Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves $14,100.00 in cash seized by the Linn County Sheriff’s Office from a Bitcoin ATM kiosk in Cedar Rapids during a fraud investigation. Bitcoin Depot, the owner of the ATM, sought the return of the seized funds, while Carrie Carlson, the customer who deposited the money, also filed a competing claim for the return of the funds. Carlson had deposited the money into the ATM and received Bitcoins in return, which were transferred to a wallet as directed by a scammer.The Iowa District Court for Linn County held a hearing on the competing claims and ordered the return of the seized funds to Carlson. The court reasoned that Carlson was a victim of fraud and likened the situation to recovering stolen property from a pawnbroker. The court also considered the transaction a "smart contract" and concluded that Bitcoin Depot had reason to know of potential duress due to the warning provided on the ATM.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and concluded that Bitcoin Depot had the greater right to possession of the seized funds. The court found that Bitcoin Depot acted in good faith and without reason to know of Carlson’s duress. The court rejected the district court’s analogy to pawnbrokers and the characterization of the transaction as a smart contract that inherently involved knowledge of duress. The court held that Carlson did not meet her burden to show that Bitcoin Depot had reason to know of her duress, and thus, the contract was not voidable.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to return the seized funds to Bitcoin Depot. View "In the Matter of Property Seized for Forfeiture from Bitcoin Depot Operating, LLC v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Vanessa Gale was at a convenience store in Davenport when she encountered Romaro Houston. They walked outside together and got into Gale’s car. Shortly after, police officers arrived to arrest Houston, leading to a search of Gale’s body and purse. The search uncovered cash, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Gale was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana, both alleged as second offenses.In the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gale filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the search, arguing that the stop and subsequent search were unlawful. The district court denied her motion. Gale consented to a trial on the minutes of testimony, and the court found her guilty on both counts, sentencing her based on the belief that she had prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance.Gale appealed, and the case was transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals. She argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress and that her sentence was illegal because her prior conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under Iowa Code § 124.401(5). The State agreed that the minutes of testimony were inaccurate regarding her prior conviction. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the sentence, stating it could not take judicial notice of the Cedar County case filings.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the parties that Gale’s prior conviction was for possession of prescription drugs without a prescription, which does not qualify as a predicate offense under § 124.401(5). The court concluded that Gale’s sentence for second-offense possession counts was illegal and remanded the case for resentencing. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the district court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "State of Iowa v. Gale" on Justia Law

Ronald Eugene Cooley was charged with failing to fulfill his sex offender registration requirements after moving to a new address. Iowa law mandates that sex offenders must appear in person to notify the sheriff of any change in residence within five business days. Cooley claimed he attempted to register his new address in person, but the sheriff's office was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The State argued that Cooley could have registered by calling a phone number posted on the sheriff's office door. The district court did not include the "appear in person" requirement in the jury instructions, and Cooley was convicted.The Iowa District Court for Linn County denied Cooley's motions for acquittal and a new trial, concluding that the closure of the sheriff's office did not absolve Cooley of his duty to register. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, agreeing that the district court did not err in omitting the in-person requirement from the jury instructions.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that appearing in person is an essential element of the crime of failing to register a change of address. The court found that the district court erred by not including this requirement in the jury instructions. The court concluded that the error was not harmless, as it could not be determined whether the jury would have found Cooley guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if properly instructed. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State of Iowa v. Cooley" on Justia Law

Melissa S. Bret was charged with theft by shoplifting goods valued at $500 or less and having two prior convictions for the same offense, which would classify the crime as a Class IV felony. A jury found her guilty of shoplifting property valued at $77.64. After the jury returned its verdict, the district court adjudged Bret guilty of theft by shoplifting, a Class IV felony, and sentenced her to 1 year’s imprisonment. However, no evidence was presented regarding Bret’s prior convictions, and the court did not make any findings about such convictions.The District Court for Douglas County initially adjudged Bret guilty of a Class IV felony based on the jury's verdict. During the sentencing hearing, the court and both parties proceeded under the assumption that Bret was being sentenced for a Class IV felony. The presentence investigation report also indicated that Bret was charged with and convicted of a Class IV felony. However, the court did not hold a separate enhancement hearing to determine the existence of prior convictions, nor did the State present evidence of such convictions.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in enhancing Bret’s offense to a Class IV felony without evidence of prior convictions. The court held that the sentence imposed was illegal because it exceeded the permissible statutory penalty for a Class II misdemeanor, which is the correct classification based on the jury's finding of the value involved. The Supreme Court vacated Bret’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court also concluded that the State did not waive its right to seek enhancement and may attempt to prove Bret’s prior convictions on remand. View "State v. Bret" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child and one count of child abuse, involving two young victims, M.R. and E.R. The alleged crimes occurred while the defendant was babysitting the children during their mother's part-time evening job. M.R. disclosed the sexual assaults years later, and E.R. disclosed the physical abuse during a forensic interview. The defense argued that the children's memories were unreliable and that the defendant lacked the opportunity to commit the crimes.The trial court joined the charges for a single trial, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the joinder of charges, request a limiting instruction, and object to certain testimonies on hearsay and foundation grounds. He also claimed the trial court erred in overruling an objection to a witness's testimony about delayed disclosures of abuse.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the charges were properly joined as they were "connected together" under the relevant statute, given the overlapping timeframes, locations, and witnesses. The court also held that the defendant failed to show prejudice from the joinder, as the evidence was cross-admissible for proper purposes, and the jury was instructed to consider each charge separately. The court found no merit in the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the objections would likely have lacked merit or the evidence was cumulative. The court also ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness's testimony about delayed disclosures. The judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Corral" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jessica Warren, was convicted of driving after suspension or revocation, with death resulting, under RSA 263:64, V-a, following a jury trial in the Superior Court. On September 5, 2018, Warren, whose license was suspended, drove a minivan in Concord, passing a delivery truck that blocked a bike lane. Her minivan collided with a bicyclist, who died from the collision, and then veered into the opposite lane, hitting a curb and another vehicle.In the Superior Court, Warren requested a jury instruction that required the State to prove she knowingly committed the act that violated a rule of the road. The court, however, issued an instruction that did not require the State to prove any mental state regarding the "unlawful operation" element. Warren objected, but the court overruled her objection, and the jury convicted her.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. Warren argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the "knowingly" mens rea applied to the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. The State contended that the statute omits a culpable mental state and that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable to the "unlawful operation" element. The Supreme Court agreed with the State that the "knowingly" mens rea is inapplicable but concluded that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mental state for the "unlawful operation" element. The court held that the trial court erred by not including this mens rea element in its jury instruction.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction and remanded the case, holding that "criminal negligence" is the appropriate mens rea for the "unlawful operation" element of RSA 263:64, V-a. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2009, Wesley Swick pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm and was sentenced to 33 months in prison and two years of supervised release. His federal sentence was to run concurrently with longer state sentences. Swick was released from state prison in 2017 but did not report to federal probation as required. His failure to report went unnoticed until after his supervised release period should have ended. During this time, Swick committed several state crimes and served additional time in state prison.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas revoked Swick's supervised release based on his failure to report and subsequent criminal activities. The court asserted jurisdiction using the fugitive tolling doctrine, which pauses the supervised release period when a supervisee absconds from supervision. Swick was sentenced to 24 months in prison, to run consecutively with a separate federal sentence for a felon-in-possession charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that fugitive tolling applies to supervised release, meaning that Swick's supervised release period was tolled when he failed to report to probation. The court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Swick intentionally avoided supervision, as he did not report to federal probation despite knowing his obligation to do so. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to revoke Swick's supervised release and the imposition of the 24-month prison sentence. View "United States v. Swick" on Justia Law

