the jury trial. The jury convicted the appellant of conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, aggravated assault while armed (including a “while armed” sentencing enhancement), and PFCV, but acquitted her on other counts. She was sentenced to seventy-two months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release. On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the PFCV conviction and the “while armed” enhancement, and she also raised issues regarding the trial court’s handling of witness testimony and jury instructions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the appellant’s conviction for PFCV under an aiding-and-abetting theory, as there was no evidence that the victim posed a threat of disarming the gunman, or that the appellant’s actions were undertaken with the requisite guilty knowledge. However, the court found sufficient evidence for the “while armed” enhancement to the aggravated assault conviction, as the appellant knew about the gun and continued to participate in the assault. The court affirmed the convictions for conspiracy and aggravated assault with the enhancement, but reversed the PFCV conviction. View "Chandler v. United States" on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of attempted robbery after allegedly assaulting a white woman. During jury selection, the government used its peremptory strikes to remove all six nonwhite prospective jurors—four Black, one Asian, and one Hispanic—from a venire of thirty-six, resulting in an all-white jury. The defense objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s actions were racially discriminatory and violated the precedent established in Batson v. Kentucky. The government provided purportedly race-neutral reasons for the strikes of the Black jurors, such as concerns about their ability to understand scientific testimony or responses during voir dire. The trial court accepted these explanations, found them credible and race-neutral, and denied the Batson challenge.A jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia acquitted the defendant of attempted robbery but convicted him on both sexual abuse counts. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the trial court had adequately scrutinized the government’s justifications for the jury strikes. The defendant sought en banc review, and the division’s decision was vacated pending review by the full District of Columbia Court of Appeals.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the trial court’s Batson analysis was insufficient because it failed to rigorously scrutinize the prosecutor’s explanations in the context of the entire record, including statistical evidence and the racially charged nature of the case. The court found that at least one of the government’s strikes was more likely than not racially discriminatory. Accordingly, it reversed the defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with practicing law without a license after submitting court filings on behalf of another individual in a criminal case in Wells County, North Dakota. The filings included motions and related documents, each signed to indicate the defendant was representing the incarcerated individual. The State filed charges based on these actions, and after pretrial proceedings, the case proceeded to a jury trial.Prior to trial, the District Court of Wells County addressed several motions. The defendant’s motion to dismiss, based on alleged unlawful access by law enforcement to jail communications, was denied as untimely under the court’s pretrial order and applicable procedural rules. The State’s motion to amend the information to expand the offense date was granted after the court found no additional or different offense was charged and no substantial right was prejudiced. The court also ruled, over the defendant’s objection, that the offense of practicing law without a license was a strict liability crime under North Dakota law, and removed the requirement of a culpable mental state from the jury instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the district court entered a criminal judgment and sentenced the defendant.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant raised several issues. The court only considered those claims that were properly preserved and sufficiently briefed. The Supreme Court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss as untimely, allowing amendment of the information, or removing the mens rea element from the jury instructions. The Supreme Court held that the statute under which the defendant was convicted is a strict liability offense, and the jury instructions accurately reflected the law. The criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Olson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement discovered a handgun in a vehicle parked outside a bar while the defendant was inside the bar. The defendant, who was previously convicted of a qualifying offense, was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, the defendant objected to the proposed jury instructions regarding the definition of “possession,” arguing that the instructions failed to require proof of intent as allegedly mandated by recent amendments to the relevant statute. The defendant also moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting insufficient evidence linked him to the vehicle containing the gun. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.The District Court of Ward County presided over the trial. The defendant’s objections to the jury instructions were overruled, and the motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. After conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions by not requiring the State to prove intent to possess the firearm and by not entering a judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence that the handgun qualified as a “firearm” under the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that, under the amended statute, intent is required only for convictions based on constructive possession, not for actual possession, and the district court’s jury instructions properly reflected this distinction. The Court also held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational fact finder to conclude the handgun was functional, as required by statute, and thus the district court did not commit obvious error by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgment. View "State v. Luetzen" on Justia Law

Authorities responded to a residence to investigate an alleged assault involving a young child. Upon arrival, social workers and a detective entered the property through an open garage door, which led to an interior entryway. The resident, Shantel Lais, allowed them inside. Once inside, the detective observed hazardous conditions, including accessible firearms, open alcohol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia within reach of a two-year-old child. As a result, Christopher Golberg was charged with child neglect, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm.Prior to trial in the District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, Golberg moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing the detective unlawfully entered the garage without a warrant or consent, thus tainting the evidence subsequently gathered. A suppression hearing was held, where the detective testified that the garage functioned as the main entrance due to home construction and that the exterior door was open. The district court found that Golberg did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage under these circumstances and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, Golberg twice moved for judgment of acquittal on the basis that he did not reside at the house; both motions were denied. The jury found Golberg guilty of child neglect and not guilty on the other charges.