Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Carlos Galindo was found by police officers asleep in the driver’s seat of his parked car in Queens, New York, with the engine running, heat blowing, and an open beer in his hand. He testified that he had entered the car late at night to listen to music and keep warm without disturbing his family, and that he had not driven or intended to drive the car. His son corroborated that the car was stuck in the snow and that Galindo had not driven. Galindo was charged with several offenses, including driving while intoxicated, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and consumption of alcoholic beverages in a motor vehicle.After trial in County Court, Galindo was convicted of two misdemeanor counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and two traffic infractions: unlicensed operation and consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle. His motion to set aside the verdict was denied, and he received a conditional discharge. The Appellate Term initially reversed the judgment and dismissed the charges on speedy trial grounds, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for further consideration. On remand, the Appellate Term affirmed the convictions for the two traffic infractions.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court complied with procedures for handling jury notes as required by People v O'Rama. It held that the trial court’s failure to read a substantive jury note verbatim, omitting the jury’s specific question about the meaning of “operates,” deprived Galindo of meaningful notice and required automatic reversal of his conviction for unlicensed operation. The Court found no legal basis to overturn the conviction for consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle. The Court modified the Appellate Term’s order by dismissing the unlicensed operation charge and otherwise affirmed. View "People v Galindo" on Justia Law

The defendant was stopped by police while driving a white Dodge Caravan suspected of involvement in two prior criminal incidents. On April 28, 2019, an eyewitness reported a road rage altercation in Washington Heights, stating that a Hispanic male driving a white Dodge Caravan fired a gun at another car and provided the vehicle’s license plate. Police identified the defendant as the registered owner. Nearly three weeks later, a traffic agent observed the same van illegally parked on Baruch Drive; the vehicle sped away, nearly hitting the agent. Officers later located the van and conducted a stop, during which the defendant was arrested after reaching for a gun. He was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and reckless endangerment relating to both incidents.The defendant moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop. The Supreme Court denied the motion, concluding there were articulable and credible reasons for the stop, including the officers’ awareness of the vehicle’s connection to the earlier shooting and the recent traffic violation. A jury convicted the defendant of four counts of criminal possession of a weapon and one count of reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the BOLO alert and their knowledge of both incidents. One Justice dissented, arguing reasonable suspicion was lacking without confirmation that the driver matched the earlier suspect’s description. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal.The New York State Court of Appeals reviewed whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on information from the license plate search, the proximity of the traffic violation, and the logical inference that the same person was driving during both incidents. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "People v Zubidi" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on two counts of robbery in the second degree and ultimately pleaded guilty to one count in satisfaction of the indictment. During the plea allocution, he admitted under oath to having forcibly stolen various items from a store clerk while displaying what appeared to be a firearm. After the plea was accepted, but before sentencing, the defendant told the probation department that he had not robbed anyone, later explaining he committed the robbery while working as a confidential informant or to collect a debt on behalf of a drug dealer. At sentencing, the court questioned him about these statements; with counsel’s input, he again admitted guilt, and the court proceeded to sentence him.On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendant argued that his postplea statements at sentencing cast doubt on the voluntariness and knowing nature of his plea, which, he claimed, required the plea’s vacatur. The Appellate Division rejected this argument, holding that the defendant’s challenge was unpreserved because he had not moved to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction. The court also held that the exception to the preservation rule established in People v Lopez did not apply.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the narrow Lopez exception to the preservation requirement—where a defendant’s statements during the plea allocution cast significant doubt on the validity of the plea and the court fails to inquire further—does not apply to statements made after the plea has been entered, such as those made at sentencing. Therefore, because the defendant did not move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment based on his postplea statements, his challenge was unpreserved and not reviewable. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Rios" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of multiple serious offenses, including two counts of first-degree murder, following a shooting in Rochester, New York, that resulted in two deaths and one victim being paralyzed. The investigation linked the defendant to the crime through eyewitness identifications and forensic evidence, such as shell casings and fingerprints on a handgun magazine. After the incident, police located and arrested the defendant at an apartment where he had stayed overnight. A subsequent search of the apartment, conducted with the tenant’s consent, yielded a 9-millimeter handgun hidden in a toilet tank, which was later used as evidence against the defendant.After his conviction in Monroe County, the defendant moved to suppress the handgun, arguing that his arrest was unconstitutional under Payton v. New York because police coerced him to exit the apartment without a warrant, and that the tenant’s consent to search was not voluntary or sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest. The Supreme Court denied suppression, finding no Payton violation, concluding the defendant lacked standing, and determining the consent was voluntary. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, found a Payton violation due to the coercive nature of the arrest but held that suppression was not warranted because the tenant’s consent was voluntary and attenuated from the illegality.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s conclusion that there was a Payton violation, based on overwhelming police force and coercion. The Court clarified that both the Fourth Amendment and New York Constitution prohibit such constructive entries. However, it found that the Appellate Division applied the wrong legal standard to assess voluntariness of the tenant’s consent, confusing voluntariness with attenuation. The Court of Appeals remitted the case for the Appellate Division to apply the correct standard regarding the handgun as to count nine, while holding any error was harmless on the remaining counts. The order was thus modified and otherwise affirmed. View "People v Shaw" on Justia Law