Rick Coley and David Duggar were convicted by a jury on drug and firearm charges related to their involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy led by Jason Betts in Indianapolis. Coley and Duggar argued that their relationships with Betts were merely buyer-seller relationships, not conspiratorial agreements. Coley also contested the sufficiency of the evidence for his firearm conviction, and both defendants challenged the denial of their motion to sever the drug-trafficking counts from the firearms counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the motion to sever, noting that the firearms were found in the defendants' rooms along with evidence of drug trafficking. The jury found Coley and Duggar guilty on all counts, and the judge denied their motions for acquittal, sentencing Coley to 360 months and Duggar to 276 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy convictions, citing the recent en banc decision in United States v. Page, which established that repeated, distribution-quantity drug transactions alone can sustain a conspiracy conviction. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Coley's firearm conviction based on constructive possession, as the gun was found in his bedroom along with his personal items and drug-dealing implements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the defendants' arguments regarding the buyer-seller relationship, the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm conviction, and the denial of the severance motion. The court concluded that the drug and firearm charges were properly joined and that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the severance motion. View "United States v Coley" on Justia Law

Investigators suspected Lamont Coleman of running a heroin operation from his apartment building in Gary, Indiana. They conducted fourteen controlled drug purchases using confidential informants and undercover officers. Evidence from these buys and surveillance led to a search warrant for Coleman’s apartment and a neighboring house he owned. The search uncovered drugs, money, and firearms, leading to Coleman’s conviction on most counts of the indictment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a Franks hearing and denied Coleman’s motion to suppress evidence, finding sufficient probable cause for the search warrant. At trial, the jury convicted Coleman of being a felon in possession of a firearm, conspiring to distribute heroin, and possessing heroin with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted him of some drug distribution charges and possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Coleman was sentenced to 240 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Coleman’s appeal, which included four claims. Coleman argued that the district court constructively amended his indictment by issuing generic jury instructions, the government withheld exculpatory information, the court improperly excluded an affidavit as evidence, and the court erred in considering acquitted conduct at sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions on all grounds. The court found no prejudice from the alleged constructive amendment, determined that the new evidence about the surveillance recordings was not material, upheld the exclusion of Leroy Coleman’s affidavit due to its unreliability, and noted that current precedent allows the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing. View "USA v Coleman" on Justia Law

The case involves codefendant brothers Joshua and Jamie Yafa, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their involvement in a "pump-and-dump" stock manipulation scheme. They promoted the stock of Global Wholehealth Products Corporation (GWHP) through various means, including a "phone room" and social media, to inflate its price. Once the stock price rose significantly, they sold their shares, earning over $1 million. Following the sale, the stock price plummeted, causing significant losses to individual investors. A grand jury indicted the Yafas, along with their associates Charles Strongo and Brian Volmer, who pled guilty and testified against the Yafas at trial.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced the Yafas, applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2B1.1. The court used Application Note 3(B) from the commentary to § 2B1.1, which allows courts to use the gain from the offense as an alternative measure for calculating loss when the actual loss cannot be reasonably determined. The district court found it difficult to calculate the full amount of investor losses and thus relied on the gain as a proxy. This resulted in a fourteen-level increase in the offense level for both brothers, leading to sentences of thirty-two months for Joshua and seventeen months for Jamie.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the term "loss" in § 2B1.1 is genuinely ambiguous and that Application Note 3(B)'s instruction to use gain as an alternative measure is a reasonable interpretation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in using the gain from the Yafas's offenses to calculate the loss and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA V. YAFA" on Justia Law