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the denial of the suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence were erroneous. The court held that the open garage, serving as the main access point and lacking express signs restricting entry, did not afford Golberg a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, no unlawful search occurred. The court also found that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict on child neglect. The amended criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Golberg" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was prosecuted for forgery under specific subsections of the Texas Penal Code. During the proceedings, a question arose as to whether the defendant should have been charged under a different subsection, which provides for reduced penalties if certain facts are established—specifically, if the conduct was to obtain or attempt to obtain property or services. The statute at issue contains a “value ladder” that can affect the degree of the offense depending on the circumstances of the forgery.After the trial, the Sixth Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The defendant did not raise any objection at trial regarding the jury instructions, nor did he complain about jury charge error on direct appeal. Nevertheless, the court of appeals addressed the issue as unassigned error, considering whether the jury should have been instructed on the alternative, potentially less severe, subsection based on facts that arose during the trial. The appellate court found that the issue was “fairly raised” in relation to the defendant’s argument about his sentence.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in reviewing the case, discussed whether the alternative subsection—though containing elements that could reduce the offense—constitutes “law applicable to the case” requiring a jury instruction even without a defense request. The dissenting opinion argued that such an instruction is defensive in nature and not mandatory unless requested. The majority, however, rejected the argument that the defendant’s failure to request the instruction forfeited the right to it, holding that the trial court must instruct the jury on the lesser offense if facts supporting it arise, regardless of whether the defense requested it. The court thus determined that the trial court’s obligation is triggered by the facts presented at trial, not solely by party request. View "LENNOX v. STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

A retired Texas Ranger, employed as a “cattle ranger” by a private association, responded to allegations that an adult had exchanged explicit photos with a minor. The cattle ranger, Steven Jeter, interviewed the suspect, who admitted to the conduct. Jeter identified himself as a cattle ranger, wore a badge, and carried a gun, but was not deputized by local law enforcement for this matter. During the voluntary, noncustodial interview, Jeter clarified he was retired from the Texas Rangers and now worked for the Cattle Rangers, stating, “I’m still a police officer.” He obtained statements and the suspect’s phone passcode.The defendant moved to suppress his statements, arguing Jeter unlawfully acted outside his statutory authority and committed impersonation of a public servant. The 278th District Court of Madison County found Jeter had no authority in this non-livestock matter and granted the suppression motion, deeming the statement voluntary but based suppression on Jeter’s lack of authority. On appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Jeter acted outside his statutory mandate and that his conduct amounted to impersonation of a public servant, which provided the defendant standing to challenge admission of his statement under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23.The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. It held that Jeter did not commit impersonation of a public servant because he accurately identified himself as a cattle ranger and did not falsely claim to be another type of public servant. The court further found that, since the interview was a consensual encounter and not an exercise of pretended official authority, suppression was not warranted on these grounds. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. COLEMAN" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in South Bend, Indiana, in February 2021, police discovered that Jose Reyna was in possession of marijuana, methamphetamine intended for distribution, and a loaded handgun with its serial number obliterated. Reyna admitted to dealing drugs and to having intentionally removed the serial number from the firearm. A grand jury indicted him for possessing a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), to which he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. Shortly before sentencing, Reyna moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(k) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found good cause to consider Reyna's otherwise untimely motion but denied it on the merits. The district judge ruled that the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number was not covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore rejected the constitutional challenge at the first step of the Bruen framework. The judge did not address whether the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of § 922(k) de novo. While the appellate court was not persuaded that the challenge could be resolved solely on the text of the Second Amendment, it proceeded to Bruen’s second step, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi. The court concluded that although modern serialization lacks a direct historical analogue, historical practices of marking, inventorying, and inspecting firearms for militia purposes provide a relevant tradition. The Seventh Circuit held that § 922(k) is consistent with the principles underlying this tradition and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Reyna" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of third-degree murder in 2002 for the killing of a police officer. At trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses who implicated the defendant, including testimony from an individual who claimed to have observed the shooting and another who reported the defendant’s incriminating statements. The defense was precluded from introducing evidence suggesting that another individual, Tusweet Smith, may have been the perpetrator, including testimony about Smith’s alleged intent and confessions. Over the years, the defendant filed multiple post-conviction petitions, raising claims based on newly discovered evidence and recantations by key prosecution witnesses. These petitions were denied, primarily on timeliness grounds under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), which imposes a one-year filing limit unless specific exceptions are met.The Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County dismissed the defendant’s most recent PCRA petition, finding it untimely and holding that a third-party confession (specifically, Smith’s confession to another inmate, Dorsett) could not qualify as a newly discovered fact because it was deemed inadmissible hearsay. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal regarding the third-party confession, relying on precedent that inadmissible hearsay cannot support the PCRA’s newly discovered facts exception. However, the Superior Court agreed that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on separate statements and affidavits but not on the Dorsett/Smith confession.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court’s order as to the Dorsett/Smith statement. The Court held that a PCRA petitioner may establish the newly discovered facts exception with evidence that would be admissible at a PCRA hearing, and that a third-party confession to another person can serve as a newly discovered fact under the PCRA if properly pleaded. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to allow the defendant to attempt to prove his allegations with admissible evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law