On a December morning in 2008, a house fire in Green Cove Springs, Florida, led to the discovery of Maria Ruiz’s burned and bloodied body. The home had recently been occupied by Leo Louis Kaczmar III, his family members, and Ruiz. Investigators found gasoline was used to start the fire. Kaczmar arrived at the scene, presenting a gas receipt and claiming he had been fishing, but admitted being alone with Ruiz in the hours before the fire. Post-indictment, Kaczmar discussed his case with fellow inmate William Filancia, who later worked with law enforcement. Undercover Detective Humphrey posed as "Carlos" to elicit incriminating statements from Kaczmar.At trial in the Circuit Court, the State presented extensive evidence, including witness testimony, video showing Kaczmar purchasing gasoline before the fire, and DNA evidence linking Ruiz’s blood to Kaczmar’s sock. Kaczmar’s defense called one witness regarding his truck’s search. The jury convicted Kaczmar of murder, arson, and attempted sexual battery, recommending death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence due to insufficient proof on aggravating factors, remanding for a new penalty phase. At resentencing, the jury unanimously recommended death, and the court imposed it. This was affirmed on appeal, with a rehearing denied.Kaczmar then sought postconviction relief in the circuit court, alleging ineffective counsel and various due process violations. The circuit court vacated his death sentence based on counsel’s failure to object to the judge’s mention of a prior death sentence, but denied all other claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the grant of penalty-phase relief, finding no prejudice from the judge’s statement, and affirmed denial of all other claims. Kaczmar’s habeas petition was also denied. The Court ordered reinstatement of his death sentence. View "State of Florida v. Kaczmar" on Justia Law

In January 2019, a shooting occurred at a gas station in Helena-West Helena, Arkansas, resulting in the death of Casey Grant and serious injury to Raymond Clark. Security footage captured the incident, and multiple witnesses, including law enforcement officers familiar with the accused, Vann Bragg, identified him as one of the shooters. Testimony from Bragg’s co-defendant, Robinson, corroborated Bragg’s involvement, as did statements from the surviving victim. Bragg was convicted by a Phillips County jury of first-degree murder and first-degree battery in June 2021.After his conviction, Bragg’s direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas was unsuccessful, and the court also affirmed the denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Bragg then filed a timely Rule 37 petition in the Phillips County Circuit Court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failures to challenge witness identifications, introduce impeachment evidence, present an exculpatory affidavit, call his brother as a witness, and investigate or present mitigation evidence at sentencing. The circuit court held a hearing, considered testimony from multiple witnesses, and subsequently denied Bragg’s petition in a detailed order, finding that none of his claims established deficient performance or prejudice as required under Strickland v. Washington.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 37 petition for clear error. The court held that Bragg failed to demonstrate either deficient performance by his trial counsel or resulting prejudice under the Strickland standard on any of his claims. The court also found no cumulative error, as no individual errors were established. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Bragg’s Rule 37 petition. View "BRAGG v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In July 2011, Roschell Lamb reported to police that she had been raped by a stranger who dragged her into a shed and assaulted her. The police investigation initially yielded no suspects, and the case went dormant until 2018, when Roy Nichols was identified as a suspect through DNA evidence. After locating Lamb in 2023, the State charged Nichols with rape. Nichols claims the encounter was consensual and seeks to introduce evidence that he and Lamb had a prior sexual relationship, specifically alleging they had sex weeks before the incident.The Craighead County Circuit Court held an in camera hearing regarding Nichols’s motion to introduce evidence of the alleged prior sexual encounter. Nichols testified about the supposed prior relationship, and his mother and sister claimed Lamb had visited their home looking for Nichols around the time of the alleged rape. The circuit court found Nichols’s testimony about prior consensual sexual conduct probative of consent and allowed him to testify about it and cross-examine Lamb on the topic, but excluded testimony from Nichols’s mother and sister. The State appealed this evidentiary ruling.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It concluded the circuit court erred because Nichols’s claim was uncorroborated, only marginally probative, and highly prejudicial. The Court held that Arkansas’s rape-shield statute generally prohibits introduction of evidence of prior sexual conduct unless it is acutely probative and corroborated. The Court also found that Nichols’s Confrontation Clause argument was unavailing, as he could challenge Lamb’s credibility through other means. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court’s ruling and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. NICHOLS" on Justia Law

