Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Ronald Deshunn Lewis was charged with two counts of assault and alleged probation violations. He was found mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (Department), which was authorized to administer antipsychotic medication involuntarily. Lewis appealed, arguing that his due process and equal protection rights were violated because the trial court issued the involuntary medication order without an evidentiary hearing.The Contra Costa County District Attorney initially charged Lewis with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings due to doubts about his mental competence and appointed psychologists to evaluate him. Based on their reports, the court found him incompetent and committed him to the Department. After a month, the Department certified that Lewis had regained competence, and he pled no contest to the assault charge, receiving probation. However, a subsequent probation violation led to new charges and another suspension of proceedings due to doubts about his competence. A psychologist's report again found him incompetent, and the court committed him to the Department, authorizing involuntary medication.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370(a)(2)(B) of the Penal Code does not require an evidentiary hearing before authorizing involuntary medication. The court found that the trial court's procedures, which included considering written reports from mental health experts and allowing for argument by counsel, provided sufficient due process. The court also held that the different procedural requirements for inmates and other civil committees did not violate equal protection, as there were rational bases for the distinctions. The court affirmed the trial court's order authorizing involuntary medication. View "P. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In the early morning of August 11, 2021, Officer Robert Savage of the Providence Police Department responded to a 911 call at a home on Canton Street, where he encountered gunfire from Luis Roman, who was heavily intoxicated and fired numerous shots from an AR-15 rifle at the officer's vehicle. The call was made by Roman's girlfriend, Stephanie Perez, after Roman physically assaulted her. Roman fled but was later arrested at his mother's house. He was indicted on ten charges, including assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence.Roman pled guilty to eight of the ten charges, acknowledging his status as a habitual offender and probation violator. The Superior Court sentenced him to seventy years, with thirty years to serve, including ten nonparolable years. Roman filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35, arguing that the sentencing justice did not adequately consider his diminished capacity and other mitigating factors. The motion was denied, with the court noting Roman's waiver of his right to file such a motion due to his guilty plea and finding the sentence appropriate given the circumstances.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order. The court held that the sentencing justice acted within his discretion, considering Roman's violent criminal history and the severity of his actions. The court found no due process violation in the sentencing justice's consideration of Roman's alleged statement about preferring a shootout with police over returning to prison. The sentence was deemed justified and not grossly disparate from other sentences for similar offenses. View "State v. Roman" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which criminalizes unlawfully reentering the United States after a prior removal. They argued that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by discriminating against Mexican and other Latin American immigrants. Their theory was that the statute’s predecessor, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was enacted with discriminatory intent, and that § 1326, first codified in 1952 and amended several times thereafter, perpetuates that taint.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss their indictments. The court assumed without deciding that the Arlington Heights framework applied but concluded that the defendants had failed to establish a discriminatory purpose behind § 1326’s enactment. The court also concluded that the statute easily satisfied rational-basis review. The defendants then entered conditional guilty pleas or proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, reserving their rights to appeal the constitutional issue. The District Court sentenced the defendants to varying terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court’s decision. The court found no clear error in the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 was enacted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The court noted that the defendants’ evidence, including historical context, statements by public officials, and statistical disparities, was insufficient to establish that the 1952 Congress acted with discriminatory intent. The court also emphasized that laws do not carry forward “taint” through reenactment unless the later legislature acted with the same constitutionally impermissible purpose. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "USA v. Ferretiz-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendants Falandis Russell and Terrance Williams committed a series of armed commercial robberies in Chicago over nearly a year and a half. They were indicted for conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, with Russell facing eleven additional counts and Williams six counts of obstruction of commerce by robbery. Russell's counsel requested a forensic psychologist to assess his cognitive capacity, leading to a diagnosis of intellectual disability and ADHD. A competency examination was conducted, and Dr. Jajko found Russell unfit for trial. However, further evaluations by Dr. Muhkin and Dr. Dinwiddie concluded that Russell was competent, suggesting he was malingering.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a competency hearing and found Russell competent to stand trial. Both defendants pleaded guilty, with Russell reserving the right to challenge the competency determination. Russell was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment and 60 months of supervised release, while Williams received 114 months of imprisonment. Williams objected to a supervised release condition requiring him to notify another person if his probation officer determined he posed a risk, but the court imposed it with amendments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's competency determination for Russell, finding no clear error in the reliance on the evaluations by Drs. Muhkin and Dinwiddie. The court also found no procedural error in Russell's sentencing, noting that the district court adequately considered his cognitive impairments. However, the court vacated the supervised release condition imposed on Williams, agreeing that certain terms were vague, and remanded for further proceedings to reconsider the necessity and scope of the condition. View "USA v Williams" on Justia Law

On March 15, 2022, law enforcement responded to a drug overdose in Rapid City, South Dakota, where they found K.S. conscious but sluggish after receiving Narcan. Officers suspected two individuals, including a woman with purple hair, of distributing fentanyl to K.S. Surveillance at a hotel led to a traffic stop of a red Ford Fiesta, where officers found Anthony Ward in the backseat. Ward was arrested for false impersonation after providing false names. A search of the vehicle revealed drugs, a stolen gun, and cash. Ward was charged with distribution of a controlled substance resulting in serious bodily injury and conspiracy to distribute fentanyl.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Ward's motions to suppress evidence from the traffic stop and to dismiss the indictment for failure to preserve evidence. After a five-day trial, the jury convicted Ward on both counts, and the court imposed concurrent 360-month sentences. Ward appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court's denial of Ward's motions to suppress and dismiss, finding no unreasonable extension of the traffic stop and no bad faith in the handling of evidence. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Ward's convictions. The court concluded that the evidence showed Ward distributed fentanyl that caused K.S.'s serious bodily injury and that Ward was involved in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

A Missouri state trooper stopped the defendant for minor traffic violations, during which the defendant disclosed his status as a registered sex offender. The trooper invited the defendant into his patrol car while checking his license and registration. During this time, the trooper learned that the defendant had not registered any social media accounts as required by Missouri law. The trooper then asked for and received consent to search the defendant’s vehicle. While searching, the trooper picked up the defendant’s cell phone, which illuminated to reveal social media app icons. The trooper questioned the defendant about the phone and, after repeated requests, obtained the defendant’s verbal consent to search the phone. The search revealed images suspected to be child pornography, leading to the defendant’s arrest. After being read his Miranda rights, the defendant made further incriminating statements. A subsequent warrant-based search of the phone uncovered additional illegal material.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence from the cell phone and his statements to law enforcement, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial, proceeded to a bench trial, and was convicted of receiving child pornography.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the trooper’s brief questioning and request for consent did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. The court found that moving the cell phone during a consensual vehicle search did not constitute an unlawful search or seizure, and that the defendant voluntarily consented to the phone search. The court also determined that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes during pre-arrest questioning, so suppression of his statements was not warranted. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Puckett" on Justia Law

The case involves Kirk Ardell Sjodin Jr., who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Sjodin had a prior felony conviction in California for assault with a firearm and unlawful firearm possession, for which he served over a year in prison. In 2022, he was found in possession of a firearm in Utah, leading to the federal charge. Sjodin argued that he believed his civil rights, including the right to possess firearms, had been restored, based on his interactions with the legal system in Oklahoma.The United States District Court for the District of Utah found Sjodin guilty. The court noted that Sjodin did not present any evidence at trial to support his claim that he believed his rights had been restored. The court also found that the documents from his Oklahoma case did not indicate any restoration of his civil rights or expungement of his felony conviction. Consequently, the court concluded that the government had met its burden of proving that Sjodin knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Sjodin’s conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Sjodin knew of his prohibited status. The court noted that Sjodin’s stipulations and the records of his prior felony conviction were sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court found that the district court erred in classifying Sjodin’s California assault conviction as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, as the California statute allows for convictions with a mens rea less than recklessness. The court remanded the case for resentencing without the crime of violence enhancement. View "United States v. Sjodin" on Justia Law

William Hines was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receipt and possession of child pornography found on his cellphone and laptop. Hines had pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his cellphone. Hines argued that his girlfriend, K.S., acted as an agent of the police when she used his password to unlock his cellphone, observed child pornography, and showed the images to a police officer, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights.The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent when she unlocked the phone and showed the images to the police officer. The court concluded that the private search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the subsequent search warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the burden lies with the defendant to show that a private search constituted governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's determination that Hines failed to meet this burden. The court concluded that K.S. acted independently and not as a government agent, and thus, the private search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the evidence obtained from the search warrant was admissible. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

Aarin Clinkscale was indicted in 2014 for his involvement in an armed robbery that resulted in two deaths. He pled guilty to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter. In 2016, the trial court sentenced him to a total of 14 years in prison, including a mandatory three-year term for the firearm specification. Clinkscale received 762 days of jail-time credit for time served prior to sentencing.Clinkscale filed his first motion for judicial release in June 2020, which the trial court denied, stating he would be eligible for release in October 2022. He filed a second motion for judicial release in October 2022. The State objected, arguing that Clinkscale was not eligible until November 2024, as he needed to serve the mandatory term and then wait five years. The trial court granted Clinkscale’s motion, and the State appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Clinkscale’s jail-time credit shortened the waiting period for judicial release.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the Tenth District’s conclusion. The court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the required five-year waiting period following the expiration of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d). The court emphasized that the five-year waiting period is fixed and begins only after the mandatory term is completed. Consequently, Clinkscale’s motion for judicial release was premature. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case for consideration of Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. View "State v. Clinkscale" on Justia Law

The case involves the execution of an anticipatory search warrant that led to the seizure of cocaine and U.S. currency from Victor Manuel Mercedes' apartment. The warrant was contingent on a future triggering event, which did not occur. The issue is whether the police could still search the apartment based on other information in the warrant affidavit that independently established probable cause.In the Superior Court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on drug trafficking charges. A codefendant's motion to suppress evidence from a related search was granted, and the defendant joined this motion. The judge allowed the motion, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void because the triggering event did not occur. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the search was valid based on probable cause from other information in the affidavit.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, police cannot execute an anticipatory search warrant without the occurrence of the specified triggering event or its equivalent. The court emphasized that the triggering event must be clear and narrowly defined to prevent police from exercising unfettered discretion. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void without the triggering event, and no valid exception to the warrant requirement was established. The defendant's cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mercedes" on Justia Law