Russell Amboree was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, which are Class D felonies under Kentucky law, and a Class B misdemeanor for marijuana possession. The jury recommended that Amboree receive the maximum three-year penalty for each possession conviction, to be served consecutively for a total of six years, and forty-five days for marijuana possession to be served concurrently. At sentencing, Amboree objected, arguing that a six-year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for these offenses, but the Henderson Circuit Court imposed the consecutive sentences as recommended.Amboree appealed, contending that the sentence violated the statutory maximum. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the relevant statutes and cases, including Eldridge v. Commonwealth, and found that KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) prohibits any application of KRS Chapter 532 that would increase the term of incarceration for possession convictions beyond three years. The Court of Appeals vacated Amboree’s six-year sentence, ruling that consecutive sentences for multiple convictions under this statute cannot exceed three years in total.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review to resolve whether consecutive sentences for Class D possession offenses could exceed three years. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) unambiguously limits the maximum term of incarceration for first-degree possession convictions to three years, regardless of any provision in KRS Chapter 532, including those authorizing consecutive sentences. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate Amboree’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that aggregate consecutive sentences for these offenses cannot exceed three years. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. AMBOREE" on Justia Law

Two men were killed in Louisville, Kentucky, after being shot near an intersection. Investigators received eyewitness accounts and surveillance footage identifying a green Chevrolet Tahoe with unique features as the vehicle involved. Further investigation linked Edgar Hernandez to the vehicle, including corroborating cell phone data placing him near the scene and statements he made to his ex-girlfriend implicating himself in the shootings. Police observed Hernandez in possession of a handgun and driving the Tahoe. Hernandez was arrested outside his home without a warrant, searched, and a gun was found on his person. He was then interviewed at the police station, where he was advised of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver, and confessed to the murders. He was indicted for two counts of murder and tampering with physical evidence.The Jefferson Circuit Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Hernandez’s motion to suppress his confession and evidence obtained after his arrest. He argued that the arrest was unlawful due to lack of probable cause and that his confession was involuntary. The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding the arrest was supported by probable cause, the search incident to arrest was proper, Hernandez had been adequately informed of his rights, and his confession was not coerced. Hernandez entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The trial court sentenced him to a total of twenty-five years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and considered legal questions de novo. The Court held that the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause, the search incident to arrest was lawful, and Hernandez validly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court found no evidence of coercion or police misconduct that would taint his confession. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court. View "HERNANDEZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A vehicle driven by the defendant struck a pedestrian, causing serious injuries. The defendant was indicted for assault, wanton endangerment, and driving under the influence. A public defender, Amy Miller, was appointed as counsel. At a bond hearing, Miller made detailed statements about the defendant’s medical conditions and medications, suggesting the accident resulted from an acute medical emergency. Later, the Commonwealth argued Miller’s statements conflicted with disclosures by the defense’s medical expert, raising the possibility that Miller might be called as a witness at trial, thereby creating a conflict under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(3.7)(a).After extensive proceedings, the Kenton Circuit Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to disqualify Miller, reasoning that her statements would likely be introduced for impeachment and that she could become a necessary witness. The court found that continuing with Miller as counsel could prejudice the defendant and noted that substitute counsel lacked Miller’s familiarity with the case. The defendant petitioned the Kentucky Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the disqualification order, arguing she lacked an adequate remedy by appeal and would suffer irreparable injury. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that an appeal after conviction would be an adequate remedy.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under the circumstances, a later appeal would not be an adequate remedy and the defendant would suffer great and irreparable injury if deprived of her chosen counsel at such a late stage. The Court found the trial court’s disqualification order was speculative and unsupported by sufficient findings that Miller would be a necessary witness at trial. The Supreme Court ordered issuance of the requested writ of prohibition, barring enforcement of the disqualification order. View "SCHULKERS V. LAPE" on Justia Law